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Since the 1980s, many Western European countries have witnessed the rise of the radical right. Much 
has been written on the ideology of these parties, the tactics they adopt, the sorts of people that vote 
for them, and the reasons behind their electoral success. The growing electoral success of these 
parties represents a serious electoral challenge to major political parties or ‘principal parties’ and yet 
comparatively little has been written on how principal parties respond to the radical right and even 
less so on the impact that this has on the electoral success of radical right parties. Indeed, what has 
been written tends to focus on either a small number of parties or a particular party family.  
What is thus far lacking is a comprehensive comparative account of how principal parties have 
responded to the radical right and to what extent these strategic responses have been successful. This 
thesis seeks to address this gap by adopting a multi-method approach that combines cross-case 
comparative analysis with qualitative case studies in order to identify the various strategies that 
principal parties employ and the degree of success, if any, they have. By building on the existing 
literature, it develops an enhanced model of party competition which is subsequently tested in an 
mvQCA analysis and two in-depth, qualitative case studies: France and Sweden. In doing so, this thesis 
will identify what strategies principal parties adopt, how successful they are, and whether or not a 
‘silver bullet’ exists that can be employed against the radical right.  
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1.1. The Subject to be Explored 
Throughout most of Western Europe, established political parties have had to come to grips with the 
widespread upsurge of radical right competitors, which have eschewed traditional, comprehensive 
policy platforms in favour of more extreme positions on a restricted set of political issues (Meguid 
2005, 2008). In response to these challengers and to maintain their electoral advantage and, of course, 
their position within government, established political parties have employed a wide array of 
strategies. These include ignoring the new rivals, or trying to isolate them, or, by contrast, 
collaborating with them or attempting to steal away core personnel. They also involve taking opposing 
stances on the issues that the radical right competitors promote, or dismissing them, or even 
accommodating them.  
Despite the growing presence of radical right parties throughout Western Europe, and despite the 
existence of work that focuses on specific parties (Copsey 2005; Art 2007; Dahlström and Sundell 2012; 
Heinze 2018) or specific strategies (Downs 2001, 2012; Meguid 2005, 2008; van Spanje and van der 
Brug 2008; van Spanje 2010; van Spanje and de Graaf 2018; Hjorth and Larsen 2020; Spoon and Klüver 
2020; Abou-Chadi et al. 2021), very few studies have actually considered the efficacy of particular 
party strategies. That is, few studies have sought to understand the effects and consequences of 
established party strategies on the radical right. Indeed, to date, Bonnie Meguid’s (2005, 2008) 
seminal contributions to the study of competition between unequals – between established political 
parties and smaller, niche parties, of which the radical right is a part – remains the most substantive 
response to the efficacy of party strategies. Through her statistical analysis and case studies, Meguid 
argued that accommodative strategies were by far and away the most effective way for established 
parties to combat the radical right as such strategies would lead to a reduction in the vote share of 
the radical right. Meguid aside, there is a distinct lack of research on the efficacy of established party 
2 | P a g e  
 
strategies despite the relatively recently call for such work by Bale et al. (2010: 423; see also Schain 
2006), who said that ‘which strategy (or, more likely, combination of strategies) works best is surely a 
subject for further research’. 
In light of these gaps, the purpose of this thesis, then, is to not only identify which strategies 
established parties are employing in their fight against the radical right, but to also understand how 
effective these strategies have been in reducing the vote share of the radical right. As such, the thesis 
is concerned with three overarching questions. Firstly, what strategies have principal parties adopted 
against radical right competitors? Secondly, how successful (or unsuccessful) have these strategies 
actually been in combating the radical right? And thirdly, is there a ‘silver bullet’ or ‘magic formula’ 
that established parties can employ against the radical right?  
In order to answer these three questions, this thesis will develop and then test an expanded model of 
competition. This new model takes into account and ultimately brings together a number of existing 
approaches to party competition, but it also augments existing models by including a new dimension 
of competition based on reputation. The model is tested through a two-step analytical approach. First 
an extensive phase explores the strategies of 38 established parties in 14 West European political 
systems through the use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Then, an intensive phase focuses 
on two carefully chosen case studies – France and Sweden – and engages in an in-depth exploration 
of what strategies the established parties have chosen, why they have chosen them, and what the 
consequences of these choices have been. The adoption of a multi-method approach is not only 
recommended as a standard of good practice among QCA practitioners (Schneider and Wagemann 
2010) but QCA allows for the identification of different combinations of strategies employed by 
established parties and the consequences that these different combinations have for the vote share 
of the radical right, while the in-depth case studies although for the contextualisation of party 
strategies.  
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1.2. The Contribution of the Thesis 
The thesis makes a number of important contributions. Firstly, its chief conclusion is that there is no 
silver bullet or magic formula for established parties to use against the radical right. That is, there are 
no strategies that are routinely successful in curtailing the radical right. Rather, the same strategies 
employed in different countries or in the same country but at different times, can produce widely 
different results. As such then, as Gruber and Bale (2014: 237) have argued, the radical right is ‘not so 
much a problem to be solved [by established political parties] as a situation to be managed’. 
This overall conclusion is explained by a range of factors, and in identifying why a silver bullet does 
not exist, the thesis makes a number of additional contributions. Firstly, it demonstrates the 
importance of context on party strategies. Here, context is understood as those factors that impact 
upon the efficacy of party strategies, such as the issue agenda, voter attitudes to immigration and 
other policy areas, how trusting voters are of politicians and political parties, levels of voter 
satisfaction in democracy, and the spatial positioning of other parties. This context shapes what 
strategies are employed by established parties but also the extent to which these strategies are 
successful (or unsuccessful) in combating the radical right.  
Secondly, it confirms other studies (e.g., Betz 1998; Carter 2005; Mudde 2007; Luther 2011; van Kessel 
2015) in showing the importance of radical right agency and organisation on the types and efficacy of 
strategies that established parties employ. Indeed, rather than radical right parties being seen as mere 
pawns in a game between established political parties, as per Meguid (2005, 2008), this thesis 
considers radical right parties to be key players in their own right, capable of navigating the political 
game to their own advantage. Radical right parties are, then, to a large extent, ‘masters of their own 
success’ (Carter 2005: 13).  
The third contribution of the thesis is that it draws our attention to strategies that have so far been 
overlooked in the literature in the field. The thesis theoretically argues and empirically demonstrates 
that the reputation of political parties is an important feature of party competition. Reputations allow 
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parties to more effectively trespass on the issue territory of other parties, to convincingly sell 
particular policy positions, and to more easily reach voters. Reputations are therefore valuable 
investments that political parties protect and procure and can therefore be employed to enhance the 
effectiveness of established party strategies. More than this, however, reputational strategies can be 
employed by political parties to either enhance or undermine the reputations of other parties. In 
short, parties can manipulate their own reputation and the reputation of other parties; reputations 
are therefore a dimension of competition of their own. Importantly, though, reputations are dynamic 
features of party competition that do not always play out in favour of established political parties. 
Through manipulation and the use of reputational strategies, reputations can improve and weaken 
over time. This acknowledgement of the importance of reputation in party competition challenges 
Meguid’s (2005, 2008) assumption that established political parties can rely on some supposed 
inherent reputational advantage over their radical right counterparts. This is not the case and radical 
right parties can, through careful manipulation and the use of reputational strategies, achieve stronger 
and more positive reputation than their established party counterparts.  
 
1.3. The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured in nine chapters. The next chapter – Chapter 2 – is devoted to exploring what 
party competition is, how it plays out, and how it can be modelled. The chapter begins by discussing 
the concepts of issues and dimensions, before engaging in an extensive literature review of the 
different approaches to party competition that have emerged and developed over the years, and it 
pays particular attention to Meguid’s (2005, 2008) influential and widely applied Position, Saliency, 
and Ownership (PSO) model, and to studies that have subsequently built on Meguid’s work. The 
chapter then considers the concept of reputation, and explains how reputation can improve our 
understanding of party competition. Having done this, the chapter then develops and presents an 
augmented model of party competition, which brings together the strategic approaches identified in 
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previous studies and also includes a new reputation dimension of competition. This new model 
presents an arsenal of strategies that established political parties can employ against a radical right 
challenger.  
Which strategies the established parties choose to adopt, and how successful these strategies prove 
to be, will of course be affected by a range of factors. Chapter 3 explores these factors in some depth. 
It considers whether a party’s origin or type might affect its choice of strategy, whether the internal 
balance of power within parties shapes which strategies are adopted, and whether organisations that 
are closely linked to parties exert any influence on strategy choice. The chapter also considers the 
goals that parties pursue and how these goals may impact on what strategies are pursued. In addition 
to these factors, which can be considered endogenous to the established parties, other factors are 
also likely to influence what strategies are chosen, and how successful they are. Of particular 
importance is the possible impact of the radical right competitors themselves, as well as the 
institutional rules that govern the game of competition. Thus, this chapter also examines whether and 
how the goals and organisation of the radical right parties might affect what strategies the established 
parties choose, and how these strategies work out, and it explores how the institutional environment 
within which party competition takes place may affect what strategies are adopted, and how effective 
these turn out to be.  
Chapter 4 defines the key concepts with which the thesis is concerned, and identifies the parties that 
are to be investigated. It engages in a review of the different terms that have been used to describe 
important political parties – such as mainstream, establishment, and moderate – and it discusses what 
each of these mean. It then introduces the concept of the principal party, and explains and justifies 
why this concept is favoured over others. The chapter then also defines the concept of the radical 
right. On the basis of these definitions, the chapter closes by identifying the players of the game: it 
identifies 37 principal parties and 19 radical right parties in the 14 political systems under 
investigation.  
6 | P a g e  
 
In a last step before the analysis begins, Chapter 5 sets out the thesis’ research design and methods. 
The chapter begins with an introduction to set-theoretic methods and then offers a discussion of 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) specifically. This includes outlining the advantages of 
employing QCA in this type of research, and the benefits of using multi-value QCA (mvQCA) in 
particular. The chapter then explains how the mvQCA analysis will be carried out. The chapter then 
sets out the second part of the thesis’ design, namely its case study design that allows for intensive 
analysis. It highlights the benefits of undertaking case study analysis following QCA analysis, and it 
then explains the process used for selecting the cases. Finally, it outlines the contextual conditions 
found in each of the cases that are most likely to be pertinent in shaping what strategies principal 
parties choose to adopt, and how successful these strategies end up being.  
Chapter 6 engages in the mvQCA analysis. It starts by explaining how each of the different strategies 
available to the principal parties is operationalised, and it provides information on the data used in 
the mvQCA analysis. Then, the chapter analyses the strategies adopted by a single principal party and 
the effect of these strategies on the vote share of the radical right. This process is then repeated, but 
with a focus on the strategies adopted by two principal parties and their impact on the radical right 
vote share.  
As noted above, one of the main contributions of this thesis is the finding – uncovered from the 
mvQCA analysis – that there is no silver bullet. In other words, there are no strategies that are 
consistently successful in curbing the radical right party vote, and instead the same strategies 
employed in different countries or at different times can have very different consequences. In light of 
this, and so as to explore in more detail why certain strategies are adopted and others are not, and 
why different strategies succeed or fail, Chapters 7 and 8 of the thesis engage in in-depth analysis of 
two cases, namely France and Sweden. Each chapter begins with an overview of each country’s 
electoral and party system, and a discussion of the radical right challengers, outlining the origins of 
the National Front and Sweden Democrats, their development and their ideologies. This scene-setting 
7 | P a g e  
 
helps to establish the context in which the respective principal parties are competing. After this, the 
two chapters present a summary of the elections in each country in the time period under 
investigation, highlighting what issues were salient in the various campaigns, how the different parties 
dealt with them, and essentially, how competition played out. From this, the chapters then offer a 
review of the strategies that the principal parties in each country have adopted vis-à-vis their radical 
right competitors. Then the two chapters turn their attention to the importance of contextual factors, 
and consider which issues have been particularly salient in the two countries, where voters position 
themselves on the issues that the radical right parties promote, how satisfied voters are with the 
principal parties and how much they trust them and their leaders, as well as the reputations of parties 
and candidates. These factors are explored as they are all likely to affect what strategies the principal 
parties have chosen to pursue and how effective their strategies have been. 
The thesis closes with a conclusion – set out in Chapter 9 – that summarises its main empirical findings 
and highlights its contributions. This chapter also proposes avenues for future research into party 
competition between unequals, and party strategies.  
This introductory chapter has set out the questions that this thesis seeks to ask and explore, and has 
explained why these questions are important ones to pose. It has also outlined how the thesis 
proposes to go about addressing these questions, and how the thesis will be structured. Having done 
all this, the next chapter turns to the subject to be investigated. It begins by considering what issues 
and dimensions are, and then considers what party competition is, how it is played out, and how it 
can be modelled.  
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2. From Toolkit to Arsenal: The Expansion of Party Competition Strategies 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The academic literature on party competition is significant, and the purpose of this chapter is to 
critically review it so as to then propose a framework of analysis for this thesis. To do this, the chapter 
begins by considering some of the core concepts in party competition, namely ‘issues’ and 
‘dimensions’, so as to establish a clear understanding as to what these terms actually mean. Then it 
proceeds by reviewing the classical spatial models of Hotelling and Downs, and by considering the 
criticisms of these, and adjustments such as directional spatial models. Next, the chapter turns to the 
saliency and issue ownership literatures, and to the Position, Saliency, and Ownership (PSO) 
framework put forward by Bonnie Meguid (2005, 2008), and similar strategic approaches advanced 
by other scholars. It delves deeper into this strain of the literature through its exploration of 
dimensionally-oriented strategies. Thereafter, the chapter focuses on the concept of reputation and 
introduces the reputational dimension of competition, which, it is argued, establishes a new and 
dynamic plane of competition for political parties. Toward the end of the chapter, the various issue-, 
dimensionally-, and party-oriented strategies are brought together alongside the new reputational 
dimension in order to create a new model of competition which forms the analytical framework used 
by this thesis. The chapter ends by bringing together the various issue-, dimensionally-, and party-
oriented strategies together with the new reputational dimension in order to make up the analytical 
framework used by this thesis.  
 
2.2. Issues and Dimensions 
The concept of a political issue is employed widely in both academia and the media and yet remains 
surprisingly ambiguous. While the concept has been employed in numerous subfields of political 
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science, there is little agreement concerning its definition and constitution, and little effort has been 
put into actually defining what an issue is (Guinaudeau and Persico 2014). Defining the concept here, 
then, is more a matter of extraction than review.  
In one of the few attempts to define what constitutes an issue Budge (1993: 43) argues that an issue 
is either ‘a point or topic emphasised by only one of the parties’ or ‘a point, topic, or position, whether 
or not stressed by the leaders, important in defining party support among electors or moving support 
between the parties’. This inevitably raises the question of what constitutes a point, topic, or position. 
Does it strictly refer to what are traditionally conceived of as issues (such as immigration or healthcare) 
or does it include personal characteristics such as the likeability of the party leader? The latter is often 
not considered an issue in and of itself (see Hinich and Munger 1994 for contrasting view), but is 
nonetheless important in determining party support among electors or indeed moving support 
between parties. Yet, the inclusion of personal characteristics, likeability, and the determinants of 
party support, possibly stretch the definition of issue so wide as to weaken the overall usefulness of 
the concept.   
Turning to the issue competition (valence, saliency, and ownership) literature, two conceptions of 
‘issue’ can be extracted. Firstly, issues can be conceived of as broad themes, categorisations, or policy 
areas such as welfare, foreign affairs, or healthcare (e.g., Budge and Farlie 1983; Bale et al. 2003; 
Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010). Secondly, issues can be conceived of as specific policy problems 
or goals such as the invasion of Iraq, preventative measures on crime, and measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., Holian 2004; Green and Hobolt 2008; Carter et al. 2017).  
The major approaches to issue competition, as exemplified by the Comparative Manifesto Project and 
Comparative Agendas Project, locate political parties’ positions on issues in line with the broad themes 
conceived above (Guinaudeau and Persico 2014). This approach has major implications for the 
conclusions drawn from such research. The issue ownership literature argues that political parties 
develop ownership over particular issues and will avoid those issues that their opponents own 
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(Petrocik 1996). The implication is that political parties will abandon and ignore whole swathes of 
issues instead of competing on them (Carmines 1991; Riker 1993).  
The reality, of course, is that the majority of political issues are composed of a variety of ‘sub-issues’ 
that open up alternative avenues on which political parties can compete. Political parties therefore 
seek to reframe these broad thematic issues by reference to ‘sub-issues’ that are more favourable to 
them (Sides 2006). The effect, then, is to reframe the broad thematic issue in a manner that is 
congruent with the party’s existing ideology, goals, and programmatic profile. For example, in the 
1990s, the Democratic Party (United States), and in particular Bill Clinton, sought to challenge the 
Republican Party’s ownership of the broad thematic issue of crime (Holian 2004). Clinton first 
neutralised the difference in policy between the Democrats and Republicans by accepting the 
Republican position on capital punishment before advocating greater crime prevention measures such 
as increasing the number of police officers patrolling the streets. This permitted the Democratic Party 
to demonstrate concern over the broad thematic issue of crime but in a manner congruent with its 
programmatic profile, ideology, and goals (Holian 2004). A focus on less broad, ‘sub-issues’ might 
therefore reveal considerably less issue overlap or contestation than might have been the case with a 
broader, thematic conception of issue (Guinaudeau and Persico 2014).   
The definition of issue has implications for the categorisation of issues as either valence or positional 
issues. Consider, again, the issue of crime: everyone bar the mafia has a shared interest in reducing 
crime and therefore crime is often considered a valence issue. By contrast, can the increase in stop 
and search, the imposition of the death penalty, the increase in officers on the beat, or other ‘sub 
issues’ of crime, be categorised as valence issues? Each of these issues suffers from considerable 
contestation and controversy, and therefore, cannot be considered valence issues; rather, they are 
considered ‘positional issues’.   
Distinguishing between themes and issues is therefore crucial. In an attempt to do so, Guinaudeau 
and Persico (2014: 316) define issues as the following: ‘a question of public policy, as demarcated, 
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defined, and specified by political actors, possibly giving rise to one or several positions’. This inductive 
approach to policy issues – in contrast to the deductive approaches seen in Budge and Farlie 1983, 
among others – has the benefit of permitting political actors to define what constitutes an issue. This 
is important when considering many of the non-positional strategies considered in this thesis such as 
Rovny’s (2012) blurring strategy or the reframing of various issues (Jacoby 2000; Elias et al. 2015). That 
being said, it should be acknowledged that the major datasets (see the Comparative Manifesto 
Project) and indeed major party competition projects and studies regularly conflate theme and issue.  
By contrast to issues, the defining of dimensions is somewhat more complicated inasmuch as the 
precise constitution of dimensions can change across time and space. At its core, however, a 
dimension is merely the simplification of issue space; the clustering of issues by various political actors 
into single bundles (Robertson 1978; Benoit and Laver 2006). For example, the left-right dimension – 
the most well known and most widely applied dimension – can be conceived of as a bundling of various 
economic issues whose poles contrast a more redistributive with a market-oriented economic 
structure (de Vries and Marks 2012). Dimensions, therefore, depend upon a political actor’s 
perception of the political space and might not be fixed and/or shared by all political actors (Budge 
1993). To further complicate matters, the content of a given dimension might change over time due 
to natural evolutionary processes in the political space: the introduction of new issues by so-called 
‘issue entrepreneurs’ (de Vries and Hobolt 2012), the death of old issues, the reframing of existing 
issues, and the linking of one issue to another. The very nature of the political space is therefore fluid. 
What is more, it can vary from country to country. The issues and dimensions that are important in 
one country may not hold importance in another, or the issues that constitute a dimension in one 
country may not do so in another.   
That being said, the literature has identified a number of important dimensions of political 
competition that hold across both time and space: an economic left-right dimension (Robertson 1978; 
Kitschelt 1994; Hooghe and Marks 1999, 2001; Marks et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2006); a cultural or social 
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dimension often conceptualised as a distance between liberalism and authoritarianism (Kitschelt 
1994; Marks et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2006); a European integration dimension (Hooghe and Marks 
1999, 2001 – although Marks & Steenbergen 2002 argue that the European dimension can be fully 
integrated into the traditional left-right dimension); and even a territorial dimension based on support 
or opposition towards decentralisation (Basile 2015; Elias et al. 2015; Rovny 2015). In fact, Budge et 
al. (1987) have identified over twenty potential dimensions of political competition.  
In practice, however, much of this political contestation can be reduced to two-dimensions: an 
economic and a social or cultural dimension (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003; 
Spies and Franzman 2011). Indeed, Poole and Rosenthal (1997: 19) argue that ‘virtually no substantive 
concern is observed by going beyond two dimensions’. Therefore, while one could explore potentially 
infinite dimensions, there is little to be gained from doing so unless there are case specific factors that 
warrant the inclusion of a multidimensional approach – such as religious or linguistic cleavages in 
countries such as Israel or Belgium (Lijphart 1979). In fact, the dimensionality of the political space is 
best conceived of as a heuristic tool through which political actors greatly simplify the political space, 
and which allows for analysis that might otherwise be overwhelming in complexity (Budge et al. 2001; 
Bakker et al. 2012). For voters, this simplification makes engagement with politics a simpler process – 
it is far easier to understand politics by reference to left-right positioning than a detailed 
understanding of potentially-infinite political space – while for political parties, the reduction of 
information costs aids in the mobilisation of both activists and voters (Bakker et al. 2012). To that end, 
then, the number of dimensions chosen is often reflective of the needs of the researcher rather than 
an attempt to completely accurately reflect the political space (Budge et al. 2001). Indeed, some have 
argued that a completely accurate representation is impossible and that the best that can be strived 
for is a sufficiently accurate representation (Budge 1994) which, as outlined above, is achieved 
through a two-dimensional approach. 
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Having discussed these core concepts of issues and dimensions, the chapter now moves to exploring 
the substantial literature on party competition. It begins by focusing on the early literature and the 
classical spatial models of voting behaviour through to the more recently presented strategic 
approaches. 
 
2.3. Hotelling, Downs, and the Classic Spatial Model of Voting Behaviour 
The origins of the classic spatial model of voting behaviour can be traced back to Hotelling (1929). 
Hotelling was primarily seeking to explain the spatial positioning of businesses within a given location 
and subsequently argued that the logic of his theory could be applied to other theatres of competition, 
including the political arena.  
Suppose, then, a hypothetical Main Street within a hypothetical town. Along this street exists a 
uniform distribution of consumers who are considered to have inelastic demand for the homogenous 
products of two firms (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990). That is to say, there is no 
differentiation between the products offered by the two firms and that each consumer purchases one 
unit of the product per visit in a given time at a given price. Further to this, consumers must also pay 
a given transportation cost reflective of the distance between their home and the firm they frequent.  
No consumer has any preference for either firm except on the grounds of price and transportation 
cost (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990). Your average consumer, therefore, will prefer the firm 
whose store is essentially located at the consumer’s address and therefore reduces transport costs to 
near-zero. By contrast, the average consumer will not consume the product if the utility derived from 
the product is lower than the cost of the transportation required to purchase it. Therefore, the 
consumer’s utility is increased as transportation costs are reduced (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 
1990). Without resorting to incredulity, further assume that a firm’s profit is solely dependent upon 
the number of sales that it makes. Given these established conditions, Hotelling (1929) sought to 
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determine the equilibrium point between two competing firms, that is, where they would situate 
themselves on Main Street.  
To establish basic principles, we can devise two hypothetical scenarios: one in which a single firm 
establishes itself and subsequently anticipates further competition and another where two businesses 
are already established on Main Street but seek to maximise their market share.  
For the first scenario, assume that a business establishes itself, seeks a location on Main Street, and 
anticipates competition from other competitors, where should this business locate itself? Given that 
the first firm is able to predict what a rational second firm would do, and knowing that a second firm 
could theoretically dominate a larger segment of the market if the first firm mislocates itself, the 
rational first firm will locate itself at the median point of the market, that is, centrally located along 
Main Street. In doing so, the first firm guarantees maximum market share. A rational second firm, 
supposing the same, would naturally locate itself in the same location, either next door or across the 
street, and therefore each will share the market equally (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990).  
For the second scenario, however, let us imagine a situation wherein two firms have established 
premises on either ends of Main Street. Supposing that both businesses are capable of moving 
locations, have homogenous prices and goods, both businesses can increase their market share, and 
therefore profitability, by shifting towards the centre of Main Street, and thereby capitalise upon 
greater access to consumers who, to recall, seek to reduce transportation costs and are uniformly 
distributed along Main Street (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle and Cohen 1990).  
The conclusion for both scenarios, then, is what has become known as the principle of minimum 
differentiation, the phenomenon that sees competitors bunching up as close as possible to one-
another due to a shared desire to increase market share and therefore profits (Hotelling 1929; Shepsle 
and Cohen 1990). Furthermore, this principle holds that firms will devise and produce goods and 
services that are, for the most part, homogenous, i.e., that the products and services offered by 
different firms will be extremely similar.  
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Hotelling (1929), while primarily occupied by competition between firms, believed in the applicability 
of his theory to other theatres of competition, and held that the general tendencies towards 
centripetal competition existed within the political sphere just as much as the economic sphere, 
arguing:  
 
The competition for votes between the Republican and Democratic parties does not lead 
to a clear drawing of issues, an adoption of two strongly contrasted positions between 
which the voter may choose. Instead, each party strives to make its platform as much like 
the other’s as possible. Any radical departure would lose many votes…. Real differences, 
if they ever exist, fade gradually with time though the issue may be as important as ever 
(Hotelling 1929: 54-55). 
 
Those who have extended Hotelling’s work have done so through the relaxation of one or both of the 
assumptions made in Hotelling’s original work. Smithies (1941), for instance, dispensed with the 
assumption of inelastic demand and argues, by contrast, that demand depends on price. For this 
reason, then, producers will experience pressures both centripetal – movement towards the centre 
to improve sales in the competitive arena – and centrifugal – movement away from the centre to 
improve sales in their respective ‘hinterlands’. Applied to politics, then, Smithies (1941) argues that 
electoral demand is elastic in that a voter who feels both parties are too far from his or her ideological 
position can simply stay away from the polls. With this assumption in mind, Smithies believed that the 
model could explain why Democrats and Republicans were some distance apart in ideological terms.   
While Hotelling (1929) and Smithies (1941) provide an anecdotal observation of how a spatial model 
of competition could be applied to political parties in democratic elections, it was not until Black 
(1948) that this concept was applied in the field of political science. Even then, however, Black (1948) 
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only sought to analyse equilibrium points in committee voting. It was not until Downs’ (1957a, b) An 
Economic Theory of Democracy that a formal spatial model of party competition was developed.  
For Downs, political parties are essentially political entrepreneurs that sell policies to voters in much 
the same way firms sell products to consumers. However, rather than seeking to maximise profits, 
political parties seek to maximise votes (Downs 1957a, b). Contrary to more recent research that 
considers political behaviour with regard to policy-seeking, office-seeking, and vote-seeking objectives 
(Müller and Strøm 1999), Downs maintained that political parties are purely office-seeking 
organisations with no preconceived policy interests. The formulation of policy, and the servicing of 
interest groups, is a mere formality in the pursuit of political office. For political parties, which are but 
teams of men – and presumably women – the ultimate goal is to enjoy the prestige, power, and 
income that comes from governing and holding political office (Downs 1957a, b). As with businesses 
in a marketplace, however, political parties are not solitary organisations. Not only must they compete 
with other political parties for these rewards, but they must also appeal to voters, without whom their 
dream of prestige, power, and income will go unfulfilled.  
A key component in the Downsian spatial model is the rationality of voters. Each voter will view 
elections as the means by which to select the government most beneficial to them. In order to achieve 
the outcome that maximises their utility, defined by Downs as increasing benefits and income accrued 
from government policy, each voter estimates the utility income that they expect each political party 
will provide to them if it were in power, and votes on that basis (Downs 1957a, b). Of course, whereas 
consumers have the luxury of viewing any goods and services they intend on purchasing from a 
business before actually purchasing them, voters have no such ability. Therefore, the primary factor 
influencing a voter’s estimation of each political party is not the promises made within a campaign, 
but the party’s performance during the previous electoral period. The voters’ decision is therefore 
based upon a comparison of the utility income they actually received during the last electoral cycle 
compared to what they believe they would have received had the other political party(ies) been in 
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office (Downs 1957a, b). Voters therefore engage in so-called retrospective voting (see Fiorina 1981) 
with the incumbent’s record being the essential item under evaluation.  
One of the central criticisms of this sort of approach to understanding voting behaviour is the degree 
to which voters actually have the information available that would permit such a detailed cost-benefit 
analysis. For Downs, imperfect knowledge and a degree of uncertainty are fundamental realities that 
one cannot escape, and are therefore incorporated into his spatial model. This means that political 
parties do not always understand what it is voters want; that voters do not always understand what 
the government or opposition has done, is doing, or even should be doing; and that the information 
required to overcome such ignorance is costly, that is, resources and time must be expended in order 
to achieve greater clarity (Downs 1957a, b). While democratic theorists might wish for voters to 
expend valuable resources in the pursuit of such information, the reality is that the levels of 
information required would be truly staggering for the average voter. Not only would voters require 
an understanding of the policy platforms offered by each party, but they would also need to further 
understand, in advance, the likely problems a future government would experience, and the solutions 
that said government would propose. 
It is under these conditions that ideologies become useful heuristics employed by voters to simplify 
political decision making (Hinich and Pollard 1981).1 Ideologies convey a wealth of information about 
the likely policy solutions that a political party would pursue once in government, and therefore permit 
the voter to make a rational choice in the face of considerable uncertainty and a lack of information 
(Downs 1957a, b). Indeed, detailed information on the policy positions adopted by various political 
parties is often lacking, with political parties often described in far more general terms by reference 
to established political labels such as ‘fiscal conservative’ or ‘New Deal liberal’ (Hinich and Pollard 
1981; Enelow and Hinich 1982; Enelow and Hinich 1984). These labels, tied to and akin to ideologies, 
 
1 It is often the case that scholars have misinterpreted Downs as referring to issues – see Grofman 1985 as an 
example of this – while in reality, Downs was concerned with ideologies (Downs 1957b: Chapter 7; see also 
Hinich and Munger 1994) 
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carry a substantial amount of information regarding the likely policy positions that political parties 
would adopt, and therefore serve to reduce information costs and uncertainty. For instance, a ‘New 
Deal liberal’ might be expected to favour increases in spending on social welfare programmes, 
additional regulation on business, favourable policies regarding labour unions, and even opposition to 
tax-cuts for the wealthy, among other things (Hinich and Pollard 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1982; 
Enelow and Hinich 1984).  
A lack of information on the part of voters therefore creates demand for ideologies and political labels 
that is ultimately supplied by political parties. To recall, in this model political parties are primarily 
motivated by office-seeking goals, and devise policy purely as a means of gaining office. The 
development of ideologies and political labels serves to reduce the costs associated with gaining 
information and reducing uncertainty. Once a political party has established an ideology, however, it 
cannot suddenly abandon or radically alter it. Having chosen an ideology, any position that a political 
party adopts must be congenial with its ideological profile. To radically alter this profile or adopt an 
inharmonious position would convey to voters that the political party is non-credible, unreliable, and 
perhaps even dishonest (Downs 1957a, b; Hinich and Munger 1994; Hinich and Pollard 1981; Enelow 
and Hinich 1982). Furthermore, at a more basic level, it would destroy the benefit of having developed 
the ideology in the first place and voters would be none-the-wiser as to what the party stood for. Just 
as political parties are committed to an ideology once it has been established, political parties cannot 
adopt ideologies identical to other political parties as they must provide ‘product differentiation’ in 
order to ensure they are distinguishable from their opponents and therefore encourage voters to turn 
out (Downs 1957a, b).  
Downs’ (1957a, b) conception of Hotelling’s (1929) spatial market is therefore reflective of the need 
for ideologies as a heuristic and is conceived of as a linear scale representing the left-right spectrum. 
For this Downs (1957a, b) assumes that voters agree upon the order that political parties appear on 
the scale; that once placed upon the scale, parties may move either left or rightwards but do not leap 
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over other parties; and that the distribution of the voters along the scale differs between countries 
but is fixed within them. This last element represents a point of departure from Hotelling inasmuch as 
Hotelling concluded that political parties in a two-party system would inevitably converge upon the 
centre. Indeed, while it has become ubiquitous that the Downsian spatial model encourages 
centripetal competition, Downs (1957a, b) himself never claimed this – or rather, to be more accurate, 
he argued that the distribution of parties along the spectrum is dependent upon the distribution of 
voters. So, while Hotelling assumes a unimodal distribution of voters along the spectrum, with parties 
converging upon the peak within this distribution, Downs (1957a, b) further elaborates that countries 
may be characterised by bimodal or even multimodal distributions of voters. In these circumstances, 
one would expect to see political parties occupying the various peaks along the spectrum, with as 
many political parties as there are peaks. In certain circumstances, therefore, Downs (1957a, b) 
envisaged centrifugal competition especially among more polarised societies. This connection 
between the distribution of voters and political parties in Downs’ spatial model is often overlooked 
and has led many scholars to erroneously characterise the Downsian model as predicting centripetal 
competition even though Downs (1957a: 142) himself argued that the ‘conclusion that the parties in 
a two-party system inevitably converge on the center does not necessarily hold true’. 
While there are numerous variants of the spatial model, for the most part, they are merely 
amendments to the traditional Downsian model (Green and Shapiro 1994). Oftentimes, these 
variations incorporate additional elements into spatial modelling or alter assumptions made within 
previous iterations. For instance, Adams et al. (2005) include party identification into their spatial 
model as well as the ability for voters to discount the claims of political parties, i.e., the likelihood of 
success in policy implementation, and the willingness, or lack thereof, of citizens to participate in 
elections when none of the political parties is an attractive option. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) 
and MacDonald and Rabinowitz (1998) sought to incorporate valence issues into spatial models, while 
Aldrich (1983) included a second theatre of electoral participation, namely, the ability of citizens to 
become activists within political parties. By contrast, Grofman (1985) and Kedar (2009) propose an 
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alteration to the proximity assumption within traditional spatial models. They argue that what matters 
is not the exact position that parties take so much as the ‘side’ of the divide they are on. For instance, 
a left-wing party slightly further away on the spectrum might be more favourable to voters than a 
more proximate right-wing party. Other variations are, to be less than charitable, simply a response 
to ‘a stylised fact coming into currency that calls into question the validity of earlier predictions’ (Green 
and Shapiro 1994: 149). As a result, many spatial models are merely ‘post hoc theorising’ intended to 
address a very narrow criticism or empirical occurrence (Green and Shapiro 1994). Despite all these 
variations, however, these proximity spatial models are unified by a series of shared assumptions, 
namely, that political parties and voters can be located within an n-dimensional space; that political 
parties produce policy platforms or ideologies in order to win elected office; and that voters seek to 
maximise their utility by casting a ballot for the political party or candidate closest to them in the n-
dimensional political space.  
There are a number of problems with the traditional spatial model, however. More specifically, the 
ground over which political parties compete is not a physical space in the sense of Main Street and to 
treat it as such would be to introduce assumptions concerning the unidimensionality of the political 
space, the stability of its structure, and the existence of ordered dimensions (Stokes 1963).  
The unidimensionality of the political space is not a reality in either Europe and America. A one-
dimensional account of political competition would hold that positions regarding welfare provision, 
government intervention in the economy, foreign policy, among other issue areas, would be situated 
at the same location on a left-right or liberal-conservative spectrum (Stokes 1963). However, various 
pieces of research have proven that there is no relationship between these attitudes among voters; 
indeed, voters regularly support both an expanded welfare state and lower taxes (Budge 1982; see 
also Stokes 1963). The non-existence of unidimensionality can be further highlighted by reference to 
multiparty systems in Europe. While the socio-economic or class-oriented dimension is dominant 
(Wagner 2012), many European systems contain a variety of political parties that owe their existence 
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to religious, racial, ethnic, or linguistic cleavages that exist outside of a simple socio-economic interest 
(Lijphart 1977), and therefore it becomes difficult to plot them along a unidimensional spectrum 
(Stokes 1963). This criticism is resolved by Enelow, Hinich, Pollard, and Munger (Hinich and Pollard 
1981; Enelow and Hinich 1982; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Enelow and Hinich 1990; Hinich and Munger 
1994) who drop the unidimensionality assumption of the traditional Downsian spatial model.  
The assumption of fixed structure as represented by a business along Main Street depends on physical 
distance and therefore business structures are fixed. The distribution of consumers within these 
spaces may vary but the structures themselves will not. By contrast, the space in which political parties 
compete can be a highly fluid structure. Just as the parties may be perceived and evaluated on several 
dimensions so too may the dimensions that are salient to the electorate change over time; sometimes 
radically (Stokes 1963). However, the fluidity of this space should not be overstated. Political parties 
are tied down by their reputations and this introduces some semblance of a fixed structure inasmuch 
as political parties are not free to move throughout the political space; at least not without 
reputational damage (Downs 1957; Meguid 2005, 2008).  
For the traditional Downsian spatial model to apply, both political party and voter must be able to 
place themselves on one or more common dimensions. There must be at least one ordered set of 
alternatives of government action that the parties can advocate and the voters prefer. At its most 
simple there is a position that one party supports and another opposes. Problematically for the 
traditional Downsian spatial model, however, is that not all issues can be boiled down to such 
dichotomous choices. In many instances both parties and voters are located at the same point: no 
one, for instance, supports unemployment, high inflation, or corruption (Stokes 1963; Budge 2015). 
Robertson’s (1976) seminal study in quantifying the manifestos of British political parties – and 
attempting to subject them to a dimensional analysis in order to test policy convergence – determined 
the absence of pro- and con- position-taking. One therefore must distinguish between positional 
issues – those that involve advocacy of government action from a set of alternatives – and valence 
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issues – those that merely involve the linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or 
negatively valued by voters (Stokes 1963). Expressed more simply, then, valence issues are those 
where the differences between the political parties are not the positions they take but rather their 
perceived competence and performance in handling the most important issues/problems facing the 
country. To return to the above examples, then, which party is the most competent in achieving low 
unemployment, low inflation, and lower levels of corruption? (Stokes 1963). As the preferences of 
both party and voter must be distributed over an ordered set of policy alternatives for the spatial 
model to work, valence issues do not fit neatly within the traditional Downsian spatial model. That 
being said, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and MacDonald and Rabinowitz (1998) sought to 
incorporate valence issues into spatial models. 
 
2.4. Directional Spatial Models 
The first major challenge to the proximity spatial model came from Rabinowitz (1978) and Rabinowitz 
and Macdonald (1989) who pioneered the directional model of party competition. Borrowing from 
cognitive psychology they propose that political issues, much like symbols, should be understood with 
regard to the emotions that they trigger. In contrast to the proximity spatial model, which argues that 
voters make judgements on political parties based on proximity or closeness, the directional model of 
voting behaviour holds that what matters is the side that political parties and voters are on with 
regards to particular issues and the strength of their attachment to these issues. Voters, therefore, 
are not attracted to political parties that are proximate to them, but rather to those political parties 
that are on the same side of the debate and that espouse intensity with regards to that direction 
(Rabinowitz 1978; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). For instance, German voters should prefer the 
Left Party over the Social Democratic Party as the former espouses a more intense leftist agenda than 
the latter. Intensity, then, can be understood to mean the extremeness of the party’s position and this 
has a direct impact upon voter evaluations of parties. If a voter is ‘directionally compatible’ with a 
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political party, then an increase in the intensity from that political party should further entice the 
voter. By contrast, if the voter is ‘directionally incompatible’, greater intensity should repulse the voter 
(Rabinowitz 1978; Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). From the perspective of political parties, greater 
issue intensity can generate greater electoral support or opposition, depending on the direction the 
party takes. When the electorate has a clear policy preference, the political party that responds to 
that preference, and does so with intensity, will be victorious. The implication, then, is that the political 
party that adopts the more extreme position relative to its opponents, is the political party with the 
greatest chance of electoral victory (Iversen 1994b). And as Rabinowitz (1978) and Rabinowitz and 
MacDonald (1989) assume that political parties are vote-maximisers, the incentive is for political 
parties to adopt extreme positions.  
Aware of this curious phenomenon, which sees voters reward extremism, Rabinowitz and Macdonald 
(1989) introduce the ‘region of acceptability’. Voters are supposedly wary of political parties that 
espouse radical or extreme positions, and indeed, the extremist label can hamper the enthusiasm of 
potential supporters.  Political parties outside of this region, therefore, lose support by virtue of being 
too extreme (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Being located outside of the region of acceptability 
does not automatically remove the potential for electoral victory, however. It merely implies some 
unstated penalty for having crossed the boundary (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Therefore, the 
centrifugal forces at the heart of the directional model of voting behaviour are checked by the need 
for political parties to appear moderate (Iversen 1994b). In practice, then, vote-maximising political 
parties should seek to locate themselves at or as close to the border of the region of acceptability as 
possible, regardless of the party system or distribution of voters (Iversen 1994b).  
The rather arbitrary placement of the region of acceptability does have peculiar consequences, 
however. It requires that all voters agree on the location of the region of acceptability irrespective of 
whether that voter is positioned in the centre, close to the region, or beyond its borders (Iversen 
1994b). Taken to extremes, the implication is that voters who are themselves located beyond the 
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borders of the region of acceptability would penalise parties for transgressing that border (Iversen 
1994a). Reconceptualising the region of acceptability to be more theoretically sound has a curious 
consequence: the introduction of traditional spatial proximity. Suppose, then, as per Iversen (1994b), 
that in order to avoid the odd situation described above, each voter is given an individual region of 
acceptability with associated penalty for political parties perceived as extreme. Just as with the 
traditional spatial model, voters in the directional model are put off by extremist parties. This 
consequence leads Iversen (1994b) to conclude that spatial considerations are indispensable to 
directional theory and that both directional and spatial theory are not so much incompatible as 
complementary. Iversen (1994b) and Merrill and Grofman (1999) take this and argue that voters 
prefer parties with clear stances and the same direction, but that, as the distance between them and 
the party grows, the voter’s support diminishes. Indeed, this introduction of directionality within 
spatial models is fundamental to the spatial models outlined by Grofman (1985) and Kedar (2009).  
Furthermore, it is worth considering that the directional model fails to distinguish between different 
types of emotions. For instance, it does not distinguish between ambivalence and indifference 
(Thompson et al. 2009). An individual who is indifferent to an issue or issues, as a result of disinterest, 
say, is unlikely to have the same reaction as an individual whose interest is peaked but torn between 
equally positive and negative evaluations. By way of illustration, consider the example provided by 
Thompson et al. (2009: 381) regarding personal evaluations:  
Consider, for example, the domain of interpersonal attraction. We know from past 
research that evaluations of others are multidimensional. One dimension can be 
characterised as affection or liking; the other as admiration or respect. Thus, although we 
often like and respect or both dislike and disrespect others, we all know people we like, 
but do not respect (for example, imagine a person who is warm and caring, but also 
dependent and not very assertive) as well as people we respect, but do not particularly 
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like (for example, imagine a person who is intellectually desirable or agentic, but not very 
socially desirable or communal).  
Indifference and ambivalence are therefore quite distinct and, given the differences in emotional 
intensity vis-à-vis political issues, should produce different evaluations with regards to political parties. 
In the directional theory, however, they are both subsumed into the medium point, without 
distinction. This distinction is quite important, however. An individual who suffers from indifference 
may be less likely to engage in the voting process than someone who is ambivalent, and the responses 
of both individuals to party strategies may be quite distinct.  
Finally, it is worth considering the logical result of the directional theory with regard to empirical 
reality. To recall, then, the directional approach holds that the centre has no competitive value. 
Operating on the assumption that voters demand a clear stance, the centre represents a losing 
position. The centre is therefore a vote-minimising strategy (Evans 2001). So, if they are assumed to 
be vote-maximisers, as Rabinowitz (1978) and Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) assume, then why 
do so many political parties exist at the centre or middle point? If one assumes directional logic, then 
political parties that hold at the centre should haemorrhage support and eventually disintegrate. 
However, research has shown that centre parties do not disintegrate when faced with polarising 
competition (Hazan 1997). Indeed, when this competition escalates, centre parties seek to present 
themselves as moderate alternatives to the now extremist parties (Hazan 1997). The problem of the 
existence of centre parties becomes even more pronounced when one allows for voters to discount 
the platforms of political parties (see Grofman 1985; Merrill and Grofman 1996). Voters may discount 
the platforms of political parties as a result of their perceived lack of effectiveness or because of the 
political structures limiting the degree to which political parties can actually shift from the status quo 
(Merrill and Grofman 1996). If we permit the discounting of party platforms by voters, the region of 
acceptability should be theoretically larger as voters would be more tolerant of (moderate) 
26 | P a g e  
 
extremism. A wider region of acceptability should punish centre parties even more strongly as they 
are even further away from optimum points within the political space.  
 
2.5. Saliency, Issue Ownership, and Responding to the Policy Agenda 
The origins of saliency theory are inextricably linked to textual content analysis. While most early 
content analyses were conducted on media reports (e.g., Madge 1953), it was Robertson’s (1976) 
reading of party manifestos that established the dominance of manifestos within party scholarship 
and the notion of issue saliency as the primary component in party competition (Budge 2015). In 
classifying the contents of British party manifestos, Robertson (1976) discovered that very few 
sentences gave clear pro- or con- positions within the policy areas outlined. Rather, they stressed the 
importance of the policy area, the importance of the ‘problem’, the party’s record on this issue, and 
an explicit promise to prioritise it should the party win the election (Robertson 1976; Budge 2015). 
Manifestos regularly failed to mention other political parties or the policies associated with them. The 
order of the day, then, was not direct competition over issues, but rather, selective emphasis on 
different issues (Budge 2015). Focusing on the saliency of individual policy or issue areas had the 
advantage of incorporating Stokes’ (1963) original criticism of Downsian spatial analysis, notably, the 
failure to include valence or one-position issues such as corruption (Budge 2015)  
This saliency approach was further developed by Budge and Farlie (1983) and Petrocik (1996) who 
argued that election campaigns could be understood by reference to the differing emphases placed 
upon different issues by different parties, and by parties selectively emphasising their preferred issues 
while ignoring or de-emphasising those issues associated with their political opponents (Budge 1982; 
Budge and Farlie 1983; Carmines 1991; Green-Pedersen 2007; Lefevere et al. 2015). This de-
emphasising applies quite widely inasmuch as the mere mentioning of other political parties runs the 
risk of increasing the saliency of unfavourable issues – even if such encroachment is to refute the 
policy area’s importance (Budge 1982; Budge and Farlie 1983). The focus of political parties, therefore, 
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is priming voters to consider certain issues to be highly relevant and others irrelevant (Green and 
Hobolt 2008; Thesen, Green-Pedersen, and Mortensen 2016). From this perspective, then, campaign 
messages, broadcasts, and press releases do not have the purpose of engaging the opposition in 
debate, but rather they seek to increase the salience of issues over which the party is perceived as the 
owner (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Riker 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). Once a political 
party has developed ownership (see below) over a specific issue, it should increase its vote share 
among voters for whom that issue is important (Holian 2004; Petrocik 1996). In other words, issue 
ownership should only impact voter choice when voters believe that issue is salient. As argued by 
Bélanger and Meguid (2008: 479) ‘why should knowing the Democrats … are the owner of the 
healthcare issue matter for an individual … if she thinks that healthcare is irrelevant?’ It therefore 
follows that when an issue becomes more salient, the greater the effect issue ownership is expected 
to have (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Lefevere et al. 2015).  
There are four subdimensions to issue ownership. These are associative issue ownership, competence-
based issue ownership, negative issue ownership, and incomplete issue ownership (Geys 2012; 
Walgrave et al. 2012; Lefevere et al. 2015; Meyer and Muller 2013; Wagner and Meyer 2015). 
Associative ownership is characterised by the ‘spontaneous identification’ of a particular issue with a 
political party in the minds of voters, irrespective of any competence-based assessment. By contrast, 
and as one might expect, competence-based ownership is developed by a political party when it is 
perceived as being most competent or proficient in managing a particular issue or problem (Walgrave 
et al. 2012). While there may be overlaps between associative and competence-based ownership, 
inasmuch as the party associated with an issue may also be considered the more competent, these 
are actually two very separate dimensions. Political parties can be considered competent on an issue 
without being spontaneously associated with it, and vice versa (Walgrave et al. 2012). This distinction 
is quite important in that it has strong implications for voting behaviour. Competence-based 
ownership is considered to have a strong direct effect on voting behaviour while associative ownership 
affects voting behaviour only when the issue is perceived as important or salient by voters (Walgrave 
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et al. 2012). That being said, political parties that are strongly associated with a particular issue do 
tend to enjoy higher levels of credibility on that issue as they are perceived as being sincere in their 
commitment to the issue (Sides 2006). There is also some evidence to suggest that associative issue 
ownership produces indirect electoral benefits. For instance, parties that are associated with salient 
issues tend to be given more coverage by the media (Hayes 2008), thus increasing their profile, and 
allowing them to more widely communicate their position to voters. 
Issue ownership also affords parties some degree of flexibility when it comes to actual performance. 
For instance, an incumbent party may be able to overcome poor performance in the short term if it 
enjoys strong reputational advantages on the issue, derived from its history of attention to that issue, 
or indeed its past performance (Bélanger and Nadeau 2015). Poor performance can, however, lead to 
a political party developing what has become known as ‘negative issue ownership’ (Wagner and Meyer 
2015). This is where a political party develops a reputation for being ill-suited or incapable of resolving 
an issue or problem, or becomes known for suggesting ‘wrong-headed’ solutions (Wagner and Meyer 
2015). Given that individuals tend to focus on and place more emphasis on negative assessments than 
positive ones, negative issue ownership could have a stronger influence than positive issue ownership 
on overall evaluations and therefore voting behaviour (Wagner and Meyer 2015).  
Finally, one should distinguish between complete and incomplete issue ownership. It may be the case 
that numerous political parties stake a claim and therefore compete over the same issue, even if they 
are not equally successful in that endeavour (Geys 2012). In a state of incomplete ownership, political 
parties that co-own particular issues are not guaranteed the benefits either relative or absolute, that 
is vote share or votes respectively, from an increase in the issue’s saliency (Geys 2012). The difference 
between electoral gain and loss under these circumstances depends on the degree to which the 
electorate perceives a party’s relative competence in handling the issue. Therefore, for the party with 
the weaker grip on the issue, emphasising it may become counter-productive and result in electoral 
loss (Geys 2012).  
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When notions of issue ownership, competition, and selective emphasis are taken to their logical 
conclusions the implication is that political parties focus upon different issues with little to no overlap 
(Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015; Riker 1993). After all, issue ownership theories involve 
political parties selectively emphasising those issues on which they hold comparative advantage while 
downplaying all others. The optimum strategy, therefore, would be to ignore those issues that bestow 
no electoral advantage while only emphasising those issues that do convey electoral advantage (see 
Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Carmines 1991). The end result, therefore, is no overlap in issue 
focus. Yet it has been demonstrated across numerous studies that overlap does occur and that it can 
be quite sizeable (Sigelman and Buell 2004; Damore 2005; Green-Pedersen 2007; Dolezal et al. 2014). 
Therefore, while political parties may seek to emphasise only those issues that they own, while de-
emphasising all others, the reality is that political parties do give due attention to those issues that are 
considered owned by their political opponents (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015). ‘The 
actual state of the world makes certain issues unavoidable’ (Budge and Farlie 1983: 129) and therefore 
the goal is to minimize the damage while continuing to emphasise one’s own issues (Petrocik 1996; 
Carmines 1991). While the notion of ‘incomplete issue ownership’ (Geys 2012) might explain some of 
this overlap, it does not and cannot explain all of it. Contestation over non-monopolised issues is 
common place but so too is contestation over issues that are clearly owned by other political parties. 
So why do political parties engage with the issues that competitors own?  
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010, 2015) argue that this overlap can be understood by reference 
to the policy agenda and agenda-setting processes. The agenda is a structural phenomenon 
characterised by a hierarchy of salient issues that all relevant political actors must engage with, even 
if they contest the future structure of this hierarchy (Dearing and Rogers 1996; Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen 2010, 2015). Failure to address the agenda and the issues and problems on it could result 
in electoral penalties (Sigelman and Buell 2004). Political parties need to be seen to be concerned and 
informed about all the major issues of the day (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Sigelman and Buell 
2004). It is therefore within the interests of political parties to not only respond to the agenda, but to 
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also contest its future formation, with an emphasis on issues that are more favourable. This is 
particularly so given that the presence of highly salient issues on the agenda can result in increased 
voter support for the issue owner (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994).  
 
2.6. Competition between Unequals: Position, Saliency, and Ownership, and Other Strategic 
Approaches 
A number of other models of party competition require consideration and review here. More 
specifically, given that the focus of this thesis is on how mainstream political parties compete with 
niche party competitors, particularly those of the radical right, it is relevant to examine those models 
of party competition that concern themselves with competition between unequals. The first of these 
is the by-now influential position, saliency, and ownership model (PSO) developed by Bonnie Meguid 
(2005, 2008). Unlike in previous research, Meguid was concerned with how mainstream political 
parties compete with their niche party competitors, and had a particular interest in understanding 
how mainstream strategies influence niche party success. Building on the party competition literature 
reviewed above, Meguid argues that there are three important elements to party competition: the 
position that the party adopts, the salience of the issue being contested, and the ownership of those 
issues. Mainstream parties, then, can change their positions on various issues, moving towards (policy 
convergence) or moving away (policy divergence) from specific competitors. They can also alter the 
saliency of given issues through selective emphasis. And finally, they can develop ownership or 
challenge a competitor’s ownership of an issue (Meguid 2005; 2008). From these three elements, 
Meguid develops three strategies that mainstream political parties can adopt. These are: 
accommodative, adversarial, and dismissive strategies. Given the significant overlap between the 
strategies introduced by Meguid (2005, 2008) and those of Bale et al. (2010) and Downs (2001, 2012), 
these strategic approaches will be discussed in unison.  
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In accepting spatial logic and the notion of party positioning, the first two strategies are determined 
by convergence towards, or divergence from, a specific niche party competitor. The former, 
convergence towards, is an accommodative strategy while the latter, divergence from, is an 
adversarial strategy. An accommodative strategy is where the mainstream political party seeks to 
undermine the distinctiveness of the niche party through an extension of its own programmatic 
profile. Relying on the assumption that vote-maximisation is the primary goal of the mainstream 
political party, this strategy is essentially the proverbial bandwagoning: ‘if you can’t beat them, join 
them’ (Bale et al. 2010: 413). In adopting this strategy, the mainstream political party seeks to claim 
ownership of the issue and therefore ‘steal’ voters that have drifted towards the niche party 
competitor. This process occurs as a result of the ‘legislative experience’ and ‘governmental 
effectiveness’ of the mainstream political party (Meguid 2005: 349). From the perspective of voters, 
then, the ‘established party copy [would] be perceived as more attractive than the niche party original’ 
(Meguid 2005: 349). Conversely, the adversarial strategy is a statement of opposition to the policy 
position of the niche party. The mainstream political party therefore seeks to increase the policy 
distance between it and the niche party (Meguid 2008: 24). The effect of such an approach is to 
reinforce the niche party’s ownership over the issue and therefore the niche party’s electoral support 
(Meguid 2005, 2008). While counterintuitive, Meguid argues that the mainstream political party that 
adopts this strategy seeks to bolster the electoral support of the niche competitor in order to weaken 
another mainstream political party by establishing a stronger competitor on its flank. To that end, 
then, the niche party is merely a tool employed by one mainstream political party against another 
(Meguid 2005, 2008). 
Alternatively, mainstream political parties might determine a niche issue to be unimportant or too 
difficult to address. In these circumstances, the mainstream political party can pursue the dismissive 
strategy: in essence, ignore the issue. In doing so, the mainstream political party signals to voters that 
the issue lacks merit or importance (Downs 2001, 2012; Meguid 2005, 2008; Bale et al. 2010).  In 
adopting the dismissive strategy mainstream political parties seek to reduce the issue’s saliency while 
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diverting attention to more favourable issues. The adoption of the dismissive strategy by a mainstream 
party should result in a weakening of the electoral support for the niche party competitor (Meguid 
2005, 2008). Finally, if the mainstream party already holds a position on that issue, it might choose to 
‘stick to its guns’ and maintain its existing position (Bale et al. 2010). This final strategy is known as 
the hold strategy. 
These issue-oriented strategies might be the dominant tools that are employed in competition 
between mainstream and niche political parties (Meguid 2008: 50) but there exists a range of 
organisational and institutional strategies that have not yet been explored in this chapter. These 
strategies include isolation/ostracism; the imposition of legal restrictions; collaboration; and finally, 
denigrating the niche party. As above, these will be discussed with reference to Meguid (2008), Downs 
(2001, 2012), Bale et al. (2010), among others. None of the following strategies addresses issue 
ownership or the saliency of particular issues. Rather, they seek to prevent the niche party capitalising 
on its ownership of particular issues. Given this, then, the following strategies are quite distinct from 
the accommodative, adversarial, and dismissive strategies outlined above inasmuch as those are 
issue-oriented, whereas the following strategies are party- or actor-oriented.  
When faced with a radical right niche party, a common tactic employed is that of isolation or 
ostracism. The formation of anti-niche blocking or grand coalitions among the established mainstream 
political parties, with the intention of excluding the niche party from participation in office, is a 
common practice in countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands (Downs 2001, 2012; Meguid 2008; 
van Spanje and Weber 2019). Ostracisation can include non-participation in other forms of 
cooperation between political parties such as joint press releases, electoral alliances, or joint 
legislative activities (van Spanje and Weber 2019). For Downs (2001: 27), this cordon sanitaire forms 
a clear ‘democratic front in opposition to extremism’. This strategy can, however, increase the niche 
party’s outsider status, and increase its popularity among supporters, while also leading to 
radicalisation within the party (van Spanje and van der Brug 2007: 1023). While this strategy does not 
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focus on any particular issue, it is possible that it serves as an indirect method for increasing the 
saliency of the issues that the niche party emphasises.  
Alternatively, mainstream political parties can seek to impose legal restrictions upon the niche political 
party. This can include outlawing the party, raising electoral thresholds, restricting the niche party’s 
access to broadcast media, tightening the access niche parties have to public funds, support, and 
information, and changing the requirements for electoral participation, such as registration 
requirements, deposits, and/or signatures required (Downs 2001, 2012; Meguid 2008). Putting aside 
normative claims regarding democracy and tolerance, the imposition of legal restrictions can be 
effective in tackling radical niche party challengers. Indeed, these approaches can often serve to 
reduce the targeted party’s vote share, as its position and platform are delegitimised in the eyes of 
voters (Minkenberg 2006). A further consequence of delegitimisation is that voters’ perceptions of 
the party become more negative as their ‘sympathy’ towards the party decreases. While immediately 
successful, however, the long-term efficacy of legal strategies is not entirely clear. The imposition of 
legal restrictions often has the effect of provoking organisation reformation and the adoption of new 
strategies among the targeted parties in order to avoid or survive the imposed legal restrictions 
(Minkenberg 2006). Furthermore, failed legal action can have the unintended consequence of 
empowering the niche party challenger, which often proceeds to present itself as a victim of the 
establishment or a martyr for the cause, with increasing vote share often the result (Downs 2011: 
108). The increased attention to the niche party, as above, might also have the consequence of 
increasing issue saliency.  
Conversely, in certain circumstances, mainstream political parties may seek to collaborate with the 
niche party. Collaboration between mainstream and niche political parties can take place in three 
environments: electoral, legislative, and executive (Downs 2001). For the first, the mainstream 
political party can establish a cartel or joint-ticket with its niche party competitor. Less formally, 
political parties can agree not to compete in particular constituencies or contests and therefore ‘stand 
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down’ for their political ally. Secondly, in the legislative environment, the mainstream party and its 
niche party competitor can work together in supporting or opposing particular legislation, budgetary 
measures, or even votes of (no) confidence. Thirdly, in the executive environment, the mainstream 
political party can agree with the niche party to a confidence-and-supply arrangement or even a 
formal coalition in government (at whatever level – e.g., local, regional, national) (Downs 2001; 
Meguid 2008). Collaboration with a niche party challenger has the effect of legitimising the niche party 
and therefore does nothing to challenge it electorally. Rather, the mainstream party seeks an 
alternative avenue in the pursuit of power, that is, a new (formal or informal) coalition partner. 
Indeed, we have witnessed within Western Europe the increasing development of block politics, 
where mainstream social democratic parties have sought to ally themselves with green parties, while 
the mainstream right has made overtures to the radical right (Bale 2003). Collaboration can also have 
the effect of forcing the niche party to contend with the reality of office – something which has often 
resulted in leading to splits and division within the niche party (Heinisch 2003; Luther 2003; Bolleyer 
et al. 2012), between those who favour an outsider profile and those who value incumbency. At their 
peak, such divisions can lead the party to implode. Collaboration can therefore have the effect of 
castrating the niche party (Luther 2003).  
Finally, the mainstream political party can engage in a series of organisational tactics. In one form, the 
mainstream political party can seek to pacify the niche party by co-opting the leader and elite through 
the offering of jobs, portfolios, and other roles within the mainstream organisation. In doing so, the 
mainstream political party can ‘hollow out’ the niche party (Meguid 2008). This is especially effective 
for incumbent parties as they can offer portfolios and other roles within the government to members 
of the niche party’s elite.2 If the niche party holds ownership over particular issues, then organisational 
accommodation can result in the transfer of some issue ownership to the mainstream political party 
 
2 For instance, the French Socialist Party engaged in an organisational strategy in 1988 when it established a 
junior ministry of the environment and selected Brice Lalonde, the leader of the French Greens, as the 
environment minister. This did not involve formal collaboration between the Socialist and Green parties, 
however, merely the co-optation of the leading figure within the Green Party (Meguid 2008: 31). 
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(Meguid 2008). Conversely, the mainstream political party may verbally denigrate the niche party and 
its leadership.3 The organisational strength of the mainstream party can be employed to damage the 
image of the niche party or suggest impropriety with regards to the sincerity of the party vis-à-vis 
certain issues (Meguid 2008). This approach can have unintended consequences, however, as doing 
this does nothing to delegitimise the niche party’s arguments or issues. In fact, the attention that the 
niche party receives could increase the saliency of its issues and therefore increase its vote share 
(Meguid 2005, 2008).  
 
2.7. Strategic Approaches Across Multiple Dimensions 
Meguid's Position, Saliency, and Ownership (PSO) theory accepts spatial distance as the underlying 
logic of party competition. As a consequence, Meguid assumes, like Downs, a unidimensional policy 
space. For Meguid, niche party support is dependent upon a single issue, and therefore tactics 
designed to undermine the perceived relevance of that issue, or indeed the distinctiveness or 
credibility of the niche party’s position on it, will result in niche party vote loss. However, this relies 
on an unrealistic interpretation of what constitutes a niche party. A radical right niche party may not 
only focus on the immigration issue but may also address subsidiary issues such as housing, welfare, 
employment, and government spending, all of which are dealt with on a routine basis by mainstream 
parties, but which are often adopted by the radical right with a frame linking these issues within the 
context of immigration. Therefore, radical right niche parties often have expansive platforms but these 
are often focused on a single 'cultural' dimension of competition, whereas mainstream political parties 
tend to reserve competition to an 'economic' dimension of competition (Wagner 2012; Rovny 2013). 
Already, then, we can determine that party competition takes place on at least two dimensions of 
competition. The strategies devised by Meguid then depend upon the extent to which mainstream 
 
3 For instance, the British Conservative Party engaged in this organisational strategy in the run-up to the 2015 
General Election, when it used party resources to locate controversial statements made by officials and 
members of UKIP. These statements were subsequently leaked to the press (The Commentator 2013).  
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parties recognise the 'cultural' dimension – or even 'territorial' dimension in the case of Lega (Basile 
2015) – and therefore dimensional strategies, not considered by Meguid, are required.   
The dimensional approach outlined by Rovny (2012) borrows heavily from issue ownership and 
saliency theories (outlined above) in that political parties seek to influence voter preferences by 
position taking, issue emphasis, and voter priming (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Green and 
Hobolt 2008). Further, the structure of political competition is not assumed to be a fixed stage, but 
rather, the subject of competition. This approach, then, considers political competition as a contest 
over the presence and bundling of issues into various issue dimensions. Put more simply, the various 
dimensions of politics, be they economic, cultural, territorial, or whatever else, are themselves the 
subject of political competition and therefore strategies need not be solely issue-based but can be 
dimensionally-oriented (Alonso 2012; Elias et al. 2015; Alonso et al. 2015). Political parties can 
therefore compete on their primary dimension – often the economic dimension for mainstream 
political parties and the cultural dimension for radical right niche parties – as well as their secondary 
or even tertiary dimension. The secondary dimension gives sizeable strategic flexibility to political 
parties inasmuch as their reputations are mostly tied to their primary dimension. Therefore, political 
parties can readily move and adopt new positions on a secondary dimension, even to the extent of 
leapfrogging between issues, which may not be possible without severe penalty on their primary 
dimension (Alonso 2012; Elias et al. 2015). Political parties therefore not only choose which 
dimensions to compete on (positioning4), but also the degree of emphasis they place on each 
dimension (selective emphasis) and how they define issues associated with those dimensions (issue 
framing) (Elias et al. 2015). Within this approach, then, Alonso et al. (2012), Rovny (2013), Elias et al. 
(2015), and Basile (2015) develop four strategies; albeit without the same theoretical expectations put 
forward by Meguid (2005, 2008). 
 
4 While it is more common to use ‘position’ in reference to particular issues, Elias et al. (2015) and Rovny (2012, 
2015) use position and positioning to also refer to political parties determining what dimensions to compete on. 
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The first strategy is the unidimensional one, where political parties selectively emphasise and position 
themselves on their core dimension, and associated issues, while at the same time ignoring the other 
dimensions of competition. Alternatively, in a second strategy, political parties can reframe issues 
belonging to the second dimension of competition in primary dimension terms (Alonso et al. 2015; 
Basile 2015; Elias et al. 2015). This subsuming strategy is essentially a rhetorical exercise whereby 
policy issues on a second dimension are reformulated within the context of the primary dimension. 
For instance, immigration may be reframed from a cultural issue into a solely economic one.  
Thirdly, parties can adopt a blurring strategy, in which they seek to blur their position on the second 
dimension. Political parties may be in a position where, while they wish to concentrate on core 
economic issues, they may not wish to ignore secondary issues (Elias et al. 2015) or may even be 
compelled to respond to secondary issues as a result of the agenda (e.g., Ansolabehere and Iyengar 
1994; Dearing and Rogers 1996; Sigelman and Buell 2004; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 
2015). Therefore, to dismiss these secondary issues would carry potential risks related to vote share. 
Parties therefore address these secondary issues but in such a way as to be ambiguous, vague, and/or 
even contradictory so as to not to divide their voter base (Rovny 2013; Alonso et al. 2015; Basile 2015; 
Elias et al. 2015).5 
Finally, parties can pursue the two-dimensional strategy, where they position themselves on both 
their core and secondary dimension (Alonso et al. 2015; Elias et al. 2015). The implication of this 
strategy, by contrast to blurring, is a clearer and more consistent positioning (Alonso et al. 2015). 
Basile (2015) demonstrates that once a political party has adopted a two-dimensional strategy, the 
core issue-based strategies outlined by Meguid (2005, 2008) come into effect. That is to say, once a 
political party has focused on a secondary dimension, it can then adopt an accommodative, 
adversarial, or dismissive strategy on that dimension with respect to an opponent.  
 
5 A tenuous example of this can be witnessed with the British Labour’s Party’s (autumn 2018) ambiguous 
positioning on the issue of (withdrawing from) the European Union.  
38 | P a g e  
 
2.8. An Expansion to the Expanded Toolkit: A New Conception of Party Competition 
As has been seen, Meguid’s work focuses mainly on the issue-oriented strategies that mainstream 
parties employ in the face of a niche party competitor. She does acknowledge the existence of non-
issue-based strategies in her work too, in that she does employ some party-oriented strategies in her 
case studies, but these are largely overlooked, especially in her large-n analysis. This is a shame 
because there are sound theoretical reasons why these non-issue-based strategies are important, and 
why they therefore deserve to be included in any analysis.  
Borrowing from the valence model of voting behaviour (see Clarke et al. 2011), it is proposed here 
that ‘what’ (the issue), ‘how’ (the position), and ‘who’ (the party) are equally important facets of party 
competition. It will be argued that ‘who’ is a fundamentally important feature of party competition; 
that ‘who’ is distinct from ‘what’ and ‘how’; and that ‘who’, or more accurately the reputation of 
‘who’, is subject to party competition, potentially independently of ‘what’ and ‘how’. Given this, the 
following section will explain the importance of ‘who’ in party competition, including examples of how 
‘who’ has been employed in competition between parties. It will then move on to exploring the 
concept of reputation that is fundamental to understanding ‘who’ in the context of competitive 
electoral politics. 
 
2.9. The Importance of ‘Who’: Reputation in Party Competition 
As just mentioned, the PSO theory of party competition as conceived by Meguid fully incorporates 
‘what’ and ‘how’ but fails to properly address ‘who’. Indeed, the PSO theory assumes that ‘who’ is not 
a dynamic element of party competition; that niche parties are pawns in a larger game between 
mainstream parties, easily manipulated, and with little agency of their own. However, while Meguid 
fails to properly incorporate ‘who’ into her model of party competition, it does nonetheless feature 
within her model. Consider the following hypothetical:  
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Within a given election, a radical right niche party is gaining votes by emphasising the issue of 
immigration, from an anti-immigration position. In order to secure its right flank, the mainstream 
conservative party shifts its position towards that of the niche party. In this scenario then, which is 
depicted in Figure 2.1, there is no longer any distinction between the issue position of the mainstream 
conservative party (represented by the broccoli) and the radical right niche party (represented by the 
fruitcake) on the issue of immigration.  
 
Figure 2.1: The mainstream conservative party shifting its position towards a niche party competitor 
 
 
Given that both parties now share the same position on the issue dimension, how are they 
distinguished by voters? The PSO theory holds that the ‘mainstream party copy’ will be the recipient 
of votes rather than the ‘niche party original’. This is because of the ‘governmental effectiveness’ and 
‘legislative experience’ of the mainstream party (Meguid 2005: 249). As we know, a ‘reputation for 
policy performance and competence is an important ingredient for electoral success, with evaluations 
of parties’ … handling of issues forming a key battle ground at election time’ (Jennings 2012: 47; see 
also Green and Jennings 2017). Returning to our example, it is because of the reputation of the 
mainstream conservative party that voters prefer it over its niche party competitor. By holding a 
stronger and more positive reputation, the mainstream party is able to usurp ownership over the issue 
of immigration. However, therein lies a problem with Meguid’s inclusion of reputation: it is a static 
condition. Mainstream parties are considered more reputable as a result of their mainstream status. 
This is quite an assumption to make and somewhat controversial given that a) reputation tends to 
feature in electoral battles between political parties, especially when issues do not feature strongly in 
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a campaign (see Arter 2007); and b) niche parties can also be considered competent issue owners 
(Abou-Chadi 2016). The inclusion of reputational evaluations and strategies becomes even more 
important when one considers the rise of catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966) and the convergence of 
mainstream parties in some polities (Green 2007). In these circumstances, reputational evaluations 
become important elements of voter decision-making. As a result of this, one would expect 
strategically-minded parties to devote time and energy to strengthening their reputations, while also 
seeking to weaken or outright damage the reputations of their opponents.  
By clearly delineating between ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘who’, a wider range of party strategies becomes 
available. This is especially apparent when one looks to case examples. For example, the British 
Conservative Party sought to dismiss the United Kingdom Independence Party by communicating to 
voters that UKIP was not a serious rival.  Then leader of the Conservative Party, Michael Howard (2003-
2005) dismissed UKIP as a party of ‘cranks and political gadflies’, while David Cameron, who succeeded 
Howard in late 2005, dismissed UKIP as ‘fruitcakes, loons, and closest racists’ (Lynch and Whitaker 
2013: 299). The purpose of this strategy was to undermine UKIP as a political party but, importantly, 
the strategy is distinct from Meguid’s ‘dismissive’ strategy inasmuch as the issue position of UKIP was 
not the subject of the strategy, rather, the party itself was the target.  
With regard to issue-oriented strategies, we witness a far messier picture. Under the leadership of 
David Cameron, the Conservatives withdrew (2009) from the European People’s Party and established 
a new grouping within the European Parliament; the Conservatives gave a ‘cast iron guarantee’ to 
hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty; and pledged to negotiate ‘British guarantees’ and ‘restore 
key powers to Britain’ (Cameron 2009). These policies follow the development of a soft-Eurosceptic 
position by the Conservative Party, a position that had been in development since the leadership of 
John Major (Lynch and Whitaker 2013). This soft Euroscepticism was distinct from the ‘withdrawalist’ 
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position of UKIP, and is therefore consistent with the hold strategy outlined by Bale et al. (2010).6 
Importantly, however, while the Conservative Party sought to develop its soft-Eurosceptic position in 
contrast to UKIP, it also sought to reduce the salience of the issue, dedicating fewer manifesto 
statements it (Lynch and Whitaker 2013). With regard to the European issue, then, the Conservative 
Party approach was two-pronged: it adopted an adversarial strategy with regards to positioning but a 
‘defusal’ strategy with regards to the saliency of the European issue (see Bale et al. 2010). Lynch and 
Whitaker (2013) are correct, then, in their conclusion that party competition is often messier than 
what Meguid’s ideal-typical strategies allow for.   
Similarly, during the 2017 General Election in the UK, assessments regarding the competence and 
reputation of the political parties and their leaders took pride of place, as the Conservative Party 
sought to reduce the election down to the ‘strong and stable’ leadership qualities of Theresa May 
(then-Prime Minister and leader of the British Conservative Party) or the inevitable ‘coalition of chaos’ 
that would follow the election of Jeremy Corbyn (then-leader of the British Labour Party). Indeed, 
these strategies were so prominent that the campaign slogan ‘strong and stable’ became widely 
derided by media and voters alike (Prosser 2018) while gaining new life as a ‘meme’ in the online 
political sphere. In fact, voting behaviour in the UK can be effectively modelled by considering just 
three factors: the reputation of both party and leader as well as the policies they pursue (Worcester 
et al. 2005). According to Stewart and Clarke (1992), the reputation of party leaders during the 1987 
General Election had a greater influence on voters than voters’ opinion of economic conditions. Of 
course, it is not only within the British electoral context that reputational assessments overtake issues. 
In reporting the 2003 General Election in Finland, Arter (2003: 155) noted that ‘in the finest traditions 
of Finnish general elections, the campaign was as dull as ditch water – virtually an issue-free zone. 
 
6 Lynch and Whitaker (2013) argue that the ‘soft Eurosceptic’ position of the Conservative Party during this 
period is consistent with the adversarial strategy developed by Meguid (2005, 2008). However, the adversarial 
strategy requires policy divergence, that is, movement away from the niche party position (Meguid 2008: 24 and 
30). Given that the Conservatives reinforced their existing position rather than move further away from UKIP, 
the strategy employed is more consistent with the ‘hold’ strategy of Bale et al. (2010) than the adversarial 
strategy of Meguid (2005, 2008).  
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Moreover, with clear signs of an impending downturn in the economy, the parties competed among 
themselves to promise the voters as little as possible’ (see also Downs and Riutta 2003). As with the 
UK, personalities and reputational qualities dominated (Nurmi and Nurmi 2003). The implication of 
this is that reputation must feature in any conception of party competition (Green 2007: 651). 
What has thus far been argued is that reputation is a fundamentally important component of voter 
decision-making as well as party competition. Before moving onto the specific strategies that will be 
explored within the analytical chapters of this thesis, it is first prudent to understand what is meant 
by reputation. In essence a reputation is a ‘characteristic or attribute ascribed to one actor by another’ 
(Salonen and Wiberg 1987: 160). It is an aggregate of past behaviours and transactions that establishes 
in the minds of other actors an estimation of future behaviour drawn from prior observations (Salonen 
and Wiberg 1987; Weigelt and Camerer 1988; Bowler 1990; Herbig and Milewicz 1993; Fombrun 
1996). For instance, if one is to say that an actor has a reputation for honesty, then one is making an 
historical observation of previous honesty by the actor as well as a prediction about likely honesty in 
the future (Salonen and Wiberg 1987: 160; Bowler 1990). Given this, therefore, reputation as a 
characteristic or attribute can be conceived of as a method for reducing the costs associated with 
decision-making. Indeed, the importance of reputation to decision-making can be witnessed in any 
transaction between individuals, individuals and organisations, or between organisations (Bowler 
1990).  
With regards to political parties, reputation can be conceived of in two ways. Firstly, as an issue-
dependent conception and secondly, a more generalised conception that incorporates the totality of 
party behaviour. The next few paragraphs will explore and outline these two conceptions.   
For the issue-dependent conception of reputation, let us return to the economic roots of spatial 
theory. Consider the following: Located at 1920 Main Street is Hotelling’s Emporium for Amazing 
Goods. It is one of several businesses in the area specialising in providing consumers with a range of 
quality goods. When consumers visit the store, they peruse the aisles looking for high quality products. 
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Although consumers will make their decisions at the point of purchase, the quality of many products 
at Hotelling’s Emporium will remain unknown until they are consumed (Weigelt and Camerer 1988). 
Producers of high-quality goods will therefore wish to signal to consumers the quality of their goods 
before consumers make a decision regarding purchase. Consumers themselves will use the reputation 
of the goods or store to infer the quality of the product (Herbig and Milewicz 1993). Reputation 
therefore reduces the costs for consumers, with a positive reputation increasing the likelihood of 
purchase for producers and stores, and a negative reputation decreasing such likelihoods. Of course, 
in the event that the product does not live up to expectation, consumers can often return the product, 
and incorporate the quality of the product into future decisions, in essence, reducing the reputation 
of the producer or store in question, and thereby reducing potential future purchases.  
Certain types of goods and services are rather unlike the ones previously mentioned inasmuch as they 
are bought prior to use. These ‘credence goods or services’ (Fombrun 1996: 7) are bought on 
reputation alone. For instance, one cannot know the quality of the service provided by a bank, law 
firm, hospital, or university, without first using that service. Paying thousands for a service without 
proof of quality is highly risky, and therefore, consumers will use the reputation of the business or 
organisation to infer the quality of their services. So, consider Downs’ Publishing House and suppose 
that a consumer wishes to hire a writer to develop a better analogy for their work. The reputation of 
Downs’ Publishing House will be instrumental to the decision-making of that consumer. While the 
Publishing House might be able to provide a portfolio of previous works, there is no guarantee of 
continued good service, nor indeed that the Publishing House has the capacity to provide the service 
required by the consumer. However, given the stellar reputation of the Publishing House, the 
consumer can infer the likely quality of the service provided. As with the above example, in extremis, 
the consumer can demand a refund if the Publishing House fails to deliver, and incorporate this 
experience into future decision-making. 
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In both examples, then, reputation provides a useful heuristic in aiding the consumer to reduce the 
costs associated with imperfect information in decision-making with regards to the purchase of goods 
or services. As a positive reputation is good for business, businesses and organisations value their 
reputations, and often invest considerable resources to build, sustain, and defend them, often hiring 
public relations firms and advertisers to help promote a positive reputation (Fombrun 1996). A 
business or organisation’s reputation is thus an ‘enlightened investment’ that holds economic value 
derived from its ability to reinforce the business’ competitiveness (Fombrun 1996: 6).  
Of course, the transactions outlined above do not apply to the political marketplace in the same way. 
To maintain the already exhausted analogy, assume that political parties offer policies as products and 
that voters purchase these products through voting. Unlike the first example, the transaction is not 
simultaneous, that is, voters do not cast a vote at the same time that parties deliver upon policies. The 
delivery of the policy can often be months or years after the voter has voted and while this might be 
similar to the second example, the ability to demand a refund does not exist as a nuclear option. 
Voters must therefore trust that political parties will deliver upon the promised policies. This situation 
creates a lot of uncertainty for voters as while they might favour the policy offered by a particular 
party, they have no guarantee that the party will implement the policy should it win the election. As 
with businesses in a marketplace, then, political parties are incentivised to develop and maintain 
reputations for honesty and following through by delivering on promised policy. While maintaining a 
positive reputation might restrict the ability of the party to shift its policy positions (see Downs 1957; 
Klingemann et al. 2006; Meguid 2008), reputations represent enlightened investments that hold 
political value. As outlined above, not only do positive reputations reduce uncertainty for voters but 
they also offer a mechanism for differentiation when two parties espouse the same policy positions. 
Reconsider the example above: if the mainstream conservative party shifts its policy position towards 
that of the radical right party, on what basis do voters distinguish between the two parties?  
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Reputation can help here in that it allows voters to distinguish between two parties that share 
common ground on the same issue dimension. It also introduces the ability to political parties to 
manipulate both their own reputation and that of their competitors. In this way, the space becomes 
two-dimensional, and parties can manipulate the reputational dimension just as they would the issue 
dimension. Figure 2.2 illustrates this, and shows a successful reputational attack by the mainstream 
party on the radical right niche party. By seeking to damage the reputation of the radical right niche 
party, the mainstream conservative party in our example is attempting to gain ground by reducing the 
reputation of the niche party while also trying to establish competence-based issue ownership.  
There are numerous sub-dimensions to the concept of issue-ownership including a competence 
dimension. However, it should be noted that a party’s reputation on an issue is more than just its 
competence or performance. For instance, and has been outlined above, an incumbent party might 
be able to overcome poor performance if it enjoys a strong reputational advantage on the issue (see 
Bélanger and Nadeau 2015). Competence, honesty, and regular attention to issues or particular 
constituencies can all be considered facets of reputation. 
 
Figure 2.2: A demonstration of the successful implementation of a reputational strategy against the 
niche party by the mainstream party 
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However, as has been alluded to throughout this section, reputation as a concept can be broader than 
just performance or advantage on a particular issue. Indeed, political parties have reputations that are 
broader than single issues. When American voters accuse the Republican Party of being ‘for the 1%’ 
this evaluation is not based on a single issue but is rather an aggregate of the party’s past behaviours 
and policy initiatives that have established in the minds of some voters an estimation of future 
behaviour. A single policy initiative, for a long-lived political party, is not enough to create such an 
enduring reputation. The reputation is the result of decades of similar policy initiatives surrounding 
taxation and government spending, as well as statements made by personnel, elected representatives, 
and the party central office. All these facets come together in the minds of voters, and culminate into 
their perception that the Republican Party favours the wealthy.  
General reputations are open to manipulation by political parties. For example, when Theresa May 
attacked the leadership capabilities of Jeremy Corbyn, she was not focusing on his capacity to perform 
on particular issues but was condemning his perceived leadership qualities more generally, and by 
extension was damaging the reputation of the Labour Party – the reputation of party leaders can often 
central to elections (Graetz and McAllister 1987) and while there is a great deal of reputational 
symbiosis between leader and party, research suggests that the greater transfer is from leader to party 
(Davies and Mian 2008), and therefore in condemning Corbyn May was attacking the Labour Party 
itself. Similarly, the modernisation agenda of the British Conservative Party under David Cameron 
(leader between 2005 and 2016) was an attempt to ‘undo’ the reputation that it had developed for 
being rather ‘nasty’ (Bale 2008). This reputation was the product of decades of Thatcherite policies as 
well as statements and positions made by leading Conservatives. By embodying a younger, fresher-
faced leader, as well as repositioning on a whole swathe of issues, David Cameron sought to 
manipulate the general reputation of the Conservative Party.  
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2.10. From Toolkit to Arsenal: An Extensive Range of Mainstream Party Strategies 
This discussion has shown that, when threatened by a niche party competitor, mainstream political 
parties have access to an array of strategies that focus upon the dimensionality of the political space, 
the issues that the niche party raises or emphasises, and the niche party itself. Importantly, 
mainstream political parties can also undermine niche party ownership over issues or indeed the 
niche party itself through the reputational strategies that were developed above. The following 
section will outline the analytical framework employed in this thesis. It starts with the dimensional 
strategies, then continues by presenting the issue-based strategies and how the two relate. It 
finishes by outlining the party-based strategies.  
 
2.10.1. Dimensional Strategies 
As argued above, radical right niche parties will contest elections on a range of issues but these issues 
will form part of a cultural, rather than an economic, dimension of competition. In response, 
mainstream parties can choose whether or not to position themselves on this cultural dimension, the 
degree of emphasis they place on this dimension should they decide to position themselves on it, and 
can even how they define the issues associated with that dimension. The dimensional strategies 
employed in this conception of party competition are as follows:  
The unidimensional Strategy: the mainstream party will emphasise and position itself on the core 
economic dimension, and associated issues, and will ignore other dimensions of competition. While 
Alonso et al. (2012), Rovny (2013), Elias et al. (2015), and Basile (2015) do not consider saliency in their 
dimensional approach, it is likely that by playing down the importance of the cultural dimension, the 
salience of this dimension as a whole will decline, indicating that cultural issues ‘lack merit’ (see 
Meguid 2005, 2008).  
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The subsuming strategy: the mainstream political party will reframe issues belonging to the cultural 
dimension of competition in economic terms. Given that greater attention is afforded to these cultural 
issues, it is likely that the salience of these issues will increase, while the cultural dimension will lose 
saliency, given the reframing of the issues into economic terms.  
The blurring strategy: the mainstream party will position itself on the cultural dimension in an 
ambiguous way. It is likely that such a strategy will increase the saliency of the cultural dimension to 
a moderate extent as the mainstream party does nothing to signal its lack of importance, but 
tokenistically recognises it as legitimate.  
The two-dimensional strategy: the mainstream party will position itself clearly on both the economic 
and cultural dimensions. The saliency of the cultural dimension should increase.  
 
2.10.2. Issue Strategies 
The issue strategies employed in this conception of party competition are as follows: 
The accommodative strategy: the mainstream party shifts its position on an issue towards that of the 
niche party and attempts to claim ownership over that issue. The effect of such a strategy is to increase 
the saliency of the issue and therefore increase the vote share of the issue owner.  
The adversarial strategy: the mainstream party shifts its position on an issue away from that of the 
niche party and does nothing to challenge niche party ownership over the issue. As the mainstream 
party declares its opposition to the niche party and calls attention to the niche challenger and its issue, 
the saliency of the issue is increased.  
The dismissive strategy: the mainstream party completely ignores the issue and in doing so, reduces 
the saliency of the issue by starving it of attention.  
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The hold strategy: the mainstream party maintains and reinforces its existing policy position. The 
effect on saliency of such a strategy is unclear. On the one hand, by the mainstream party reinforcing 
its existing position, one could envisage an increase in saliency, but on the other, by failing to draw 
attention to any change in the status quo, it is possible that saliency remains the same or decreases.  
The reputational strategy: the mainstream party seeks to undermine the reputation of the niche party 
on a particular issue. This should increase the saliency of the issue by calling greater attention to it.   
Before moving on to addressing party-oriented strategies, it is important to note the links between 
dimensional and issue strategies, as these two types of strategy are not wholly independent of each 
other. Rather, the adoption of a particular dimensional strategy will dictate what issue strategies can 
be employed. For instance, it would be impossible for a political party to adopt a dimensional blurring 
strategy and a strongly adversarial issue strategy at the same time. The former entails an ambiguous 
position on a particular dimension while the latter is an unambiguous position.  
In work focused on the territorial dimension in party competition in Italy, and that demonstrates that 
once a political party has adopted a two-dimensional strategy then Meguid’s (2005, 2008) issue-based 
strategies come into effect, Basile (2015) develops a typology that joins dimensional and issue 
strategies. In her typology, she distinguishes between what she calls directional certainty and saliency. 
Directional certainty concerns the issue-strategies that are used and is calculated as a sum of quasi-
sentences drawn from party manifestos (see Chapter 6 for details). This scale runs from, in the terms 
of this thesis, strongly adversarial through ambiguous to strongly accommodative. Saliency, here, is 
conceived of as a scale ranging from 0 to 100 and demonstrates the level of interest that a party shows 
in a particular issue. As previously, it is based on the number of quasi-sentences in party manifestos, 
with zero quasi-sentences related to the issue indicating ‘no interest’, with between 0.1 percent and 
3.3 percent of the total manifesto consisting of relevant quasi-sentences indicating ‘minor interest’, 
and with 3.3 percent and up indicating ‘major interest’.  
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Figure 2.3 presents an adaption of that typology. The first column details whether the issue being 
contested is salient or not, while subsequent columns (adversarial, neutral, accommodative) describe 
the issue-oriented strategies that are adopted. The differing levels of saliency in Basile’s (2015) 
typology seemed to offer little beyond introducing additional categories for parties. The benefit of 
doing this is not immediately obvious nor provided by Basile, and for the sake of simplicity, then, has 
been dispensed with. Secondly, the weak, adversarial and accommodative strategies have been 
reconceptualised. Basile (2015) considers these strategies to be no different from the blurring 
strategy. In reality, however, a weak accommodative or adversarial strategy still indicates a directional 
preference and is therefore distinct from the blurring strategy which represents a party deliberately 
avoiding directional positioning. Finally, given that the reputational strategy is extremely flexible and 
can be employed in combination with any of the strategies developed above and below, it has been 
excluded from Figure 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.3: The combined dimensional-issue strategies  
 Dimensionality and Issue Positioning 
Adversarial No Direction Accommodative 
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By combining the dimensional and issue-oriented strategies, seven dimensional-issue strategy 
combinations are achieved. Importantly, by formulating combined dimensional-issue strategies, the 
majority of the dimensional and issue-based strategies outlined above are made redundant. That is, 
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all with the exception of the subsuming dimensional strategy and the reputational issue strategy no 
longer remain. These seven dimensional-issue strategies are thus: 
[1] The one-dimensional dismissive strategy: The mainstream party does not devote any attention to 
the second dimension, making this a one-dimensional strategy, and by doing this it dismisses cultural 
issues.  
[2] The two-dimensional adversarial strategy: The mainstream party devotes attention to the second 
dimension, making it salient, and meaning that it engages in a two-dimensional strategy. Moreover, it 
chooses to position itself on that second, cultural dimension in a position that it is contrast to the 
radical right, meaning it adopts an adversarial position.  
[3] The reluctant two-dimensional adversarial strategy: This strategy is similar to the last one, but is 
adopted with far less vigour and conviction.  
[4] The blurring strategy: The mainstream party does pay attention to the cultural dimension but is 
unwilling to adopt a clear position on the issue(s) encompassed by this dimension. This suggests that 
the mainstream party might be paying attention to the cultural dimension and its issues – perhaps out 
of necessity or because it feels ‘forced’ to – but that it does not wish to risk upsetting supporters who 
might lose faith with the party should it adopt a position on this second dimension that is contrary to 
their own.  
[5] The two-dimensional hold strategy: The mainstream party has previously recognised the 
dimension (i.e., it does not dismiss it), has a clear position on it with regards to specific issues, and has 
chosen to maintain that position. 
[6] The reluctant two-dimensional accommodative strategy: The mainstream party is devoting 
attention to the second dimension and the issues on it but is unwilling to adopt a strong 
accommodative strategy.  It does this because, while it wishes to indicate to some supporters that it 
is willing to accommodate the issues they care about or wishes to signal to potential supporters that 
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it cares about certain issues, it does so in a reluctant fashion only, so as to avoid upsetting other 
supporters who might not be so supportive a strong accommodative position and an overture to the 
radical right. Its reluctance to engage in a full accommodative strategy might also be explained by 
other factors, including previous policy announcements or reputation.  
[7] The two-dimensional accommodative strategy: The mainstream party recognises the second 
dimension and thus competes on it and takes a position on the issues of this dimension. Moreover, its 
position is an accommodative one, in that it occupies a similar position to that of the radical right.  
As noted above, to these we can add the two strategies that remain from the earlier list, namely, [8] 
the (dimensional) subsuming strategy, and [9] the (issue) reputational strategy (both as explained 
above).  
  
2.10.3. Party Strategies 
Turning to the party strategies, those employed in this conception of party competition are as follows: 
[10] The ignore strategy: The mainstream party simply ignores the niche party. This can be as a result 
of deliberate policy or the perceived unimportance of the niche party either in terms of coalition 
potential, blackmail potential, or capacity to steal votes. The ignore strategy is distinct from the 
dismissive strategy in that it is a party-oriented strategy and is thus focused purely on the niche party 
as a party, not on the issue(s) that the niche party emphases. The distinction between the ignore 
strategy and the dismissive strategy presented above [1], from the perspective of operationalisation, 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
[11] The isolate strategy: The mainstream party cooperates with other mainstream parties to form 
anti-niche blocking or grand coalitions with the intent to exclude the niche party from office. The 
mainstream party will reject any form of cooperation with the niche party and might even engage in 
a désistement républicain or ‘mutual withdrawal’, where weaker mainstream candidates in 
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constituencies or races drop out in favour of a stronger candidate from a different mainstream party. 
This strategy therefore applies a cordon sanitaire to the niche party.  
[12] The strategy of imposing of legal restrictions: The mainstream party, often in cooperation with 
other mainstream parties, will seek to i) ban the niche party outright; ii) raise electoral thresholds; iii) 
restrict niche party access to media; iv) restrict niche party access to public funds; v) alter registration 
requirements, deposits, or signatures required for candidacy to make these more difficult for the niche 
party; vi) change the ballot structure of the electoral system in a way that hinders the niche party; 
and/or vii) introduce any other institutional or legal requirements to restrict the success of the niche 
party. 
[13] The collaborate strategy: The mainstream party seeks to cooperate with the niche party. This 
collaboration can take the form of joint tickets, standing down in certain races, electoral alliances, and 
formal coalitions. 
[14] The co-optation of personnel strategy: The mainstream party can pinch the leaders, officials, or 
other personnel of the niche party through the offering of jobs, portfolios, and/or other roles within 
the mainstream party. The intention here is to hollow out the niche party as an organisation through 
a co-optation of personnel only (policy co-optation would constitute an accommodative strategy [6] 
and [7]). 
[15] The party reputational strategy: The mainstream party directly attacks the reputation of the niche 
party, seeking to delegitimise it in the eyes of voters, and potentially avoiding a discussion of the issues 
with which the niche party is associated. This strategy is distinct from the issue reputational strategy 
[9] in that the issue reputational strategy is solely concerned with damaging another party’s 
reputation on a particular issue, while the party reputational strategy [15] is concerned with damaging 
the reputation of the party without necessarily calling attention to issues. 
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2.11. Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed the large literature on party competition and in doing so has brought 
together several strands of research. This has enabled the development of an enhanced toolkit or 
arsenal of strategies that principal parties can employ against the radical right. Moreover, the chapter 
has also introduced a new dimension of competition on which both principal parties and radical right 
parties can compete, namely the reputational dimension. Together, all these strategies provide a 
framework for analysis that can be deployed in this thesis to identify which strategies principal parties 
adopt against the radical right. Before this analysis is undertaken, however, the next chapter (chapter 
3) considers the various contextual factors that impact upon the sorts or types of strategies that 




3. Factors Influencing Party Strategies 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Following on from Chapter 2, which introduced a new model of competition between principal parties 
and radical right parties, this chapter will focus on the various factors that may influence the types of 
strategies that principal parties choose to employ. It is guided by two obvious but important 
observations: first, that parties are not unitary actors, and are instead groupings of actors, each with 
different concerns, interests and levels of influence; and second, that parties do not exist in a vacuum. 
Rather, they compete with rivals, and exist within an institutional framework.  
Addressing the first of these two observations, the chapter begins by exploring the evolution of 
parties, as organisations, from their origins as cadre or elite parties, through their development into 
mass parties, catch-all parties, and finally to cartel parties. This summary is of relevance because it 
provides an overview of how the different groups within parties, or the different ‘faces’ of party 
organisation (Katz and Mair 1993), have been empowered or constrained in different times and 
contexts. And this matters, because where power lies within political parties, and the extent to which 
different actors within parties exert influence, shape which strategies parties decide to pursue. Having 
sketched out this evolution of parties, the chapter then concentrates on party leadership. Party 
leaders are incredibly important actors in terms of intra-party organisation but also in respect of the 
leader’s ability to win votes, especially in the context of ever personalised or ‘media centric’ 
campaigns. The centrality of the leader has been reinforced through a number of processes including 
greater personalisation, presidentialisation, and even Europeanisation – each of which are discussed 
in turn – and each of which have contributed to the growing power and influence of leaders within 
their respective organisations. As a consequence, leaders are at the forefront of developing and 
executing party strategies.  
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As indicated, however, political parties play host to a range of different actors each with their own 
goals and interests. Therefore, having detailed the importance of leaders to the development of party 
strategies, the chapter then turns its attention to the impact that factions can have on party strategies. 
In particular, this section distinguishes between factions of interest and principle, and explores the 
potential impact that these different types of factions could have on party strategy. It also considers 
the relationship between factions and the leadership, the extent to which factions are a help or 
hinderance to party leaders, and how factions may influence party strategies.  
Of course, parties do not exist in a vacuum and therefore this chapter will consider a number of 
additional factors, starting with auxiliary organisations. Auxiliary organisations are external to political 
parties but often have very close relationships with parties. These relationships can often affect the 
sorts of policies that parties pursue but can also impact on the overall goals of a party, including the 
sorts of strategies that a party adopts.  
The discussion of all these facets of party life, and of their impact on party strategies clearly invites a 
closer examination of party goals, and it to this that the chapter turns next. It explores how certain 
goals encourage particular approaches with regard to strategies. Moreover, the chapter considers not 
only the goals of a single party, but also how the goals of another party can be influential in 
determining a party’s goals and ultimately its strategies. This then leads into a discussion of radical 
right parties. That is, given the focus of the thesis, it is important to explore how radical right parties 
can influence the strategies that the principal parties adopt. In particular, the goals, leadership, 
organisation, and even level of institutionalisation of radical right parties are all likely to have a bearing 
on the sorts of strategies that principal parties might opt for.  
Finally, the chapter considers the institutional environment in which principal parties exist, focusing 
in particular on the electoral system. It examines how electoral systems can influence the strategies 
principal parties pursue, and explores both the impact that electoral systems have on strategies as 
well as their impact on leadership, factions, and radical right parties. 
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3.2. Party Type 
The parties of old, so-called cadre or elite parties, were leadership-dominated parties with minimal 
operations outside of the parliamentary environment (Wolinetz 2002). With the expansion of the 
franchise, new political parties came into being, primarily among newly activated constituencies, such 
as the working classes (Katz and Mair 1995). These mass parties (Duverger 1963) relied upon and 
engaged with a large pool of voters as supporters and members, often drawn from a single stratum of 
society (such as the working class), and sought to integrate that social group into the ‘body politic’ 
(Katz and Mair 1995; Krouwel 2003; Sartori 2005a). Indeed, it is this integration that distinguishes 
mass parties from elite or cadre parties. 
By contrast to the cadre party, then, the mass party was activist-dominated and required a strong 
commitment from members, bringing them into the wider, more extensive party organisation, and 
often providing them with a range of services (such as support and education) via ancillary 
organisations (Krouwel 2003). As a result of competition from the new mass parties cadre parties 
sought to appeal to wider constituencies (Koole 1996), inviting supporters to join as members but 
without restructuring their organisations to incorporate new members in the decision-making 
processes of the party.  
In the years that followed, drawing upon the wider observations of Downs (1957a, b; see Chapter 2), 
Kirchheimer (1966; see also Wolinetz 2002; Krouwel 2003) noted that mass parties gradually began to 
abandon their dependence upon, and support for, particular social groups in favour of a wider pool of 
voters. This process occurred as social groupings and identities became less distinct due to changing 
social and economic contexts, and in light of these weakening cleavages, the ties between parties and 
specific groups of voters began to wane (Dalton 2004). Parties now had to appeal to a wider pool of 
voters, and this necessitated a dilution of the party’s ideological appendages, and positional shifts 
towards the centre of the political spectrum. The process of ‘de-ideologisation’ was accompanied by 
the downgrading of the role of the individual party member – as party members served to constrain 
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the ability of parties to shift positions – and the strengthening of the party leadership, perhaps 
confirming the inevitable oligarchisation of democratic organisations (Michels 1962). In addition, party 
organisations were professionalised. As voters were no longer as committed or loyal to particular 
political parties, and as the new catch-all party was more reliant on transitory bases of support, it 
became increasingly more important to actively ‘sell’ the party to voters (Kirchheimer 1966). This 
marketisation of the party was accompanied by an increasing reliance on external technocratic actors 
such as marketing consultants, strategists, and psephologists (Kirchheimer 1966; see also Panebianco 
1988). And as the catch-all party became increasingly professionalised, so too did it become 
increasingly capital intensive, relying more and more on state subsidies and interest group 
contributions (Kirchheimer 1966).  
The success of the new catch-all party prompted other parties to reform their organisations in a similar 
fashion, thereby encouraging widespread de-ideologisation and a growing attention to leadership 
characteristics and popular issues (Wolinetz 2002). For instance, the social democratic parties of 
Norway and Sweden began erasing the distinctive elements of their programmatic profiles in favour 
of much more centrist orientations. Similarly, the communist parties of Italy and France abandoned 
their existing ideological commitments in favour of more moderate social democratic orientations 
(Krouwel 2003).  
This, however, made catch-all parties particularly vulnerable to the whims of voters who were no 
longer bound to particular parties. Unable to rely upon the loyalty of such voters, and with party 
operations, campaigning, and activity generally becoming increasingly expensive, parties began co-
opting the state apparatus, becoming progressively more dependent upon state resources and 
subsidies in order to not only compete but to actually survive (Katz and Mair 1995; Wolinetz 2002). 
Renamed ‘cartel’ parties, these parties were even more ‘catch all’ than the catch-all party in so far as 
they fished in a far wider pool, engaged in primarily capital-intensive campaigns, emphasised their 
managerial skills and efficiency, and were even further removed from their members, who became 
59 
 
barely distinguishable from ordinary voters (Katz and Mair 1995; Wolinetz 2002). Yet, what 
characterises the cartel party above all else, is its willingness to coalesce with rivals to ensure its 
continued access to state resources. The net effect, then, is the ‘toning down of competition’ (Katz 
and Mair 1995: 23) and therefore a reduced responsiveness to public opinion. At the same time 
though, and as was argued in Chapter 2, general reputations as well as perceptions of trust and 
competence became more important. At its extreme, the cartelisation of parties might also imply the 
absence of policy issues in party competition as parties emphasise managerial teams and competency. 
As such, programmatic differences are eroded, and the distinction between governmental and 
opposition parties are blurred or imperceptible (Katz and Mair 1995).  
This brief summary of the processes of party evolution has highlighted the gradual strengthening of 
leaderships within parties over time, and it points to leaderships being particularly important in 
determining which strategies the parties choose to pursue. It is therefore worth examining the role of 
party leaderships, and how and why this has changed, in a little more depth.  
 
3.3. Leadership: Growing Autonomy, Personalisation, Presidentialisation, and Europeanisation 
While different leaders have different abilities and act on those abilities in different ways, it is 
generally assumed that leaders are instrumental in devising and implementing the strategies of parties 
(Harmel et al. 1995). After all, it is the leadership that generally controls the main apparatus of the 
party and establishes a sense of direction. Leaders are responsible for communicating the policies and 
messages of the party, in championing the party, and in defending it. Beyond this, party leaders are 
also responsible for overseeing relations with party members, for managing the party’s links with 
other parties and key actors and/or organisations, for directing relationships with voters, and for 
securing electoral victory (or perhaps limiting the impact of defeat). Indeed, owing to their position, 
leaders in political parties can have considerable influence over the organisations that they lead, at 
least theoretically (King 2002). This is especially so during a transition in leadership, which can 
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represent a ‘natural entry point’ for change (Gilmore 2003: 10-11), and while leadership changes can 
be destabilising influences, they provide an opportunity to reconsider the commitment to a particular 
agenda or set of issues (Gilmore 2003). 
When thinking of party leadership, it is worth distinguishing between direct and indirect influence. 
Direct influence is the impact that leaders have as a result of who they are, how they appear, the 
manner in which they present themselves, as well as how charismatic they are, and the strength of 
their oratory skills (King 2002). For instance, former US president Barack Obama embodied a range of 
positive leadership traits from sociability to charisma, and something more symbolically important: he 
was a black candidate and then president in a country that has, for centuries, struggled with issues of 
racial inequality, identity, and racism. Obama’s ‘blackness’ therefore reinforced his message of 
change. 
Indirect influences, by contrast, are the product of what a leader does rather than what a leader is 
(King 2002). The leader who changes the ideology of their party or modernises its image is said to have 
exercised indirect influence (King 2002). A prominent example can be found in François Mitterrand, 
the leader of the French Socialist Party. Mitterrand won the French presidential election in 1981 not 
because of who he was – as King (2002: 5) wryly observes ‘he had been François Mitterrand for a very 
long time and, as such, had lost two previous presidential elections’ – but rather because of what he 
did with regard to the ideology of the Socialist Party: transforming its ideology and image (King 2002). 
This is not to suggest, however, that the personality of the leader – the direct influences – do not 
themselves impact upon the indirect influences that a leader has. Few would doubt that Margaret 
Thatcher’s strength, sense of purpose, and tenacity in achieving her goals was not instrumental in 
reforming her party’s policy platform and overall image (King 2002). The point is that just as leaders 
possess characteristics that can make them formidable – or useless non-events – a strong character is 
not in of itself a guarantee that the leader will achieve their desired goals. Indeed, there are a whole 
61 
 
range of obstacles or even veto-players (see Tsebelis 2002) that will prevent a leader from achieving 
meaningful changes (see below).  
The impact that leaders can have is thus multifaceted. What is more, there is a lack of agreement in 
the scholarly literature about the actual impact that leaders have, particularly in terms of their direct 
influence. While some conclude that leaders do matter in terms of winning elections (Stokes 1966; 
Kelley and Mirer 1974; Miller et al. 1986; Stewart and Clarke 1992; Clarke et al. 2004; Worcester et al. 
2005; Bittner 2011), others find leaders do not matter (Klingemann and Taylor 1978; Shanks and Miller 
1991; Miller and Shanks 1996; Bartle et al. 1997; King 2002), and others are unsure (Graetz and 
McAllister 1987; Crewe and King 1994; Holmberg and Oscarsson 2013).  
When presented with a range of options, voters will most often make up their minds on the basis of 
the parties, the policies on offer, and the qualities of the respective leaders (Worcester et al. 2005; 
Blais 2013). What is more, leaders have become increasingly important since the latter half of the 
twentieth century because of the rise of media and television in particular (Poguntke and Webb 2005; 
Blondel and Thiébault 2010; Blais 2013; Ohr 2013). Television is by its very nature a visual medium in 
which complicated exposition – which is perhaps more easily communicated through text – is often 
displaced by soundbites, simplified speech, and images, with a focus given to individual actors. 
Television, therefore, tends to favour the personalising of politics and this personalisation provides 
leaders with a structural advantage compared to other actors or institutions (Poguntke and Webb 
2005; Ohr 2013). Indeed, ‘if one reduces politics to its bare bones, to what is most visible to most 
citizens, it is the national political leaders, both at home and abroad, that remain once everything else 
has been erased; they are the most universal, the most recognized, the most talked about elements 
of political life’ (Blondel 1987: 1).  
However, it should be acknowledged that while television can provide a strong structural advantage 
for leaders, it can also prove to be a huge disadvantage as the failings or ‘quirks’ of an individual leader 
can damage a party’s entire campaign. A strange but prominent example of this is Ed Miliband (UK 
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Labour leader 25 September 2010 – 8 May 2015) whose general ‘dorkiness’ – including his inability to 
eat a bacon sandwich properly – proved surprisingly damaging. This of course can be mitigated by the 
personality of the leader in question. For instance, Boris Johnson is no stranger to gaffes, yet whether 
it be falling over in a pond or getting stuck on a zipwire, these media faux pas have done little to 
damage his image; indeed, they served to reinforce his desired image as the ‘lovable rogue’.  
While this personalisation of politics, and accompanied mediatisation, has been said to have helped 
many mainstream politicians such as Tony Blair (Worcester et al. 2005) and Silvio Berlusconi (Blondel 
and Thiébault 2010) achieve electoral success, it is an especially important factor for radical right 
parties that often lack the resources of larger, more mainstream parties, and whose leaders often 
dominate their respective parties in terms of media image and voter association. It is difficult to 
imagine the success of the Pim Fortuyn List or the Austrian Freedom Party without Pim Fortuyn and 
Jörg Haider, respectively, for instance. Radical right parties tend to ‘create a minimalist structure 
around the party leadership’ (Mudde 2007: 270) and without that leader, the party can ‘fade into 
oblivion’ (Carter 2005: 65).  
Having said all this, the influence of leaders should not be overstated. From the outset, political parties 
and the actors within them try and limit the range of individuals who can become leadership 
contenders, and even when candidates are (s)elected, parties still maintain some control over their 
leader (King 2002), albeit with notable variation across different types of parties. Even strong leaders 
who otherwise dominate their parties can be removed relatively quickly when their usefulness is 
exhausted. Margaret Thatcher’s influence on the Conservative Party was extraordinary, yet when she 
became an electoral liability, she was hastily replaced (Bale 2010).  
The pre-eminence of leaders in ‘media-centred democracies’ (Swanson and Mancini 1996) is also a 
function of the need to simplify an otherwise complicated political reality (King 2002). Given the 
limited capacity of voters to understand the political world, reducing politics down to particular 
leaders and their personalities might well serve as a useful heuristic with which to understand and 
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communicate political information, especially during campaigns (King 2002). This complexity makes it 
difficult to identify the effect that leaders have in terms of direct influences.  
The increased prominence of leaders resulting from the above-mentioned factors has also had 
consequences for the power of party leaders within their own parties, so much so that some scholars 
have begun to refer to the ‘presidentialisation’ of party politics (Aylott 2005; Calise 2005; Poguntke 
and Webb 2005; Webb et al. 2012; Webb and Poguntke 2013; Passarelli 2015). The presidentialisation 
thesis holds that parties undergo a process in which they adopt characteristics more commonly 
associated with presidential styles of leadership (Poguntke and Webb 2005). This sees the leadership 
become imbued with additional ‘power resources’, it exercises considerable autonomy, and there is a 
(significant) personalising of the electoral process. Of course, this thesis has not gone unchallenged, 
with some arguing that parties in parliamentary systems cannot become truly presidentialised 
(Samuels and Shugart 2010). However, the point of relevance here is not the ultimate extent to which 
parties in parliamentary regimes can become presidentialised, but rather the gradual process of 
increased leadership autonomy, with leaders increasing their power relative to other actors within 
their parties (Poguntke and Webb 2005; Webb et al. 2012; Webb and Poguntke 2013; Passarelli 2015). 
The growing presidentialisation of parties is demonstrated in a number of cases, with one of the most 
prominent examples being Silvio Berlusconi and his ‘Go Italy’ (Forza Italia) party, which he founded in 
1994, essentially as an extension of his corporate and media interests (Casile 2005). The senior 
echelons of the party were primarily filled by executives drawn from Berlusconi’s companies, and the 
party itself served a single purpose: the election of Berlusconi as the prime minister of Italy (Casile 
2005). Berlusconi held complete control over the organisational and communicative capacity of the 
party and therefore removed any boundaries between him and the party he created (Casile 2005). 
This reached a pinnacle in the 2001 Italian general election when the House of Freedoms – an electoral 
coalition consisting of Go Italy, the National Alliance, the (Northern) League, and a handful of other 
smaller parties – ran a campaign that heavily focused on marketing Berlusconi as Italy’s next prime 
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minister. The campaign strategy itself focused on distributing billboards at key public locations such 
as town squares, railway stations, and airports, all depicting ‘President Berlusconi’ (Parker and Natale 
2002). Furthermore, given the lack of spending limits during Italian election campaigns, Berlusconi 
sent a magazine copy of his autobiography, An Italian Story, to every lucky voter in Italy (Parker and 
Natale 2002). As Donovan (2001) observes: the electoral strategy was to marginalise issues in favour 
of presidentialisation.  
Italy is perhaps an extreme case but other examples of presidentialisation at work exist. In Sweden, 
for instance, party leaders have increased their intra-party autonomy by making greater use of their 
ability to nominate persons external to parliament to ministerial posts, a process that bears 
remarkable similarity to the manner in which presidents appoint ministers in presidential systems 
(Aylott 2005). This power has been increasingly exercised in recent years by Social Democratic leaders 
in particular (Aylott 2005), with former prime minister Göran Persson having a habit of appointing 
ministers who had no base within the governing party and no principal other than that of the prime 
minister (Ruin 1991). Indeed, so common did this style of leadership become, that during the 2002 
general election, Persson was regularly criticised as running a presidential-styled government 
(Madeley 2003).   
Of course, the presidentialisation thesis also needs to be seen in the context of wider social change 
which, as discussed above, has seen a breakdown of ties between specific groups of voters and specific 
political parties and the consequent evolution of parties to more catch-all, and then cartel, 
organisations.  
Alongside the deliberate moves by party leaders to increase their power within their parties, as 
reflected in the presidentialisation thesis, the changing nature of how politics is conducted in the 
modern era has also had the result of strengthening party leaderships. Indeed, in recent decades, 
many policies that focus on the most important issues confronting countries – from terrorism and 
climate change to immigration and security – are shaped at the international level, often through 
65 
 
intergovernmental or sometimes supranational organisations (Poguntke and Webb 2005). And 
because it is heads of government who are the actors operating and making decisions in these 
organisations, they have accrued power at the expense of other actors, including national legislatures 
and even cabinets. Often, national legislatures are reduced to merely rubberstamping agreements 
negotiated by national leaders, not least because while the possibility of accountability does exist post 
facto, the reality is that many of these negotiations are conducted in secrecy (Carter and Poguntke 
2010). This is especially the case for member states of the European Union where growing 
‘Europeanisation’ has resulted in national parliaments and parties being increasingly excluded from 
decision-making in many areas, thereby enhancing the power and autonomy of leaders (Raunio 2002; 
Carter et al. 2007; Carter and Poguntke 2010; Ladrech 2007a, b). 
Here, Europeanisation is the process by which political parties adjust both behaviourally and 
organisationally as a result of increased European integration (Raunio 2002; Carter et al. 2007; Ladrech 
2007a; Poguntke et al. 2007). The instructional structures of the European Union privilege national 
executives in as much as they are the key actors in both the European Council (heads of government) 
and the Council of the European Union (national minsters), and the influence of national parties is 
extremely limited in this system of governance. While MEPs, including those from parties in opposition 
at the national level, do exercise some power, the European Parliament is just one body in this overall 
institutional architecture, and it is a supranational one at that, meaning that MEPs take direction from 
their EP party groups as well as their national parties. These arrangements, along with the limited 
ability of national parliaments to exercise ex-post control over national leaderships as mentioned 
above, all work together to enhance national leadership autonomy and to produce an ‘executive bias’ 
(Carter and Poguntke 2010). What is more, in addition to this institutional logic, the ability of national 
parties to hold their leaders to account is exacerbated by ‘informational asymmetries’ between 
leaders and other actors (Raunio 2002). In other words, domestic actors ‘do not fully know the 
competencies or preferences of their agents [i.e., their ministers] or the exact demands of the task at 
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hand … [and nor can they] fully observe the actions of their agents’ (Strøm 2000: 270 quoted in Carter 
and Poguntke 2010: 298). 
Although their influence of course varies, leaders are clearly key actors within political parties, and are 
central in determining the strategies that their parties pursue. Moreover, the above discussions have 
highlighted that the power of leaders, both externally and within their parties, has increased in recent 
decades due to a plethora of social, technological and political developments. Having said that 
however, it is important to recognise that, although perhaps weakened, other actors within political 
parties have not gone away or simply laid down. In view of this, the next section seeks to understand 
the influence that intra-party factionalism can have on the strategies that political parties pursue.   
 
3.4. Factionalism 
Personalisation, presidentialisation, Europeanisation, and the general tendency toward stronger 
leaderships (Michels 1962) should not be taken to mean that the direction of travel with respect to 
leadership power and autonomy is unidirectional. Indeed, while there are forces encouraging the 
empowering of the party leadership vis-à-vis other actors or agents, there are also countervailing 
factors that restrict the power and autonomy of leaders, and which can in turn influence the strategies 
that political parties adopt, and the issues that they focus on. One of these important factors is 
factions. Just as politics itself concerns the interrelations of different groups, parties concern 
themselves with the interaction of different groups, engaging in consensus building or even conflict 
(Maor 1997: 147), and therefore factions are essentially an expression of difference within political 
parties (Rose 1964). Rival or competing factions often struggle for control of the party apparatus and 
the success or failure of one faction over another can lead to shifts in policy or issue focus (Harmel et 
al. 1995; Harmel and Tan 2003). And just as parties can be considered to have different goals (see 
below), so too do different factions (Strøm 1994; Maor 1997; Müller and Strøm 1999; Bettcher 2005; 
Köllner and Basedau 2005). 
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Rose (1964) distinguishes between factions, which for him are groupings characterised by high levels 
of organisation, and tendencies, which are defined by reference to a stable set of attitudes rather than 
any group of politicians. A tendency, therefore, lacks the organisational development of a faction and 
is rather more ad hoc in its operation (Rose 1964). By contrast, rather than focusing on organisational 
development, Sartori (2005), who builds on the work of Hume (1742), distinguishes on the basis of 
motivation. He concentrates on the outcome (policy, office, votes) with which the intra-party group is 
concerned, and distinguishes between interest- and principle-based factions. Interest-based factions 
are those that prioritise the advancement of power and careers and the allocation of office (Sartori 
2005b). In short, they are defined by their attention to patronage over policy (Bettcher 2005). By 
contrast, principle-based factions are primarily motivated by policy-seeking goals (Bettcher 2005; 
Sartori 2005b; Boucek 2009). They are defined by a desire to seek ‘true collective goods in the form of 
policies or ideological program[mes]’ (Bettcher 2005: 344).  
Building on these two different approaches, Bettcher (2005) proposes a typology that makes use of 
two dimensions: an organisational dimension (as per Rose) and a motivational dimension (as per 
Sartori). In doing so, he identifies four types of factions: clientele, tendency, a faction of interest, and 
a faction of principle (Bettcher 2005). The latter three types are defined according to the discussion 
above, while the clientele type is essentially an organisationally weak variant of the faction of interest 
– it is highly dependent on personal relationships which are developed and maintained through 
transactions and exchanges between different echelons of the faction. Lower-order members (the 
clients) deliver votes to higher-order members (the patrons) and in doing so receive incentives such 
as jobs and services (Bettcher 2005). In short then, clienteles and factions of interest are primarily 
motivated by patronage, while tendencies and factions of principle are motivated by policy, and while 
factions of interest and principle are strongly developed organisationally, clienteles and tendencies 
tend to be more fleeting or ad hoc in their organisations (Bettcher 2005).  
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Given these differences, we would expect organisationally well-developed factions to exert greater 
influence over their parties than organisationally less developed factions. Furthermore, we would 
anticipate that principle-based factions and tendencies will dedicate far more resources to influencing 
party policy than interest-based (patronage-oriented) factions or clienteles (Kollner and Basedau 
2005). Therefore, the manner in which these two families of factions impact upon the issue emphases 
of parties, and the strategies that they pursue, are likely to differ. It should be noted, though, that 
while factions of principle might remain principled, it is also possible that they might change once they 
are in a position to distribute goods or ‘spoils of office’. That is, at this point, they might transition 
toward becoming hybrids between interest and principle, or purely factions of interest (Sartori 2005a).  
Any discussion of factionalism may give the impression that parties are barely cohesive organisations, 
with their constituent factions likely to burst at the seams at any time. Indeed, public displays of 
factionalism – such as those concerning the leadership crises of John Major – might well lend credence 
to this picture. However, this description would be simplistic and inaccurate because while parties do 
contend with centrifugal forces, such as factionalism, that might encourage splits, they are also 
characterised by centripetal forces that encourage cohesion and can restrict the influence and 
strength of factions. One such force is party discipline, often enforced via the whips’ office or 
equivalent, which is an institutional means to maintain cohesion.  
Furthermore, factions should not be simply seen as disruptive to the party leadership. Rather, they 
serve an important purpose in that they reflect the variety of views within the party, and effective 
leaderships will wish to remain informed about these views through various party channels (including 
the whips office and the party chair) and to gage support and opposition to specific policy proposals 
and priorities (Bowler et al. 1999). Therefore, while factions can act as a constraint on the power of 
leaders, they also serve as weather gauges, providing the party leadership with important information 
and helping it navigate competing demands within the party.  
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The influence that factions exert over what strategies a party pursues is therefore likely to vary 
according to the nature of the factions, and their relative influence within the party. With reference 
to the strategies examined in this thesis, therefore, where a (principal) party is dominated by a faction 
of principle, a strategy of accommodation with a radical right party may simply not be countenanced. 
By contrast, if the dominant faction is a faction of interest, then preference will be for whatever 
strategy maintains the influence, power, and position of faction members within the party.  
 
3.5. Auxiliary/Collateral Organisations  
Not all factors or mechanisms that influence the strategies of political parties are internal to the party. 
Rather, some are external. These include a range of auxiliary or collateral organisations that maintain 
some level of close cooperation with parties and that can be influential on the deliberations and, 
ultimately, on the strategising of parties. Prominent examples include many religious organisations, 
which frequently have links with Christian democratic parties, and trade unions, which often have 
strong relationships with social democratic or socialist parties (Duverger 1963; Poguntke 2002; Allern 
et al. 2020; Otjes and Green-Pedersen 2021). Indeed, in many countries, social democratic parties not 
only held strong connections with trade unions, but, as Ernest Bevin remarked of the British Labour 
Party, the party often ‘grew out of the bowels’ of the trade union movement (Allern and Bale 2017: 
5). As such, parties and unions have been considered the political and industrial wings, respectively, 
of the same movement (Howell 2001: 7; Allern et al. 2007) but with a clear division of labour: social 
democratic parties represented the working classes within the parliamentary arena, while unions 
represented and articulated the interests of workers in the economic arena (Allern et al. 2007).  
These connections have been extremely valuable to both the party and collateral organisation in that 
both supplied resources or goods that the other desired. From the parties’ perspective, collateral 
organisations have, in the first instance, provided information and policy expertise, two things that 
parties traditionally lacked because of being organisations with few members of staff. Secondly, 
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collateral organisations provide funding to political parties to cover both routine running expenses 
and to contribute to the costs of election campaigns. Given the expense of modern election campaigns 
in particular, these sources of funding are invaluable. For example, over 90 percent of the British 
Labour Party’s funding came from trade unions in 2019 (Audickas 2020). In addition to expertise and 
funding, collateral organisations also can act as a reservoir of personnel from which political parties 
can recruit. For instance, as of 2017, about one third of the Australian Labor Party’s parliamentarians 
have previously worked in trade unions. This is still a sizeable proportion even though it is considerably 
less than in the past (Markey 2018). Or, collateral organisations can revert to being a destination for 
departing politicians. That is, collateral organisations can offer politicians personal rewards once their 
political career is over, such as lucrative positions. For instance, Steffen Kampeter, a CDU MP in the 
German Bundestag between 1990 and 2016, recently became the Executive Director of the 
Confederation of German Employers’ Association (Klüver 2020). Finally, away from providing these 
specific resources, collateral organisations also fulfil an important wider function in that they mobilise 
their members to vote for specific parties at the polls. In this way then, they can provide parties with 
a sizeable support base that can be counted upon. That said, that base can evaporate if relations 
between the organisation and the party sour, and if, out of dissatisfaction, the one-time ally instructs 
its members to lend support to a rival. Klüver (2020) has empirically demonstrated that political parties 
are especially responsive to collateral organisations that can mobilise voters and therefore tend to 
emphasise issues that are prioritised by these organisations (see also Otjes and Green-Pedersen 2021).   
In exchange for these resources, political parties traditionally devoted, and to some extent and with 
variation continue to devote, particular attention to issues and policy areas that collateral 
organisations favour. In addition, parties deliver general benefits to the members of these 
organisations, such as enhanced employment rights to trade union members (Klüver 2020), or the 
liberalisation of employment rules and regulations for business and employers’ associations (Razzuoli 
and Raimundo (2018). 
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In recent years, however, the relationship between political parties and collateral organisations has 
begun to weaken (Poguntke 2002), especially for social democratic parties and their trade union allies 
(Allern et al. 2017; Allern and Bale 2017). Economic and social changes have led to the breakdown of 
long-existing cleavages, characterised by a decline in group identification and weakened ties between 
particular social groups and specific political parties – i.e., to electoral dealignment (Dalton 2004). The 
number of working-class voters has shrunk, and an increasingly pluralistic middle class has emerged. 
In this context, social democratic parties have moved away from emphasising traditional issues and 
policies and have instead broadened their appeals in a bid to attract new constituencies beyond their 
traditional social base. Moreover, social democratic parties have abandoned many of their traditional 
left-wing economic positions due to the dominance of economic neo-liberalism, arguably exacerbated 
by global economic shocks and austerity, and because of the constraints that membership of the 
European Union brings to policy agendas (Allern et al. 2017; Allern and Bale 2017). In this context, 
these parties have less to offer trade unions, and the rewards for trade unions in the once close 
relationship have thus declined. There is also less in it for the parties. The precipitous decline in 
membership numbers has drastically cut the ability of trade unions to mobilise a meaningful number 
of voters, and the pressure to continue to emphasise traditional issues and pursue traditional policies 
now serves to hamstring the parties.  
Given these changes, the traditional relationship between parties and collateral organisations is in 
decline. Some parties and organisations have kept more ad hoc arrangements, which are sometimes 
still close, but many have eschewed formal ties, and in a few instances, the relationships have been 
completely severed (Poguntke 2002; Allern et al. 2017; Allern and Bale 2017). In the British Labour 
Party, for instance, the number of trade unions affiliated to the party has fallen, the formal voting 
powers of trade union members have weakened, and the overall involvement of the unions in party 
decision-making has declined (Allern and Bale 2017). Similarly, in Italy, the relationship between the 
General Confederation of Labour and the Italian Communist Party weakened over time and became 
almost entirely ad hoc when the Communist Party formed into the Democratic Party in 2007 (Allern 
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and Bale 2017; Otjes and Rasmussen 2017). Even more marked is the example of the Netherlands, 
where traditionally strong connections between parties and collateral organisations have all but 
disappeared (Otjes and Rasmussen 2017).  
These developments call into question the influence that collateral organisations have on political 
parties in the contemporary context. Historically, collateral organisations have exerted an impact on 
what issues parties have prioritised and even on the strategies that parties have pursued, favouring a 
goal of policy-shaping rather than one of vote maximisation or office seeking. Yet, given their declining 
positions in society and weaker links with political parties, collateral organisations are likely to be 
much less important in determining the overall strategies of parties today than they once were. 
 
3.6. Party Goals 
As has already been alluded to, different actors within parties are likely to wish to pursue different 
goals. Thus, the balance of power within a party – between the leadership and the party’s factions, as 
well as between the leadership, the parliamentary party, the party’s activists, and its members – and 
the influence of collateral organisations, all shape the goals of a party. Goals include maximising the 
vote share of the party, maximising the spoils of office to which the party has access, increasing the 
representation or participation of party members, and/or advocating or delivering particular policy 
prescriptions (Harmel and Janda 1994). While political parties will have numerous goals, each party is 
expected to have a singular ‘primary goal’, and this primary goal can vary not only across parties but 
also within parties across time (Harmel and Janda 1994: 265). The primary goals of parties will often 
dictate not only the issues that individual parties emphasise, but also the strategies that they employ 
around these issues.  
The academic literature points to a number of trends or generalisations concerning what goals parties 
of different types tend to pursue. Left-wing parties are characterised as being policy-seeking 
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organisations and are said to aspire, at least historically, to public office in order to enact significant 
social change (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Kitschelt 1994). As a result, they ‘forgo ideological shifts 
that could confer short-term electoral advantages, because they instead aim to influence voter 
preferences in the long run’ (Adams et al. 2009: 615). By contrast, centre-right and right-wing parties 
tend to prioritise office-seeking considerations. Lastly, radical right parties are often primarily vote-
maximisers (Akkerman et al. 2016: 13).  
Depending on the primary goal of the party, the party will approach issues in different ways. For 
instance, consider a vote maximising party in the context of an electoral loss. Following such a loss, 
the vote maximising party might seek to adjust its electoral offering to voters in order to better reflect 
the policy preferences of particular electorates, and thereby enhance its capacity to increase its vote 
share next time round (see below). By contrast, an office maximising party might compromise its 
electoral offerings or even ideological purity, in order to open up potential avenues of collaboration 
with other parties. Indeed, this behaviour can be observed with centre-right parties in particular, 
which tend to shift their positions in line with public opinion in order to increase their chances of 
securing office. By contrast, a policy-seeking party is unlikely to change its policy positions, and this is 
borne out in the fact that left-wing parties are far less responsive to shifts in public opinion and often 
opt for policy purity over short-term electoral considerations (Adams et al. 2004; Adams et al. 2009). 
As noted above, the primary goal of a party is most often dynamic; it can and often does change over 
time. The Sweden Democrats provide a real-world example of a party changing its primary goal and 
approaching issues in new ways. Prior to 2014, the party pursued a strategy of vote maximisation, and 
in a bid to increase its electability, it embarked on an effort to detoxify its brand, moderate its ideology, 
and evolve its policies, and it undertook a process of organisational reformation, all to present a more 
moderate face to Swedish voters (Widfeldt 2008; Hellström and Nilsson 2010; Rydgren and Ruth 2011; 
Erlingsson et al. 2014; Widfeldt 2014; Bolin and Aylott 2019). From 2014 onwards, however, the party 
changed its primary goal, and began to adopt a more office-focused strategy, building a foundation 
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from which it could begin to collaborate with the centre-right Moderate Party and Christian Democrats 
(Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019).  
This example also serves to underline the fact that parties do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they react 
to other competitors, and adopt their strategies with these in mind. Moreover, it illustrates that a 
change in the primary goal of one party can impact on the strategies of other parties. In this case, as 
the Sweden Democrats shifted towards a more office-maximising orientation, the Moderate and 
Christian Democratic parties began altering their goals in favour of collaboration with the now more 
ideologically moderate, but nonetheless still radical, Sweden Democrats.  
 
3.7. Radical Right Parties 
Given the subject and aims of this thesis, it is worth spending a little time exploring the strategies and 
goals of radical right parties, and how these parties go about pursuing them. As just noted, the goals 
of one party may well impact on those of another, and so the strategies that principal parties adopt 
vis-à-vis their radical right competitors will most likely be influenced by what these competitors do, 
and what strategies and goals they pursue, which as also noted, can change with time.  
Like all parties, radical right parties harbour and pursue a number of goals. Above all else, however, 
radical right parties tend to be vote-seeking organisations (Akkerman et al. 2016: 13). This vote-
maximisation agenda has been achieved, in part, through an ideological cocktail that consists of anti-
immigration and anti-establishment rhetoric and positioning, as well as other opportunistic 
developments, such as focusing on issues relating to welfare, European integration, and even 
women’s rights (Akkerman 2015). This potent ideological offering has been extremely successful for 
many radical right parties across Europe and their vote-maximisation goal has often been further 
improved by the presence of charismatic leaders. However, the most successful radical right parties 
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have also learned that in order to fully realise their goals, they need to engage in organisation building 
and they therefore often dedicate a great deal of time and resources to this function.  
When it comes to the organisation of radical right parties, many scholars have argued that ‘the most 
successful radical right-wing populist parties are led by charismatic figures [and possess a] highly 
centralised organisational structure, with decisions being made at the top by a relatively circumscribed 
circle of party activists and transmitted to the bottom’ (Betz 1998: 9). Most successful radical right 
leaders not only possess charisma, but a whole host of other ‘external leadership’ qualities including 
rhetorical and oratory skills, media savviness, and communicative penetration (Mudde 2007; de Lange 
and Art 2011).  
However, as well as needing leaders who have strong external leadership qualities, successful radical 
right parties also require their leaders to have internal leadership skills. Internal leadership is more 
oriented to intra-party considerations. It concerns the capacity of the leader to recruit and socialise 
political personnel, activists, and suitable candidates, his or her ability to communicate and issue 
instruction within an organisation that has not yet fully developed, a skill for developing and executing 
electoral campaigns, and the capacity to enhance the organisational capabilities of the party beyond 
their own authority (Mudde 2007; de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012). Internal leadership, 
then, is vital in ensuring the long-term existence of the party, and in avoiding internal strife, or at least 
developing mechanisms to manage and address internal disagreements. Moreover, internal 
leadership has become all the more important as many radical right parties have begun to focus much 
more on office-seeking goals in recent years (Heinisch 2003; Luther 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012; 
Akkerman et al. 2016). A leader with strong internal skills is thus better able to ensure that the party 
is ready for the burdens of office, both in the sense of organisational adjustments required for 
collaboration with another party – especially given that radical right parties tend to enter government 
as junior partners – and in the sense of establishing a well-trained and well-organised group of recruits 
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and candidates for office (Mudde 2007; de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012; see Luther 2011 
for the consequences of failing to achieve this).  
An internally strong leader, then, does not just ensure that the party is adapted for the burdens of 
office, but actively pursues the institutionalisation of the party. In the context of political parties, 
institutionalisation is the ‘process by which an organisation, from being a means to an end, becomes 
an end in itself’ (Gunther and Hopkin 2002: 196). For our purpose, this essentially concerns the extent 
to which different organs of the party have developed interdependence and how routinised party 
behaviour has become (Harmel and Svåsand 1993). This process of institutionalisation is dependent 
upon strong internal leadership and the application of that strong internal leadership to the 
recruitment, training, and most importantly the socialisation of activists, officials, and elites within the 
party (Mudde 2007; de Lange and Art 2011; Bolleyer et al. 2012). Through the adequate socialisation 
of elites, officials, candidates and activists, a party can become ‘value infused’, that is the party 
develops value in of itself beyond a single policy or appeal of a particular leader (Levitsky 1998; 
Gunther and Hopkin 2002). This process is important for two key reasons. Firstly, as individual elites, 
officials, candidates, and activists perceive value in the party in of itself, the goals and needs of the 
party are become internalised, and therefore individuals within the party balance self-interest with 
the needs and interests of the party. This consideration is critical for parties that shift from being 
primarily vote maximising to office seeking, as the demands of office require compromise, 
collaboration with other parties, and a watering down of the potent ideological cocktail discussed 
above. An institutionalised party that holds value will be better able to manage this transition as elites, 
officials, candidates, and especially activists no longer perceive the party as ‘a mere instrument to 
achieve a set of goals’ and become ‘more willing to prioritise the organisational interest [of the party] 
even when in conflict with their individual preferences (Levitsky 1998: 79). Secondly, 
institutionalisation ensures that the party is able to navigate future leadership changes and has the 
organisational capacity to install a new leader without a loss of personnel or support. In short, through 
institutionalisation, a radical right party can not only effectively manage a transition in its primary goal 
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from vote maximising to office seeking, but also ‘can effectively respond to and profit from 
government participation’ when that office seeking goal is realised (Bolleyer et al. 2012: 988).  
The extent to which different radical right parties have successfully managed to transition from vote 
maximising to office seeking is mixed. Crucially, however, the organisational capacity and 
institutionalisation of a radical right party impacts upon the strategies that a principal party will likely 
pursue. This can be demonstrated by way of three illustrative cases that highlight different levels of 
organisational capacity (including external and internal leadership characteristics) and 
institutionalisation. 
The first case is that of the Pim Fortuyn List, which can be described as a poorly institutionalised party 
with low organisational capacity. The LPF began participating in elections only a few months after 
being founded in 2002 by Pim Fortuyn. Given its youth, there was little party organisation to speak of 
beyond a series of friends and allies of Fortuyn who formed the core administration of the party and 
who recruited candidates (de Lange and Art 2011). Having performed strongly in the elections, as a 
result of Fortuyn’s stellar external leadership, the party was invited to join in coalition with the VVD 
and CDA. In response, the LPF had to quickly expand its organisational capacity, developing the party 
in central and public office. However, the party had not yet socialised elites, ministers, or 
representatives, nor had it provided adequate training. As a consequence, elites and ministers 
operated as independent agents who acted according to their own goals and interests rather than 
that of the party (de Lange and Art 2011; Akkerman and de Lange 2012). Many of those involved in 
the LPF had joined because of their relationship to Fortuyn himself, and therefore, without Fortuyn 
(who was assassinated just before the 2002 elections), the party lacked a common goal. As a result, 
the party was dominated by intra-party strife and ultimately collapsed (Akkerman and de Lange 2012). 
What this demonstrates, then, is the importance of internal leadership in developing the 
organisational capacity of the party and achieving a sufficient level of institutionalisation. Ultimately, 
this meant that the LPF was not ready for the success it experienced nor for its participation in 
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government; even when accounting for Fortuyn’s untimely death (de Lange and Art 2011). This had a 
direct impact on other principal parties in that the office-seeking VVD and CDA formed a coalition with 
the LPF in order to achieve the number of seats required to form a government. However, the lack of 
institutionalisation and organisational capacity of the LPF proved to be a disaster and resulted in the 
coalition collapsing shortly after being formed. Ultimately, then, principal party collaboration with a 
weakly-institutionalised and weakly-led radical right party proved unworkable and given the 
coalition’s collapse might discourage future collaboration between these principal parties and new 
entrants.  
The Austrian FPÖ under the leadership of Jörg Haider was a party defined by high external leadership, 
low internal leadership, and insufficient levels of institutionalisation, especially with regard to party 
value and socialisation. Under Haider, the FPÖ shifted from vote-maximising to office-seeking. 
However, while the FPÖ was exceedingly effective in its initial vote maximisation strategy, its 
preparations for incumbency were far less effective as Haider failed to maintain internal unity over 
party goals and strategy (Luther 2007; Akkerman and de Lange 2012; Heinisch 2016). This was made 
worse by significant discrepancies in party behaviour among party officials and elites, including Haider 
himself who resorted to strategies that proved successful during the era of vote maximisation but 
which proved counterproductive to the goals of office (Luther 2007; Akkerman and de Lange 2012). 
With regards to principal party strategies, it is entirely possible that, fearing an unpredictable or 
unstable partner, that the principal party might seek to avoid any form of collaboration. That being 
said, the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), under the leadership of Wolfgang Schüssel, identified an 
opportunity to exploit the FPÖ in order to advance its own desires for office and sought collaboration 
as a means of securing office through the cannibalisation of the FPÖ (Bale 2003; Luther 2003). 
Interestingly, this was not the first time that experience in government had caused the party to 
fracture and suffer internal strife. Under the leadership of Norbert Steger (1980 to 1986), the FPÖ had 
adopted a less confrontational approach and liberalised its programmatic profile to focus on anti-
statism, free markets, and individualism (Luther 2007; Heinisch 2016). It entered into coalition with 
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the SPÖ in 1983 but disagreements over party policy and focus eventually led Haider to replace Steger 
as leader (Luther 2007, 2011). As with the case of the LPF above, then, a weakly-led and insufficiently 
institutionalised party can often make for a poor choice of coalition partner.  
Finally, the Dutch Party for Freedom, under its leader, Geert Wilders, not only expended considerable 
resources on institutionalising itself but had foregone the opportunity to participate in elections in 
order to achieve adequate institutionalisation.7 Founded in 2005, the PVV is an incredibly centralised 
but surprisingly small organisation. It has no local or regional branches, no auxiliary organisations, and 
unusually for political parties, does not permit members to join the party – it therefore has no ‘party 
on the ground’ (de Lange and Art 2011). Even the other faces of the party – the party in central and 
public office – are small units. Wilders, instead, focused on the socialisation and training of all 
personnel involved with the PVV. As a result of this significant focus on socialisation, PVV activists and 
representatives strongly identify with the party and its leader, and generally few conflicts have arisen 
from leadership decisions. Indeed, even in instances where aspiring candidates have been left off 
party lists or representatives have been disciplined, conflicts have remained largely absent, and those 
involved in the party rarely speak negatively about the party or its leader (de Lange and Art 2011). The 
PVV, then, is characterised by moderate levels of external leadership, and high levels of internal 
leadership and institutionalisation. Indeed, Wilders’ focus on organisation building was as a direct 
result of the failure and ultimate implosion of the LPF. Depending upon the arithmetic in parliament 
and the ideology of the radical right party, a radical right party that is well led (both internally and 
externally) and that is well institutionalised is likely to be an attractive prospect to principal parties. In 
other words, with a radical right party of this type, principal parties might well opt for strategies of 
collaboration, be this a formal coalition with the radical right as a junior partner, or some kind of 
confidence and supply arrangement. And this is precisely what happened with the PVV, as had also 
occurred in Denmark. Following the 2010 Dutch election in which the PVV won a large vote share and 
 
7 Wilders publicly cited a lack of adequate candidates as his reasoning for refusing to participate in the 2007 
provincial elections (de Lange and Art 2011).  
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became the third largest party in parliament, the VVD and CDA formed a minority government which 
depended on the support of the PVV. The arrangements lasted until 2012 when the PVV withdrew its 
support over proposed austerity measures. Interestingly enough, the experience of such an 
arrangement was such that following the 2012 and 2017 elections, all major parties declared that they 
would not repeat it, with all declaring they would not work with the PVV again.  
These examples therefore demonstrate that radical right parties that are insufficiently 
institutionalised and lack internal leadership will find government participation to be highly 
destabilising events (see Heinisch 2003; Luther 2003, 2011; Akkerman and de Lange 2012, Bolleyer et 
al. 2012), and that principal parties will likely wish to keep such parties at arm’s length unless there is 
some particular benefit in cooperation. By contrast, radical right parties that display high levels of 
(external and internal) leadership and institutionalisation can often be attractive partners for principal 
parties, either for coalition or confidence and supply arrangements. However, this will be mitigated 
by conditions such as the ideology of the radical right party and the extent to which other actors 
(including other coalition partners) are willing to tolerate a radical right party as a legitimate player. 
In circumstances where principal parties are unwilling to tolerate the ideology of the radical right and 
see it as beyond the pale, strategies of collaboration may be abandoned and a cordon sanitaire might 
be applied instead.  
 
3.8. Electoral System 
As has been underlined more than once before in this chapter, parties of course do not exist in a 
vacuum. Rather, they respond to external actors, such as auxiliary or collateral organisations with 
which they have close links, as well as to their competitors. In addition, however, parties also respond, 
to varying extents, to the rules of the game – i.e., to the institutional environment in which they exist. 
A core feature of this environment is the electoral system, and it can be theorised that different 
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electoral systems may well influence parties, either by constraining them or by encouraging them, to 
pursue some goals and strategies over others.  
The conventional wisdom regarding the impact of electoral systems on party systems is that 
majoritarian systems tend to produce convergent or centripetal pressures that tend to restrict 
competition to two large parties, with the expectation that a single party will secure office alone 
(Downs 1957a, b; Norris 1997; Dow 2001). As a result of these centripetal pressures, vote maximising 
locations are assumed to be centrally located along a hypothetical dimension – often a left-right 
dimension (although see Chapter 2), assuming a unimodal distribution of voters. Policy offerings and 
ideological expressions of parties are therefore often more limited (Downs 1957a, b; Dow 2001). The 
logic and pressures of such systems also make it difficult for smaller parties – such as those of the 
radical right – to gain a foothold, unless their support is geographically concentrated (Johnston and 
Ballantyne 1977; Norris 1997).  
Majoritarian electoral systems therefore encourage larger parties to downplay and even ignore 
smaller competitors. Borrowing from the model of competition established in Chapter 2, it is thus 
likely that larger principal parties in majoritarian systems will favour disengagement strategies as 
there is little to be gained from collaboration or cooperation with smaller actors except in unusual or 
particular circumstances. As for issues, majoritarian electoral systems are likely to encourage principal 
parties to adopt a strategy of issue accommodation. Smaller parties might prime or encourage voters 
to consider other issues to be important but since the likelihood of representation for these parties is 
quite low, larger parties are likely to adopt these issues and positions themselves if they judge that 
there are electoral benefits to be had in doing so (see Meguid 2005, 2008).  
It should be noted, however, that even in majoritarian systems, radical right parties can have 
considerable blackmail potential, not least because they can sometimes still win a sufficiently large 
share of the vote, even if this is not translated into large seat shares. This can occur because the 
psychological effects of the electoral system on radical right voters do not seem to be very strongly 
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felt (Carter 2002, 2004a; Arzheimer and Carter 2006). This is the case in France where the majoritarian 
electoral system – albeit a two-round one with its own particularities – has not prevented the National 
Front from securing a significant share of the vote in numerous elections. Under these conditions, the 
efficacy of an accommodative strategy can be called into question. Put simply, if the radical right party 
has such influence, voters who care about the issues that the radical right party promotes might prefer 
to vote for the radical right ‘original’ rather than the principal party ‘copy’.  
Having said all this, it is clear that majoritarian electoral systems do not always produce centripetal 
forces and do not always encourage the development of a two-party system. An example that 
illustrates this well is Italy, which engaged in electoral system change in the mid-1990s, replacing its 
proportional system with a majoritarian variant of a mixed member system (wherein 75 percent of 
seats were allocated according to FPTP, while the remaining 25 percent were allocated 
supplementarily). This change did not result in a reduction in the number of parties or in convergence 
to the centre as might have been expected. Instead, there was a drastic increase in polarisation and a 
rise in the number of relevant parties (Sartori 1999). Indeed, during the proportional representation 
era, there were on average six relevant parties, while under the new electoral system, this had 
doubled to twelve (Sartori 1999).  
By contrast, this same conventional wisdom holds that proportional systems tend to produce 
divergent or centrifugal pressures that encourage a wider array of electorally successful parties, with 
the expectation that multiple parties will secure office given the need for coalition governments (Dow 
2001). As a consequence of the multitude of parties and the centrifugal pressures, proportional 
representation is often assumed to produce a polarisation of ideological positions, with vote 
maximising locations distributed along any hypothetical dimension in accordance with the multimodal 
distribution of voters (Downs 1957a, b; Norris 1997; Dow 2001). However, the extent to which 
proportional systems produce centrifugal pressures and ideological polarisation is a product of the 
number of relevant parties. A smaller number of relevant parties, regardless of proportionality, is still 
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likely to produce centripetal pressures as the underlying electoral logic rewards central positioning 
(assuming a normal distribution of voters) (Sartori 2005b: 310).  
With regard to strategies, proportional electoral systems are quite likely to encourage greater 
collaboration and cooperation between principal parties and smaller parties – including those of the 
radical right – than would be the case in majoritarian systems. This dynamic does depend on how 
competitive the party system is, however, and is also only likely when the radical right party possesses 
coalition potential (see Sartori 2005b). This is clearly not always the case as some radical right parties 
have chosen to remain at the fringes of the spectrum, pursuing a radical programmatic profile and 
concentrating on solidifying their vote share among the more radical or extreme segment of the 
electorate. An example of such a party is the Alternative for Germany, which has increasingly 
radicalised its programmatic profile, moving from a Eurosceptic stance with populist inclinations, to 
becoming a more conventional radical right party, and now a more extreme radical right party beset 
by issues of racism and historical revisionism regarding Germany’s Nazi past (Arzheimer and Berning 
2019; Bochum 2020). There are, of course, particular historical and cultural reasons why German 
principal parties are very unlikely to engage in strategies of collaboration with the radical right anyway, 
but this example highlight the wider point that the more extreme the radical right party, the less likely 
principal parties are to consider a strategy of collaboration, even in proportional systems.  
Collaboration is of course a party strategy (see Chapter 2), and if we turn our attention to issue 
strategies, then we can theorise that a proportional electoral system might encourage greater use of 
dismissive strategies by principal parties. This is because, in a proportional system, smaller parties 
have a genuine chance of securing representation, and therefore adversarial strategies, which 
increase the saliency of an issue and reinforce the radical right party’s ownership of said issue, are 
often going to run counter to the electoral interests of a principal party – although, of course, a 
principal party might adopt an adversarial strategy out of principle. Accommodative strategies, by 
contrast, become much riskier in proportional systems. While the underlying logic of the 
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accommodative strategy still holds – that is, principal parties should be able to steal voters away from 
the radical right party owing to their ‘legislative experience’ and ‘governmental effectiveness’ (see 
Meguid 2005, 2008) – because proportional systems increase the chance of smaller parties gaining 
representation and of becoming involved in some form of governmental arrangement, voters can cast 
meaningful votes in favour of smaller parties without fear that that vote will be wasted, as is often the 
case in majoritarian systems. Moreover, even if the radical right party lacks coalition potential, in a 
proportional system it might possess considerable blackmail potential, meaning that it could secure 
policy objectives without the need for formal collaboration. In this context, then, an accommodative 
strategy would increase the saliency of the issue, but would not necessarily guarantee the transfer of 
votes from the smaller party to the principal one.  
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, proportional systems do not always produce 
multiparty systems. A particularly prominent example of this is Malta where the use of the Single 
Transferable Vote system exists alongside the purest two-party system in Europe – where the Maltese 
Labour Party and the Nationalist Party score around 98 percent of the vote in elections – and strong 
bipolarity (de Miño and Lane 1996; Cini 2002).8 Furthermore, as a result of the relatively small district 
magnitude of each constituency, the electoral system is quite disproportionate and minor parties 
which are unable to geographically concentrate their vote are routinely disadvantaged (de Miño and 
Lane 1996). As a consequence, principal parties in Malta need not worry about competition from 
smaller parties.  
In addition, even where proportional representation does produce multiparty systems, it does not 
always encourage collaboration and cooperation between the principal parties and the radical right, 
even when the radical right party is quite sizeable. The case of Flanders illustrates this. Here the 
Vlaams Belang has experienced considerable, if variable, electoral success over the years, but the 
 
8 Prior to the 1970s, Malta operated a multi-party system. However, following independence in 1964, the party 
system underwent a process of consolidation and ‘purification’ until a purely two-party system came about 
(Cini 2002).  
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principal parties have tended towards the application of a cordon sanitaire, mainly for ethical reasons 
and as a result of Flanders’ highly cartelised party system (Downs 2012: 96-97). Furthermore, with 
regard to issue strategies, the principal parties have not tended to adopt dismissive strategies, as 
outlined above. Rather, some such as the Socialist Party have tended to embrace adversarial 
strategies, while others, including the centre-right parties, have favoured accommodative strategies. 
It could therefore be the case that the application of the cordon sanitaire might act as a ‘suppressor’ 
to the risks associated with an accommodative strategy. That is, by excluding and isolating the VB, 
principal parties can then go on to emphasise the issues of the radical right, and steal their votes.  
The above discussion has explored the systemic effects that electoral systems can have, including on 
the direction of competition, the extent of ideological polarisation, and the format of the party system 
and resulting coalition demands. As has been argued, these effects are all likely to encourage or 
discourage particular party strategies. In addition, the last paragraphs have pointed to the effect that 
electoral systems can have on whether radical right issues are addressed by the principal parties, and 
if they are, whether these are accommodated or rejected, or whether principal parties prefer to 
dismiss such issues. A further facet of the electoral system might also matter. That is, the way in which 
voters choose which candidates are elected is also likely to have an impact on the ability of party 
leaderships to pursue their preferred strategy. This is determined by the format of the ballot, and 
different ballot formats impact, to some degree, on how much party leaderships can control which 
candidates end up being elected. 
The format of the ballot is typically described as being ‘categorical’ or ‘ordinal’, and in list PR systems 
as being ‘closed’, ‘ordered’, or ‘open’ (Farrell 2011). Categorical ballots – be they in majoritarian 
systems like the UK or in proportional ones like Spain (Farrell 2011: 166) – offer a voter a simple 
either/or choice, while ordinal ballots enable to voter to express a preference, usually through ranking. 
By contrast, the distinction between closed, ordinal and open ballots relates to the extent to which 
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voters can have a say over which candidates are elected, and therefore also to the degree of party 
control over which candidates are elected.   
In closed ballot structures, the ordering of the candidates is determined by the party and voters cannot 
express a preference for a particular candidate. This presents the party leadership with the advantage 
of being able to control the list, as loyal candidates can be placed high on the list, and dissident or 
troublesome individuals can be placed so low on it that they stand no chance of being elected (Farrell 
2011: 78). In effect then, closed ballot structures empower the party leadership.  
By contrast, in ordered and open ballot systems, the ballot structure is such that individual voters can 
express a preference vote for individual candidates within each party. The format of these ballots 
varies considerably from system to system, with some allowing voters to choose between whether 
they do indeed express a preference for a certain candidate or whether they simply opt for a party 
(and hence accept the party’s ordering of candidates on the list, as in Belgium), and others requiring 
voters to choose between candidates, like in Finland. Moreover, the extent to which seat allocations 
are affected by preference votes varies. In some systems, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, the 
influence of preference votes is rather limited, and candidates require a huge number of preference 
votes to move up the list (Farrell 2011: 81-85). Elsewhere, however, preference votes really do matter. 
In Finland’s open list system, ‘preference votes alone determine the success of candidates within 
parties’ (Raunio 2008: 481). Similarly, in the system used in Italy prior to the 1990s reform, voters 
could express preferences, and these preference votes could make all the difference (Farrell 2011: 
86).  
Voters may of course have a number of different reasons for expressing the preferences they do. They 
may simply prefer the personality or image of a specific candidate, or they may prefer the candidate’s 
own political opinions and favoured policies, or they may wish to register dissatisfaction with a party’s 
policy or leadership (Solsten and Meditz 1988), or a combination of these motivations could be at 
work. For the party and its leadership, however, a large number of preference votes for specific 
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candidates might present a challenge. This is particularly the case if the recipients of preference votes 
are candidates who are ‘out of sync’ with the party leadership, or if such votes go in large numbers to 
factions within the party that might contest the policies or control of the leadership. In short then, if 
the ballot format is such that preference votes do influence which candidates get elected, the party 
leadership’s ability to control who ends up being its representatives in parliament can be constrained, 
and the level of factionalism within parties may also increase.   
One prominent example that illustrates such tensions, is that of Rita Verdonk, who was a senior 
member of the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Having served as a cabinet 
minister from 2003, she contested the leadership of the VVD when Jozias van Aartsen stood down 
from the position in March 2006. However, she lost – to Mark Rutte – and in the subsequent general 
elections of November 2006, positioned second on the list behind Rutte, she mounted a very active 
private campaign, with her own staff, campaign bus, and slogan. This resulted in her winning a greater 
number of votes and more personal list preferences than Rutte (Van Holsteyn 2007). The tensions this 
created within the VVD, and the continued strains between Rutte and Verdonk (and their respective 
factions), ultimately led to Verdonk being expelled from the party’s parliamentary group, and then 
going on to form her own Proud of the Netherlands party.  
It is not just ordered and open list proportional representation systems that can lead to the 
development or strengthening of factions. Rather, factions can exert themselves in Single Transferable 
Vote (STV) ones too. In these systems the way voters express a preference is different in as much as 
the ballot structure is a preferential one, with voters ranking candidates in their order of preference 
(rather than simply choosing candidates). Yet the effects can be similar because parties will present 
multiple candidates in the same district, meaning that individuals from the same party are effectively 
competing against each other. In reality the extent to which this results in factionalism is hard to 
discern. In the case of Ireland, on the one hand, there is some evidence of growing internal party 
rivalry (Farrell 2011: 136). Yet on the other, a more pressing concern for parties is voter loyalty and 
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ensuring that voters express not only their first preference for a candidate of the party, but also a 
second (and subsequent) preference too. This affects the so-called ‘transfer rate’ – i.e., the votes that 
are surplus to the quota of elected candidates, which are then transferred to the remaining 
candidates. For parties, it is crucial to ensure that these surplus votes are also for its candidates, and 
so vote management strategies to maximise voter loyalty, which has been declining in recent years, 
have become particularly important (Farrell 2011: 135). These priorities may well quell the 
development of factions. Moreover, even if there has been some internal strife in Irish parties in more 
recent years, the level of factionalism has remained generally low as historically factions have tended 
to be weak in Ireland (Hine 1982). 
This discussion has shown that it is not just the effects that electoral systems have on party 
competition and on the party system that might shape what strategies principal parties opt for, but 
that the format of the ballot might also influence the ability of principal party leaderships to pursue 
their preferred strategies. More specifically, closed ballots are likely to enable party leaderships to 
pursue their preferred strategy as these types of ballots empower leaderships and close down rivalries 
and factions. By contrast, ordered and open ballots (and possibly preferential ballots such as STV too) 
are likely to leave more room for other party actors to challenge the party leadership over its 
strategies, and for intra-party factions to develop and/or strengthen. And depending on who these 
other actors are, and/or on what type of factions gain influence (see above), it could be that party 
leaderships find themselves having adapt their strategies, perhaps paying more attention to policy, at 
the expense of vote maximisation or office. Equally, open or preferential ballots may well strengthen 
calls from within the party to adopt disengagement strategies. As Downs (2001) has shown, elected 
candidates who are able to develop a certain autonomy from the central party and build a loyal base 
(two things that open and preferential ballots enable) are more likely to favour ‘clean hands’ strategies 





This chapter has provided a discussion of a range of conditions or intervening variables that might 
impact on what strategies principal parties pursue. It began with a discussion of party types and how 
the different ‘faces’ of party organisation have been empowered or constrained over time and in 
different parties, and why this matters for the formulation of party strategies. From here the chapter 
concentrated on party leaders and leadership and explored how and why leaders have been 
empowered in recent decades, and what this means for the formation of party strategies. Then, the 
chapter turned its attention to other party actors, and considered the type, role and power of intra-
party factions and the ways in which, and extent to which, they may influence party strategies. After 
this, the discussion moved to focus on those conditions external to the party. The chapter examined 
the role of auxiliary or collateral organisations, and the ways in which these actors may influence the 
sorts of policies that parties adopt, and the strategies that parties pursue. 
Having explored different actors within and beyond parties and their influence, the chapter then 
turned to discussing party goals, which are crucial to underpinning what strategies parties decide to 
adopt. Moreover, it was made very clear here that one party’s goals are influenced by the goals of 
other parties, and in terms of this thesis, the goals of radical right parties are especially important. The 
chapter therefore engaged in a substantial discussion of how the goals, leadership, organisation, and 
level of institutionalisation of radical right parties can influence which strategies principal parties 
decide to pursue. 
Finally, the chapter considered how the principal parties’ choice of strategies may be influenced by 
the institutional environment, and in particular by the electoral system. It underlined the logic of 
different electoral systems and showed that in some systems principal parties do not need to pay that 
much attention to parties of the radical right or to the issues that these parties champion, whereas in 
other systems, principal parties cannot afford to ignore these competitors or their issues. It also 
showed that these latter cases might encourage strategies of collaboration or cooperation with the 
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radical right, or might prompt the adoption of cordons sanitaires. This section of the chapter also 
included an examination of how the structure of the ballot may influence what strategies principal 
parties pursue, and it distinguished between closed ballot formats which broadly enable the party 
leadership to pursue its preferred strategy, and open and preferential ones, which potentially 
constrain the party leadership in its choice of strategy. 
Many of the factors discussed in this chapter are picked up in Chapter 7 on France and Chapter 8 on 
Sweden where they are covered in more detail. For the time being though, the thesis continues by 
turning to conceptual and definitional matters. The next chapter engages in a discussion of key terms, 
offers a definition of what a principal party is and what a radical right party is, and then identifies the 
parties relevant for the analysis.  
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4. Defining and Identifying Relevant Parties 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Before the strategies that principal parties adopt towards parties of the radical right can be explored, 
analysed and explained, it is necessary to spend some time thinking about what defines these two sets 
of parties, and what they should be called. These questions of definition and terminology are crucial 
because they point us towards our object of study. That is, clarifying the intension of the concept and 
deciding on its term allows us to then move on to identify the extension – i.e., to identify which parties 
we should be analysing. It is with these conceptual issues that this chapter concerns itself. 
Throughout the academic literature on political parties, and indeed in the wider circles, the concept 
of the mainstream party is fairly ubiquitous. Yet, while universally applied, this concept can be rather 
problematic as far as consistent definitions go. Moreover, very rarely is the time taken to actually 
explore or define what is meant by mainstream or non-mainstream. The consequence is that a familiar 
subset of parties is regularly presented as mainstream, with little appreciation or understanding of 
why these parties are considered mainstream, and with little or no explanation of what the underlying 
theoretical basis for such a categorisation.  
This problem is further compounded by the fact that a great number of scholars insist on using several 
synonyms for these parties: from mainstream to moderate, from established to establishment, and 
from major to conventional. While these terms are employed as synonyms, in actuality, each carries 
a rather different connotation (intension). For instance, one might intuitively classify the Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) or indeed the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) as established and even major, yet few 
would seek to describe these parties as moderate or mainstream. Each of these terms is (intuitively 
and in common parlance) connotatively different and therefore denotes a different subset of political 
parties. It is thus argued that the concept of mainstream party, or indeed any of the terms employed 
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as synonyms, can in fact be considered ‘bicycle concepts’ (Zimmerling 2005). Zimmerling (2005: 15) 
defines a bicycle concept as any concept that is ‘unproblematic as long as one does not stop to think 
about how exactly it works’.  
This is not to suggest that one cannot get some mileage out of a bicycle concept or that such concepts 
have no value. Indeed, Arzheimer (2018) makes the point well that, actually, such concepts can have 
incredible value. By reference to research into the radical right party family, Arzheimer highlights that 
while there is an abundance of terms to describe what is essentially the same phenomenon (see also 
Carter 2005: 20-23; Mudde 2007: 11-12), research into radical right parties has produced some fruitful 
results. Mudde (1996: 233) argues that definitional problems in the radical right literature have been 
of limited relevance owing to near universal agreement among scholars on which parties should and 
should not be classified as radical right. However, as will be seen below, such agreement does not 
exist with regards to what parties are considered to be mainstream, establishment, and so on. The 
consequence is that we have considerably different subsets of parties linked to each term. 
Furthermore, the theoretical basis for classification – or the intension of the concepts – often differs 
as well. As a result, inferences or conclusions drawn from different studies can be difficult to generalise 
(Meyer and Miller 2013).  
The following section, then, will seek to elucidate on each of these terms, explaining their connotation 
and definition. It begins with a quick overview of the definitions – or lack thereof – regarding 
mainstream parties, before moving onto looking at how the scholarly literature has defined major and 
minor parties, niche parties, and finally establishment and anti-establishment parties. Thereafter, the 
chapter will provide a quick summary of definitions for each of these concepts, before arguing that 
none of these concepts is wholly adequate for the purpose of this thesis. As a result of this, the chapter 
introduces the concept of the ‘principal party’ – parties that are the most important in their respective 
systems – in order to identify who the key players are; a list of which is provided. Having defined the 
concept of the principal party and identified principal parties in Western Europe between 1995 and 
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2017, the chapter turns its attention to the concepts of extreme and radical right parties. It engages 
in a brief review of the literature in order to establish a working definition for this thesis, before, again, 
identifying extreme and radical right parties that are relevant to this thesis.  
 
4.2. Mainstream Parties  
As noted, above, what makes defining the concept of ‘mainstream’ difficult is that very few scholars 
take the time to outline their definition. Often definitions are extremely short, tucked away in a 
footnote or in an easily missed sentence in the methods section of the study. There are even examples 
of studies that fail to provide any definition of the concept at all (e.g., Schumacher and van Kersbergen 
2016).  
In addition, many scholars define the concept of mainstream – and also that of ‘non-mainstream’ – by 
reference to how the concept is operationalised. This can be by the parties’ positioning in expert 
surveys, or their policy positions derived from the content analysis of their manifestos. For example, 
Meguid (2005, 2008) uses the Castles and Mair (1984) expert survey and defines mainstream parties 
are those that score between 1.25 and 3.75, and 6.25 and 8.75, while Norris (2005) makes use of the 
Lubbers 2000 expert survey and classifies radical right parties as those with a score of greater than 
8.0. By contrast, Hino (2012) makes us of the Comparative Manifesto Project data and constructs a 
number of indices on which to position both New Politics Parties and Extreme Right Parties. While 
these authors provide clear details of how they have operationalised the concepts, and hence which 
parties are identified for analysis, what is nonetheless missing is a full discussion of what these 
concepts entail – i.e., what their content is.  
A number of other scholars define the concept of mainstream by reference to party family (e.g., Abou-
Chadi 2014), and point to which party families are to be considered mainstream. Those families that 
are most frequently seen as mainstream as the social democratic, the liberal, the conservative, and 
94 | P a g e  
 
the Christian Democratic ones. However, sometimes other families are also included as mainstream, 
be it the socialist and communist ones (Meguid 2005, 2008), the Green party family (Katz and Mair 
2002), and even the radical right one (Katz and Mair 2002). The inclusion of so many families in the 
‘mainstream’ category clearly has important consequences in that this category becomes very large 
and extremely diverse, and nearly nothing is left out of it. Furthermore, the fact that different scholars 
reach different conclusions as to which families should or should not be included in the mainstream 
category also presents difficulties.  
Having said all of this, some authors do spend time discussing and defining the concept of 
‘mainstream’. For instance, Swenden and Toubeau (2013: 249) define mainstream parties as ‘parties 
that represent one of the major ideologies of the state and that seek to gain polity-wide 
representation in elections across all levels of the state (federal or central, regional, municipal, etc.)’. 
Yet even though it is explicit, this definition is not without its problems. What constitutes a major 
ideology of the state is not explained, although one might hazard a guess that liberalism, social 
democracy, conservatism and the like, are considered major ideologies of the state. And if this is the 
case, then it raises the question of how different this definition actually is in practice from the party 
families approach mentioned above. The second element of the definition, which appears to point to 
some kind of relevance criterion, is also troublesome in that it implies that non-mainstream parties 
are not capable of gaining polity-wide representation across all levels of the state. This is clearly not 
the case; they are and regularly do.  
 
4.3. Major and Minor Parties 
By contrast, McDaid and Rekawek (2010: 630) define a mainstream party as ‘one that is often close to 
major party status, is a potential party of government, and not ideologically constrained from taking 
part in a coalition such as far-right or far-left parties often are’.  They then go on to defer to Mair’s 
(1991) conception of a major party as one that normally polls above 15 percent of the national vote. 
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By doing this, they therefore emphasise that major parties are defined by their size. Others have 
followed a similar approach. Indeed, Gerring (2005), Coakley (2010), and Copus et al. (2009) have all 
defined major party status by reference to size, although they express this in the form of the two, 
three, or four largest parties respectively, and then consider all other parties as minor.  
Although simple, the approach does have some drawbacks. First, it means that minor parties are 
defined by a negative – that is, they are minor because they are not major. There is no reference to 
any other specific criteria that defines what ‘minor’ might constitute. Furthermore, the approach fails 
to appreciate elements of ‘major’ and ‘minor’ that are contained in the classical literature on political 
parties (Sartori 2005b; see also Kefford 2016). Indeed, within this literature the concepts of major and 
minor party relate not only to size but also to the relevance of the party in the party system. According 
to Sartori (2005b), a relevant party is one that possesses either coalition potential or blackmail 
potential. In other words, the party must be considered when a coalition is formed, or the party’s 
‘existence or appearance affects the tactics of party competition’ (Sartori 2005b: 108).  
Building on Sartori’s framework, Kefford (2016) proposes a distinction between major, minor, and 
‘peripheral’ parties. Major parties are those that can regularly expect to form a government in their 
own right, or become the largest party in any coalition. This is an approach shared by Smith (2006) 
who argues that major parties are those that regularly achieve governmental inclusion. By contrast, 
minor parties are those parties that do not regularly expect to form a government in their own right 
or be the largest party in any coalition. They do, however, possess relevance in the party system, either 
through coalition potential or blackmail potential. Finally, peripheral parties are those parties that 
have no effect on the party system. While these parties may have parliamentary representation, they 
possess no coalition or blackmail potential.  
However, while this typology has the advantage of distinguishing between major and minor parties 
based on how these parties affect the party system, it introduces a somewhat arbitrary element in its 
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inclusion of regular governmental participation. This, of course, raises the question of how frequent 
must participation in government be for a party to be considered major rather than minor?  
Regardless of the exact nature of ‘frequently’, any party that regularly finds itself in government is 
more likely to have a moderate ideology, as a more moderate ideology would allow a party to 
participate in a wider range of possible coalitions. This, though, raises the question of what moderate 
actually means – as moderate can be difficult to define without reference to some arbitrary cut-off 
point based upon expert surveys or similar methodological approaches (such as the Manifesto 
Project). This carries the problem of putting quantification before concept formation (Sartori 1970). 
That being said, it is possible to suggest that nativism, racism, and other such ideological ‘baggage’ 
could exclude a party from being considered ideologically moderate. Though it should be noted that 
many parties of this type have participated in government and continue to do so.  
 
4.4. Niche and Mainstream 
In contrast to defining mainstream – or major and minor – parties by reference to their size and to the 
frequency with which they participate in government, a number of other scholars define the concept 
by focusing on the substance of politics, and on the issues or dimensions on which parties compete. 
In doing this, these authors (Wagner 2012; Meyer and Miller 2013: Meyer and Wagner 2013) 
juxtapose mainstream parties to niche parties. 
The niche party concept was first introduced by Meguid (2005, 2008) in her seminal work on party 
competition. She considered niche parties to be parties that i) reject the traditional class-based 
orientation of politics; ii) raise novel issues that do not coincide with existing left-right dimensions of 
politics; iii) and are largely perceived as single-issue parties by voters and other parties. Other authors 
then simplified or added to her definition. For instance, Wagner (2012) introduced a simpler 
definition, suggesting that niche parties are those that focus on non-economic issues. This was 
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shorthand for arguing that niche parties concentrate on issues that are not dominant, but Wagner’s 
specific identification of economic issues was problematic in that it rested on the assumption that the 
economy is the dominant issue everywhere, and would remain so. Indeed, Wagner himself noted the 
problem and pointed to a more general reformulation of the definition that focused on issues and/or 
dimensions often ignored by the majority of competitors in a party system rather than any specific 
dimension of competition. He noted (2012: 6): 
The niche-party concept could arguably be rendered even more general if it referred 
to a ‘main dimension’ of political contestation instead of to economic ideology. The 
assumption in the proposed definition is that economic matters generally have 
primacy over other concerns, yet this need not be the case: party systems in some 
countries are defined more strongly by, for example, ethnic divisions. 
 
Other scholars define the niche concept in other ways. For example, Adams et al. (2006), Ezrow (2010), 
and Ezrow et al. (2011) define niche parties by reference to party families, and argue that niche parties 
belong to ideologically extreme (communist and extreme right) or non-centrist (green) party families. 
This clearly represents quite a different approach to that of Meguid (2005, 2008) and Wagner (2012) 
in as much as the focus in no longer on the dominant dimension of competition. Instead, the focus is 
on the ideology of the parties, determined by party family, and the implicit argument is simply that if 
the ideology is extreme or non-centrist, then this constitutes a niche party.  
This approach is problematic in so far as there can be a great deal of heterogeneity within party 
families. For instance, some Agrarian parties are essentially single-issue parties that focus on niche, 
non-economic issues, while others are quite conventional parties that have held prime ministerships 
in various European countries (Müller and Strøm 2000; Meyer and Miller 2013). For instance, Danish 
Venstre is an economically liberal catch-all party, while the Latvian Farmers' Union prioritises 
agricultural issues and draws its support primarily from farmers and rural workers (Nissinen 1999). 
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Similarly, Liberal parties can be quite distinct from one another: the German FDP heavily focuses on 
economic issues, while the Dutch Democrats ’66 party was primarily concerned with political 
democratisation and later social (not economic) liberalism.  
Either way, the practice of using party families to identify niche parties – as Adam et al. (2006), Ezrow 
(2010), and Ezrow et al. (2011) do – is the less common one, however, and most authors working in 
this field do make use of Meguid’s definition or of subsequent ones that focus on whether or not 
parties compete on the dominant dimension of competition and the issues within this dimension. 
However, even with this relatively wide agreement that niche parties are those that compete on issues 
and dimensions that are neglected by their more mainstream counterparts, there remain problems in 
identifying niche parties. And this is because the whole definition rests on the salience of the 
dimensions of competition and the salience of issues. 
Added to the fact that parties modify issue salience to maximise competitive advantage (Budge and 
Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; see Chapter 2), Meyer and Wagner (2013) propose that parties can change 
their salience profiles and thus shift between niche and mainstream profiles. They argue that parties 
deliberately choose between these profiles due to strategic incentives and vote-seeking 
considerations. This means that niche parties could incorporate more issues into their programmes 
and thus become mainstream parties (as with the German Greens, arguably UKIP (Abedi and Lundberg 
2009), and some ethno-territorial parties (see Elias 2009)) or that mainstream parties may seek to fill 
a more specific niche, such as with the Austrian Freedom Party, which shifted from a liberal-
mainstream platform to a nationalist niche in the mid-1980s (Wagner 2012; Meyer and Wagner 2013).  
Niche and mainstream can therefore be conceptualised as functions of issue emphasis. As a result, 
niche or mainstream status is a product of the attention that all relevant political parties pay to 
particular issues (or dimensions of competition), and not as a result of individual parties emphasising 
issues (or dimensions) independently of each other. Therefore, supposing that all relevant parties 
emphasise the main dimension of competition, and the relevant issues therein, then any party that 
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emphases other dimensions of competition, and thus hitherto unaddressed issues, can be considered 
to be a niche party. By extension, if a mainstream party that has hitherto focused on the main 
dimension of competition (and those subsidiary issues) changes and now competes primarily on a 
secondary dimension of competition, and thus focuses on issues that have hitherto been ignored, then 
that party is considered to have transitioned from a mainstream to a niche status. Finally, supposing 
that a niche party maintains its focus upon secondary dimensions and issues, but that mainstream 
parties trespass onto this niche territory and focus their attention of these secondary dimensions and 
issues, the effect is the mainstreaming of these issues and dimensions, and thus the niche party loses 
its niche status and is considered to be a mainstream party as its issue emphasis no longer reflects a 
niche profile. Should the niche party wish to remain niche, therefore, it would need to adjust its 
programmatic profile to emphasise those issues that do not receive widespread attention from other 
political parties.  
Meyer and Miller (2013) argue that the mainstream-niche dichotomy should not be considered a 
dichotomy at all. Rather, they argue that mainstream and niche represent extreme poles on a single 
continuum or spectrum. Here, if all parties emphasise the exact same issues as the average party 
(determined by the mean, weighted average of all party emphases in that system9) then it corresponds 
to the ideal-typical mainstream party (Meyer and Miller 2013: 262). By contrast, if a party emphasises 
issues that are completely neglected by its rivals, then it is considered to be an ideal-typical niche party 
(Meyer and Miller 2013). While useful, this approach does raise the question of how one actually 
distinguishes between mainstream and niche parties. Yes, we can determine their overall 
mainstreamness or nicheness, but at what point can we categorically declare that a party is 
mainstream or niche? Put simply, the focus upon continuums or spectrums, while useful, serves to 
ignore that mainstream and niche represent different classes of parties. While the spectrum might 
help us operationalise our definition of mainstream and niche, without clear boundaries between each 
 
9 The exact calculation for this is described in Appendix A. 
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class, we cannot categorise parties as either mainstream or niche. Therefore, any continuum or 
spectrum must be intra-class, that is, we have two distinct classes of parties, but that within each class, 
we can have degrees of that class. Perhaps an obvious example is that of the pregnant woman. While 
she can be more (8 months) or less (3 months) pregnant, the fact remains that throughout she is 
pregnant. Thus, class comes before degree (Sartori 1970: 1038). Applied to our concept, then, a niche 
party can be more or less niche but must be first categorised as niche; and the same for mainstream, 
and the other concepts that we have considered here.  
 
4.5. Establishment and Anti-Establishment 
An alternative dichotomy for differentiating political parties is that of the establishment and anti-
establishment party. The approach of Schedler (1996) and Abedi (2002, 2004) have been grouped 
together owing to their shared use of the same terms rather than their approach to defining those 
terms.  
For Schedler (1996), this dichotomy exists as a result of a specific societal cleavage or conflict between 
the rulers on the one hand and the ruled on the other. While this cleavage can often be expressed 
through various terminology, such as the elite versus the common man, or the political class versus 
the people, the core message is the same: public officials and politicians form an ‘anti-popular 
coalition’, that is, they are a political class distinguishable from everyone else (Schedler 1996: 294). 
Abedi (2002, 2004) defines establishment parties as those parties that have i) participated in 
government or that other parties regard as suitable partners for coalition; ii) expressed a willingness 
to cooperate with other parties in terms of coalition. By contrast, anti-establishment are considered 
to be all those parties that fulfil three criteria: firstly, the party perceives itself to be a challenger to 
establishment parties. Secondly, that the party asserts that a fundamental divide exists between the 
establishment or political class (or whatever term is preferred) and the people (again, whatever 
preferred term) and while also implying that the establishment parties are essentially the same (Abedi 
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2002; 2004) or that they form some form of cartel (Schedler 1996; see also Katz and Mair 1995). 
Finally, and similarly to Meguid and others, that it introduces new or neglected issues.  
While a useful heuristic or starting point, this approach does suffer from a conceptual boundary 
problem in as much as some radical right parties fulfil the criteria to be considered an anti-
establishment party and yet still participate in government or confidence and supply arrangements. 
Thus, put simply, the two definitions are not exclusive, and thus some parties could hold joint 
membership in each category. Borrowing from Schedler instead, then, the essential characteristic of 
the anti-establishment party, be they ‘new politics’, left libertarian, green, populist, or right-wing 
radical, is a rejection of the existing system without breaching into anti-democracy. Indeed, anti-
establishment political parties adopt similar language to the anti-authoritarian movements of old and 
frame their criticisms within the context of perceived democratic decay (Schedler 1996).  
 
4.6. Summary of Concept Definitions 
The following then considers in turn each of the concepts that have been explored above. Each is 
visualised as classes and degrees, with an accompanying explanation of how these concepts operate 
and relate to each other.  
4.6.1. Mainstream and Niche 
Following Meyer and Miller (2013), Meyer and Wagner (2013), and Wagner (2012), it is proposed that 
mainstream and niche represent the focus of party profiles. That is, the more ‘commonly-owned’ 
issues that the party focuses on, the more mainstream that party is, while the more ‘neglected’ issues 
that the party focuses on, the more niche that party is.  
4.6.2. Major, Minor, and Peripheral 
Following Kefford (2016), and thus building on Sartori (2005), what distinguishes major, minor, and 
peripheral parties is size and relevance. Major parties are those that regularly form a government in 
their own right or as the largest party within any coalition. Minor parties are those parties that do not 
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expect regular governmental inclusion nor expect to be the largest party in any coalition. Peripheral 
parties will usually be exceptionally small in size, often failing to gain parliamentary representation, or 
holding only a few seats. Thus, what separates minor and peripheral is the Sartorian (2005) notion of 
relevance. That is, they possess blackmail or coalition potential (see above).  
Given this then, major, minor, and peripheral are to be operationalised as such: a major party is any 
party with 15 percent of the vote or over. A minor party is any party that scores below 15 percent of 
the vote and above 5 percent of the vote or polls between 1 and 5 percent of the vote but has regular 
government participation. A peripheral party is any party that polls below 5 percent of the vote and 
has no history of governmental participation.  
4.6.3. Establishment, Anti-Establishment, and Anti-System 
Building on Schedler (1996), anti-establishment parties, be they ‘new politics’, left libertarian, green, 
populist, or right-wing radical, reject the existing political system without breaching into anti-
democracy. As Schedler (1996) argues, anti-establishment parties often adopt language similar to that 
of historical anti-authoritarian movements and tend to frame their critiques in the context of 
perceived democratic decay. By contrast, anti-system parties – which are discussed further below – 
are those that outright reject the system in which they operate and are thus considered (explicitly) 
anti-democratic.  
4.6.4. Moderate and Non-Moderate 
Moderate and centrist ideologies are to be operationalised using data from the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (2014, 2017) survey. Parties can be categorised as moderate left (scoring between 1.25 and 
3.75), centre (scoring between 3.76 and 6.24), moderate right (scoring between 6.25 and 8.75) and 
non-moderate (scoring between 0 and 1.24 and 8.76 and 10) on the general left-right dimension. 
Given that the labels radical and extremist have specific ideological meanings in this thesis (see below), 
scores outside of the moderate ranges of the general left-right dimension are not considered 
inherently extremist or radical, merely non-moderate.   
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The concepts discussed above – major and minor, moderate and non-moderate, establishment, anti-
establishment and anti-system, and mainstream and niche – all offer useful ways to identify 
different types of parties. However, as has been shown, these concepts also suffer from a number of 
problems, or throw up a number of challenges, and some of these are particularly pertinent for this 
thesis. That is, this thesis is primarily concerned with competition between, for want of a better term 
for the moment, ‘main’ party actors, and actors from the radical right. And yet some of the concept 
presented above that seek to capture these ‘main’ actors would include parties of the radical right. 
Indeed, some radical right parties (e.g., the FPÖ or the Lega) would fall into the major party category 
by virtue of their size and/or the frequency with which they have participated in government. Others 
might easily breach the arbitrary cut off point on any moderate-non-moderate spectrum. And others 
could well end up being defined as mainstream instead of niche given their emphasis of issues that 
belong to the dominant dimension of competition. For all these reasons then, a different concept is 
used in this thesis to differentiate between the ‘main’ parties and those of the radical right, and a 
different term is proposed, namely that of ‘principal parties’.  
 
4.7. Principal Parties 
The concept used in this thesis is that of the ‘principal party’. It is a concept derived from the other 
concepts discussed above, and is one that brings together some of the characteristics or elements of 
each. As such, it could be considered a portmanteau concept, by virtue of the fact that it blends 
together a number of concepts. 
Principal parties are most important, traditional, party actors in any given system and are recognised 
by three characteristics. Firstly, they are economically mainstream. In practice, these parties advance 
economic policies that are broadly comparable to other mainstream parties. In other words, principal 
parties tend to coalesce around similar economic positions, notwithstanding specific differences in 
the implementation of those economic positions (for instance, a social democratic and conservative 
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party might both advance a commitment to the market, even if in the specifics, there are slight 
variations). Secondly, they are considered to be major parties. In other words, they are sufficiently 
large parties that regularly poll above 15 percent of the vote and can be expected to participate, 
regularly, in government. Thirdly, they have a moderate ideological profile. That is, they are not 
weighed down by ideological baggage or commitments such as nativism, racism, or anti-systemness.  
It will be noticed that this concept of the principal party does not include any mention of whether or 
not these parties compete on the cultural dimension of competition, or whether they compete on 
other dimensions too, and hence whether they address salient issues only or also more neglected 
ones. In other words, this definition does not encompass this definition does not encompass the core 
definition of mainstream parties, as contained in the mainstream-niche literature, with regard to 
secondary dimensions of competition. This is because of the changing saliency of the secondary 
dimension and issues therein, as well as the fact that some of the core parties in any given system, 
especially social democratic parties, regularly express niche or perfectly average profiles on the 
cultural dimension the saliency of secondary dimensions and issues change over time, yet this need 
not change who the core players are.10 
The term ‘principal’ is chosen to denote parties that conform to this definition. The term’s common 
meaning is “a person or thing as first in order of importance” (Cambridge Dictionary n.d.; Collins 
Dictionary n.d.), and this fits well with the three characteristics just presented. 
Naturally, which parties are considered principal parties can and does change over time. Parties can 
cease to be principal ones if they cease to possess any of the three characteristics listed above. They 
can stop being principal ones if their economic policies cease being mainstream; if their electoral 
fortunes wane so much that they no longer poll sizeable shares of the vote and thus fail to be frequent 
 
10 The cultural dimension here having been created through the Comparative Manifesto Codes for Traditional 
Morality, Multiculturalism, and National Way of Life. The principal parties that express ‘perfectly average’ or 
niche profiles on this dimension are as followed: Norwegian Labour Party, Finnish Social Democrats, Flemish 
Socialist Party, Italian Democratic Party, Swiss Social Democratic Party, the Austrian Social Democratic Party, 
and the British Liberal Democratic Party. 
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partners in government; and if their overall ideology ceases to be moderate. Indeed, as is regularly 
observed with many social democratic principal parties in Western Europe, this traditionally dominant 
family is in what appears to be terminal decline. Overtime, therefore, it seems possible – perhaps even 
likely – that a number of social democratic parties are likely to cease to be principal parties as their 
vote share continues to decline.  
The advantage of the principal party concept, then, is in its clear identification of relevant and 
important political parties that, hitherto, have been among the most important parties in their 
respective systems. Furthermore, it provides the vehicle by which these parties can be adequately 
differentiated from the radical right; a family of parties that have become, in recent years, increasingly 
important in their respective systems. And finally, it does not depend on the saliency of dimensions 
or issues, which makes it better than the concept mainstream, as is used in the mainstream-niche 
literature. The concept of the principal party is therefore more appropriate for the task at hand. 
Table 4.1 lists all those parties contained within the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset, between 
1995 and 2017, that meet the definition established above for categorisation as principal parties.11 In 
a number of cases, owing to name changes, party reformation, mergers, and the like, some of the 
parties listed below are inclusive of previous iterations of that party or functional equivalents (such as 
the dominant party in any merger). These parties (tagged with an asterisk (*) in the table) have been 
treated as single, continuous organisations to simplify the analytical aspects of this thesis. Table 4.1 
also reports the average vote of each party in the time period, as well as its placement on the left-
right spectrum.  
 
 
11 The Norwegian Progress Party could be classified as a principal party in that it is a major party, having polled 
an average of 16.25 percent of the vote, is considered a moderate-right party (as operationalised by manifesto 
data), and has a mainstream economic profile. What excludes the Progress Party from inclusion within the 
principal party family, however, is its anti-systemness (see below). This raises the prospect that borderline 
cases such as the Progress Party might soon become fully-fledged principal parties (see Ignazi 2006: 256).  
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Table 4.1: Principal parties in western Europe, 1995-2017. 
Country Party Name Abbrev. Avr. Vote Placement 
Austria Austrian Social Democratic Party SPÖ 32.62 Centre 
Austria Austrian People's Party ÖVP 30.12 Centre 
Denmark Social Democratic Party S 29.29 Centre 
Denmark Liberals V 26.76 Moderate Right 
Finland Finnish Social Democrats SDP 23.04 Centre 
Finland National Coalition KOK 19.91 Moderate Right 
Finland Finnish Centre KESK 21.77 Centre 
Flanders, Belgium* New Flemish Alliance NVA 18.78 Moderate Right 
Flanders, Belgium Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats Open VLD 24.40 Moderate Right 
Flanders, Belgium Socialist Party Differently SP.A 20.85 Moderate Left 
Flanders, Belgium Christian Democratic and Flemish CD&V 20.99 Moderate Right 
France Socialist Party PS 21.89 Moderate Left 
France Republic Onwards! LREM 28.21 Centre 
France The Republicans LR 23.74 Moderate Right 
Germany Social Democratic Party of Germany SPD 31.33 Centre 
Germany Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union CDU/CSU 36.93 Centre 
Great Britain Labour Party Lab 36.12 Centre 
Great Britain Liberal Democrats LD 16.16 Centre 
Great Britain Conservative Party Con 36.00 Moderate Right 
Greece Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) Syriza 35.90 Moderate Left 
Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK 29.03 Centre 
Greece New Democracy ND 34.39 Moderate Right 
Italy Democratic Party PD 21.28 Moderate Left 
Italy Five Star Movement M5S 25.56 Centre 
Italy Go Italy / People of Freedom FI / PdL 26.52 Moderate Right 
Netherlands Labour Party PvdA 20.84 Centre 
Netherlands People's Party for Freedom and Democracy VVD 20.13 Moderate Right 
Netherlands Christian Democratic Appeal CDA 19.77 Centre 
Norway Labour Party A/Ap 32.52 Moderate Left 
Norway Conservative Party H 18.45 Moderate Right 
Sweden Social Democratic Labour Party SAP 36.36 Moderate Left 
Sweden Moderate Coalition Party M 23.36 Moderate Right 
Switzerland Social Democratic Party of Switzerland SP 20.44 Moderate Left 
Switzerland FDP.The Liberals FDP 15.75 Moderate Right 
Wallonia, Belgium Socialist Party PS 40.78 Moderate Left 
Wallonia, Belgium Reform Movement MR 37.77 Moderate Right 
Wallonia, Belgium Ecologists Ecolo 17.10 Moderate Left 
Notes: Fuller details on those parties that have undergone name changes, reformation or mergers, with 
previous iterations included in parenthesis: Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats, Party of Liberty and Progress); Christian Democratic and Flemish (Christian People's Party); The 
Republicans (Union for Presidential Majority, Union for a Popular Movement, Rally for the Republic); 
Democratic Party (Democratic Party of the Left, Olive Tree); Go Italy (People of Freedom); Socialist Party 
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Different (Flemish Socialist Party, Socialist Party Different - Spirit). 
* Flanders and Wallonia have been treated as distinct party systems. This was achieved by adding the vote 
shares of the Flemish parties for the provinces of Antwepen, Limburg, Oost-Vlaanderen, Vlaams-Brabant, and 
West-Vlaanderen to create a Flemish party system. For Wallonia, the same process was followed for the 
provinces of Brabant Wallon, Hainaut, Liège, Luxembourg, and Namur. Given that both Flemish and Walloon 
parties compete in Brussels, it was determined that the votes gained in Brussels from Flemish and Walloon 
parties would be divided by two and then added to their provincial totals. 
 
 
4.8. Extreme and Radical Right Parties 
Within the literature on extreme or radical right parties, it has become almost customary for 
researchers to begin any study with a declaration that there is no agreement among scholars on what 
to call these parties or how to define them. In fact, even the briefest survey of the literature reveals 
an abundance of terms to describe what is essentially the same set or class of parties. These labels 
include, but are not limited to: extreme right, far right, radical right, nativist, ethno-nationalist, fascist, 
reactionary tribalist, anti-partyist, anti-immigrant and many variants of populist (Carter 2005: 21; 
Mudde 2007). However, while there is little agreement over what to call these parties, there is more 
agreement over how to define these parties than is often assumed (Carter 2018). The purpose of this 
section is to outline the definition of extreme and radical right that will be employed within this thesis. 
This definition, employing the works of Carter and Mudde, creates two separate but related classes of 
parties: the extreme right and the radical right.  
Throughout the literature on the extreme and/or radical right, authors have advanced a number of 
definitions that centre on the rejection of the established socio-cultural and/or socio-political system 
(Betz 1993; 1994), on anti-democracy (Carter 2005; 2018), on the mobilisation of xenophobic 
sentiments against immigrants (Husbands 1981; Kitschelt 2007), on the myth of a homogenous nation 
(Minkenberg 2000, 2017), and on nativist or nationalistic ideology (Eatwell 2000; Mudde 2007; Zaslove 
2009). In his influential study, Mudde (1996) found no fewer than 58 features that contributed to 
defining the extreme or radical right, of which, five were mentioned in over half of the definitions. 
These are: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the strong state.  
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As Carter (2005) notes, there are two problems to Mudde’s (1996) approach of defining the extreme 
and/or radical right by seeing which features appear most regularly. Firstly, not all parties that are 
routinely considered extreme right share all these attributes. Indeed, Mudde himself acknowledged 
this in his 1995 article Right‐wing extremism analysed. In looking at the ideology of the Austrian 
National Democratic Party (NDP), the Dutch Centre Party ’86 (CP’86), and the National Democratic 
Party (NPD) of Germany, Mudde concluded that only one of these parties, the Austrian NDP, 
possessed all five features. The strong state aspect was missing from the CP’86, while anti-democracy 
was missing from both the CP’86 and German NPD.  
Secondly, while routinely mentioned, these features do not necessarily define the concept of extreme 
and/or radical right party. Rather, they only permit intra-class categorisation. In concept formation, in 
order to advance an accurate definition of a concept, we need to first ascertain and identify those 
attributes that form necessary and/or sufficient conditions that define the boundaries of the concept 
(Sartori 1970; Gerring 1999; Goertz 2006). An important aspect of this procedure is the identification 
of taxonomic categories that represent appropriately the level of abstraction at which we wish to 
operate. Higher order classes represent more generalised and thus more abstract categories, and 
therefore require fewer necessary and/or sufficient conditions, while lower order classes, which 
represent more specific categories, require more necessary and/or sufficient conditions (Sartori 1970; 
Collier and Mahon 1993; O’Kane 1993; Goertz 2006; Mair 2008). In regard to the definition put 
forward by Mudde (1996), four of the five regularly featured characteristics identified are in fact 
manifestations of a higher order concept, namely anti-democratic sentiment (Carter 2005; 2018). And 
indeed, the same applies to many of the other attributes identified by the other authors highlighted 
above. All this underlines the importance of identifying the level of abstraction at which we wish to 
operate, and of identifying necessary, rather than possible characteristics in coming up with an 
accurate definition of the extreme and/or radical right.12 The importance of doing this is succinctly 
 
12 While the taxonomical approach to concept formation considers necessary and sufficient conditions, 
research into the extreme or radical right has tended to focus on necessary and possible conditions, while 
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captured by Carter (2005: 15) who points out that that while a racist party might well be an extreme 
right party, not all extreme right parties are racist.  
Thus, in order to advance an accurate definition of the extreme and radical right, we need to first 
identify those features or attributes that are necessary to defining the concept of the extreme and/or 
radical right, while avoiding those attributes that do nothing to delineate it from other concepts. By 
way of example, consider the attributes populism and neoliberalism, both of which have been applied 
to the extreme or radical right (Betz 1994; Rydgren 2005; Kitschelt 2007; Mudde 2007; among others). 
While these attributes might help us distinguish between parties within the extreme and/or radical 
right party family, they do nothing to actually define the party family itself. Both populism and 
neoliberalism can be found within the new right parties of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and 
therefore fail to delineate between new right and extreme or radical right (Minkenberg 2000). As 
Carter (2005: 15) again rightly argues:  
To get closer to identifying the defining features of right-wing extremism – that is, 
features that are common to all right-wing extremist parties – and to make out which 
parties belong to an extreme right party family, it is therefore important to focus on 
necessary features of right-wing extremism rather than on possible ones. Possible 
features only become important later on, when the extreme right party family is 
subdivided in some way or another.  
 
In this vein then, Carter (2005) argues that the two necessary conditions by which we can adequately 
define the extreme right family are: anti-democratic sentiment and rejection of fundamental human 
equality. The former reflects the extremeness of these parties, and Carter (2005: 16) borrows from 
 
ignoring sufficient conditions. This is not necessarily a deficiency, however, and there are good reasons for 
doing this, namely that none of the attributes or conditions put forward define the concept sufficiently – i.e., 
they are coupled together with other attributes or conditions.  
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Backes and Moreau (cited in Roberts 1994: 463) in conceiving of democracy as ‘fundamental values 
(human rights), procedures and institutions (free, equal, direct and secret elections; party 
competition; pluralism; parliamentarism; a state based on the rule of law; separation of powers) of 
the democratic constitutional state’. The second condition relates to the party’s right-wingness (Carter 
2005: 17) 
This approach to defining right-wing is particularly useful in that the extreme and/or radical right tend 
to compete on the non-economic dimension (Rovny 2012) and thus defining right-wing by reference 
to economics is unhelpful (Mudde 2007: 25; Carter 2018: 151).  
The emphasis that Carter places on these parties’ rejection of democracy is put under pressure 
somewhat in her subsequent typology of extreme right parties. One category of this typology includes 
parties that are supposedly anti-democratic in nature but nonetheless advocate ‘more democracy and 
less state’ (2005: 42). Carter (2005: 47) acknowledges this herself, and recognises that the attitudes 
of these parties call into question their inclusion in the wider extreme right party family:  
A third group of contemporary West European right-wing extremist parties also calls 
for significant reform of the existing democratic order, but unlike the second group of 
parties just discussed, parties in this third group believe that existing democratic 
institutions and procedures make for too little democracy rather than too much. In 
particular, parties of this third group are critical of the established parliamentary 
system and of the existing parties for not representing citizens adequately, and they 
call for substantial reforms to address these issues. Parties in this third group also 
favour a reduction (rather than a strengthening) of the role and reach of the state. 
They also differ from the first two groups of parties in that they do not maintain that 
individual rights and freedoms should be subordinated to the greater national 
interest. 
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A cursory reading of this category would suggest that parties that advocate less state and more 
democracy could not possibly be considered extreme right. After all, how can a party that advocates 
more democracy be anti-democratic? For Carter – and Ignazi (2003), from whom she draws – the 
answer is that these parties have a delegitimising impact upon the systems in which they operate. 
That is, these parties have a strained relationship with the more liberal, substantive aspects of modern 
democracy, rather than the procedural aspects. For instance, while the Danish Progress Party ‘never 
made a full-frontal attack on democracy by invoking authoritarian solutions, they certainly 
undermined the system’s legitimacy, not just by displaying contempt towards the parties and 
politicians, but by also considering them useless, backward, and even harmful’ (Ignazi 2003: 148). 
Thus, for Carter and Ignazi, these parties display anti-systemic qualities that are ‘sufficient to 
undermine the legitimacy of that state’ and thus while ‘their anti-systemness is less strong than that 
of some of the other right-wing extremist parties [they] nonetheless display contempt … for the 
democratic system’ (Carter 2005: 53-54) and can therefore be reasonably considered to be extreme 
right parties.  
It is worth acknowledging two points, however. Firstly, while many of these parties express a 
significant degree of anti-systemness or anti-pluralism, this has not prevented them from taking part 
in coalitions or confidence and supply arrangements in a variety of West European countries. 
Secondly, while many of these parties seek to devalue many democratic institutions through an 
enhancement of personalised leadership-oriented institutions, such as a presidencies or 
governorships, or through greater use of direct democracy, other parties, such as the Austrian FPÖ, 
seek to enhance the powers of national parliaments vis-à-vis the executive (Mudde 2007: 154). Thus, 
while these parties display anti-systemic qualities, their relationship to the systems in which they 
operate is often quite complex. The bottom line is that it is not entirely clear that these parties will 
undermine the system in which they operate, and often times, they have raised ‘legitimate democratic 
issues’ that have been ignored by conventional political parties (Eatwell 2000: 142). 
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The existence of this third category reveals a complex relationship between these parties and 
democracy, and between those parties that are explicitly anti-democratic, and those that actually 
advocate more democracy but present a challenge to the more liberal aspects of modern democracy, 
including pluralism (Mudde 2000, 2007, 2010; Betz and Johnson 2004; Kitschelt 2007; Zaslove 2009; 
Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Minkenberg 2017). Borrowing from Carter (2018) – whose definition is 
a synthesis of Sartori (1987: 92), Collier and Levitsky (1997: 434), and Diamond and Morlino (2004: 20-
31) – democracy can be conceived of as a concept with two core components. The first concerns a 
procedural definition of democracy defined as ‘fully contested elections with full suffrage and the 
absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of 
speech, assembly and association’ (Carter 2018: 170). The second concerns the substance of 
democracy and ‘includes a belief in the value of diversity and hence tolerance of difference (i.e., 
pluralism), the principle of political equality …, and the valuing of, and respect for, civil and political 
freedoms’ (Carter 2018: 170).  
Mudde (2007) distinguish between extreme and radical right parties on this basis and conceives of the 
extreme right as those parties that reject democracy in its entirety (its procedures and its substance), 
while he defines the radical right as a rejection of the substance of democracy only – that is, the 
rejection of all or part of the liberal values that underpin modern democracy. Therefore, unlike the 
extreme right, the radical right accepts the procedures of modern representative democracy.  
Given these definitions, parties of the extreme or radical right will not be identified here by making 
use of data from expert surveys or manifestos. This is because this data does not reflect the parties’ 
attitudes towards democracy (procedures or substance) and the system in which they operate. 
Instead, this data focuses on policy, be it on the overall left-right dimension or on specific policy issues. 
Indeed, some of these parties sometimes embrace rather moderate policy on certain issues.  
Table 4.2 lists those parties that are considered to be radical or extreme right parties, drawn from the 
relevant literature, on the basis of their attitudes towards the procedures and values of liberal 
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democracy. Table 4.2 does not include an exhaustive list of all radical and extreme right parties across 
the relevant cases, but rather, includes a list of radical and extreme right parties that are included 
within the analysis. The exclusion of any radical or extreme right parties, such as the French MNR, the 
Dutch CD and CP’86, and the Swiss FPS, is as a result of a lack of data (see Chapter 5) regarding principal 
party strategies. Table 4.2 therefore only reports those parties that feature, in some form, in the 
analytical stages of this thesis.  
Of course, some extreme and radical right parties are borderline cases whose inclusion within Table 
4.2 would be contested and therefore requires some justification. These parties are: The Danish 
People’s Party, the Norwegian Progress Party, the United Kingdom Independence Party, the Pim 
Fortuyn List, and the Finns Party. While each of these borderline cases accept the procedures of 
democracy and none has criticised or attacked democratic systems of government, or advocated 
overtly authoritarian solutions, each has, to varying degrees, undermined the legitimacy of the system 
in which they operate, have advocated anti-system or anti-constitutional positions, or have expressed 
and embraced xenophobic attitudes, and have thereby rejected the principle of fundamental human 
equality. 
The Norwegian Progress Party is sometimes discounted from studies of the radical right (see Ignazi 
2006; Mudde 2007). Yet, as Ignazi argues, ‘opposition to the basic values of Norwegian society, 
supplemented by its contempt for the political system and politics in general, and its propensity for 
authoritarian forms of social conflict management, including a xenophobic penchant, portray a party 
that undermines the system’s legitimacy and is, in Sartori’s terms, an ‘anti-system’ party’ (Ignazi 2003: 
157). Indeed, the Norwegian Progress Party expressed a clear xenophobia towards both Muslims and 
the Sami peoples of the north (Downs 2001; Bergmann 2017). While the Norwegian Progress Party 
has toned down some of its original propensity for authoritarianism, and adopted a more centrist 
profile, it has maintained its anti-immigration and anti-establishment elements (Jungar and Jupskås 
2014; Jupskås 2016).  
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The United Kingdom Independence Party, originally conceived of as a hard Eurosceptic movement 
party, has been considered by a number of scholars to be a radical right party (e.g., Ford and Goodwin 
2014; Gruber and Bale 2014; Webb and Bale 2014; Pareschi and Albertini 2016). Like the Progress 
Parties of Scandinavia, UKIP has a delegitimising influence on the party system. It portrays the principal 
parties as a homogenous block, the ‘LibLabCon’, whose policies are totally indistinguishable from one 
another, and thus appeals to the public to ‘sod the lot’ (Pareschi and Albertini 2016: 7). Equally, the 
party has appealed to voters on the basis that ‘ordinary people are being sold out by an out-of-touch 
political elite’ (Geddes 2014: 29) and in doing so have undermined the system’s legitimacy by 
displaying contempt towards other parties and politicians (see Ignazi 2003). UKIP advocated a number 
of democratic reforms that would have reduced the power of parliament while empowering the 
people directly, such as through ‘Swiss-styled referenda’, and coupled this with exclusionary, often 
xenophobic, policies and rhetoric around immigration, immigrants, and refugees (Ford and Goodwin 
2014). This trend reached a pinnacle under the leadership of Gerald Batton (2018-2019) who made 
clear overtures to a number of radical right individuals in British politics, including the founder of the 
English Defence League, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (also known as Tommy Robinson), and ratcheted up 
the anti-Muslim rhetoric.  
The Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) also combined a mix of anti-systemic beliefs and rhetoric alongside 
xenophobic pronouncements against targeted minority groups. The LPF displayed a certain hostility 
and distrust of conventional parties, criticising the ‘closed circuit of the Hague with its incestuous 
political elite’, while denouncing the old parties and politics as elitist and undemocratic (Akkerman 
2005). As with the parties above, this anti-systemic bent was tied to anti-Muslim prejudices, with Pim 
Fortuyn once stating that he would, if legally permissible, ban Muslims from entering the Netherlands 
(Akkerman 2005). Fortuyn feared that the Islamisation of the Netherlands would destroy Dutch 
culture and freedom, suppress individual autonomy, and undo the emancipation of women and 
homosexuals (Akkerman 2005). On the constitutional front, Fortuyn advocated the removal of Article 
1 of the Dutch constitution, a provision for the prevention of discrimination, on the basis that it 
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infringes upon individual freedom of speech/expression (Akkerman 2005). This thus qualified it as 
undermining the democratic system and hence belonging to the radical right family.   
Like the other parties listed above, the Finns Party combines strong anti-establishment rhetoric and 
messaging with equally strong anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies. A central pillar of the party’s anti-
establishment appeal is the juxtaposition of the good, ordinary people against the corrupt and 
unresponsive elite (Bergmann 2017). Indeed, the Finns Party regularly positions itself against the 
‘rotten gentlemen’ – ‘corrupt, wheeling and dealing politicians’ and the ‘theoretical gentlemen’ – 
isolated, ivory tower academics with no sense of the real world (Jungar 2016: 125) – and presents all 
alternatives as a monopoly or cartel that suppresses any differing viewpoint; and in doing so, 
fundamentally undermines the system in which they operate. This is coupled with a hostility towards 
minorities both external – immigrants, particularly Muslims – and internal – the Sami people and 
Swedish-speaking minority (Jungar 2016; Bergmann 2017). Thus, while the Finns Party does firmly 
support the democratic institutions and processes of the Finnish state, its rejection of the principle of 
fundamental human equality is sufficient for it to be included within the radical right party family.  
 
Table 4.2: Radical and extreme right Parties in western Europe, 1995-2017. 
Country Party Abbrev. Extreme or radical? 
Austria Freedom Party FPÖ Radical 
 Alliance for the Future of Austria BZÖ Radical 
Flanders, Belgium Flemish Interest (née Blok)  VB Radical 
Denmark People’s Party DF Radical 
 Progress Party FrP Radical 
Finland (True) Finns Party (since 2003) PS Radical 
France National Front FN Radical 
Germany National Democratic Party NPD Extreme 
 Alternative for Germany AfD Radical 
Greece Popular Orthodox Rally LAOS Radical 
 Independent Greeks ANEL Radical 
Italy (Northern) League LN Radical 
Netherlands Pim Fortuyn List (ceased 2008) LPF Radical 
 Party for Freedom PVV Radical 
Norway Progress Party FrP Radical 
Sweden Sweden Democrats (since 1995) SD Radical 
Switzerland People’s Party SVP Radical 
United Kingdom United Kingdom Independence Party (since 2001) UKIP Radical 
Wallonia, Belgium National Front FN Radical 
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4.9. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to first define and then identify the key players or parties 
relevant to this thesis. The chapter achieved this by engaging with the scholarly literature that deals 
with the defining of the relevant concepts. Having determined that none of the concepts defined are 
totally appropriate for this thesis, this chapter introduced the concept of the ‘principal party’ – parties 
that are first in order of importance in their respective systems – and set about listing which parties 
in each country case is considered a principal party and therefore relevant to this thesis. Having done 
this, the chapter then turned its attention to the defining of extreme and radical right parties. It 
engaged with the relevant scholarly literature in order to arrive at a minimal definition based on 
parties’ attitudes to the substantive and procedural dimensions of democracy. With a definition 
arrived at, the chapter once again identified the relevant extreme and radical right parties.  
This chapter therefore represents the end of the theoretical groundwork required for this thesis. 
Chapter 2 introduced a new model of competition with a reputational dimension, Chapter 3 focused 
on factors that would influence the types of strategies that parties might choose, and this chapter, 
Chapter 4, has defined and identified the relevant players. With the theoretical groundwork 
accomplished, Chapter 5 outlines the methodological approach of this thesis.  
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5. Research Design and Methods 
 
5.1. Introduction 
It should be recalled that the purpose of this thesis is to understand the competitive relationship 
between principal parties on the one hand and radical right parties on the other. More specifically, 
the thesis poses three related questions: 
I. What strategies do principal parties adopt against radical right competitors? 
II. How successful are these strategies in terms of reducing radical right vote share? 
III. Is there a ‘silver bullet’ that can be employed against the radical right?  
In order to answer these questions, this thesis will employ a set-theoretic multi-method research 
design, that will be conducted in two distinct stages. The first will consist of an extensive stage that 
will employ multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA), while the second, an intensive 
stage, will consist of case studies. The inclusion of case studies post QCA allows for the verification (or 
refutation) and evaluation of results produced during the QCA analysis. Indeed, this multi-method 
approach is recommended as a good standard of practice within the QCA community (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2010). 
Before proceeding to outline the way in which mvQCA has been employed, it is first worth considering 
set-theoretic methods and QCA generally, so as to understand the value-added of mvQCA for this 
thesis.  
 
5.2. Set Theoretic Methods and Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Set-theoretic methods are a group of methods that share three characteristics. Firstly, they make use 
of data that is calibrated as set-membership scores. That is, any data of interest must be recalibrated 
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from its current state to that of full, partial, or full non-membership of the relevant set. Consider, for 
example, whether or not Turkey is a European country. If it is determined that European countries are 
defined by a shared Christian heritage, or denominations therein, then Turkey would receive a 
membership score of 0 in the set ‘European religion/Christianity’. By contrast, Turkey might receive a 
set membership score of 0.33 in the set ‘European location’, indicating that while some of Turkey is 
geographically within Europe, most of it is not (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). 
Secondly, relations between social phenomena are conceptualised as set-relations rather than 
correlations (Wagemann and Schneider 2010; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Thus, while causal 
inference in regressional analytical methods tend to structure solution terms as ‘the more of X, the 
more of Y’, or ‘the less of X, the less of Y’, or even ‘the more of X, the less of Y’, in set-theoretic methods 
a solution term would take the form ‘if X, then Y’. For example, consider the claim that all NATO 
members are democracies. This observation is a set-relational statement as ‘NATO members’ and 
‘democracies’ both represent sets containing different cases. As all NATO members must be 
(nominally) democracies, the set ‘NATO members’ is considered a subset of ‘democracies’ (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012). 
Thirdly, set-relations are interpreted with reference to notions of sufficiency and necessity (Goertz 
and Mahoney 2012; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Legewie 2013). A necessary condition is one that 
is necessary for the outcome to occur. Therefore, no matter the number of causal paths to the 
outcome, the necessary condition must be present. By contrast, a sufficient condition is one which is 
sufficient for the outcome to occur but not necessary. This means that while the sufficient condition 
causes the outcome to occur, other conditions may do so as well.13 
 
13 In addition to necessary and sufficient conditions, set-relations can also be interpreted by their more 
complex modifications, namely INUS and SUIN conditions. An INUS condition is one that is ‘an insufficient but 
necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result’ (Mackie 1965: 246). INUS 
conditions are essential components of a configuration of conditions that is sufficient for the outcome (Goertz 
and Mahoney 2012: 25). A SUIN condition is a ‘sufficient but unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient 
but necessary for the result’ (Mahoney et al. 2009: 126). It is worth noting that INUS and SUIN make reference 
to more than a single condition. The first two letters in INUS capture the properties of a single condition while 
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QCA distinguishes itself from other set-theoretical methods – such as Mill’s classical methods of 
difference and agreement, explanatory typologies, and coincidence analysis – through its emphasis 
on causal interpretation as well as its employment of Boolean truth tables and minimisation. With few 
exceptions (e.g., Elman 2005; George and Bennett 2005), other set-theoretical methods tend not to 
focus on causal complexity, or even on outcome conditions (as is often the case with typologies), and 
none employs truth tables to aid the visualisation and analysis of causal complexity (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012). The core feature of QCA, then, is that it seeks to model social reality in terms of set 
relations, by reference to necessary and sufficient conditions, and that it is these conditions, perhaps 
in combination, that explain social phenomena. Indeed, the notion of causal complexity or equifinality 
– the idea that outcomes are produced through a configuration or combination of conditions and that 
different combinations of conditions can lead to the same outcome – is essential to QCA (Mahoney 
and Goertz 2006; Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Rohling 2012; Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012) 
It should be noted, however, that while a combination of conditions might explain the outcome, these 
same conditions do not necessarily explain its complement, i.e., the non-outcome. Set-relations, then, 
are considered asymmetric (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). 
This notion of asymmetry has some interesting consequences for the subject of this thesis. For 
instance, Meguid (2005, 2008) argues that the accommodative strategy, when employed by a 
mainstream party, should result in vote loss for the radical right party. For Meguid, then, the presence 
of cases where:  
I. the accommodative strategy has been employed but the mainstream party has not 
benefited electorally; 
 
the latter two refer to the properties of a configuration of conditions. By contrast, the first two letters in SUIN 
refer to conceptual issues – that is, the attributes that make up a condition – while the latter two refer to the 
causal pattern (Rohlfing 2012: 58-59). 
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II. the mainstream party has benefited electorally from non-accommodative strategies 
serves to undermine the theory as it weakens the correlation between condition and outcome. By 
contrast, for QCA, the presence of deviant cases – cases that deviate from theoretical expectations – 
does not undermine the hypothesis but rather indicates the presence of other causal paths to the 
outcome or even the asymmetry of causal paths. In other words, an accommodative strategy could 
lead to radical right vote loss when combined with other strategies (conditions) and lead to radical 
right vote gain when combined with others. The nature of causal complexity, then, is that ‘[p]arts are 
not viewed in isolation but in context of the whole they form. To change one or more elements often 
changes how the whole is perceived or understood, which, in turn, has an impact on the meaning of 
each individual part’ (Ragin 2014: 23). Indeed, this is one of the strongest advantages of QCA: its 
natural capacity for dealing with causal complexity, such that Vaisey (2014) refers to QCA as 
‘complexity-oriented’. While there have been attempts to address equifinality in conventional 
quantitative methods (e.g., Braumoeller 2003), these approaches have often required stringent data 
requirements – very large-n – or have produced ‘convoluted likelihood functions’ (Vis 2012).14 
Therefore, while it is technically possible to incorporate equifinality into conventional quantitative 
methods, the procedure is often far more cumbersome when compared to QCA (Vis 2012).  
In addition, QCA handles issues of limited diversity quite well. Limited diversity is the QCA-equivalent 
of what Lijphart would consider to be the ‘many variables, small-n’ problem (Lijphart 1971: 686). 
Limited diversity is omnipresent in social science research and often poses a problem for research of 
all sizes (Lijphart 1971; Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). In QCA, limited diversity 
manifests itself as logical remainders within the truth table. Logical remainders are empty rows within 
the truth table – that is, logically possible configurations or combinations of conditions that do not 
appear empirically (Schneider and Wagemann 2006: 757). These logical remainders are made visible 
 
14 The likelihood is the probability of observing the data given the assumed model's parameter value. The 
likelihood function, then, is the method by which the likelihood is calculated (parameter values based upon a 
given distribution of data). 
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during the analytical process and provide researchers with an opportunity to engage in simplifying 
assumptions in a transparent and theory-driven way. Simplifying assumptions are essentially theory-
driven assumptions based on counterfactuals – i.e., thought experiments in which the researcher 
theorises about how the event or outcome of interest might have changed should certain conditions 
be different (Legewie 2013). QCA is not unique in its use of counterfactuals. Indeed, they are 
ubiquitous in causal inference (George and Bennett 2005). However, the advantage of QCA in this 
regard is that it deals with counterfactuals in a transparent and systematised way (Ragin 2008).  
The value-added of QCA for the purposes of this thesis is a combination of the above: a medium-n, 
case-oriented15, middle-ground methodological approach, that is rooted in set-theory. The majority 
of implementations of QCA in the social sciences have sought to explain its advantages in terms of its 
capacity for handling small or medium-sized n comparative research (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009). Yet, 
while this is true (see Ragin 1987), such a justification disregards the set-theoretical foundations upon 
which QCA was developed, and further ignores the capacity of QCA to adequately address large-n 
comparative research (Vis 2012). Indeed, those at the forefront of developing QCA have long argued 
that the use of QCA should be justified not on its capacity to handle certain-n research but rather on 
the basis of its set-theoretic approach (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). It has been argued that 
‘[g]ood social science [should be] problem driven and not methodology driven in the sense that it 
employs those methods that for a given problematic, best help answer the research questions at hand’ 
(Flyvbjerg 2006: 242). More often than not this requires a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods, achieving a balance between ‘over-generalizing and “universalizing” … quantitative 
approaches, on the one hand, and purely individualizing case-oriented approaches, on the other’ 
(Berg-Schlosser and Cronqvist 2005: 172; see also Flyvbjerg 2006: 242). By employing QCA, this thesis 
not only achieves a balance between quantitative and qualitative methods, but also heeds Hall’s 
 
15 Case-oriented research focuses upon a small number of cases and often a larger number of variables or 
conditions. By contrast, variable-oriented research focuses mainly on generalised relationships between 
variables (della Porta 2008). See della Porta (2008: 208, Table 11.2) for a summary of the primary differences 
between variable- and case-oriented approaches.  
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(2003) call to ensure the aligning of ontology and methodology. The logic underlying the way social 
scientists often understand the social world is set-theoretic (Ragin 2008; Wagemann and Schneider 
2010; Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Legewie 2013). Indeed, set-theoretical relationships are 
ubiquitous and implicit in most social science discourse (Ragin 2000), and therefore it is appropriate 
that the method and approach chosen reflect the set-theoretical reality of social phenomena, in this 
case, party competition.  
The attractiveness of QCA as a methodological approach and novel set of techniques is demonstrated 
by its increasing popularity across a range of disciplines in the social sciences (Marx et al. 2013; Rihoux 
et al. 2013; Thiem and Dușa 2013). In fact, QCA has been employed in party politics quite a number of 
times. It has been used to explain the electoral success of populist parties in Europe (van Kessel 2015); 
to re-evaluate Kitschelt’s theory of support for the new radical right (Veugelers and Magnan 2005); to 
determine why some parties fail and others succeed (Beyens et al. 2015); to explore ethnic 
mobilisation in post-communist countries (Gherghina and Jiglau 2011); to elucidate on why some left-
libertarian parties have succeeded while others have failed (Redding and Viterna 1999); to investigate 
the breakthrough of anti-establishment reform parties in Eastern Europe (Hanley and Sikk 2016); to 
analyse the success of ethnic minority parties in post-communist countries (Bochsler 2011); to 
scrutinise gender balance in political parties in Western Europe (Lilliefeldt 2010); to expound upon 
Europeanisation and state reform in Belgium (Dardanelli 2012); and to detail the emergence of 
dominant parties in post-secessionist unrecognised states (Ishiyama and Batta 2012). Indeed, variants 
of QCA have been employed in comparative politics more than in other fields of study (Roig-Tierno et 
al. 2017).  
 
5.3. Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA) 
To determine which (combinations of) strategies principal parties employ against the radical right, and 
to analyse the extent to which these strategies are successful (or not), this thesis will employ mvQCA. 
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mvQCA is essentially an extension or generalisation of crisp-set QCA (csQCA) (Cronqvist and Berg-
Schlosser 2009). What distinguishes these two variants of QCA is that csQCA is purely dichotomous 
while mvQCA permits the use of multinomial categorisation. By way of example, consider a traffic 
light. csQCA would assign a value of either 1, indicating that the condition is present, or 0, indicating 
that the condition is absent. In other words, each colour of the traffic light – red, amber, and green – 
would be given either a 1 or 0. By contrast, mvQCA would allow multiple values to be assigned, so that 
0 could represent the colour red, 1 could represent amber, and 2 could represent green (Haesebrouck 
2016). mvQCA therefore permits the use of multinomial conditions without resorting to creating a 
series of crisp-set or binary dummy conditions to achieve the same effect (Cronqvist and Berg-
Schlosser 2009). In our example, then, the use of three conditions in csQCA is reduced to a single 
condition in mvQCA.16 The capacity of mvQCA to handle multinomial conditions is extremely useful 
for this thesis in as much as the issue-oriented strategies themselves are multinomial in orientation. 
Principal parties have to choose an issue-oriented strategy – they can’t not – but there are multiple 
options from which to choose. And indeed, it is the choice that principal parties make that is crucial 
to this thesis.  
In theory, it is possible to configure csQCA so that it could handle what are essentially multinomial 
conditions. For instance, in the traffic light example above, each colour can be configured as an 
individual condition. However, doing so introduces a methodological problem, namely the 
configuration of conditions that are logically possible but empirically impossible, or what are termed 
‘impossible remainders’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). In the context of this thesis, an example 
would be for a principal party to adopt both an accommodative strategy and an adversarial strategy. 
This is logically possible. Yet it is empirically impossible because these are contradictory strategies, 
and cannot, in reality, be adopted by the same party at the same time. The presence of impossible 
 
16 In practical terms, then, consider the example of a red light. In csQCA, this would be coded as: red = 1, 
amber = 0, and green = 0. While in mvQCA this could be colour = 2 (with 2 being red). Therefore, three 
conditions are condensed into one. 
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remainders can be mitigated through the re-evaluation or re-conceptualisation of conditions or 
through revisiting the case selection process (Schneider and Wagemann 2010) or even through the 
exclusion of impossible remainders from the analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2013). However, this 
does very much complicate the analytical process.   
An alternative to csQCA and mvQCA is of course fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA). fsQCA differs from both csQCA 
and mvQCA in that it allows for partial membership of particular conditions. Returning to the example 
of whether or not Turkey is a European country, in a fsQCA analysis, Turkey could be given a fuzzy-set 
score of 0.33 to indicate the fact that while some of the country is geographically within Europe, most 
of it is not (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). In its use of partial set-membership scores, fsQCA 
therefore allows for fine-grained analysis (Ragin 2000). However, while this is a distinct advantage in 
many instances, it is not one that is needed here. This is because this thesis is interested in what are 
essentially binary conditions – that is the presence or absence of particular strategies in a given 
context. It is not concerned with the degrees of a strategy – i.e., the extent or strength to which a 
strategy is used.  
For the purposes of this thesis, then, there is no real advantage to using fsQCA. It would present 
additional methodological problems: it would complicate the analytical process; and its ability to use 
partial set-membership scores is not needed here. Moreover, mvQCA has a number of distinct 
advantages, the most important of which is its use of multinominal categorisation, which is essential 
to this thesis. Given this, mvQCA is the best method for this thesis.  
Before moving on to detailing how exactly mvQCA will be used in this thesis, it is first worth considering 
the software chosen to conduct the mvQCA analysis. The choice of software is not a trivial matter as 
it not only dictates what functions are available to the researcher, but it also has a huge impact on the 
final results of the analysis. Many of the software packages available suffer from a number of deficits. 
For instance, the popular package Tosmana cannot provide the intermediate solution term (that is, 
one of the methods by which the various identified pathways are simplified); it cannot conduct tests 
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of necessity; and it does not provide parameters of fit (Thiem and Dușa 2013). Similarly, the other 
dominant software package, fs/QCA, cannot conduct mvQCA analysis; only has partial provision for 
tests of necessity; and has limited capacity for calibration (Thiem and Dușa 2013). Indeed, these 
software-related deficits are common among many of the available packages.  
Perhaps more concerning than this, however, is the fact that very few of these packages actually reveal 
model ambiguity (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017; Kahwati and Kane 2020). Put simply, model 
ambiguity occurs when there are multiple, logically valid models that are capable of explaining the 
outcome of interest. In these situations, it is up to the researcher to determine how to interpret the 
presence of multiple models and the extent to which the presence of multiple models impacts upon 
the substantive interpretation of the solution terms derived from the minimisation procedure 
(Kahwati and Kane 2020). In cases where the software gives some indication of ambiguity, through 
specific routes for minimisation, the software ultimately produces a single model, hiding all other 
models that are equally valid in explaining the outcome, and thereby depriving the researcher of 
necessary information that will affect their interpretation of the solution terms. To put it bluntly, a 
failure to engage with model ambiguity correctly severely dampers the researcher’s capacity to 
adequately and correctly interpret their results (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017). Of the software that 
is available, only those packages that are available in the R programming language adequately present 
model ambiguity, and of those packages, only one is fully resourced and capable of supporting a wide 
array of enquiries. This is the QCA in R package developed by Adrian Dușa (2018), and for all the 
reasons just outlined, it is this software that the thesis uses.  
 
5.4. mvQCA: Analyses and Cases 
In order to answer the thesis’ research questions, the mvQCA analysis will focus on 14 countries 
between the years 1995 and 2017. In order to maximise the extent to which the results produced by 
the mvQCA analysis can be generalised, as many Western European countries as possible should be 
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included. Indeed, generalisations in comparative politics should be checked against 'all cases' where 
possible (Sartori 1970: 1035). The countries to be included within this study, then, are: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland.17 Belgium is treated as two distinct political systems in this analysis. This is 
as a result of the fundamental distinction between the party systems of Flanders and Wallonia (see 
Chapter 4, note 3 for further details). Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain all lack a 
relevant radical right party during the investigative period and will therefore be excluded.18 
The mvQCA analysis will be split into two distinct stages. The first stage will examine a single principal 
party’s strategy at each election, and the impact of this strategy on the vote share of the radical right. 
This stage will include all principal parties that were identified in Chapter 4, including moderate right, 
moderate left, and centrist principal parties. This stage, then, will incorporate the strategies of 38 
principal parties, drawn from 14 countries, representing 76 different elections. Each election includes 
at least two principal parties, although some countries have more principal parties competing in each 
election (as demonstrated in Chapter 4, Table 4.1). In total, this yields 199 cases where each case 
represents the strategies of a single principal party, during a single election period, in a single country.  
The second stage will examine the impact of the combination of strategies adopted by the two largest 
principal parties in each election on the vote share of the radical right. Following Meguid (2005, 2008), 
it is assumed that the strategies of one principal party can impact upon the effectiveness of the 
strategies of another principal party, and therefore by incorporating the strategies of two principal 
parties, the analysis will be able to explore the more complex dynamics of party competition. The 
analysis in this stage will be restricted to the strategies of two principal parties, one drawn from the 
moderate right and the other from the moderate left. In a few cases, there are no moderate left 
 
17 Northern Ireland operates as an essentially independent party system from the rest of the United Kingdom, 
and given its lack of radical right party, has been excluded from the analysis.  
18 Since 2019, Spain has gained a relevant radical right party in Vox, which gained 24 seats in the April 2019 
congressional election and 52 seats in the November 2019 congressional election. However, this is outside of 
the timeframe for this thesis. Portugal looks set to gain a relevant radical right party in Chega, a radical right 
party that, as of 2019, gained a seat in the national parliament and in regional parliaments. 
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parties, and therefore the analysis will make use of the largest (by vote share) centrist party instead 
(see Chapter 4, Table 4.1). This restriction to two principal parties is primarily the result of 
methodological considerations. In short, each country has a differing number of principal parties, and 
therefore the analysis needs to be restricted to the lowest common denominator, otherwise a whole 
series of dummy variables would be required for those countries that do not have three or four 
principal parties. This would drastically increase the complexity of the analytical procedure and would 
hamper any substantive interpretation. This second stage will incorporate the strategies of 28 
principal parties, again drawn from 14 countries, over 76 elections, yielding a total of 76 cases. Here, 
a case represents the combined strategies of two principal parties, during a single election, in a single 
country.  
Undertaking the analysis in two stages means not only that it is possible to increase the number of 
observations, but it also makes for a point of comparison between the impact of the strategies of a 
single principal party and the strategies of two principal parties in combination. Put differently, the 
first analysis – that focuses on the strategies of a single principal party only – forms a point of reference 
against which the second analysis – that examines the strategies of the two principal parties in 
combination – can be compared.  
For both stages, the analysis is carried out twice: once for a decrease in the vote share of the radical 
right and once for an increase in the vote share of the radical right. This means that the exact effect 
of principal party strategies can be detected; that is, whether particular (combinations of) strategies 
lead or otherwise contribute to either a decrease or an increase in the vote share of the radical right.  
Furthermore, the introduction of both a decrease and an increase in the radical right vote share acts 
as a form of in-built robustness testing. Within the QCA process, it is good practice to not only test for 
the outcome of interest but also its negation. This ensures that the same set of conditions is not 
producing two opposing outcomes. In the context of this study, this robustness test can be 
incorporated into the analytical process itself and can be leveraged to deliver meaningful results for 
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substantive interpretation. The negation tests for each analysis have nonetheless been conducted and 
are included in Appendix G. These serve as additional robustness tests. 
Finally, the dataset on which the mvQCA is based is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
5.5. Case Studies 
As was highlighted above, the inclusion of case studies following any QCA analysis is a fundamental 
step that not only permits post-analysis verification and evaluation of the results produced, but is also 
considered a standard of good practice within the QCA community due to the capacity of case studies 
to support process-tracing (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). The use of case studies is especially 
important in this study as the mvQCA analysis itself is not employed here to identify causal links 
between conditions and outcomes, but rather, to identify strategic pathways that are subsequently 
explored and elaborated upon in the case studies. Any casual claims made in the subsequent chapters 
are therefore based on a combination of the results of the mvQCA analysis and the case study 
analyses, rather than on the basis of just one of these. 
In order to verify and evaluate the pathways identified within the mvQCA analysis, it was initially 
proposed that three case studies were to be conducted. These were France, Sweden, and Denmark. 
These three countries not only offer interesting examples of the competitive relationship between 
principal parties and radical right parties, but they also offer contrasting institutional arrangements, 
host differing attitudes towards immigration within their respective populations, and serve as broad 
examples of European polities. This is demonstrated in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1: The context of the three case studies 
Country Institutional Arrangement PP response RR credibility Immigration attitudes 
France Hostile Hostile Credible Slightly negative 
Sweden Friendly Hostile (somewhat) Credible Very positive 
Denmark Friendly Friendly Credible Slightly positive 
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Table 5.1 shows that these three case studies differ in four important ways. Firstly, they vary in terms 
of their institutional arrangements. These relate to the practical capacity of smaller parties to win 
votes and gain seats at the national level. This includes, but is not limited to, whether or not the polity 
employs a majoritarian or proportional electoral system for national level elections, whether or not 
the state provides some form of funding for political parties, and whether or not the state funds media 
broadcasts for parties come election time. Taken collectively, then, these elements make up wider 
electoral laws (Bowler et al. 2003) that help determine the extent to which a system is classified here 
as institutionally hostile or friendly to smaller competitors such as parties of the radical right.  
Secondly, Table 5.1 indicates the manner in which the principal parties in each country have 
responded to the presence of radical right parties. In short, a hostile response would be akin to the 
application of a cordon sanitaire or other exclusionary approaches, while a friendly response would 
take the form of collaboration and/or cooperation, or other types of inclusionary approaches. Thirdly, 
the table reports the degree to which the radical right party is considered credible. In practical terms, 
this is the degree to which the radical right party is well-organised and well-led (see Lubbers et al. 
2002; Carter 2005; van Kessel 2015). Finally, Table 5.1 includes details of voter attitudes towards 
immigration in each country, with ‘negative’ pointing to a feeling within the population that 
immigration is overall a ‘bad’ thing, and positive suggesting that, by contrast, the population sees 
immigration as bringing more benefits than costs to the country. This is important because the issue 
of immigration is clearly highly salient to radical right parties. What is more, these parties often 
subsume other important issues (e.g., employment, welfare, crime, health) into the immigration issue 
(Hellström et al. 2012; Nordensvard and Ketola 2014; Norocel 2016; Abts et al. 2021; Engler and 
Weisstanner 2021).  
To an extent then, given their differences, these three case studies – France, Sweden, and Denmark – 
together provide a representative picture of party competition in Western Europe. That said, there 
are clearly limits to this. For a start, no three cases could provide a full representation of party politics 
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across the whole of Western Europe. Moreover, national particularities and traditions that may turn 
out to be important in explaining the efficacy of principal party strategies employed against the radical 
right remain, be they the importance of laïcité in France or the tradition of Folkhem in Sweden.  
Unfortunately, focusing on three case studies proved to be over-ambitious in terms of work, time, and 
even space within this thesis, especially given the amount of time that was dedicated to understanding 
the particular contexts of each case. As a result of this, and to maintain the in-depth nature of the case 
studies, the thesis focuses on France and Sweden.  
There are a number of reasons to prefer comparison between France and Sweden than, say, France 
and Denmark, or Sweden and Denmark. Firstly, the France and Sweden comparison afforded the 
greatest variation in principal party strategies as well as the greatest variation in the contexts outlined 
above. Secondly, it was felt that the French case was particularly important owing to the long-term 
survival and presence of the National Front. Thirdly, a Sweden-Denmark comparison was avoided 
because a focus on two Scandinavian countries would harm the generalisability of the case studies. 
Finally, Sweden provides a particularly interesting example of a sizeable shift in the fortunes of the 
radical right compared to the other cases. Indeed, Sweden went from a ‘negative case’ (Rydgren 2002) 
to a particularly prominent case of radical right success by 2014.  
 
5.6. Contextual Conditions in the Case Studies 
Having chosen the case studies, it is important to outline the contextual conditions found in these 
cases, and in particular the specific contextual conditions that will be explored in greater depth in the 
case study chapters. The impact of four contextual conditions will be examined in each case study 
chapter. In addition, other factors pertinent to explaining the specific French or Swedish context 
within which the parties compete will be explored. These conditions and factors are very important 
for understanding the casual relationship between the strategies of principal parties and the effect 
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they have on the vote share of the radical right. Indeed, the mvQCA analysis is only designed to identify 
the strategic pathways that various principal parties pursue with regards to their radical right 
counterparts; it does not control for various contextual differences within the chosen systems. It is 
the case studies that contextualise the pathways explored within the mvQCA analysis, and they are 
therefore fundamentally important to the casual analysis of principal party strategies.  
The first condition that will be analysed in the case studies (Chapters 7 and 8) is that of the issue 
agenda. In particular, the focus will be on understanding how the issue agenda influences the way in 
which principal parties compete, and on the impact that the issue agenda has on the efficacy of the 
strategies these parties adopt. The issue agenda is understood to mean those issues that are 
particularly salient within the public consciousness. It is measured through public opinion, and through 
data from surveys that ask respondents which issues they believe ‘were the most important issues 
facing’ the country. 
The next condition that the case study chapters will explore is voter attitudes towards immigration. 
This condition is important because the issue of immigration is the one above all others that is 
championed by parties of the radical right, and the extent to which voters are concerned about 
immigration (i.e., the salience of the issue among the population) will not only influence the success 
of the radical right, but it is also likely to influence which strategies the principal parties choose to 
adopt in the face of the radical right challenge, and the efficacy of these strategies. As noted above, 
the parties of the radical right often subsume other issues into an immigration frame and/or link other 
issues to immigration. This is particularly so in Sweden, where the Sweden Democrats very often relate 
concerns about the funding of, and access to, the generous welfare state to immigration. Given this, 
this theme is explored in greater depth in Chapter 8. As with the issue agenda, voter attitudes towards 
immigration are measured through survey data.   
The third contextual condition examined in the case study chapters is the level of satisfaction that 
voters express with the functioning of democracy within their country, and their levels of trust in 
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politicians and/or parties. These are important conditions to explore as previous research has shown 
that voters who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy are much more likely to vote for 
radical right parties (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002). Likewise, voters who display low levels of trust 
in politicians and political parties have also been seen to be more likely to support the radical right 
(Miller 1974; Billiet and De Witte 1995; Hetherington 1999; Fieschi and Heywood 2004; Doyle 2011; 
Rooduijn 2018). Again, levels of satisfaction with democracy, and levels of trust in politicians and 
parties are measured through data from public opinion polling.  
The case study chapters also focus on the reputation of political parties and candidates – both that of 
the principal parties and of the radical right. This condition is not exogenous to the parties in the same 
way the last three were – although arguably, the issue agenda, attitudes towards immigration and 
levels of satisfaction in democracy and trust in politicians and parties are also all clearly shaped by the 
parties too – but it is crucial to exploring and explaining which strategies are chosen by the principal 
parties, and which turn out to be effective. Indeed, reputation forms the backbone of the enhanced 
model of party competition outlined in Chapter 2, and it is theorised that parties or candidates with a 
stronger reputation over an opponent will be more successful in the implementation of their 
strategies. Candidate and party reputation is measured through public opinion polling data. 
These four contextual conditions are examined in Chapter 7 on France, and Chapter 8 on Sweden. 
However, the coverage is not identical in each chapter because national particularities and traditions 
inform these conditions. As mentioned above, for instance, in Sweden the issue of immigration is often 
related to welfare issues. As such then, Chapter 8 will pay attention to this. Similarly, the discussion of 
levels of trust in politicians and parties, and the coverage of reputation will differ slightly cross the two 
chapters. In the French case, the emphasis will be on trust in politicians and on the reputation of 
individual candidates rather than the trust in and reputation of political parties. This is in reflection of 
the personalised nature of political competition in this semi-presidential system. By contrast, in the 
Sweden chapter, the discussion will encompass trust in parties as well as in individual politicians, and 
133 | P a g e  
 
the reputation of parties as well as politicians. This reflects the greater importance of political parties 
in Sweden.  
In addition to slight differences in emphasis across the two chapters when discussing these four 
contextual conditions, the Sweden chapter also includes coverage of a further condition which is 
particularly relevant to this case, namely the spatial positioning of parties. Unlike in France, in Sweden 
the principal parties have been far more hesitant to accept the issue agenda of the Sweden Democrats. 
For much of the period under study, they have sought to distance themselves from the Sweden 
Democrats through the use of dismissive or adversarial strategies. It is therefore important to 
understand the impact that this has had on the vote share of the Sweden Democrats. In particular, 
the principal parties’ initial refusal to share the territory of the Sweden Democrats is likely to have 
provided ample opportunities for the latter to develop a strong niche within the electorate. This in 
turn might have enabled them to counteract the strategies of the Swedish principal parties. Chapter 
8 will thus explore these dynamics of party competition in detail.  
The differences across the two cases, and hence the differences in the focus of the discussion, mean 
that Chapters 7 and 8 are not structured in an identical fashion. Rather, in reflection of the particular 
conditions of each case, more or less coverage is devoted to each condition, and the sequence in which 
the conditions are discussed varies a little across the chapters. This is not a problem; in fact, on the 
contrary, it ensures that the research fits the cases, rather than the cases fitting the research. 
Moreover, the distinctive nature of the chapters reflects the very nature of case study research. That 
is, while some contextual conditions are identified as important in advance of conducting the research, 
others – like the importance of welfare issues and the concept of the Folkhem in Sweden – emerge as 
the research unfolds.  
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5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has explained and justified why QCA analysis, and mvQCA in particular, will be used in 
this thesis. It has also explained how this part of the research will be designed, namely through a focus 
on 14 political systems in the 1995 to 2017 period, and by undertaking the analysis in two stages – 
one that concentrates on the impact of a single principal party’s strategy on the radical right vote, and 
a second that analyses the combined impact of the strategies of two principal parties.  
As is good practice, the QCA analysis is followed by case study research so as to enable a proper 
exploration of the casual relationship between principal party strategies and political context. The 
chapter has therefore discussed which case studies have been chosen for analysis, and why these have 
been selected. It has also then outlined the specific contextual conditions found in these cases that 
will be explored in depth in the case study chapters.  
The stage is now set for the mvQCA analysis to begin. The next chapter thus starts with a discussion 
of the data to be employed in this analysis, before moving on to explain the manner in which this data 
is operationalised, and then presenting the results of the two analytical stages that have been outlined 
above. 
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6. mvQCA: Operationalisation and Results 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and interpret the results of the mvQCA analysis. Before 
jumping into the results, however, it is first prudent to recall the purpose of this thesis and the steps 
taken thus far. The aim of this thesis is to determine what impact, if any, the strategies of principal 
parties have on the vote share of the radical right. To do this, Chapter 2 developed a theoretical model 
of party competition, focused on what Meguid (2005) would call ‘competition between unequals’. The 
enhanced toolkit of strategies presented in that chapter incorporated an array of competitive 
approaches including issue-oriented and party-oriented strategies, as well as a more novel element: 
reputational strategies. Chapter 3 focused on those factors that are likely to influence the types of 
strategies that parties pick, while Chapter 4 defined and identified parties that are relevant to this 
thesis. Finally, Chapter 5 outlined the outlined the methodological approach of this thesis, which 
consists of mvQCA and case studies. 
Moving on from those chapters, this chapter outlines the operationalisation of the various party 
strategies and the outcome conditions and provides details as to the various data sources used within 
the mvQCA analysis. Thereafter, it reports the results of the mvQCA analysis. It is split into two distinct 
sections – Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 – that represent two different analyses. The first, Section 6.3, is 
the analysis of single party strategies. In other words, it explores the impact that the strategies of one 
principal party have on the vote share of the radical right.  This analysis is conducted twice: once for 
a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, and once for an increase in the vote share of the 
radical right. The next section, Section 6.4, replicates the first analysis but instead of focusing on a 
single principal party, it analyses the impact that two principal parties have on the vote share of the 
radical right. As before, this analysis is split into two, with the first part focusing on a decrease in radical 
right vote share, and the second focusing on an increase in radical right vote share.  
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Ultimately, the results show that principal parties in Western Europe adopt a wide variety of strategies 
when faced by the radical right, and that these different combinations of strategies are inconsistent 
in the effect that they have on the vote share of the radical right. Put more simply, the strategies 
adopted by principal parties in one country or instance might produce a different result than when 
they are adopted by a different principal party in a different country, or even by the same principal 
party in the same country but at a different election. In view of this, the two chapters that follow this 
one focus on three case studies so as to incorporate what is currently missing from the analysis thus 
far: context.  
 
6.2. Operationalisation and Data 
Table 6.1 provides an overview of each of the strategies that will be explored in the mvQCA analyses. 
The first column reports the strategy in its expression form (i.e., the form that is used in the QCA 
analysis); the second names the strategy; and the third provides a short description of each strategy. 
A fuller, and more detailed overview of the various strategies is provided in Chapter 2.  
When compared to the model of competition developed in Chapter 2, the number of strategies 
employed in the mvQCA analysis has been reduced. This is for technical reasons as well as data 
availability. More specifically, the strategy that involves principal parties imposing legal restrictions on 
the radical right has been excluded, as has the subsuming strategy. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, there is no data available on the legal restrictions that political parties have pursued, and 
given time constraints it is not possible to gather the relevant data for the countries listed over the 
time period under observation. As for the subsuming strategy, while the data exists, the nature of the 
strategy would require a significant amount of time to be invested in the reading of quasi-sentences 
for all manifestos for all principal parties in the relevant countries in the chosen time period. Each 
quasi-sentence would then have to be examined with regard to the interactions of different 
dimensions of competition with a particular emphasis on which dimension is being subsumed into the 
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other. This would require a huge amount of work, and it would also necessitate foreign language skills 
which the author does not have.   
Furthermore, in order to manage the number of logical remainders, a number of strategies will be 
merged together. Firstly, the reluctant two-dimensional adversarial strategy [strategy 3] has been 
merged into the two-dimensional adversarial strategy [strategy 2], while the reluctant two-
dimensional accommodative strategy [strategy 6] has been merged into the two-dimensional 
accommodative strategy [strategy 7]. Secondly, the party-oriented strategies have been condensed 
into engagement and disengagement strategies, respectively. The engagement category consists of 
collaboration [strategy 13], co-optation [strategy 14], and positive reputational strategies [strategy 
15]. By contrast, the disengagement category is made up of the ignore strategy [strategy 10], the 
isolate strategy [strategy 11], and negative reputational strategies [strategy 15]. This approach has 
been adopted elsewhere (Weldon et al. 2017). 
Having clarified which strategies will be employed in the mvQCA analysis, it is now important to 
explain how the thesis identifies the presence or absence of these strategies. That is, how do we know 
when a principal party adopts a one-dimensional dismissive strategy; how do we know when a party 
when embraces a two-dimensional blurring one; and how do we know when a party opts for an 
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Table 6.1: Principal party strategies used in the mvQCA analysis 
mvQCA Code Strategy Description 
ISSUESTRATEGY{0} One-dimensional dismissive strategy  The principal party rejects the cultural 
dimension of competition, and the issues 
contained within it, in favour of 
competing solely on the economic 
dimension of competition. 
 
ISSUESTRATEGY{1} Two-dimensional adversarial strategy The principal party competes on both the 
economic and cultural dimensions of 
competition, but adopts a position on the 
cultural dimension that stands in contrast 
to the radical right party. 
 
ISSUESTRATEGY{2} Two-dimensional blurring strategy The principal party competes on both the 
economic and cultural dimensions of 
competition, but adopts a position on the 
cultural dimension that is ambiguous or 
tokenistic.  
 
ISSUESTRATEGY{3} Two-dimensional accommodative 
strategy 
The principal party competes on both the 
economic and cultural dimensions of 
competition, and adopts a position on 
the cultural dimension that is consonant 
with the radical right party.  
 
DISENGAGE{0} Absence of disengagement strategy(ies) The principal party does not adopt any 
disengagement strategies: ignore, 
isolate, or [negative] reputational. 
 
DISENGAGE{1} Presence of disengagement strategy(ies) The principal party adopts one or more 
disengagement strategies (ignore, 
isolate, or [negative] reputational) 
 
ENGAGE{0} Absence of engagement strategy(ies) The principal party does not adopt any 
engagement strategies (collaboration, 
co-optation, or [positive] reputational) 
 
ENGAGE{1} Presence of engagement strategy(ies) The principal party adopts one or more 
engagement strategies (collaboration, 
co-optation or [positive] reputational).  
 
 
To do this, for the issue strategies identified above, the thesis makes use of data derived from the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2020), and it uses this data to calculate the 
position of each principal party. More specifically, to reflect the range of issues on which the parties 
of radical and extreme right compete, a bundle of cultural issues that are contained in the CMP data 
has been identified, and it is the position of the parties on this bundle that is used. This cultural issue 
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bundle is composed of three themes: national way of life, traditional morality, and multiculturalism. 
And as is the case with CMP data, each of these themes had two categories: one that represents pro- 
quasi-sentences and another that represents anti- quasi-sentences. These different quasi-sentences 
are added together to create a cultural issue bundle that represents a traditionalist and progressive 
position. This process is summarised as followed:  
National Way of Life  Traditional Morality  Multiculturalism  Cultural Issue Bundle 
Per601 (pro) + Per603 (pro) + Per607 (anti) = Traditionalist 
Per602 (anti) + Per604 (anti) + Per608 (pro) = Progressive 
 
 
The position of each party on this cultural issue bundle is then calculated by adding the traditionalist 
quasi-sentences, then subtracting the sum of progressive quasi-sentences, and then dividing this by 
the total number of quasi-sentences. Notionally, this takes the form:  
(TQS-PQS)/(TQS+PQS) 
Where TQS is the total number of traditionalist quasi-sentences, and PQS is the total number of progressive 
quasi-sentences.  
The scores that result from this calculation allow for the identification of the different issue strategies. 
Scores that fall between -1 and -0.11 indicate the presence of a two-dimensional adversarial strategy. 
By contrast, scores of between 0.11 and 1 indicate a two-dimensional accommodative strategy. And 
scores that fall between these – i.e., of between -0.1 and 0.2 indicate the existence of a two-
dimensional blurring strategy. This is because the very presence of (some) quasi-sentences 
demonstrates some saliency of the issues in party manifestos, and yet the low figures indicate a lack 
of direction to the strategies.19 Where there are no traditionalist or progressive quasi-sentences in the 
parties’ manifestos at all, this is interpreted as a one-dimensional dismissive strategy.  
 
19 The level of saliency of these issues in the parties’ manifestos could have been further interpreted by 
introducing a cut-off point. That is, a cut-off point for the number of quasi-sentences could have been 
introduced to indicate high or low saliency. However, this was rejected as a rather arbitrary exercise, and one 
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Data to identify the party-oriented strategies is less easy to come by than data for the issue-oriented 
ones. Indeed, there is no existing dataset on party-oriented strategies on which to draw. In light of 
this then, evidence of engagement and disengagement strategies has been extracted from secondary 
sources, in particular from election reports produced for the journals West European Politics and 
Electoral Studies, from the European Journal of Political Research’s political data yearbooks, and from 
the European Parties Elections and Referendums Network based at Sussex University, which produces 
working papers and election reports. A close reading of these reports and papers allowed for the 
identification the party-oriented strategies. For instance, Fallend and Heinisch’s (2016: 329) statement 
that ‘the SPÖ, Greens, and Liberals (who broke away from the FPÖ in 1993) – were always committed 
to a strategy of “principled non-cooperation or Ausgrenzung” (ostracization) towards the FPÖ’ is taken 
as evidence of an isolation strategy at work. Similarly, van Kessel’s (2010: 2) observation that in the 
2012 Dutch election ‘Mr Wilders was harshly criticised by the two coalition partners and by the 
Christian Democrat deputy prime minister Verhagen in particular’ is taken as indicative of a (negative) 
reputational strategy on behalf of the VVD and the CDA.  
Finally, it is necessary to outline the operationalisation and data pertaining to the outcome conditions. 
These outcome conditions are categorized as ‘radical right vote share down’ (RRVSD), ‘radical right 
vote share up’ (RRVSU), and ‘radical right vote no change’ (RRVNC). The first of these is operationalised 
as a decrease in the vote share of the radical right party of 0.5 percentage points or more between 
two election periods; the second is an increase in the party’s vote share of 0.5 percentage points or 
more; and the third is a change in the party’s vote share of between 0.49 and -0.49 percentage points. 
These cut-off points are chosen to reflect meaningful changes in the radical right’s vote share, and to 
avoid marginal or trivial ones. The data for the vote shares of the radical right parties also comes from 
the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2020).  
 
that could have major impacts upon the analysis. Instead, it was decided that the presence of some quasi-
sentences on these issues in the parties’ manifestos would be sufficient.  
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Having provided an overview of how the principal party strategies have been adapted to work within 
the mvQCA analysis, explained how the strategies are operationalised, and outlined what data has 
been used, this chapter now moves onto report the results of the two mvQCA analyses.  
 
6.3. Single Party Strategies  
As highlighted above, the purpose of this section is to first identify the (combinations of) strategies 
that individual principal parties adopt when in competition with the radical right, and to then analyse 
the impact that these strategies have had on the electoral performance of the radical right parties. 
This analysis is split into two parts: the first examines those (combinations of) strategies that lead to 
a decrease in the radical right vote share, while the second investigates those (combinations of) 
strategies that lead to an increase in the vote share of the radical right. These two elements are then 
brought together in a discussion section in order to identify common patterns of competition and 
(radical right) electoral outcomes.  
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is first worth explaining why this section starts immediately 
with the analysis of sufficiency and not, as is common, with the analysis of necessity. The reason for 
this is that the analysis of necessity did not produce any positive results. That is, no individual strategy 
or combination of strategies were identified as necessary for either a decrease or an increase in the 
vote share of the radical right. Therefore, the results of the analysis of necessity are presented in 
Appendix B rather than here. This section focuses on the analysis of sufficiency as it produced the 
most relevant results.  
 
6.3.1. Analysis of Sufficiency [one principal party] 
The analysis of sufficiency identifies which conditions, or combination of conditions, are sufficient for 
the outcome of interest. To recall from Chapter 5, a sufficient condition is a condition that causes the 
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outcome, but does not do so exclusively. In other words, while a sufficient condition might explain a 
particular outcome, other conditions might also explain that same outcome. In set theoretic methods, 
a sufficient condition is identified when the outcome is a superset of the condition. In practical terms, 
the presence of a sufficient condition is identified when the inclusion score (inclS in subsequent tables) 
is 1 or is close to 1. A high or perfect inclusion score indicates high or perfect consistency in the 
underlying data, while low inclusion scores indicate a high degree of inconsistency in the underlying 
data.  
The analysis of sufficiency first involves the creation of a truth table – a table representing every 
possible combination of conditions, including those combinations that are not empirically present. 
The next step is the conversion of the truth table into an expression (e.g., A * B -> 0; read as condition 
A and condition B leads to Outcome) that explains the outcome of interest. This minimisation 
procedure is achieved by removing irrelevant or superfluous conditions from the above expression. 
By way of example, consider the expression below:  
A * B * C + A * B * ~C => Outcome 
No matter the value of Condition C (present or absent), the presence of Condition A and Condition B 
together is sufficient – perhaps even necessary – for the outcome. Therefore, Condition C can be 
removed as it is considered irrelevant or superfluous to any substantive interpretation. This 
minimisation procedure is conducted twice in order to first create the so-called ‘conservative 
solution’, and then to create the ‘parsimonious solution’. The conservative solution employs 
empirically present configurations only, while the parsimonious solution makes use of non-empirically 
present combinations as well as empirically present ones – so-called logical remainders – in order to 
create a more simplified expression, in the same fashion as the minimisation procedure above.  
In the pages that follow, the analysis of sufficiency is conducted twice: once for a decrease in the vote 
share of the radical right as the outcome of interest, and once for an increase in the vote share of the 
radical right as the outcome of interest. Conventionally, in most QCA studies, the analysis of sufficiency 
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is accompanied by another analysis of sufficiency whose outcome of interest is the non-outcome or 
negation of that outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). However, since the present study focuses 
on both an increase in the vote share of the radical right and a decrease in the vote share of the radical 
right, it is essentially engaging in both analyses of sufficiency. That is, for the analysis of sufficiency for 
an increase in the vote share of the radical right, the negation of the outcome would be a decrease in 
the vote share of the radical right, while in the analysis of sufficiency for a decrease in the vote share 
of the radical right, the negation of the outcome would be an increase in the vote share of the radical 
right. For this reason, then, there is little need to engage in the negation of either outcome as it would 
essentially duplicate the results. 
 
6.3.2. Analysis of Sufficiency for a Decrease in the Vote Share of the Radical Right [one principal 
party] 
As outlined above, this section examines whether or not there are any strategies, or combinations of 
strategies that, when employed by a single principal party, lead to a decrease in the vote share of the 
radical right. This is done by first constructing a truth table of all possible combinations of strategies, 
which is then minimised into two solution terms representing the conservative and parsimonious 
solutions. As the truth table represents every possible combination of strategies, it is very large and is 
thus not reported here. Rather, it can be found in Appendix C. Instead, Table 4.2 shows the results for 
the conservative solution.  
 
Table 6.2: Conservative solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right 
Pathway Expression (strategies) Parameters of Fit 
1 
 inclS PRI covS covU 
ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{0}*ENGAGE{1} 1.000 1.000 0.017 - 
Cases 
Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront 
Notes: inclS: inclusion score; PRI: proportional reduction in consistency; covS: coverage score; covU: unique 
coverage score.  
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The conservative solution has produced a single expression or pathway:  
Pathway 1: ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{0}*ENGAGE{1} 
This pathway shows that a one-dimensional dismissive strategy in combination with an engagement 
strategy, and in the absence of any disengagement strategies, is sufficient for a decrease in the vote 
share of the radical right. Put simply, the principal party dismisses the importance of a second, cultural 
dimension of competition, and those issues contained within it, in favour of competing on its primary 
dimension: the economy, and associated issues. The principal party supplements this issue-oriented 
strategy with a party-oriented engagement strategy (either collaboration or co-optation).   
This pathway has an extremely high inclusion score (1.000) indicating that all cases that conform to 
this combination of strategies show a decrease in the vote share of the radical right. However, it should 
be noted that the coverage score (covS), which measures the degree to which the outcome is 
explained by a particular expression or pathway (Dușa 2018: 136), is very low, at 0.017. Indeed, as can 
be seen from Table 6.2, only one case – that of Syriza and the Independent Greeks in the January 2015 
General Election – is represented by this pathway.  
When looking to the underlying data, no other cases conform to this expression or pathway. Five cases 
show parties adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy with the vote share of the radical right 
decreasing; however, none of these cases, with the exception of the case reported in Table 6.2 also 
shows the party adopting an engagement strategy. Therefore, the Greek case presented in Table 6.2 
is a unique case within the dataset. Moreover, when subsetting20 the data for just a decrease in the 
vote share of the radical right, a range of cases are revealed, including several where the principal 
 
20 Subsetting is the process of retrieving a subset or small part of the data based on a set of conditions or 
requirements. In this case, a subset of data was selected on the basis of its outcome – here instances in which 
the radical right party suffered a decrease in vote share.  
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party has adopted an engagement strategy. However, the levels of consistency in these alternative 
pathways are low, and therefore no further claims of sufficiency can be made.  
Before exploring the results of the parsimonious solution, it is first worth revisiting the purpose of the 
parsimonious solution. Unlike the conservative solution, which makes use of only empirically present 
information, the parsimonious solution makes use of theoretically possible but non-empirically 
occurring data. By incorporating hypothetical but plausible combinations of strategies, the 
parsimonious solution often produces a less complex solution term and allows for what Soda and 
Furnari (2012: 287) call the ‘discovery of the plausible’; that is, using plausible counter-factuals in order 
to better understand the phenomena of interest (see also Schneider and Wagemann 2012.  
The results of the parsimonious solution are shown in Table 6.3. As with the conservative solution 
above, the parsimonious solution has produced a single pathway or expression:  
 
Pathway 1: ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*ENGAGE{1} 
This pathway shows the principal party combining a one-dimensional dismissive strategy with an 
engagement strategy. That is, the principal party rejects the cultural dimension of competition, in 
favour of competing exclusively on the economic dimension of competition (and its associated 
issues) but engages with the radical right party. As with the last, this pathway has a perfect 
consistency as measured by the inclusion score (1.000), indicating that all cases represented by this 
pathway also see a decline in the vote share of the radical right. However, also as with the last 
pathway, it covers a very small proportion of cases – namely one: the same case from Table 6.2 – 
Syriza competing against the Independent Greeks in the January 2015 election. Therefore, once 
again, this pathway is considered sufficient for a small part of the outcome but the remainder of the 
outcome remains unexplained by any consistent pathways. This suggests a significant degree of 
inconsistency in the configurational data. That is, a certain combination of strategies will produce 
one outcome in one case, but a different outcome in another case. Having said this, it is of course 
146 | P a g e  
 
possible that some contextual conditions that are missing from the analysis might contribute to 
explaining this inconsistency. This issue is covered in more detail below, and is also discussed in the 
case study chapters.  
 
 
Table 6.3: Parsimonious solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right 
Pathway Expression (strategies) Parameters of Fit 
1 
 inclS PRI covS covU 
ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*ENGAGE{1} 1.000 1.000 0.017 - 
M1 1.000 1.000 0.017 - 
Cases 
Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_25/01/2015_CoalitionoftheRadicalLeft-UnionistSocialFront 




6.3.3. Analysis of Sufficiency for an Increase in the Vote Share of the Radical Right [one principal 
party] 
 
This analysis follows the same steps as the last, albeit with a change in the outcome of interest. While 
the previous analysis focused on what strategies or combinations of strategies led to a decrease in the 
vote share of the radical right, this analysis focuses on those strategies or combinations of strategies 
that lead to an increase in the vote share of the radical right.  
As before, owing to its length, the truth table is not presented here but is instead contained in 
Appendix D. And as before, the next table – Table 6.4 – reports the results of the conservative solution. 
It shows that this solution produces three pathways.  
 
Table 6.4: Conservative solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right 
Pathway Expression (strategies) Parameters of Fit 
    inclS PRI covS covU 
1 ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1} 0.767 0.767 0.452 0.452 
2 ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1} 1.000 1.000 0.008 0.008 
3 ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.032 0.032 
  M1 0.782 0.782 0.492 - 
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Pathway 1: ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1} 
 
This pathway shows the principal party combining a two-dimensional accommodative strategy with a 
disengagement strategy. In other words, the principal party has chosen to recognise and compete on 
the cultural dimension, and has adopted a position on cultural issues akin to that of the radical right 
party. That is, the principal party has shifted its position towards that of the radical right party. At the 
same time, however, the principal party has opted for one or more disengagement strategies, such as 
ignoring or isolating the radical right party. The inclusion score of 0.767 suggests that this pathway has 
reasonably high levels of consistency, yet, at the same time, there are moderate levels of inconsistency 
as reflected in the fact that this score is considerably less than 1. This all means that some cases that 
conform to this pathway or expression do not share membership of the outcome – i.e., they do not 
result in an increase in the vote share of the radical right. The results also show that this pathway has 
reasonably high levels of coverage (0.452). Indeed, 73 of the 199 cases in the data conform to this 
pathway. Of these 73, 56 hold membership in the outcome. The other 17 do not reflecting the less-
than-perfect inclusion score. This pathway can therefore be identified as a likely sufficient pathway, 
although its level of inconsistency should be kept in mind. 
 
 
Pathway 2: ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1} 
 
This pathway shows the principal party adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy in conjunction 
with a disengagement and engagement strategy. Simply put, as concerns the first strategy, the 
principal party has recognised the cultural dimension of competition, but has positioned itself in 
contrast to the radical right party on this dimension. As regards the second and third strategies, which 
are party- rather than issue-strategies, the principal party has adopted a combination of 
disengagement and engagement strategies. This shows that it has an inconsistent approach when it 
comes to how to treat the radical right party, independent of which issues it competes on. This 
pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its inclusion score (1.000) but it has extremely low 
levels of coverage (0.008). In fact, this pathway covers a single case, that of the Social Democratic 
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Party of Switzerland competing against the Swiss People’s Party in the 2017 elections. This case – and 
the combination of engagement and disengagement strategies that the Social Democratic Party of 
Switzerland adopted in relation to the People’s Party – can be attributed to the rather unique 
institutional arrangement of Switzerland, which essentially forces some degree of engagement 
between major parties (with the People’s Party counted as a major party). This facet of competition 
in Switzerland is discussed in more detail below. Therefore, as concerns this pathway, while it is 
considered a sufficient one to an increase in the vote share of the radical right, its capacity to explain 
the outcome is very low. In other words, other pathways explain more of the outcome than this 
pathway.  
 
Pathway 3: ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{0} 
This pathway shows the principal party combining a one-dimensional dismissive strategy with a 
disengagement strategy – in the absence of any engagement strategies. In other words, the principal 
party has rejected the cultural dimension of competition (and associated issues) in favour of 
competing solely on the economic dimension. In addition to this, the principal party has adopted 
party-oriented strategies that are essentially hostile to the radical right party, such as ignoring it, 
demonising it, or otherwise seeking to isolate it, and has chosen not to cooperate with it or co-opt its 
personnel. This pathway has perfect consistency as reflected in its inclusion score (1.000). It also has 
higher levels of coverage (0.032) than the last pathway: it covers four cases.21 As with Pathway 2, then, 
Pathway 3 is considered a sufficient pathway to explain a rise in the vote share of the radical right, but 
again, it only explains a relatively small proportion of the outcome.  
 
21 These four cases are: the Ecologists stance against the National Front in the 1995 Wallonian election; the 
Reform Movement’s strategy vis-à-vis the Wallonian National Front in the 2003 election; the approach of the 
Socialist Party Different-Spirit against Flemish Interest in the Flanders 2003 election; and finally, the strategies 
of the Socialist Party against the National Front in the 1997 French election.  
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As can be seen from Table 6.5, the parsimonious solution produces results that are somewhat similar 
to the conservative solution just discussed, but there is some reduction in the number of conditions 
that make up two of the three pathways. 
 
Table 6.5: Parsimonious solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right 
Pathway Expression (strategies) Parameters of Fit 
  inclS PRI covS covU 
1 ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1} 1.000 1.000 0.032 0.032 
2 ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1} 0.767 0.767 0.452 0.435 
3 DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1} 1.000 1.000 0.024 0.008 
 M1 0.782 0.782 0.492 - 
Notes: As Table 6.2. The full table, including all individual cases, is reported in Appendix G. 
 
 
Pathway 1: ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1} 
This pathway shows the principal party adopt a one-dimensional dismissive strategy in combination 
with a disengagement strategy. That is to say that the principal party rejects the cultural dimension of 
competition in favour of competing solely on the economic dimension. It complements this by 
disengaging from the radical right party either by seeking to isolate it, demonise it, or otherwise ignore 
it. This pathway corresponds to the third pathway in the conservative solution described above, but 
without there being an absence of an engagement strategy. This latter condition is dropped as it is 
found to be a redundant or superfluous condition. When looking to the parameters of fit, the inclusion 
and coverage scores – 1.000 and 0.032 respectively – remain unchanged, confirming that the inclusion 
of the condition (absence of engagement strategy) has no impact on this pathway. Given that this 
pathway has a relatively low level of coverage, it is considered sufficient for the outcome (increase in 
radical right vote share), but only explains a small proportion of that outcome.  
 
Pathway 2: ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1} 
This pathway shows the principal party employing a two-dimensional accommodative strategy in 
combination with a disengagement strategy. That is to say, the principal party recognises and 
competes on the cultural dimension of competition, and positions itself closely to the radical right 
150 | P a g e  
 
party on that dimension. It supplements this issue-oriented strategy with a disengagement strategy, 
be it isolating the radical right party, demonising it, or otherwise ignoring it. This pathway corresponds 
to the first pathway in the conservative solution above, and as before the inclusion and coverage 
scores remain unchanged at 0.767 and 0.452 respectively. Once again, then, a significant number of 
cases (73 of 199) conform to this pattern of competition, although not all share a similar outcome. 
While most (56 of the aforementioned 73) see an increase in the vote share of the radical right, a 
significant (17) minority do not. That being said, as with the first pathway of the conservative solution 
above, this is most likely a sufficient pathway, although its somewhat high level of inconsistency 
should be noted.  
 
Pathway 3: DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1} 
This pathway shows the principal party adopting a combination of disengagement and engagement 
party-oriented strategies, irrespective of what issue strategy it adopts. In other words, it chooses some 
combination of collaboration and/or co-optation as well as demonisation, isolation, and ignoring the 
radical right party.22 This pathway corresponds to the second pathway of the conservative solution 
discussed above, albeit with the crucial distinction that the issue strategy has been dropped here. By 
dropping the issue strategy, the parsimonious solution has increased the coverage of this pathway 
from 0.008 in the conservative solution above to 0.024. In practice, this means that three cases 
conform to this pathway. These are the Social Democratic Party competing against the People’s Party 
in Swiss election of 2007; the French 2012 election where the Union for a Popular Movement 
competed with the National Front; and the 2007 election in Switzerland where the Radical Democratic 
Party was in competition with the People’s Party. While this is a slight improvement (with three cases 
rather than just one in the conservative solution above), the coverage for this pathway is still quite 
 
22 Obviously, some combination of these is not possible: a principal party cannot collaborate with a radical 
right party while at the same time ignoring it. This element of confusion is the product of an earlier decision to 
compress party-oriented strategies into two categories. This decision produced noticeable methodological 
benefits, as discussed above, but has caused some initial yet minor obfuscation.   
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low, and therefore the degree to which an increase in the vote share of the radical right is explained 
by this pathway remains low.   
It should also be noted that while the coverage for this pathway has increased slightly, of the three 
cases represented by it, only the 2007 Social Democratic Party competing against the People’s Party 
case is unique to Pathway 3. The Union for a Popular Movement versus the National Front and the 
Radical Democratic Party against the People’s Party feature in Pathway 2 of the parsimonious solution. 
This is reflected in the unique coverage (covU) score for this pathway. At 0.008 it is noticeably lower 
than the raw coverage (covS) score of 0.024. When this happens – i.e., when the unique coverage 
score is lower than the raw coverage score – this is a sign of overlap between two or more pathways. 
The same is also evident in Pathway 2, just discussed, albeit to a lesser degree. Pathway 2 also had a 
unique coverage score (0.435) that was lower than its raw coverage score (0.452). This all leads to the 
conclusion that there is therefore some overlap in the cases represented by Pathways 2 and 3. 
Practically, however, this does not have much impact on the interpretation of the results other than 
to highlight the fact that minimising Pathway 3 (that is, the dropping of the issue strategy) did nothing 
to improve the explanatory power of the model as a whole (Pathways 1, 2, and 3 collectively) because 
the new cases represented by Pathway 3 were already represented by Pathway 2.  
 
6.3.4. Discussion 
The results thus far suggest a degree of variability in terms of what strategies single principal parties 
have adopted in regard to the radical right. The initial analyses of necessity – that is, the identification 
of conditions or combinations of conditions that are necessary for the outcome to occur – identified 
no necessary conditions. In other words, there are no strategies or combinations of strategies that 
produce a consistent increase or decrease in the vote share of the radical right across all cases (see 
Appendix B for full results of analyses of necessity).  
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Turning to the analysis of sufficiency – the results of which are summarised in Table 6.6 – a range of 
(combinations of) strategies adopted by single principal parties have been identified as sufficient in 
explaining either a decrease or increase in the vote share of the radical right. Starting with a decrease 
in the vote share of the radical right, the analysis of sufficiency (conservative solution) identified a 
single pathway: that the adoption of a one-dimensional dismissive strategy in conjunction with an 
engagement strategy, but in the absence of any disengagement strategies, by a single principal party 
leads to a decrease in radical right vote share. This showed the principal party rejecting the 
opportunity to compete on the cultural dimension of competition in favour of maintaining its focus 
solely on the economic dimension. At the same time, it did engage with the radical right party, through 
governmental collaboration. The explicit absence of any disengagement strategies initially suggests 
that the presence of a disengagement strategy would lead to a different outcome, even if the other 
strategies remained the same. However, given that the absence of disengagement strategies is 
dropped from the parsimonious solution, with the other strategies remaining the same, the inclusion 
of a disengagement strategy is unlikely to have a meaningful effect (i.e., it is a trivial condition in this 
arrangement).  
However, this pathway explains very little of the outcome, as indicated by its extremely low coverage 
score (0.017, in Table 6.3). When subsetting the data – that is, retrieving a small amount of data based 
on a set of requirements – in order to identify further potential pathways, a great deal of inconsistency 
in the underlying data was revealed. In other words, while a combination of strategies adopted by one 
principal party in one case might produce a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, the exact 
same combination of strategies adopted by a different principal party in a different case might 
produce an increase in the vote share of the radical right. As a result of this underlying inconsistency, 
no further claims of sufficiency were made.  
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Table 6.6: Summary of results from the analyses of sufficiency for single principal parties 
Analysis of sufficiency, RRVSD Pathway (strategies)  
Conservative/complex solution Issuestrategy{0}*disengage{0}*engage{1} 
Parsimonious solution Issuestrategy{0}*engage{1} 
  
Analysis of sufficiency, RRVSU  
Conservative/complex solution Issuestrategy{3}*disengage{1} 
Issuestrategy{1}*disengage{1}*engage{1} 
Issuestrategy{0}*disengage{1}*engage{0} 
Parsimonious solution Issuestrategy{0}*disengage{1} 
Issuestrategy{3}*disengage{1} 
Disengage{1}*engage{1} 




The analysis of sufficiency for an increase in the vote share of the radical right produced three 
sufficient pathways that remained broadly the same when comparing the conservative and 
parsimonious solutions. While there was some variety to these pathways in terms of the strategies 
adopted by individual principal parties, one noteworthy feature was that the disengagement strategy 
featured in all pathways. This suggests that disengagement strategies by principal parties are 
associated with an increase in the vote share of the radical right. This finding dovetails with the 
analysis for the decrease in radical right vote share, just discussed, which suggested that engagement 
strategies are associated with a decrease in the vote share of the radical right. That said, it should be 
recalled that this pathway was based on a single case – Syriza and the Independent Greeks in the 
January 2015 election – and that extreme caution should therefore be taken before any extrapolation 
is undertaken.  
Furthermore, while these results are interesting and noteworthy, it should nonetheless be 
emphasised that neither of the conditions just mentioned (disengagement and engagement 
strategies) are necessary for either an increase or decrease in the vote share of the radical right, 
respectively. Indeed, the analyses of necessity (see Appendix B) establish this. They show that there 
are 110 cases in which the principal party has adopted a disengagement strategy, and that of those, 
79 show an increase in the vote share of the radical right, while 31 show a decrease or no change in 
the vote share of the radical right. Therefore, while the disengagement strategy might seem to be 
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associated with an increase in the vote share of the radical right, there is a significant number of cases 
that buck this trend. Similarly, there are 25 cases in which the principal party has adopted an 
engagement strategy, and of these, 10 show a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, while 14 
show an increase in the vote share of the radical right (and the remaining one shows no change). 
Therefore, no association appears to exist between engagement strategies on the one hand and 
radical right vote share on the other.  
The last few points suggest that there is a great deal of inconsistency in the underlying data. That is, 
many principal parties conform to the same patterns of party competition, yet, as has been 
emphasised, the outcome of that competition on the vote share of radical right parties differs across 
cases. This inconsistency in the data suggests missing conditions. In other words, it suggests that 
specific contextual conditions might explain why a certain arrangement of strategies leads to a 
particular outcome in one case but to another outcome in a different case. All in all, then, it very much 
seems that context matters. And for that reason, once the QCA analysis has been completed, the 
thesis will engage in an in-depth study of two quite distinct cases so as to adequately contextualise 
individual patterns of competition.  
 
6.4. Two Party Strategies  
The purpose of this section, much like the section above, is to identify the strategies that principal 
parties adopt when in competition with the radical right, and to analyse the impact that these 
strategies have on the electoral performance of the radical right. The previous analysis focused 
exclusively on the strategies of a single principal party. In other words, no consideration was given to 
the impact that a second principal party might or might not have had. This analysis, then, introduces 
a second principal party into the equation, and analyses the impact that the strategies of two principal 
parties have on the vote share of the radical right. The strategies explored in this section are the same 
as those outlined in Table 6.1.  
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As was the case with the analysis of single party strategies, the analysis of necessity found no 
conditions or combinations of conditions that were necessary for either a decrease or an increase in 
the vote share of the radical right. As before then, while the analysis of necessity was conducted, its 
results are not reported here. Instead, they can be found in Appendix B. Structurally, this section is 
much the same as the previous one in that the analysis is split into two parts: the first examines those 
strategies that lead to a decrease in radical right vote share, while the second explores those strategies 
that lead to an increase in radical right vote share. Then the section offers a discussion that identifies 
common properties and that reaches conclusions.  
 
6.4.1. Analysis of Sufficiency for a Decrease in the Vote Share of the Radical Right [two principal 
parties] 
This analysis of sufficiency, like the previous ones, begins with the construction of a truth table that 
represents every possible combination of strategies. As it is very long, for reasons of space, this table 
is presented in Appendix E. From this table, two minimisation procedures are run: one that leads to 
the conservative solution, and the second that leads to the parsimonious one. The conservative 
solution is presented in Table 6.7. It identifies three pathways that lead to a decrease in the vote share 
of the radical right.  
 
Table 6.7: Conservative solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies) 
Pathway Expression (strategies) Parameters of Fit 
  inclS PRI covS covU 
1 
P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1} 1.000 1.000 0.091 0.091 
2 
P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.045 0.045 
3 
P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.136 0.136 
 M1 1.000 1.000 0.273 - 
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Pathway 1: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1} 
This pathway shows the first principal party, Party 1, adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy in 
the absence of either a disengagement or engagement strategy. The second principal party, Party 2, 
by contrast, combines a two-dimensional accommodative strategy with an engagement strategy – but 
in the absence of any disengagement strategies. Put more simply, Party 1 competes on the cultural 
dimension of competition as well as the economic one, but adopts a position on the cultural dimension 
that is ambiguous. Party 2 recognises and competes on the cultural dimension of competition (as well 
as the economic one), and has positioned itself on that cultural dimension in a manner consonant with 
the radical right party. Party 2 has supplemented this by engaging with the radical right party either 
through collaboration and/or co-optation. This pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its 
inclusion score (1.000) but has low levels of coverage (0.091). This shows that all cases that conform 
to this pathway show a decrease in the vote share of the radical right but that this pathway represents 
few cases (2 of 76). Indeed, it only represents the Labour and Conservative parties of Norway in 
competition with the Progress Party in the General Election of 2013, and the Democrats of the Left 
and Go Italy in competition with the Northern League in the Italian election of 2001.Therefore, while 
this pathway is sufficient, it only explains a small proportion of the outcome.  
 
Pathway 2: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
This pathway is understood as Party 1 employing a two-dimensional accommodative strategy in 
combination with a disengagement strategy, but in the absence of any engagement strategies. Party 
2, meanwhiles, combines a two-dimensional adversarial strategy with a disengagement strategy, but 
in the absence of any engagement strategies. In short, both parties recognise and compete on the 
cultural dimension of competition, but position themselves on that dimension in different ways. Party 
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1 positions itself closer to the radical right party, while Party 2 positions itself in contrast to the radical 
right party. Both parties supplement this by disengaging with the radical right party through isolation, 
demonisation, or ignoring it. The high inclusion score (1.000) for this pathway indicates perfect 
consistency among the cases that conform to this pathway. In other words, all cases that share this 
pattern of competition see a decrease in the vote share of the radical right. The low level of coverage 
(0.045), however, indicates that few cases conform to this pathway. In fact, this pathway represents 
a single case: that of the Socialist Party and Liberal Reformation Party against the National Front in the 
Walloon elections of 1999. Thus, while sufficient, this pathway only explains a small proportion of the 
outcome.  
 
Pathway 3: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
This pathway is translated as Party 1 adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy, while Party 2 
employs a two-dimensional accommodative strategy. In other words, Party 1 rejects the cultural 
dimension of competition in favour of competing solely on the economic dimension, while Party 2 
chooses to compete on the cultural dimension (as well as the economic one) and adopts a position on 
that cultural dimension that is akin to that of the radical right party. Neither party adopts an 
engagement or disengagement strategy. As above, this pathway has perfect consistency as measured 
by the inclusion score (1.000) but has relatively low levels of coverage (0.136). It represents three 
cases, namely the Panhellenic Socialist Movement and New Democracy in competition with the 
Independent Greeks in the June 2012 elections, the same two principal parties competing against the 
Popular Orthodox Rally in the same elections, and the same two principal parties facing the 
Independent Greeks in the September 2015 elections. Again, then, while sufficient, this pathway only 
explains a small proportion of the outcome. 
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The model, and the three pathways within it, covers a very small number of cases as shown by the 
model’s coverage score (0.273). Practically, the model represents only 6 cases of a possible 76 and 
therefore only explains a small proportion of the outcome in question – here a decrease in radical 
right vote share. This indicates that there is a significant degree of inconsistency in the remainder of 
the data. In other words, the same pattern of competition produces one outcome in one case, but 
another outcome in a different case. This lends further weight to the notion that strategies adopted 
in different contexts produce different results. This phenomenon will be further explored within two 
country case study chapters.  
Table 6.8 reports the parsimonious solution. It has produced two models (as indicated by M1 and M2). 
Model 1 is inclusive of Pathways 1, 2, and 3 while Model 2 is inclusive of Pathways 1, 2, and 4. The 
presence of multiple models often arises when the software is unable to make a conclusive decision 
regarding the inclusion or exclusion of particular conditions or combinations of conditions. In this 
particular case, the software was unable to determine whether a model inclusive of Pathway 3 (and 
exclusive of Pathway 4) was better at explaining the underlying data, or whether a model inclusive of 
Pathway 4 (and exclusive of Pathway 3) was better at the task. Two models are therefore reported.23 
Ordinarily, the presence of multiple models would introduce a degree of complexity into the 
interpretation of the results. Both models are equally viable in explaining a decrease in the vote share 
of the radical right and the parameters of fit (inclS and covS) are not sufficiently different in each 
model to make a determination in favour of one model over the other. In fact, the parameters of fit 
for Models 1 and 2 are identical. Similarly, when looking to the cases, there are no differences between 
Pathways 3 and 4; the two pathways are identical in terms of the cases they represent. This can be 
seen by looking at the unique coverage (covU) score for both pathways: the score of 0.000 for each 
 
23 The QCA in R package (Dușa 2018) reveals instances of model ambiguity while the dominant programmes – 
fs/QCA (Ragin and Davey 2014) and Tosmana (Cronqvist 2011) – do not. This is important as the failure to 
report model ambiguity often leaves researchers in the dark as to the true nature of their results (Baumgartner 
and Thiem 2017). 
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indicates that none of the cases is unique to either pathway. Given this, it is possible to integrate the 
two models into a single model through a joint interpretation of Pathways 3 and 4 – i.e., by merging 
these two pathways. The discussion of the pathways that follows is therefore concerned with 
integrated Model 1+2 (Pathways 1, 2, and 3+4).  
 
Table 6.8: Parsimonious solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies) 
Pathway Expression (strategies) Parameters of Fit 
  inclS PRI covS covU (M1) (M2) 
1 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ENGAGE{1} 1.000 1.000 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 
2 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1} 1.000 1.000 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
3 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.136 0.000 0.136 - 
4 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.136 0.000 - 0.136 
 M1 (Pathways 1, 2 and 3) 1.000 1.000 0.273 - - - 
 M2 (Pathways 1, 2 and 4) 1.000 1.000 0.273 - - - 
Notes: As Table 6.2. The full table, including all individual cases, is reported in Appendix G. 
 
 
Pathway 1: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ENGAGE{1} 
This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy, while Party 2 employs an 
engagement strategy. In other words, Party 1 acknowledges and positions itself on the cultural 
dimension of competition but does so in a way that is ambiguous: its exact position is unclear. 
Meanwhile, Party 2 engages – either through collaboration or co-optation – with the radical right 
party. The inclusion score of this pathway (1.000) indicates perfect consistency, while a relatively low 
coverage score (0.091) shows that very few cases conform to this configuration or pattern of 
competition. To be specific, only two cases out of a possible 76 conform to this pathway. These cases 
are the Norwegian Labour and Conservative parties against the Progress Party in 2013, and the 
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Pathway 2: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1} 
This pathway is understood as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional accommodative strategy, while 
Party 2 employs a two-dimensional adversarial strategy. That is, while both parties recognise and 
compete on the cultural dimension of competition, Party 1 positions itself in a manner consonant with 
the radical right party, while Party 2 positions itself in contrast to the radical right party. As above, the 
inclusion score (1.000) shows perfect consistency – meaning that all cases that conform to this 
configuration of strategies also show a decrease in the vote share of the radical right – while the low 
coverage score (0.045) indicates that very few cases conform to this pathway. In fact, only one case 
of a potential 76 does so: The Socialist Party and Liberal Reformation Party against the National Front 
in the 1999 Walloon elections.   
 
 
Pathway 3+4: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0} 
This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy in the absence 
of any disengagement strategies, and Party 2 choosing not to adopt a disengagement strategy. In other 
words, Party 1 competes solely on the economic dimension of competition, and neither of the two 
principal parties ignores, isolates, or reputationally damages the radical right party. This pathway is 
not dissimilar to some of the pathways discussed above, which saw a one-dimensional dismissive 
strategy and an engagement strategy, in the absence of any disengagement strategy, producing a 
reduction in the vote share of the radical right. This pathway has perfect consistency as measured by 
its inclusion score (1.000), but low levels of coverage (0.136) indicating that few cases conform to this 
pathway. Indeed, only three of the 76 cases are represented by this pathway: The Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement and New Democracy in competition with the Independent Greeks in June 2012 and again 
in September 2015, and the same two principal parties against the Popular Orthodox Rally in June 
2012.   
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6.4.2. Analysis of Sufficiency for an Increase in the Vote Share of the Radical Right [two principal 
parties] 
This analysis follows the same steps as the previous one, but the outcome of interest has changed 
from a decrease in the vote share of the radical right to an increase in the vote share of the radical 
right. As before, as a result of its length, the truth table is not presented here but rather is contained 
in Appendix F. The following table – Table 6.9 – reports the results of the conservative solution. It 
shows that this solution has identified 12 separate pathways. These are discussed in the order in which 
they appear in the table.  
 
 
Table 6.9: Conservative solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies) 
Pathway Expression (strategies) Parameters of Fit 
  inclS PRI covS covU 
1 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{1} 1.000 1.000 0.041 0.041 
2 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0} 0.812 0.812 0.265 0.265 
3 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.020 0.020 
4 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.020 0.020 
5 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.041 0.041 
6 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.020 0.020 
7 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{1}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1} 0.800 0.800 0.082 0.082 
8 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.041 0.041 
9 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.041 0.041 
10 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.020 0.020 
11 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.020 0.020 
12 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.041 0.041 
      
 M1 0.889 0.889 0.653 - 
Notes: As Table 6.2. The full table, including all individual cases, is reported in Appendix G. 
 




This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy in combination with a 
disengagement strategy. Party 2, however, employs a two-dimensional accommodative strategy 
alongside both a disengagement and an engagement strategy. Put more simply, Party 1 recognises 
and competes on the cultural dimension of competition, but adopts a position on this dimension that 
is counter to that of the radical right party. This issue strategy is supplemented with ignoring, isolating, 
and/or demonising the radical right party. Party 2 also recognises and competes on the cultural 
dimension but does so in a manner consonant with the radical right party. This issue-oriented strategy 
is accompanied by disengagement and engagement strategies. This pathway has a perfect inclusion 
score (1.000) indicating that all cases that conform to it show an increase in the vote share of the 
radical right. The coverage score (0.041) for this pathway is rather low, however, meaning that very 
few cases conform to it (2 of 76). These two cases are the Socialist Party and Union for a Popular 
Movement in competition with the National Front in the 2012 French elections, and the Social 




This pathway is understood as Party 1 using a two-dimensional accommodative strategy and a 
disengagement strategy, but in the absence of any engagement strategies. Party 2 also adopts a two-
dimensional accommodative strategy in the absence of any engagement strategies. In other words, 
both parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension of competition, and position 
themselves closely to the radical right party. Party 1 also ignores, isolates, and/or demonises 
(reputationally) the radical right party. Neither party collaborates with or co-opts the radical right 
party. This pathway has a high level of consistency (0.812) but the fact that this score is below 1 means 
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that a few cases that conform to it do not show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. These 
cases are the Danish Social Democrats and Liberals competing with the Progress Party in the elections 
of 1998; the French Socialist Party and the Union for a Popular Movement facing the National Front 
in the 2007 elections; and the Austrian Social Democrats and People’s Party challenging the Freedom 
Party in the 1995 elections. Finally, this pathway possesses a coverage score of 0.265, indicating that 





This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy in the absence 
of any disengagement or engagement strategies. Party 2 employs a one-dimensional dismissive 
strategy, also in the absence of any disengagement or engagement strategies. In other words, Party 1 
recognises and competes on the cultural dimension of competition but adopts a position on that 
dimension that is markedly different to the position of the radical right party. Party 2, by contrast, 
does not recognise or compete on the cultural dimension of competition, favouring exclusive 
attention to the economic dimension. Neither principal party adopts a party-oriented strategy. This 
pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its inclusion score (1.000) but very low levels of 
coverage (0.020). Only one case of a total of 76 is represented by this pathway: the Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement and New Democracy challenging the Popular Orthodox Rally in the Greek 
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This pathway is translated as both principal parties opting for two-dimensional adversarial strategies 
in the absence of any disengagement or engagement strategies. In other words, both parties compete 
on the cultural dimension of competition but adopt positions on that dimension that are in contrast 
to the radical right party. Neither principal party adopts a party-oriented strategy. This pathway has 
perfect consistency as measured by its inclusion score (1.000) but has very low levels of coverage 
(0.020). As above, this is a single case out of 76: the Labour and Conservative parties of Norway in 





This pathway shows Party 1 employing a two-dimensional adversarial strategy, while Party 2 adopts a 
two-dimensional accommodative strategy. Neither party chooses a disengagement or engagement 
strategy. Put differently, both principal parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension but 
do so in different ways: Party 1 adopts a position that is incongruent with the radical right party, while 
Party 2 adopts a position that is congruent with the radical right party. Neither principal party adopts 
a party-oriented strategy. As above, this pathway has perfect consistency (1.000) but low levels of 
coverage (0.041). It represents two cases out of a total of 76, namely the Norwegian Labour and 
Conservative parties against the Progress Party in 2009, and the Social Democratic Party and People’s 





165 | P a g e  
 
This pathway is understood as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy in combination 
with a disengagement strategy, but in the absence of any engagement strategies. Party 2, by contrast, 
favours a one-dimensional dismissive strategy and a disengagement strategy, also in the absence of 
any engagement strategies. So, Party 1 recognises and competes on the cultural dimension but 
positions itself far away from the radical right party, while Party 2 rejects the cultural dimension in 
favour of focusing on the economic dimension only. Both principal parties supplement their issue 
positioning by disengaging from the radical right party: that is ignoring, isolating, and/or demonising 
(reputationally) the radical right party. This pathway has perfect consistency (1.000), meaning that all 
cases that conform to it show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. But it has very low 
levels of coverage (0.020), indicating that few cases conform to it. Indeed, only one case of 76 is 
represented by this pathway: the Socialist Party and Liberal Reformation Party against the National 





This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional adversarial strategy and an engagement 
strategy, in the absence of a disengagement strategy. Party 2 employs a two-dimensional 
accommodative strategy and an engagement strategy, also in the absence of any disengagement 
strategies. In other words, Party 1 competes on the cultural dimension (in addition to the economic 
dimension) but does so in a manner incongruent with the radical right party. Party 2 also competes 
on the cultural dimension but does so in a manner congruent with the radical right party. These issue-
oriented strategies are supplemented by both parties with an engagement strategy (co-optation or 
cooperation) and without the adoption of any disengagement strategies (ignore, isolate, and/or 
demonise). This pathway has relatively high levels of consistency, as measured by its inclusion score 
(0.800). As noted above, however, a score below 1 indicates that there are a few cases that, while 
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conforming to this pathway, do not show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. This 
pathway has a relatively low level of coverage at 0.082. Indeed, only five cases are represented by it, 
and all five are derived from Switzerland. 
Between 1995 and 2015 Switzerland held six federal elections (in 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 
2015). In each of these elections, excluding the 2007 one, the Social Democratic Party and the Radical 
Democratic Party/FDP. The Liberals pursued the same strategies vis-à-vis the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP) (see Pathway 7 description above). In 2007, these two parties maintained similar patterns of 
competition but included disengagement strategies in their repertoire against the Swiss People’s 
Party. In each election except 2011, these combinations of strategies produced the same outcome: an 
increase in the vote share of the SVP. Yet in 2011, the same configuration of strategies produced a 
different outcome: a decrease in the vote share of the Swiss People’s Party. Indeed, this was the first 
time since 1987 that the Swiss People’s Party had actually lost votes in a federal election. What 
changed in this election, however, was competition from the new(ish) Conservative Democratic Party 
(BDP). Formed in 2008 by former SVP members following the suspension of Widmer-Schlumpf from 
the SVP,24 the BDP profited from the drastic increase in the salience of economic issues, the popularity 
of former Finance Minister Widmer-Schlumpf (an early member of the BDP), and their image of 






24 Widmer-Schlumpf was elected to the Federal Council in place of and against the wishes of Christoph 
Blocher, the leader of the SVP. The SVP leadership formally requested that Widmer-Schlumpf resign – which 
she refused to do. The SVP leadership then requested that the Graubünden branch or cantonal party expel her 
– which it refused to do. In response, the SVP suspended the entirety of the Graubünden branch and it was 
this branch that eventually formed into the BDP (Mueller 2010). 
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This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy in the absence of 
either a disengagement or an engagement strategy, and Party 2 adopting a two-dimensional 
accommodative strategy in the absence of either a disengagement or an engagement strategy. Put 
simply, both parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension but whereas Party 1 adopts a 
position that is ambiguous, Party 2 adopts a position consonant with that of the radical right party. 
Neither principal party adopts a party-oriented strategy towards the radical right. This pathway has 
perfect consistency as indicated by its inclusion score (1.000) – meaning all cases that conform to it 
show an increase in the vote share of the radical right – but has low levels of coverage (0.041). It 
represents only two cases out of a total of 76, these being the Labour and Conservative Parties 
competing with the Progress Party in the Norwegian elections of 1997, and the Panhellenic Socialist 






This pathway is understood as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy in conjunction 
with a disengagement strategy, and in the absence of any engagement strategies. Party 2 adopts a 
two-dimensional accommodative strategy with a disengagement strategy, also in the absence of any 
engagement strategies. In other words, both parties recognise and compete on the cultural 
dimension, but Party 1 adopts an ambiguous position on this dimension while Party 2 occupies a 
position that is similar to that of the radical right party. Both parties either ignore, isolate, and/or 
demonise (reputationally) the radical right party. This pathway has perfect consistency (1.000) – that 
is, all cases that conform to it also show an increase in the vote share of the radical right – but low 
levels of coverage (0.041). Out of a total of 76 cases, only two conform to this pathway. These are the 
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Austrian elections of 2006 and 2008 where the Social Democratic Party and the People’s Party were 





This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional accommodative strategy, while 
Party 2 adopts a one-dimensional dismissive strategy. Neither party adopts a disengagement or 
engagement strategy. So, Party 1 positions itself on the cultural dimension and adopts a position akin 
to that of the radical right party, while Party 2 does not compete on the cultural dimension, favouring 
to compete exclusively on the economic dimension. Neither party adopts a party-oriented strategy 
(e.g. collaboration, co-optation, isolation, demonisation, or ignoring). This pathway has perfect 
consistency (1.000) – i.e., all cases that conform to it show an increase in radical right vote share – but 
very low levels or coverage (0.020). In fact, this pathway represents only one case out of 76, namely, 






This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional accommodative strategy and a 
disengagement strategy, in the absence of any engagement strategy. Party 2, by contrast, employs a 
two-dimensional blurring strategy in combination with a disengagement strategy, also in the absence 
of any engagement strategies. In other words, both principal parties compete on the cultural 
dimension but while Party 1 adopts a position consonant with radical right party, Party 2 blurs its 
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position, making it ambiguous. Both parties supplement these issue-oriented strategies with 
disengagement strategies (ignore, isolate, and/or demonise). This pathway has perfect consistency, 
indicating that all cases that conform to it show an increase in radical right vote share, but very low 
levels of coverage (0.020). In fact, out of a total of 76 cases, only one case conforms to this pathway. 
This is the Labour Party and the Party for Freedom and Democracy competing against the new Pim 





This pathway is understood as Party 1 adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy and a 
disengagement strategy, and Party 2 pairing a two-dimensional accommodative strategy with a 
disengagement strategy. Neither party adopts an engagement strategy. Put simply, then, Party 1 
rejects the cultural dimension of competition in favour of exclusively focusing on the economic 
dimension, while Party 2 not only competes on the cultural dimension but does so in a manner 
congruent with the radical right party. Both principal parties ignore, isolate, and/or demonise 
(reputationally) the radical right party. This pathway has perfect levels of consistency, meaning that 
every case that conforms to it shows an increase in the vote share of the radical right, but as with 
many of the previous pathways, the levels of coverage for this pathway are very low (0.041). Out of a 
total of 76 cases, only two cases conform to this pathway. These are the Socialist Party Different-Spirit 
and Liberals and Democrats competing against Flemish Interest in the 2003 Flemish elections, and the 
Socialist Party and Rally for the Republic party in competition with the National Front in the 1997 
French elections.  
These results, taken collectively, indicate a great deal of variability in terms of what configurations of 
strategies lead to an increase in the radical right vote share when considering the strategies of two 
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principal parties. Out of a total of 76 cases, only 36 are actually used to formulate the pathways. This 
occurs as a result of underlying inconsistency. In other words, within a particular pathway, some cases 
show an increase in the radical right vote share, but a great deal show no change or a decrease in the 
radical right vote share. This is further revealed by the fact that, of the 12 pathways generated above, 
five only cover a single case and another five only cover two cases. The only pathways that cover more 
than two cases are Pathways 2 and 7, and while these pathways cover more cases, they also have 
lower levels of consistency. That is, there are cases that conform to Pathways 2 and 7 that do not show 
an increase in the vote share of the radical right. What this indicates, then, is that there is a great deal 
of inconsistency in the underlying data, a finding that is confirmed by the parsimonious solution below, 
as well as by the previous analyses.  
Turning to the parsimonious solution, a significant degree of model ambiguity is revealed. That is, the 
analysis has produced 16 separate models. As previously mentioned, the presence of multiple models 
often arises when the software is unable to make a firm conclusion as to which conditions or 
combinations of conditions should be included and excluded. Given that the inclusion and coverage 
scores are identical for each model, each model can be said to explain the underlying data equally 
well. Therefore, before any substantive interpretation is possible, some decision must be made 
regarding what model best explains an increase in the vote share of the radical right. In the previous 
instance of model ambiguity, it was found that the pathways exclusive to particular models 
represented the same cases, and therefore those pathways could be simplified by merging them, 
thereby creating a single, coherent model. In this instance, however, there are far more exclusive 
pathways in the individual models meaning that the previous procedure is not useful here. Another 
possible approach is to select a model based upon the parameters of fit. In other words, the model 
that has the highest consistency and coverage could be favoured. Unfortunately, however, each model 
has the same inclusion and coverage scores, which means that this approach is also unworkable. The 
final possible approach is to dispense with interpreting models in favour of interpreting individual 
expressions or pathways. Those pathways that feature in all models represent significant findings, and 
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therefore reoccurring pathways can be considered essential in any substantive interpretation, 
especially in cases of model ambiguity (Baumgartner and Thiem 2017).  
The parsimonious solution identified 16 models that contain, in some combination, 13 different 
pathways, and of those 13 pathways, five are common to all models. While these five pathways do 
not account for all observed, empirical evidence, they do collectively account for over half of the 
observations. By contrast, the remaining pathways (those that are unique to individual models) are 
often made up of just one or two cases. Therefore, in order to manage the model ambiguity, the 16 
models will be dropped, and the five pathways common to all models will instead be interpreted. 
These results are presented in Table 6.10, and the five reoccurring pathways are discussed below.  
 
Table 6.10: Parsimonious solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies) 
Pathway Expression (strategies) Parameters of Fit 
  inclS PRI covS covU 
1 P1ENGAGE{1} 0.833 0.833 0.102 0.082 
2 P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0} 1.000 1.000 0.061 0.061 
3 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2} 1.000 1.000 0.020 0.020 
4 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1.000 1.000 0.082 0.082 
5 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3} 0.812 0.812 0.265 0.265 




Pathway 1: P1ENGAGE{1} 
This pathway shows principal Party 1 adopting an engagement strategy. That is, Party 1 either 
collaborates with or co-opts members of the radical right party. The remaining strategies of Party 1 as 
well as the strategies of Party 2 are not considered to be important in this pathway. This pathway has 
a relatively high level of consistency as measured by its inclusion score (0.833) and relatively low levels 
of coverage (0.102). Indeed, when subsetting the data for ‘Party 1 adopting an engagement strategy’ 
and ‘increase in the vote share of the radical right’, only six cases are found, and all of these are from 
Switzerland (see Section 6.4.2: Pathway 7). As above, this pathway further challenges the notion that 
engagement strategies could be associated with decreases in the vote share of the radical right.  
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However, it should be noted that this pathway represents cases that are exclusively drawn from 
Switzerland, and the unique properties of Switzerland should not be taken to be representative of all 
cases (this will be discussed in more detail below).  
 
Pathway 2: P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0} 
This pathway is understood as Party 2 adopting a one-dimensional dismissive strategy. In other words, 
Party 2 competes exclusively on the economic dimension of competition and ignores the cultural 
dimension. As above, this pathway gives no consideration to the remaining strategies of Party 2 or to 
the strategies of Party 1. This pathway has perfect consistency (1.000), indicating that all cases that 
conform to this pathway show an increase in the vote share of the radical right. However, it has 
relatively low levels of coverage (0.061). Practically, this means that out of a total of 76 cases, a mere 
three conform to this pathway. These are the Panhellenic Socialist Movement and New Democracy 
competing against the Popular Orthodox Rally in the Greek elections of 2009; the Socialist Party and 
Liberal Reformation Party facing the National Front in the 2003 elections in Wallonia; and the 
Democratic Party of the Left and Go Italy fighting against the Northern League in the 1996 Italian 
elections.  
 
Pathway 3: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2} 
This pathway is interpreted as Party 1 employing a two-dimensional accommodative strategy and 
Party 2 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy. In other words, both principal parties recognise 
and compete on the cultural dimension but do so in different ways: Party 1 adopts a position similar 
to that of the radical right party, while Party 2 adopts an ambiguous position. This pathway has perfect 
consistency (1.000) as measured by its inclusion score – indicating that all cases that are represented 
by it show an increase in radical right vote share – but has very low levels of coverage (0.020). In fact, 
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only one case of 76 is represented by this pathway: the Labour and Freedom and Democracy parties 
against the very new Pim Fortuyn List in the 2002 Dutch elections. 
 
Pathway 4: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
This pathway shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional blurring strategy and Party 2 employing a 
two-dimensional accommodative strategy in the absence of an engagement strategy. Expressed more 
simply, both parties recognise and compete on the cultural dimension, but Party 1 adopts an 
ambiguous position on this dimension, while Party 2 opts for a position consonant with the radical 
right party but does not engage with it. This pathway has perfect consistency as measured by its 
inclusion score (1.000) but has relatively low levels of coverage (0.082). Only four of the 76 cases are 
represented by this pathway. These cases consist of: The Norwegian Labour and Conservative parties 
again the Progress Party in the 1997 general election; PASOK and New Democracy against the Popular 
Orthodox Rally in 2004; and the Austrian Social Democrats and People’s Party against the Freedom 
Party in 2006 and 2008.  
 
Pathway 5: P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3} 
This pathway is understood as both principal parties adopting a two-dimensional accommodative 
strategy, and Party 1 also adopting a disengagement strategy. In other words, both parties compete 
on the cultural dimension, and adopt positions akin to that of the radical right party. Party 1, however, 
supplements this with a disengagement strategy, either isolating, ignoring, or otherwise demonising 
(reputationally) the radical right party. This pathway has relatively high levels of consistency (0.812) 
and comparatively high levels of coverage (0.265). Subsetting the data for this combination of 
strategies reveals 16 cases, but three of these do not experience an increase in the vote share of the 
radical right even though they share this combination of strategies. These three deviant cases are the 
same as those present in the conservative solution, Pathway 2 (section 6.4.2), namely the Danish 
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Social Democrats and Liberals facing the Progress Party in the 1998 elections; the French Socialist 
Party and UMP competing with the National Front in the 2007 elections; and the Austrian Social 
Democrats and People’s Party fighting the Freedom Party in the elections of 1995.   
 
6.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
As with the analyses conducted for single party strategies above, the results of the analyses for two 
party strategies suggest a high degree of variability not only in terms of the strategies that principal 
parties adopt, but also with regard to the effect that these strategies have on the vote share of the 
radical right. The initial analysis of necessity – presented and summarised in Appendix B – identified 
no necessary conditions. That is, there are no strategies or combinations of strategies that produce a 
consistent decrease or increase in the vote share of the radical right across all cases.  
Turning to the analysis of sufficiency for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, three 
pathways were identified in the conservative and parsimonious solutions respectively. Each of these 
pathways had perfect consistency as measured by their respective inclusion scores and had between 
very low and moderate levels of coverage. What these solutions revealed was that there is 
considerable diversity in the combination of strategies that principal parties adopt. Interestingly, the 
conservative solution suggests that the inclusion of the accommodative strategy – that is, competing 
on the cultural dimension and positioning closely to the radical right party – in a pathway was sufficient 
for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, a finding that is in keeping with the predictions 
made by Meguid (2005; 2008).  
In one of the pathways, however, the issue-oriented strategies adopted by each of the two principal 
parties should have contrasting impacts on the vote share of the radical right. Pathway 2 of the 
conservative solution (section 6.4.1) shows Party 1 adopting a two-dimensional accommodative 
strategy in conjunction with a disengagement one, and Party 2 employing a two-dimensional 
adversarial strategy in combination with a disengagement strategy. Now, according to Meguid (2005, 
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2008), accommodative strategies should reduce radical right vote share while adversarial strategies 
should increase it. The impact on the vote share should therefore, at least theoretically, be neutral in 
this instance, and yet the pathway shows a reduction in the vote share of the radical right: a 
consequence either of both parties adopting disengagement strategies or some other contextual 
condition not yet accounted for. This once again highlights the importance of situating party 
competition within a proper context, as will be done with the case studies presented in Chapters 7 
and 8. 
The parsimonious solution for a reduction in the vote share of the radical right identified three 
pathways, only one of which included the presence of a two-dimensional accommodative strategy. 
This pathway, Pathway 2, also showed the presence of a two-dimensional adversarial strategy. That 
is, while one principal party accommodated the radical right, the other opposed it. However, unlike 
the scenarios just discussed, disengagement strategies were not present, and therefore the 
expectation is that contextual conditions should explain why the presence of accommodative and 
adversarial strategies lead to a decrease in the vote share of the radical right when, theoretically at 
least, they should have no impact. The remaining pathways are none too extraordinary in as much as 
they do not reveal any particularly interesting trends or associations. That being said, the remaining 
pathways do serve to further highlight the diversity of strategies that principal parties adopt when 
faced by a radical right challenger.  
Turning to increases in the vote share of the radical right, the conservative solution identified 12 
sufficient pathways, most of which expressed perfect consistency but relatively low levels of coverage. 
These pathways show that a wide variety of combinations of strategies are in use by the principal 
parties. Some of these are dual accommodative strategies – that is, instances in which both principal 
parties adopt accommodative strategies – and they produce an increase in the vote share of the 
radical right. Indeed, as above, accommodative strategies feature very widely and are represented in 
almost every pathway. The ubiquitous presence of these strategies – where the principal party adopts 
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a position on the cultural dimension close to the radical right party – is a particularly interesting 
finding.  
It could be that the widespread presence of these strategies is explained by simple incentive 
structures. That is, if the cultural dimension of competition gains saliency over time, then principal 
parties are incentivised to recognise and compete on this dimension as it increases the likelihood of 
gaining or maintaining votes. The presence of a successful radical right party competing on the cultural 
dimension might further encourage greater use of accommodative strategies by principal parties in 
order to retain votes that would otherwise go to the radical right party (Meguid 2005, 2008). Contrary 
to Meguid’s expectations, however, the widespread adoption of accommodative strategies is shown 
above to increase the vote share of the radical right. Thus, while the instinct of principal parties seems 
to be accommodative, the consequences of such an approach is unfavourable to principal parties in 
that it seems to increase the vote share of the radical right. Indeed, if the radical right party is 
perceived as the owner of cultural issues, then any competition on the cultural dimension increases 
the saliency of that dimension over time, and therefore as the owner of cultural issues, the radical 
right party can be expected to be the beneficiary of any vote increases. If true, then the ‘legislative 
experience’ and ‘governmental effectiveness’ (Meguid 2005: 349) of principal parties is insufficient in 
supplanting the radical right party as the owner of cultural issues. This suggests, then, that 
accommodative strategies are more likely to be successful if they are accompanied by attempts to 
weaken or eradicate the radical right’s credibility and reputation on cultural issues.  
One of the most notable findings of the analyses conducted above – for both an increase and a 
decrease in the radical right vote share – is the sheer diversity of combinations of strategies that are 
employed by principal parties in Western Europe. Even among left-wing parties exclusively, or right-
wing parties exclusively, or even among cases within a particular country (with a few noticeable 
exceptions, e.g., Switzerland), there seems to be little consensus on how to approach the radical right 
from a competitive perspective. While accommodative strategies are broadly popular, as evidenced 
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above, the impact that these strategies have on radical right vote share is inconsistent. In some cases, 
accommodative strategies have contributed to a decrease in the vote share of the radical right, while 
in other cases they have led to an increase in the vote share of the radical right. Given this, one is 
forced to conclude that the same combinations of strategies will produce different results in different 
countries, and perhaps even at different times. Therefore, any reductive approach will miss a 
considerable amount of important information in explaining the success or failure of particular party 
strategies. In order to understand the impact that particular strategies or combinations of strategies 
have on the vote share of the radical right, the context in which these competitions occur must be 
incorporated into the analysis. The next two chapters seek to do precisely this by focusing in depth on 
very different countries.  





The previous chapter outlined the results of the mvQCA analysis. The results for the analysis showed 
a high degree of variability both in terms of the strategies that principal parties adopt, and also the 
effect that these strategies have on the vote share of the radical right. Generally speaking, it seems 
that the efficacy of particular strategies is dependent upon the political contexts in which they are 
employed. In order to shed some light on this, this chapter will investigate the French case. Its purpose 
is to determine what effect certain contextual conditions have had on the effectiveness of principal 
party strategies. While the chapter explores the period 1995-2018, it focuses in particular on the 
accommodative strategies of Nicholas Sarkozy and the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). During 
the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2012, the strategic approach of Sarkozy and 
the UMP was the same: direct overtures to the voting base of the National Front through the 
accommodative strategy, coupled with a rejection of all forms of cooperation (use of the so-called 
cordon sanitaire). Yet, while the accommodative strategy was successful in peeling away FN votes in 
2007, it failed to achieve the same results in 2012.  
In order to explore the strategies and their varying success, the chapter begins by outlining the French 
electoral and party systems, before providing an overview of the ideology of the National Front. The 
section thereafter goes through each presidential and legislative election between 1995 and 2017, 
focusing on the campaigns of the principal parties and the National Front, as well as providing the 
results of each election. Then, it contextualises the elections with reference to three political 
conditions: the issue agenda, the reputation of the party leaders, and voters’ satisfaction in 
democracy/trust in politicians. The first two conditions are pillars on which this thesis’ model of 
competition is built and thus the concern here is the extent to which these conditions affect the 
efficacy of principal party strategies. The third is designed to tap the openness of the political 
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environment to a ‘mainstream copy’. In other words, higher satisfaction in democracy/trust in 
politicians might increase the efficacy of principal party strategies, while lower rates of satisfaction 
and trust might hamper the success of this accommodation.  
 
7.2. The French Electoral and Party System 
France is a semi-presidential state where both the president and the prime minister, through the 
National Assembly, hold and exercise political power (Elgie 2008; Hoyo 2018). The president, as the 
commander in chief and head of state, has the power to call referendums, ratify treaties, and appoint 
and dismiss the prime minister (Hoyo 2018). By contrast, the prime minister, as the head of 
government, is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of government, national defence25, the 
implementation of legislation, and proposing the cabinet for presidential approval (Hoyo 2018).  
Elections to the National Assembly are contested through a two-ballot system in single member 
constituencies (Cole 2002; Elgie 2008; Hoyo 2018). The absolute number of constituencies can vary 
from election to election, but since 1998 there have been 577 constituencies. Of this, 555 are situated 
within metropolitan France while the remainder are in France’s overseas territories and departments 
(Elgie 2008). In each constituency, candidates can secure victory in one of two ways. If the candidate 
wins more than 50 percent of the vote on the first ballot, and if this number exceeds 25 percent of the 
electorate, then that candidate wins the election without the need for a second ballot (Cole 2002; 
Elgie 2008). The frequency with which this outcome occurs varies: while in 1968 166 candidates were 
elected in this way, in 1997 only 12 were (Elgie 2008). If no candidate wins in the first ballot, then a 
second ballot is scheduled for one week later. Only those candidates who secured the vote of 12.5 
percent or more of the registered electorate in the first ballot may proceed to the second ballot (Cole 
2002; Elgie 2008). No matter the number of candidates in the second ballot, the candidate with the 
 
25 While the prime minister is responsible for national defence on a day-to-day basis, the President often sets 
the broad guidelines (gouvernement.fr n.d.) 
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most votes (i.e., a plurality) wins – hence why this system is often referred to as a majority-plurality 
system.  
Presidential elections operate in a relatively similar manner, in that the system used is also a two-
round one. As with legislative elections, if a candidate achieves more than 50 percent of the vote on 
the first ballot, then he or she is elected president. This, however, has never occurred in the history of 
the Fifth Republic (Elgie 2008; Hoyo 2018). In presidential elections the second ballot is held two weeks 
later, rather than one, and in contrast to parliamentary elections, only the top two candidates 
proceed. The candidate who wins the highest number of votes (and hence a majority given there are 
only two candidates) in the second ballot is elected president (Elgie 2008; Hoyo 2018). 
The use of a two-ballot system in France has encouraged the formation of an alliance-oriented 
multiparty system, in presidential and especially parliamentary elections, that can be better 
characterised as bipolar multipartyism (Elgie 2008: 126; Bornschier and Lachat 2009: 362). The 
multiparty logic is associated with the first ballot, while the alliance-orientation is associated with the 
second. In the first ballot, every political party is incentivised to participate as they have nothing to 
lose by contesting this ballot. In fact, by participating in the first ballot, they have the potential to 
register sufficient support so as to become essential to the alliance-building of the second ballot (Elgie 
2008; Bornschier and Lachat 2009). In this sense, small parties that participate in the first round have 
the chance of developing coalition potential (Sartori 2005b). As a consequence, despite France having 
the most disproportional electoral system in Europe (Sauger 2009; Gallagher 2019), a range of smaller 
parties from the radical right and left, from the centre, and with environmental and Eurosceptic 
ideologies have been able to establish themselves (Bornschier and Lachat 2009; Sauger 2009).  
The second ballot, however, has the effect of punishing small or standalone parties – those parties 
that are either uncoalitionable or are not open to coalitions – unless they can muster a significant 
concentration of support in a particular geographical area; such as with the regionalist parties in 
France’s overseas territories. However, even if a party is able to concentrate its vote, it will most likely 
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be defeated by candidates and/or parties that have developed alliances (Elgie 2008). Therefore, all 
parties are incentivised to participate in alliances with other likeminded parties, propagating the 
formation of left and right-wing blocks, such as the Plural Left under Jospin (Bornschier and Lachat 
2009).  
The consequences of this dynamic can be illustrated by the case of the National Front, which, since its 
formation, has refused to participate in alliances with the mainstream right – not that the mainstream 
right has particularly sought any alliance with the radical right. The National Front has often achieved 
impressive results in the first ballot, but it has regularly failed to solidify those gains in the second 
ballot (Elgie 2008). This highlights another effect of this two-ballot system: it tends to reduce the 
support for the extremes in favour of more centrist or ‘pragmatic’ parties (Sartori 1997: 65). Indeed, 
as Elgie (2008: 128) argues: ‘under such a system extreme parties have to choose either to remain 
marginalised and risk winning no seats or join an alliance that will fight elections at the centre and risk 
compromising their principles. In both cases, the threat they pose to the system is diminished’.  
 
7.3. The National Front  
The National Front (FN) was formed in 1972 in order to project a more forward-focused and unified 
voice to what was then a variety of extreme and radical right groupuscules and ‘ineffective sects’ 
(Shields 2007: 190; Ivaldi 2016). Its purpose, from conception, was to provide the extreme/radical 
right movement in France with a respectable public face through which the messaging of these various 
groups could be delivered to a wider audience (Shields 2007). Jean-Marie Le Pen was chosen as the 
leader of this new party because of his parliamentary experience, his military record, his nationalism, 
and his capacity for public speaking. Given the desire of the new National Front to appeal to a wider 
audience, his relative moderate stance when compared to his more extreme contemporaries would 
help bestow upon the party a degree of political respectability (Shields 2007).  
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Traditionally, the FN has favoured the expulsion of illegal immigrants, strict controls on asylum seekers 
and refugees, the ending of dual citizenship, the rejection of the automatic acquisition of French 
citizenship by immigrant-descended children born in France, and greater restrictions on the 
employment of non-Europeans (Carter 2005). Indeed, the ideological heart of the FN lies in its hostility 
towards both immigration and immigrants and its desire to protect French identity from foreign 
influence. All policy areas covered by the FN are subsumed into the immigration issue and are thus 
presented with an anti-immigration or xenophobic frame. For example, when the FN deals with the 
issue of security, the party expresses its concern about the ‘overrepresentation of immigrants in crime’ 
(Stockemer and Barisione 2016). Similarly, according to the FN, the major problem facing the welfare 
system is that ‘immigrants are taking advantage of the social welfare system and other advantages 
that they cannot find in their home countries’, while the labour market is faced with ‘massive and 
uncontrolled immigration [which] takes more than 1 million jobs away from the French and severely 
punishes our economy by imposing costs of over 300 billion francs’ (Stockemer and Barisione 2016). 
While the FN avoids any ‘blatantly racist formulations’, it does stress immutable cultural differences 
that prevent the meaningful integration of (particularly north African) immigrants into French society 
(Carter 2005).  
The illiberal attitudes of the party on immigration and integration, and on minority rights more 
generally, are matched in its views towards the democratic political system in which it operates. While 
the FN is a nominally democratic party, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s support for the authoritarian regimes of 
Franco, Pinochet, and Videla (Marcus 1995: 114) calls into question the sincerity with which the party 
claims to support democracy generally. Furthermore, the party’s condemnation of the supposed 
decadence and corruption of the political class, and its desire to impose greater controls on the media, 
call into question its support for French democracy (see Mudde 2007). Indeed, the FN considers the 
National Assembly to 'no longer [be] an element of a parliamentary democracy, but a screen for a 
bureaucratic and technocratic system’ (Marcus 1995: 114) and therefore advocates for the 
comprehensive reform of the system in favour of proportional representation, the use of referendums 
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and popular initiatives as exercised in Switzerland, and the strengthening of the presidency (Marcus 
1995; Carter 2005). While such reforms might indicate a superficial commitment to democracy, when 
they are taken together, and considered against the backdrop of subordinating the rights of the 
individual to the ‘sacred rights of the collective’, they are less of a vehicle for the enhancement of 
participatory democracy and more of a sign of ‘the desire to suppress organised interests, and curtail 
the rights and freedoms of individuals’ (Carter 2005: 45). In short, they are indicators of anti-pluralism.  
In 2011, Marine Le Pen replaced her father as leader of the party, and she very quickly sought to shed 
the FN of its extreme or radical image and present a more mainstream one. This process of ‘de-
demonisation’ involved the suppression and removal of more extremist voices within the FN, including 
her own father who had continued to make comments on extermination camps being a mere ‘detail 
of history’. It also entailed publicly stating that the party condemned anti-Semitism in all its forms 
(Ivaldi 2016: 232). Furthermore, the process involved a rhetorical or communicative shift in the 
presentation of FN policies and positions. For instance, in a move away from the party’s traditional 
position of privileging Catholicism, Marine Le Pen began incorporating secularism, or laïcité, into the 
profile of the party. This concept was used in a very particular way, however. While it conventionally 
refers to the separation of church and state in France, and to religion being relegated to a private 
matter for the individual with no place in the public realm, the FN presented laïcité as the bulwark 
against multiculturalism and a way to protect French identity, and in doing so it became a vehicle for 
the demonisation and suppression of those communities considered unFrench, in particular, Muslims 
(Almeida 2013, 2017). The traditional denunciation of the Islamisation of France was therefore 
maintained but under the guise of secularism.  
This rhetorical shift can also be seen in other issues such as abortion and immigration. While the FN 
had traditionally advocated for the outlawing of abortion, under Marine Le Pen, the party dropped 
this stance. Instead, the party would respect the right of women to choose, although this was framed 
as a free choice not to abort the pregnancy. Any women who wanted to abort their foetus would be 
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expected to pay for the cost of the procedure themselves, and the legality of abortion would be 
determined by referendum, rather than a simple passing of legislation (Almeida 2013). Thus, while the 
party did shift its position on the issue, in practice and in moral terms, there was a great deal of 
continuity. On immigration, a shift was also evident in that the party no longer prioritised the issue 
front and centre. Instead, it subsumed all other issues into the immigration one, for example 
interweaving it into wages, purchasing power, and security. The frame therefore shifted from anti-
immigration being an end in itself, to a reduction of immigration being the solution to all the other 
issues facing France (Stockemer and Barisione 2016). The de-demonisation strategy, then, should be 
perceived as a purely rhetorical device designed to alter the packaging of the party’s ideology rather 
than its contents (Bastow 2018). If anything, the election of Marine Le Pen as leader of the National 
Front corresponds to a radicalisation of the party’s policies in terms of their nativist, authoritarian, or 
populist characteristics (Ivaldi 2016: 228).  
 
7.4. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in France: 1995-2017 
7.4.1. 1995 Presidential Elections 
The 1995 presidential election was a three-way race between Jacques Chirac (RPR leader and Mayor 
of Paris), Edouard Balladur (RPR), and Lionel Jospin (PS), with the competition between Chirac and 
Balladur a major feature of the campaign (Goldey 1996; Machin 1996; Szarka 1996). While Balladur 
had initially performed strongly, his popularity suffered a setback following strikes26, a scandal27, and 
 
26 Proposed reductions in student finance and restrictions on taking additional degrees provoked days of 
strikes and mass demonstrations by students. This harmed Balladur’s popularity among young voters and 
those with sympathies and connections to the students, while his subsequent concessions damaged his 
reputation among those who thought he appeared weak and too willing to back down in the face of protest 
(Goldey 1996; Machin 1996).  
27 Balladur suffered from a corruption scandal involving the Director of Social Housing in Hauts de Seine, Didier 
Schuller, and a certain Dr Jean-Pierre Maréchal who would encourage his nephew, an anti-corruption judge, to 
drop an investigation into Schuller. Schuller and Maréchal maintained that the whole affair was a set-up by 
Interior Minister Charles Pasqua to get Judge Halphen to drop the exchange. Rather than taking strident 
action, Balladur backed his Interior Minister and suffered from a worsening reputation as a result.  
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the government’s inability to tackle unemployment.28  As a result, Chirac became the dominant 
candidate of the mainstream right. Jospin had the backing of a relatively well-organised party, but the 
Socialist Party suffered from a poor public image as a result of its governmental record and internal 
feuding (Szarka 1996).  
Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front diversified their offerings, discussing issues beyond 
immigration and law and order, seeking to link social problems, such as unemployment, crime, and 
poverty, to immigration and advocated the repatriation of immigrants, the exclusion of immigrants 
from welfare benefits, and the prioritising of French nationals in employment and housing as an 
antidote (Machin 1996; Mazey 1996). Importantly, Le Pen wanted to be seen as a responsible and 
serious statesman and hoped that the FN would become indispensable as an ally for the mainstream 
right parties. Chirac, however, had little to gain from overtures towards the FN and in response Le Pen 
criticised Chirac as ‘Jospin, [but] only worse’ (Goldey 1996: 105).  
The results of the first round of the elections, summarised in Table 7.1, show Chirac trailing somewhat 
unexpectedly behind Jospin, and only moderately in front of Balladur. Meanwhile, the comparatively 
strong performance of Jospin and other left-wing contenders (making up much of the ‘Other’ 
category) indicates that the mainstream left was able to maintain its position even against the 
attempts by Chirac to trespass on leftist territory. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s 15 percent represents a 
marginal improvement on the 14.4 percent he secured in 1988, and came after a series of strong 
performances in regional and European elections (Mazey 1996).  
 
28 Many felt that Balladur and his government were doing far too little or were otherwise failing to tackle the 
issue of unemployment (Goldey 1996). This popular feeling was seized on by Chirac, who made the battle 
against unemployment and associated social ills the centre of his campaign. Chirac advocated for cuts in 
employers’ social security contributions, ‘special measures’ for the long-term unemployed, as well as an 
increase in wages (Mazey 1996). During the Christmas of 1994, a group of homeless people occupied an empty 
apartment block within the centre of Paris. Chirac aligned himself with this issue, supported those who had 
occupied the apartment block, criticised the government of Balladur for failing to do enough to tackle 
homelessness, and advocated for the requisition of empty properties to house the homeless (Machin 1996; 
Mazey 1996).  
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Table 7.1: French presidential election results, 1995. 
Candidate Party First ballot Second ballot 
Jacques Chirac RPR 20.84 52.64 
Lionel Jospin PS 23.30 47.36 
Edouard Balladur RPR 18.58 – 
Jean-Marie Le Pen FN 15.00 – 
Other Other 22.28 – 
Total  100 100 
Sources: Elgie 1996; Szarka 1996 
 
Chirac and Jospin proceeded to the second round, in which Chirac focused his line of attack on Jospin’s 
socialist leanings and on the failures of socialism (Szarka 1996). While much of the left mobilised 
behind Jospin, the electoral arithmetic proved a shoo-in for Chirac. In the first ballot, approximately 
60 percent of the vote went to parties of the right (including Le Pen’s 15 percent) while 40 percent 
went to the left. For victory, Jospin would have needed to secure the entirety of the left’s vote and an 
additional 10 percent from the right. Thus, although Jospin did make inroads into the non-left vote, 
the odds were stacked in Chirac’s favour (Szarka 1996).  
Ultimately, the FN has failed to secure a strong electoral breakthrough in these elections. However, 
the party continued to benefit from the legitimisation of its policy agenda by the RPR and UDF which, 
since the 1980s, had pursued an accommodative policy vis-à-vis the FN on issues such as immigration, 
law and order, and anti-communism (Mazey 1996). The results represented a slight increase on 
previous performances, but the FN remained isolated from other parties. Indeed, Chirac refused to 
confront the FN directly. By maintaining silence with regard to the FN, Chirac hoped to reduce the 
public’s exposure to its ideas and sought to imply that the FN was irrelevant (Szarka 1996). Maintaining 
this ‘radio silence’ allowed Chirac to address issues of ‘social fracture’ without providing overtures to 
the FN or further legitimising it. This attempt to isolate the FN – the so-called cordon sanitaire – 
became a fixture of relations between principal parties and the FN.  
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7.4.2. 1997 Parliamentary Elections 
In April 1997, Jacques Chirac announced the dissolution of the National Assembly with elections 
scheduled for 25th May and 1st June. The government of Alain Juppé had been dealing with a series of 
economic issues, including unemployment and a high budget deficit. By April 1997, there was a 
slowdown in strikes, Chirac and Juppé experienced a slight boost in their personal ratings, and 
economic indicators on inflation and interest rates were looking good (Hainsworth 1998). This was 
most likely the best time to call for a renewed mandate. 
The RPR and UDF initially stressed the problems of cohabitation with regard to internal French politics 
but also with respect to France’s role within the European Union. A vote for the Socialist Party was 
framed as an anti-European vote that would result in disruption and the reneging of commitments 
already made. The RPR and UDF also focused on criticising the credibility of the Socialist Party 
generally, and especially its relationship to the Communist Party (PCF) (Hainsworth 1998). The RPR-
UDF alliance promised measures of budgetary control, tax reductions, greater environmental 
protections, and legislation to focus on social cohesion. The Socialist Party wanted to reduce the 
length of the working week from 39 to 35 hours (without any loss of pay), halt the government’s 
privatisation programme, reduce consumption taxes on essential goods, and make more resources 
available for culture and research (Hainsworth 1998). On the issues of taxes, support for small 
business, decentralisation, and other issues, there was a great deal of overlap between the RPR-UDF 
and PS. Where strong differences did emerge, such as on immigration reform, the RPR and UDF were 
uncharacteristically quiet. This ensured that such issues did not gain saliency in the campaign and was 
an attempt to quash the FN vote (Hainsworth 1998).  
The FN’s campaign targeted Chirac personally, criticising his motivations for dissolving parliament, and 
suggesting he should resign if the right failed to win a majority (Hainsworth 1998). The pro-European 
position adopted by Chirac resulted in him being accused of ‘selling out the French nation’, and the 
dissolution of the National Assembly was portrayed as a mechanism by which to make the French 
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people accomplices in ‘national suicide’. Jean-Marie Le Pen was presented as offering ‘the real 
alternative’ to the corrupt mainstream parties (Hainsworth 1998: 75).  
The results of the election, as summarised in Table 7.2, show a resounding success for the Socialist 
Party. The PS won 23.5 percent of the vote in the first round, and increased its share to 38.6 percent 
in the second round (IPU n.d.-a). By contrast, the RPR and UDF performed poorly, and in the first 
round, they registered the lowest vote for the mainstream right since the creation of the Fifth Republic 
(Hainsworth 1998). While the two parties did improve their share of the vote substantially between 
rounds, the second ballot confirmed the general swing to the left.  
These elections were once again characterised by the desire of the principal parties to downplay the 
importance of the National Front. Electoral alliances between the right-wing principal parties (RPR and 
UDF) and the National Front were never considered, and issues strongly associated with the National 
Front were downplayed and reduced in salience to prevent any electoral benefit for the FN. The FN 
secured around 15 percent of the vote, as it had done in the previous presidential election, but failed 
to convert this vote share into a significant number of seats, ultimately winning a single seat. This 
compares to the 113 seats won by the UDF on a similar share of the vote.  
Table 7.2: French parliamentary election results, 1997. 
 First round Second round Seats 
Party Percent +/- Percent +/- Number +/- 
Socialist Party (PS) 23.53 5.94 38.6 9.95 250 196 
Rally for the Republic (RPR 15.7 -4.69 22.7 -5.57 140 -107 
Union for French Democracy (UDF) 14.22 -4.86 21 -4.85 113 -100 
Communist Party (PCF) 9.94 0.76 3.7 -0.91 36 13 
National Front (NF) 14.94 2.53 5.7 0.04 1 1 
Other 21.67 0.32 8.3 1.34 37 -3 
Total 100  100  577  
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7.4.3. 2002 Presidential Elections 
In the 2002 presidential elections, neither Chirac nor Jospin bothered to campaign vigorously in the 
first round. Both candidates considered their progression to the second round to be a mere formality. 
Indeed, Jospin only declared his candidature 60 days before the first ballot, while Chirac declared some 
90 days before. In declaring so late, the two front runners were hoping to enjoy the benefits of 
incumbency for as long as possible, while also allowing the minor candidates to exhaust themselves 
before the final run (Cole 2002; Kuhn 2002).  
The election campaign generally centred on the theme of insecurity, which covered national security 
and law and order, but also the impact of globalisation and immigration on French culture and identity 
(Kuhn 2002). A series of events had set the campaign agenda some months previously: violence and 
disorder in France, a crisis in the Middle East, and most pressingly, the terror attacks in the United 
States on the 11th of September 2001. While unemployment is usually the most important issue in 
French elections, polls showed that these events had caused a shift in the issue agenda in favour of 
insecurity, a theme that Chirac grasped eagerly and brought to the forefront of his campaign (Cole 
2002; Kuhn 2002). The Jospin campaign suffered from a perceived lack of sincerity, as Jospin jumped 
between more centrist and left-wing positions (Cole 2002). Perhaps ironically, Jospin was also a victim 
of his own governments’ success in that by reducing unemployment, the issue of unemployment had 
fallen in importance, and therefore allowed for a shift of the agenda toward insecurity, which was 
weaker territory for Jospin and the wider left (Cole 2002).  
Other important issues such as European Union, pensions, healthcare, and public finances, were 
inconspicuously missing from the agenda. This was largely the result of the period of cohabitation 
between Chirac and Jospin, which robbed both candidates of the ability to distance themselves from 
one another for stronger strategic positioning (Fieschi 2002).  
The theme of insecurity was fertile territory for the National Front and its leader, whose campaign 
focused on the usual issues: security, immigration, and identity. In this campaign Le Pen also adopted 
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a more sophisticated, elder statesman-like posture. He confidently expected that events and the 
campaign agenda – and Chirac’s eagerness to capitalise on the issue of insecurity in particular – would 
play well for him and his party (Cole 2002; Miguet 2002).  
The results – which are reported in Table 7.3 – shocked both the nation and the international 
community. Jospin polled a mere 16.2 percent of the vote and was relegated into third place, behind 
Jean-Marie Le Pen who won 16.9 percent of ballots. And while Chirac topped the poll, the mainstream 
right collectively only won 31.8 percent of the vote in the first round. This was an historic low and 
Chirac himself polled the lowest result of any outgoing president of the Fifth Republic (Cole 2002).  
 
Table 7.3: French presidential election results, 2002. 
Candidate Party First ballot Second ballot 
Jacques Chirac RPR 19.88 82.21 
Jean-Marie Le Pen FN 16.86 17.79 
Lionel Jospin PS 16.18  
François Bayrou UDF 6.84  
Other Other 40.24  
Total  100 100 
Source: Kuhn 2002 
 
 
This election was characterised by a significant fragmentation of the vote, a fact best highlighted by 
examining the total share of the vote won by non-principal parties in the presidential contests of 1995 
and 2002. In 1995, non-principal parties polled a respectable 37.3 percent of the vote, or 22.28 
percent when excluding the National Front. This compared to 57.1 percent and 40.24 percent 
respectively in the 2002 presidential election.  
During the second round of the election, the only issue on the agenda was that of Jean-Marie Le Pen 
himself. The two weeks between the ballots were characterised by a significant mobilisation of civil 
society, with hundreds of thousands of people participating in anti-Le Pen protests across the country, 
and particularly in Paris (Kuhn 2002). The decisiveness of the second round spoke to this mobilisation 
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against Le Pen: Chirac was re-elected with the ’largest proportion of the registered vote in any 
democratic election anywhere in recent memory’ (Cole 2002: 333; see also Fieschi 2002). Left-wing 
voters justified their support for Chirac as preferring l’escroc (the criminal) to le facho (the fascist) and 
in essence, the second round was a referendum on democracy and opposition to Le Pen (Cole 2002; 
Fieschi 2002).  
 
7.4.4. 2002 Parliamentary Elections  
The 2002 parliamentary elections were held on the 9th and 16th of June. They were dominated by the 
issue of cohabitation and by Chirac’s demand for institutional and ideological coherence – i.e., the 
presidential party (now the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)) controlling both the presidency 
and the National Assembly. Therefore, for the right, ‘cohabitation’ was the main enemy and focus, 
and Chirac concentrated solely on asking voters for a parliamentary majority to support the presidency 
(Fieschi 2002). The Socialist Party made attempts to dissuade voters from handing the president such 
a majority. However, this message was undermined by the rather harsh criticism of cohabitation that 
Jospin and his aides had made during the presidential election (Cole 2002; Fieschi 2002). Furthermore, 
Jospin’s defeat in that election, and his subsequent resignation as party leader, meant that the 
Socialist Party’s upper organisation had collapsed and that there was little attempt to defend the 
government’s record. What characterised the parliamentary campaign, then, was the complete 
absence of any real campaign (Fieschi 2002).  
The results of these elections, reported in Table 7.4, show the UMP gaining seven percentage points 
since 1997, and winning 65 percent of all seats in the National Assembly. Chirac’s desire for a strong 
UMP presence in the National Assembly was therefore granted by voters. By contrast, the fortunes of 
most other parties were somewhat bleak. While the Socialist Party only lost 3.4 percentage points, 
this translated to a loss of 101 seats. The UDF’s losses were also large, as were those of the Communist 
Party. The results were also particularly negative for the National Front. The party’s vote share in both 
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rounds was significantly lower than in 1997 (-3.6 and -3.9 percentage points respectively), and it lost 
its only seat in the National Assembly.  
 
Table 7.4: French parliamentary election results, 2002. 
 First round Second round Seats 
Party Percent +/- Percent +/- Number +/- 
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 33.3 19.08 47.26 24.56 364 224 
Socialist Party (PS) 24.11 0.58 35.26 -3.34 149 -101 
Union for French Democracy (UDF) 4.86 -9.36 3.92 -17.08 30 -83 
Communist Party (PCF) 4.82 -5.12 3.26 -0.44 22 -14 
National Front (FN) 11.34 -3.6 1.85 -3.85 0 -1 
Other 21.57 -0.1 8.45 0.15 12 -25 
Total 100  100  577  
Source: IPU n.d.-b 
 
 
5.4.5. 2007 Presidential Elections 
In 2007, neither the incumbent President, Jacques Chirac, nor his former Socialist Party challenger, 
Lionel Jospin, were willing or indeed able to run for the presidency, and therefore new candidates 
emerged. Nicholas Sarkozy, the former Minister of the Economy and Minister of the Interior, had been 
selected by an overwhelming majority (98.1 percent) of the UMP’s selectorate, while Ségolène Royal 
emerged as the PS candidate (Kuhn 2007; Sauger 2007; Spoon 2008). The two other leading 
presidential candidates were François Bayrou for the UDF and Jean-Marie Le Pen for the FN.  
The campaign kicked off in December 2006 and was widely considered to be a contest between 
Sarkozy and Royal. In stark contrast to the approach of his predecessor, Sarkozy sought to make overt 
overtures to the voting base of the FN. He tried to capitalise on his tenure as Minister of the Interior, 
adopting a staunchly right-wing position on a variety of issues including immigration and law and 
order. He also proposed the creation of a Ministry of Immigration and National Identity. Alongside 
this, he adopted a distinctly neo-liberal economic programme that advocated tax cuts, greater work 
incentives, and a rejection of the 35-hour week introduced by Jospin (Kuhn 2007; Marthaler 2007a; 
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Sauger 2007; Spoon 2008). Royal advocated an increase in the minimum wage, the creation of 500,000 
new jobs (especially for young people), and encouragements for employers to hire graduates. She also 
promised to review the 35-hour week (Spoon 2008). She too sought to entice FN voters by playing up 
the importance of the French flag and national anthem (Kuhn 2007; Marthaler 2007a; Spoon 2008).  
Interestingly, François Bayrou (UDF) managed to emerge as a credible challenger, with his polling 
figures increasing from 6 percent in December 2006 to an impressive 20 percent in February 2007 – a 
figure sufficient to threaten Royal’s progression into the second round of voting (Marthaler 2007a; 
Sauger 2007). Bayrou’s advance in the polls was as a result of three factors: growing concerns 
regarding Royal’s suitability for the presidency and fears of Sarkozy’s authoritarian, even Bonapartist, 
personality; his focus on the educated, middle-aged, and middle-class elements of the electorate, 
groups that Sarkozy and Royal failed to appeal to sufficiently; and his ‘ambiguously populist’ style and 
rhetoric – denouncing the left-right cleavage of French politics, criticising the media for their supposed 
bias, and condemning the immorality of the other candidates, especially Sarkozy (Sauger 2007: 117).  
The significant inroads made by candidates of principal parties had the effect of crowding out Jean-
Marie Le Pen. The results for the election, reported in Table 7.5, show just how well Sarkozy did in 
capturing the mainstream right electorate as well as a significant chunk of the FN one (Kuhn 2007). He 
performed better than Chirac had done in 1988, 1995, and 2002, a fact partly attributed to his explicit 
appeal to FN voters (Kuhn 2007). Royal won 25.9 percent of the vote – an increase of 9.7 percentage 
points over Jospin in 2002 – while Bayrou polled a respectable 18.6 percent of the vote – an increase 
of 11.7 percentage points on his 2002 score. The first round of this election was therefore 
characterised by high levels of support for principal party candidates, and the failure of candidates 
from radical or extreme parties (Kuhn 2007; Spoon 2008). Indeed, not only did Le Pen fail to break 
through into the second round, as he had done in the 2002 contest, but the 10.4 percent of the vote 
he secured was his lowest in all presidential elections since the early 1980s. Indeed, in 2007 he lost 
over a million voters as compared to 2002 (Kuhn 2007).  
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Table 7.5: French presidential election results, 2007. 
Candidate Party First ballot Second ballot 
Nicholas Sarkozy UMP 31.18 53.06 
Ségolène Royal PS 25.87 46.94 
François Bayrou UDF 18.57  
Jean-Marie Le Pen FN 10.44  
Other Other 13.94  
Total  100 100 
Sources: Kuhn 2007; Marthaler 2007a; Sauger 2007; Spoon 2008 
 
After the first round, Royal sought to secure Bayrou’s voters, with some success, and while Bayrou did 
not openly tell his supporters which candidate to favour in this second round, he implicitly backed 
Royal. The majority of the UDF cadre supported Sarkozy, however, and this ultimately led to the 
splintering of the UDF. Following the election, the majority of the UDF deputies (25 of 29) joined the 
UMP in coalition, and created the New Centre (Nouveau Centre), while Bayrou and the remaining 
rump of the party formed the Democrats’ Movement, or MoDem (Sauger 2007).  
 
7.4.6. 2007 Parliamentary Elections 
The 2007 legislative elections took place on 10th and 17th June. The UMP campaign was led by Prime 
Minister François Fillon, while the Socialist campaign was led by party leader François Hollande 
(Marthaler 2007b). The campaign was generally dominated by the issue of the size of the majority for 
the UMP (Marthaler 2007b; Sauger 2007; Spoon 2008).  
The results of the election are reported in Table 7.6. In the first round, the UMP won just shy of 40 
percent of the vote and saw some 98 candidates elected to the National Assembly (IPU n.d.-c). The 
Socialist Party gained a much lower vote share, winning just under 25 percent of the vote – a result 
similar to its first round one in 2002. In this first round, the combined vote share for all non-principal 
roughly was similar to that in 2002, although the FN’s vote collapsed from 11.3 percent in 2002 to 4.8 
in 2007. This was the party’s worst result since 1981 when it scored a low of 0.4 percent.  
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In the week between the two rounds of voting, Jean-Louis Borloo, the new Minister of Economics, 
Finance, and Employment, proposed an increase in VAT for most goods and services so as to reduce 
payroll taxes for employers (Marthaler 2007b; Spoon 2008). This move hurt the popularity of the new 
government and helped the Socialist Party make significant gains in the second round of voting. By 
the end of this second round, the UMP and its allies had managed to secure 343 seats (313 for the 
UMP itself), while the Socialist Party won 186 seats, or with allies, 205.  
 
Table 7.6: French parliamentary election results, 2007. 
 First round Second round Seats 
Party Percent +/- Percent +/- Number +/- 
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 39.45 6.15 46.36 -0.9 313 -51 
Socialist Party (PS) 24.73 0.62 42.26 7 186 37 
Communist Party (PCF) 4.29 -0.53 2.28 -0.98 15 -7 
Union for French Democracy (UDF) 7.61 2.75 0.49 -3.43 3 -27 
National Front (FN) 4.79 -6.55 0.08 -1.77 0 0 
Other 19.13 -2.44 8.53 0.08 60 48 
Total 100  100  577  
Sources: Sauger 2007; IPU n.d.-c 
Note: FN score inclusive of other, smaller, extreme right parties 
 
 
7.4.7. 2012 Presidential Elections 
The two rounds of the 2012 presidential elections were held on 22nd April and 6th May. Incumbent 
president Nicholas Sarkozy was given a clear run within the UMP as other possible candidates, such 
as Prime Minister François Fillon, delayed their ambitions until 2017, while for the Socialist Party, 
François Hollande emerged as the presidential nominee (Kuhn 2013). 
Sarkozy entered the campaign with the lowest popularity of any French president. His personal 
excesses, such as hosting a post-election celebration in a luxury restaurant, his pursuit of friendships 
with the wealthiest and most powerful people in business and media, his near authoritarian style of 
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governing, and his general rudeness to voters29 and opponents, made many voters feel that he was 
unfit to hold the presidential office (Hewlett 2012; Cole 2013; Evans and Ivaldi 2013). In addition, and 
perhaps most damagingly, he also showed himself prepared to use his position as president to engage 
in the ‘grubbier elements of [party] finance and patronage’ (Evans and Ivaldi 2013: 16).  
The 2012 campaign took place during an ongoing global economic crisis from which France was not 
spared (Cole 2013). France’s economy had deteriorated substantially, GDP growth was virtually non-
existent, the trade deficit was abysmal, and unemployment increased (Evans and Ivaldi 2013; Kuhn 
2013). In response, the Sarkozy-Fillon government had engaged in a process of austerity, seeking to 
reduce the public deficit in part through spending cuts and additional taxes (Evans and Ivaldi 2013). 
The downgrading of France’s credit rating (from Triple-A to AA+) by Standard and Poor was a particular 
blow to Sarkozy’s re-election attempts. Unsurprisingly, this was leapt upon by the Socialists who 
argued that this was indicative of the president’s failure to get to grips with the financial crisis, and of 
the harm that his policies had done to France (Evans and Ivaldi 2013). However, while the downgrading 
of the credit rating provided an avenue of attack for the Socialists, it also constrained the promises 
that they were able to make. Ultimately, the Socialists proposed additional taxes on the wealthy and 
additional Keynesian measures to increase youth employment (Hewlett 2012; see also Kuhn 2013; 
Merle and Patterson 2014).  
Sarkozy sought to once again capitalise on the cultural issues that helped him secure victory in 2007. 
He promised to reduce immigration and, make it harder for immigrants to claim benefits, and he 
regularly suggested that immigration was strongly correlated with crime and declining prosperity 
(Hewlett 2012). Unfortunately for Sarkozy, voters for whom these issues were important had become 
disillusioned with him and the UMP, and therefore shifted toward the National Front. Not only did the 
FN promise to go much further than Sarkozy on these issues, but, under Marine Le Pen, it had also 
 
29 At an agricultural show in February 2008, Sarkozy reached out to shake the hand of a voter. The voter 
rejected this advance, and Sarkozy responded by saying ‘casse-toi, pauvre con’, which is politely translated as 
‘get lost then you bloody idiot, just get lost!’ (Kirby 2008).  
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engaged in a process of detoxification, increasing its respectability and rendering it more mainstream 
(see above). This process was helped by Nicolas Sarkozy. He not only legitimised the issue agenda of 
the National Front, but he also described the National Front as a normal, ‘democratic’ party (Mondon 
2013). Le Pen focused her campaign on national identity, law and order, immigration, and to a lesser 
extent, economics. She proposed a series of taxes to support French manufacturers, revive former 
industrial areas, and protect small businesses (Hewlett 2012).  
The results of the election, as summarised in Table 7.7, show a reversal of fortunes for Sarkozy. In the 
first round, he polled 27.2 percent, 4 percentage points less than he had in 2007. By contrast, Hollande 
polled a slightly stronger 28.6 percent, which represented a minor increase of 2.8 percentage points 
on Royal’s 2007 score. The main winners, in terms of biggest increases in vote share, were Marine Le 
Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon of the Left Front. Le Pen scored 17.9 percent of the vote, gaining 7.5 
percentage points on her father’s 2007 score, while Mélenchon polled 11.1 percent, an increase of 
9.2 percentage points on the Communist Party’s 2007 score.  
 
Table 7.7: French presidential election results, 2012. 
Candidate Party First ballot Second ballot 
François Hollande PS 28.63 51.64 
Nicholas Sarkozy UMP 27.18 48.36 
Marine Le Pen FN 17.9  
Jean-Luc Mélenchon PG 11.1  
François Bayrou UDF 9.13  
Other Other 6.06  
Total  100 100 
Source: Evans and Ivaldi 2013 
 
 
The campaign between the two rounds was dominated by the strategic need of both leading 
candidates to maximise their electoral appeal beyond their core support. Hollande had a clear lead in 
this regard in that candidates of the left, most importantly Mélenchon, explicitly called for their voters 
to back Hollande. By contrast, Sarkozy lacked any significant reservoir of support, and his attempts to 
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attract large numbers of FN voters were scuppered somewhat by Marine Le Pen saying she would cast 
a blank ballot (Hewlett 2012; Kuhn 2013; Merle and Patterson 2014). Sarkozy did manage to attract 
some Bayrou voters and many Le Pen ones, but he failed to secure them in sufficient numbers to win 
(Kuhn 2013).  
Sarkozy had promised big in 2007, and had reaped the rewards thereafter. His attempts to repeat this 
success in 2012, however, were unsuccessful. For FN voters and sympathisers, if the 2007 presidential 
election suggested a preference for a principal party copy, the 2012 election confirmed a preference 
for the radical right original.  
 
7.4.8. 2012 Parliamentary Elections 
The parliamentary elections were their usual lacklustre affair, with greater emphasis placed on 
strategic considerations than on substantive issues. The Socialists and the newly elected president 
Hollande announced several reforms that built on the presidential campaign, including an increase in 
the minimum wage, a reduction of the retirement age, and new laws on sexual harassment (no doubt 
influenced by the storm created by the scandal surrounding former IMF managing director and one-
time Socialist Party front-runner Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who was accused of and arrested for 
sexually assaulting a maid in a New York hotel. The main initiative of the Socialists and Hollande, 
however, was trying to persuade German Chancellor Angela Merkel of the need for a package to 
stimulate Eurozone growth and the relaxation of the austerity regime (Kuhn 2013; Merle and 
Patterson 2014). The UMP, now rudderless following in the wake of Sarkozy’s loss in the presidential 
elections, focused almost exclusively on the issue of immigration (Merle and Patterson 2014). In light 
of this, Marine Le Pen devoted substantial attention to convincing the UMP to drop the cordon 
sanitaire against the National Front, and directed directing local leaders of the FN to initiate talks with 
their UMP counterparts (Evans and Ivaldi 2013). While the cordon sanitaire was maintained by the 
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UMP at the national level, there was some indication that it faltered at the local level, with some local 
UMP leaders making overtures to the FN (Evans and Ivaldi 2013; Merle and Patterson 2014). 
The results of the 2012 parliamentary election, as summarised in Table 7.8, show a strong 
performance by the Socialist Party, but nothing resembling the ‘hegemonic status’ achieved by the 
UMP in 2007 (Evans and Ivaldi 2013: 167). Indeed, the Socialist Party’s performance in the second 
round actually represented a decrease in its vote share of 1.4 percentage points on 2007. Fortunately 
for the Socialists, the UMP’s losses were even greater. The UMP polled 38 percent of the vote in the 
second round – a loss of 8.4 percentage points on 2007. This meant that even with a lower share of 
the vote in the second round, the Socialist Party was able to increase its share of seats from 186 in 
2007 to 280 in 2012. Yet, while it could claim victory, this did not compare to the sheer dominance of 
the UMP in 2007. The National Front, by contrast, had one of its best showings in years. The party 
polled 13.6 percent of the vote in the first round and 3.7 in the second. This marked a drastic increase 
in its score compared to 2007 when it had polled a mere 3.8 percent in the first round, and just 0.1 
percent in the second. This even translated into the election of two deputies. This was the first time 
the FN has won a seat in the National Assembly since 1997, and was the party’s strongest showing, in 
terms of seats, since 1986.  
 
Table 7.8: French parliamentary election results, 2012. 
 First round Second round Seats 
Party Percent +/- Percent +/- Number +/- 
Socialist Party (PS) 29.35 4.62 40.91 -1.35 280 94 
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 27.12 -12.33 37.95 -8.41 194 -119 
Communist Party (PCF) 6.91 2.62 1.08 -1.2 10 -5 
Democratic Movement (MoDem) 1.77 -5.84 0.49 0 2 -1 
National Front (FN) 13.6 8.81 3.66 3.58 2 2 
Other 21.25 2.12 15.91 7.38 89 29 
Total 100  100  577  
Source: Evans and Ivaldi 2013 
Note: PCF score is inclusive of the Left Party (PG) as both parties were in an electoral coalition 
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7.4.9. 2017 Presidential Elections 
The 2017 presidential elections were held on 23rd April and 7th May. Benoît Hamon stood for the 
Socialists, while François Fillon was selected as the Republicans candidate.30 The biggest shake up of 
the election was the presence of Emmanuel Macron, former minister for industrial renewal under 
Hollande, who reinvented himself as an outsider candidate attached to a new party, On The Move!31  
At the outset of the campaign, there were four main candidates who had a realistic chance of making 
it through to the second round. Each represented a different ideological approach: Fillon, stood for 
economic liberalism and social conservatism; Macron offered pro-European (economic and social) 
liberalism; Le Pen put forward a somewhat incoherent blend of anti-liberal, anti-EU, right-wing 
radicalism; and Mélenchon, a former socialist who ran under the banner France Unbowed (a coalition 
of smaller, leftist parties), advocated an anti-liberal, Eurosceptic, left-wing radicalism (Gougou and 
Persico 2017; Kuhn 2017).  
The campaign itself covered familiar themes: the minimum wage, the length of the working week, the 
deficit, immigration, as well as some other issues such as gay rights. Fillon proposed a fairly run-of-
the-mill neo-liberal manifesto, which advocated lowering taxes, reforming benefits, and eradicating 
the deficit (Hewlett 2017; Lees 2017). Much of this was echoed by the equally economically-liberal 
 
30 Of the Socialist Party’s potential candidates, of prime importance were Manuel Valls, Prime Minister under 
Hollande; Benoît Hamon, former education minister within Valls’ government; and Arnaud Montebourg, 
minister for industrial renewal under Valls. Valls advocated for business-friendly, supply-side reforms, a tough 
law-and-order approach, and greater restrictions on immigration, even going so far as to question whether or 
not Islam was compatible with French culture (Vinocur 2016). By contrast, Hamon and Montebourg were on the 
left-wing of the Socialist Party. Both advocated for an end to austerity, an increase in the minimum wage, and 
stimulus spending. What separated them was the generally protectionist platform offered by Montebourg and 
the introduction of a universal basic income by Hamon (Hewlett 2017). Ultimately Hamon won the Socialist 
Party’s nomination, and maintained the same basic platform for the presidential election. The Republican 
primary included five candidates, the most important of whom were Nicholas Sarkozy, Alain Juppé, and Fillon. 
Initially, the primary was considered a closed contest between Sarkozy and Juppé but Fillon’s strong 
performance boosted his polling numbers substantially (franceinfo 2016). Much like his 2007 and 2012 
presidential contests, Sarkozy emphasised immigration, security and the incompatibility of Islam. These themes 
were also addressed by Juppé and Fillon, although Juppé adopted a less restrictive or less ‘authoritarian’ 
approach, while Fillon emphasised economic issues (Kuhn 2017). Fillon emerged victorious with some two-thirds 
of the registered vote.  
31 The initials of which, EM, are the same as Emmanuel Macron’s.  
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Macron. Macron also focused on the issue of employment opportunities for young people, something 
missing from Fillon’s platform (Hewlett 2017; Lees 2017). On the economic front, then, Fillon was 
somewhat crowded out by Macron (Hewlett 2017; Lees 2017).  
On Europe, Fillon suggested the ‘eventual’ renegotiation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and an end to EU expansion (Lees 2017). Yet again, however, Fillon found himself crowded out. 
In essence, Fillon was not pro-European enough to prevent pro-EU centre-right voters abandoning 
him in favour of Macron, nor sufficiently Eurosceptical enough to avoid losses to the National Front 
and Le Pen (Lees 2017).  
On social issues, Fillon adopted Sarkozian positions on immigration, designed to appeal to FN voters, 
as well as conventionally conservative positions on gay marriage, adoption, and Islam (Hewlett 2017). 
These were of course issues raised by Marine Le Pen and the National Front, who argued in favour of 
ending ‘uncontrolled immigration’, as well as promoting French secularism as an antidote to the 
‘Islamisation of French society’ (Hewlett 2017). In the social sphere, then, Fillon was less radical than 
Le Pen but too illiberal for many centrist voters. 
The biggest threat to Fillon’s candidacy, however, was not the squeeze from Macron and Le Pen, but 
a publication from the satirical magazine Le Canard enchaîné that alleged that Fillon had paid his wife 
hundreds of thousands of euros, out of taxpayers’ money, for work that she did not do, and his 
children sums for legal services before they had become qualified lawyers. The magazine also reported 
that he has accepted donations from a Lebanese businessman in exchange for being introduced to 
Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin (Hewlett 2017; Kuhn 2017; Lees 2017; Evans and Ivaldi 2018; 
Durovic 2019).  
The results, summarised in Table 7.9, show a relatively tight contest in the first round between 
Macron, Le Pen, Fillon, and Mélenchon. The closeness of the result reflected the fact that both the 
Republicans and the Socialist Party had chosen relatively polarising candidates who ultimately failed 
to unify their parties behind them. As a result, Macron was able to steal centrist and right-wing 
202 | P a g e  
 
members of the Socialist Party, as well as centrist and more liberal members of the Republicans (Evans 
and Ivaldi 2018). Furthermore, the selection of relatively ideologically extreme candidates by the 
principal parties legitimised proximal radical alternatives such as France Unbowed and the National 
Front (Evans and Ivaldi 2018). In the end, with 24 and 21.3 percent of the vote respectively, Macron 
and Le Pen advanced to the second round of voting. Fillon was narrowly beaten into third place by Le 
Pen, a consequence attributed to a combination of his failure to effectively trespass on FN territory, 
the fact that he left his centrist flank open to Macron, and the scandal involving his financial 
impropriety. The results also show a shift among left-wing voters away from Hamon and the Socialist 
Party towards Mélenchon who came a close fourth.  
 
Table 7.9: French presidential election results, 2017. 
Candidate Party First ballot Second ballot 
Emmanuel Macron EM 24.01 66.1 
Marine Le Pen FN 21.3 33.9 
François Fillon LR 20.01  
Jean-Luc Mélenchon LFI 19.58  
Benoît Hamon PS 6.36  
Other Other 8.74  
Total  100 100 
Source: Evans and Ivaldi 2018 
 
Between the two rounds of the election a TV debate was held between Macron and Le Pen. This was 
widely considered to be a disaster for Le Pen, who was perceived as being aggressive and rude towards 
Macron. Her performance also contrasted markedly to the calmer and softer image that she had been 
cultivating as part of her de-demonisation strategy. This, and her supposed incompetence in the 
debate were considered by many to have cost her the presidency (Durovic 2017; Kuhn 2017; Meny 
2017). An alternative reading, however, is that Le Pen’s approach to these debates was rooted in a 
realisation that she could never win the election. According to this view, then, her aggressive tone was 
designed to demobilise potential Macron supporters, especially those from the Fillon and Mélenchon 
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camps, while at the same time positioning the FN as the official opposition to a future President 
Macron (Evans and Ivaldi 2018: 117).   
 
7.4.10. 2017 Parliamentary Elections 
The parliamentary elections, held just over a month later, brought a resounding success for Macron’s 
Republic on the Move. As reported in Table 7.10, the party scored an impressive 43.1 percent of the 
vote in the second round, and severely weakened the two principal parties, the Republicans and the 
Socialist Party, which scored 22.2 and 5.7 percent respectively. Both these parties had shifted their 
programmes towards Macron’s, abandoning some of their more radical proposals, including universal 
basic income (for the PS) and anti-immigration positions (for the LR). However, this proved insufficient, 
and both parties were severely divided during the campaign, with big hitters within both camps 
absent, and some leading Socialist figures, including Hamon himself, jumping ship (Evans and Ivaldi 
2018). By contrast, the results were an improvement for the National Front. Not only did the FN 
manage to outpoll the Socialist Party, but it secured 8 deputies, its highest figure since 1986.  
 
Table 7.10: French parliamentary election results, 2017. 
 First round Second round Seats 
Party Percent +/- Percent +/- Number +/- 
The Republic on the Move (LREM) 28.21  43.06  308  
The Republicans (LR) 15.77 -11.35 22.23 -15.72 112 -82 
Socialist Party (PS) 7.44 -21.91 5.68 -35.23 30 -250 
France Unbowed (LFI) 11.03  4.86  17  
National Front (FN) 13.2 -0.4 8.75 5.09 8 6 
Other 24.35 3.1 15.42 -0.49 102 13 
Total 100  100  577  
Source: Evans and Ivaldi 2018 
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This section has provided an overview of the campaigns, the issues at stake, and the manoeuvrings of 
the parties and candidates in all presidential and parliamentary elections between 1995 and 2017. 
Now, the next section turns its attention more squarely to the strategies of the principal parties, and 
more specifically to their strategies in regard to the National Front.  
 
7.5. An overview of principal party strategies 
During the period 1995-2017, French principal parties have adopted a rather consistent approach in 
terms of their strategies vis-à-vis the National Front. Broadly speaking, the Socialist Party has tended 
to favour the two-dimensional adversarial approach – that is, it positions itself on the cultural 
dimension of competition as well as the economic one, and has adopted a position that stands in 
contrast to the National Front. The PS adopted this approach some decades ago so as to shut down 
competition between itself and the FN, and to instead encourage competition between the FN and 
the mainstream right (mainly the RPR) (Meguid 2008). The PS has deviated from this approach on 
occasion, yet even in these instances, it has adopted strategies that meant it did not directly compete 
with the National Front. For example, in the 1997 legislative elections it chose to use a one-
dimensional dismissive strategy, ignoring the cultural dimension of competition, while in the 2002 
elections it employed a blurring strategy. Neither of these strategies challenge the FN on the cultural 
dimension, and nor do they increase the saliency of cultural issues. 
By contrast, the centre-right UDF (later the Democratic Movement) and RPR (later the Union for a 
Popular Movement, and then the Republicans) have tended to accommodate the National Front by 
adopting positions on the cultural dimension akin to those of the National Front (e.g., restrictionist 
positions on immigration). As with the PS, however, both the UDF and RPR have deviated from this 
approach. In the 1997 legislative elections, both the UDF and RPR adopted blurring strategies. The 
UMP did the same in the 2002 elections. Of particular interest, however, is the success and failure of 
the two-dimensional accommodative strategy employed by Nicholas Sarkozy and the UMP in 2007 
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and 2012 respectively. Sarkozy made immigration a key component of his election campaigns and was 
forthright in his overtures to the National Front. Ultimately, this approach helped him secure victory 
in the presidential and legislative elections of 2007. These elections, then, would seem to confirm 
Meguid’s prediction that the adoption of an accommodative strategy against the radical right would 
reduce the latter’s vote share. To recall from above, the FN’s vote share in the presidential elections 
fell from 16.9 percent (first round) in 2002 to 10.4 percent in 2007, while its vote share in the legislative 
elections fell from 11.3 percent (first round) in 2002 to 4.3 percent (first round) in 2007. However, 
when Sarkozy sought to replicate this approach in 2012, the FN’s vote share increased to 18 percent 
in the presidential elections (first round) while its vote share in the legislative elections increased to 
13.6 percent (first round). The failure to steal FN voters meant that Sarkozy lost the election to 
Hollande (see above).  
Despite the issue accommodation from the centre right parties, all the principal parties have also 
sought to politically isolate the National Front through the imposition of the cordon sanitaire. This, 
essentially, is an implicit agreement between the principal parties that none of them will make an 
electoral pact with the National Front. The aim of this is to make full use of the two-round electoral 
system so as to ensure that the National Front is limited in its ability to translate its vote share into 
seats in the National Assembly, or in its ability to progress into the second round of the presidential 
elections.  
Of course, the strategies of the principal parties need to also be set in the political context of each 
election, and therefore the next section concerns itself with a number of factors that are likely to 
impact on the efficacy of principal party strategies (see Chapter 5). These are the issue agenda, French 
voter attitudes to immigration, the reputation of candidates and parties, levels of voter satisfaction in 
the functioning of democracy, and levels of (dis)trust that voters have in politicians. 
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7.6. Introducing Political Context, France.  
7.6.1. The Issue Agenda 
One of the fundamental pillars on which this thesis’ model of competition is built upon is the notion 
that political parties selectively emphasise particular issues, while downplaying or ignoring others, and 
seeking to establish an ownership over issues considered favourable (Chapter 2; see also Carmines 
and Stimson 1980; Riker 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). Once a political party has developed 
ownership over a particular issue, it should increase its vote share among voters for whom that issue 
is important (Petrocik 1996; Holian 2004). Given the significant effort that Sarkozy and the UMP put 
into addressing the issue of immigration, one would expect it to be a relatively salient issue. However, 
when looking to French voters’ perceptions of the most important issues facing their country, very 
few seem to believe immigration is all that important. Indeed, as is confirmed in Figure 7.1, cultural 
issues have tended to take second place to economic issues, particularly that of unemployment. In 
fact, unemployment has been the dominant issue in every French election for which there is available 
data (European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 2017b). 
Given the relatively strong electoral performance of the National Front, the low ranking of immigration 
among the most important issues is somewhat surprising. Moreover, the data shows that overall, 
cultural issues are not considered the most important by French voters. Indeed, only crime is present 
in the top five issues (averaged over the three most recent electoral periods). The issues of terrorism 
and immigration, both represented by the cultural dimension, are ranked sixth and seventh 
respectively. The top four issues are all economic: unemployment (first), the economic situation 
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Figure 7.1: Issue saliency in France, 2007-2017. 
 
Source: European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 2017b 
 
While the attention devoted to the issue of immigration by principal parties and the National Front 
seems disproportionate to the general saliency of the issue, it is nonetheless clear that Sarkozy’s initial 
accommodation of the National Front in 2007 – and which was set in train during his stint as the 
Minister of the Interior (2005 - 2007) – successfully transferred a sufficient proportion of votes away 
from the Le Pens and the National Front. While the saliency of immigration between 2007 and 2012 
did not change all that much – with some 5 percent of respondents believing it to be one of the most 
important issues in 2007, compared to 6 percent in 2012 (European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 
2012b, 2017a, 2017b)32 – the perception of who was best able to deal with the issue of immigration 
did change significantly. In 2007, 40.9 percent of voters believed that Jean-Marie Le Pen and the 
National Front were best placed to deal with immigration, while a somewhat lower 32.2 percent 
believed Sarkozy and the UMP were best placed. By 2012, however, this had changed quite 
 
32 The Eurobarometer surveys give respondents two choices, and therefore totals add up to 200 percent. In the 
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significantly with over 67 percent favouring Marine Le Pen and the National Front on the issue, as 
compared to 19.4 percent backing Sarkozy and the UMP (FES 2007, 2012; Carvalho 2019). In short, 
the extent to which the Le Pens and the FN were seen to own the immigration issue increased 
drastically during this period.  
Even if the salience of immigration has been relatively low, the 2007 elections showed that this 
territory is still fertile enough to allow a principal party to win over sufficient voters from the National 
Front for the principal party to win the election. Indeed, anti-immigration feeling in France seems to 
be more widespread than the saliency of immigration might initially suggest. The Gallup Migrant 
Acceptance Index shows that France is below the Western European average when it comes to how 
accepting people are of new arrivals (Esipova et al. 2017). On this index, France ranks at 6.46 while 
the European average (and median) stands at 6.61 (Esipova et al. 2017). While this difference is small, 
it definitely puts France within the more immigration-hostile group of European countries, with only 
Austria and Belgium being less welcoming. Similarly, and as shown in Figure 7.2, a majority of voters 
between 1995 and 2017 believed that there were too many immigrants in France. The percentage of 
people who agreed with the statement that ‘there are too many immigrants in France’ ranged from 
74.8 percent in 1995 to 55.8 percent in 2017, while the numbers who did not agree with the statement 
ranged from 25.2 in 1995 to 44.2 in 2017 (PEF 1995, 2002; FES 2007, 2012, 2017). While this suggests 
a growing acceptance of immigration, the majority of French voters still tend to think that there are 
too many immigrants in France. Indeed, the number of people who believed that there are too many 
immigrants in France never fell below 52.1 percent in the 1995 to 2017 period (PEF 1995, 2002; FES 
2007, 2012, 2017). And ironically, more people disagreed with the statement that there were too 
many immigrants in France in 2007 than at any other point in the period under investigation, and it 
was this (presidential) election that was almost entirely defined by the anti-immigration rhetoric of 
Nicolas Sarkozy.  
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Figure 7.2: Percentage of respondents who felt that there were too many immigrants in France. 
 
Source: PEF 1995, 2002; FES 2007, 2012, 2017 
 
To further complicate the picture on immigration, it seems that the French people have somewhat 
warmer – perhaps even contradictory – views when it comes to the cultural impact that immigration 
has had on France. Given that a majority of voters feels that there are too many immigrants in France, 
one might have anticipated that French voters would also have a negative view of the cultural impact 
of immigration. Yet it appears that more French voters view immigration as enhancing rather than 
undermining French culture. As Figure 7.3 shows, between 2002 and 2016, the percentage of people 
who believed that immigration enhances French culture ranged from a low of 41.3 percent in 2004 to 
a high of 47.7 percent in 2016 (European Social Survey 2018). By contrast, those who viewed 
immigration as undermining French culture ranged from 31.9 in 2008 to 36.5 in 2006 (European Social 
Survey 2018). Curiously, the biggest drop in the number of people who felt that immigration 
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Figure 7.3: Percentage of respondents who felt that immigration undermined or enhanced French culture. 
 
Source: PEF 1995, 2002; FES 2007, 2012, 2017 
 
In summary then, the available data suggests that immigration has not been a particularly important 
issue in France, and that the predominant view is that while the overall number of immigrants should 
be reduced, immigrants have culturally enhanced to France. This raises the question of why the 
accommodative strategy of Sarkozy was so effective in 2007. The answer has to be that either the 
territory was large enough and Sarkozy was skilled or lucky enough to attract a sufficient number of 
voters from the FN, or that something else was going on that explained the success of the 
accommodative strategy in 2007 and its subsequent failure in 2012.   
While immigration is no doubt an important issue to the radical right and its voting base, it is not the 
only issue on which the radical right campaigns. It is therefore important to extend the focus of 
investigation and to also consider other cultural dimension issues, such as crime and terrorism. If we 
do this, then the percentage of respondents who name cultural issues as the most important is 
significantly higher. As Figure 7.4 shows, in 2007 20 percent of respondents named cultural issues as 
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Economics issues still predominate, however, with 64.5 percent of respondents naming these as the 
most important issues facing France in 2007. This then rose to 75.5 percent in 2012, but fell 
substantially to 53 percent in 2017 (European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 
2017b). The trends in these figures indicate that, not surprisingly, economic and cultural issues exist 
in an inverse relationship; that is, when economic issues are more prominent, cultural issues are less 
salient, and vice versa. The ebb and flow in the saliency of cultural or economic issues also helps 
explain why the accommodative strategy employed by Sarkozy was successful in 2007 – a period 
where cultural issues were particularly salient – and failed in 2012 – where economic issues were more 
salient.  
 
Figure 7.4: Cultural and economic issue saliency in France, 2007-2017. 
 
Source: PEF 2002; European Commission 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 2017b 
 
What Figure 7.4 also shows is that in 2002 and 2017, there is a reduction in the salience of economic 
issues, and a relative growth in importance of cultural issues. It is through an exploitation of the 
growth in cultural issues that helps explain why Jean-Marie Le Pen was successful in 2002 and why 
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the second round of the presidential elections. But of course, there were limits to how much the Le 
Pens could exploit this as the dynamics of the electoral system are unfavourable to them and the 
National Front. The two-round voting system means that all mainstream voters can back principal 
party candidates in the second round, even if that candidate was not of the principal party that the 
voters favoured – i.e., the electoral specific to French presidential elections limited the extent to which 
the Le Pens could progress.  
From the perspective of a centre-right or right-wing principal party that wishes to capture the vote 
share of a radical right party, however, the data would suggest an accommodative strategy towards 
the radical right makes most sense when cultural issues are particularly prominent in the public 
consciousness. By contrast, if the principal party were concerned with reducing the vote share of the 
radical right without necessarily wishing to engage with its preferred issues, a dismissive strategy 
might be preferable, while an adversarial strategy employed in this situation would most likely 
reinforce the radical right’s ownership of the issue and therefore increase their vote share (see Meguid 
2005, 2008).  
 
7.6.2. Leadership Reputation 
To recall from Chapter 2, when political parties or candidates share a similar position on the same 
issue dimension, the reputation of the parties or candidates allows voters to distinguish between them 
and choose accordingly. A reputation is essentially an indicator that allows actors (in this case voters) 
to make a choice or come to a judgement about another actor (in this case parties) based on prior 
observations and behaviour (Salonen and Wiberg 1987; Weigelt and Camerer 1988; Bowler 1990; 
Herbig and Milewicz 1993; Fombrun 1996). In the context of elections, a party or candidates’ 
reputation is what allows voters to judge the sincerity of parties and candidates, and weight up the 
likelihood that they will keep their promises, including those made about tackling particular problems 
or introducing specific legislation. If a party or candidate shifts its/their position in a manner that 
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signals insincerity, then that party or candidate will likely suffer reputational damage and will be 
unlikely to win over voters as a result (Downs 1957b). 
In 2007, the leader and presidential candidate for the then UMP, Nicolas Sarkozy, made a clear 
overture to the voting base of the National Front. It was his estimation that by accommodating the 
National Front’s positions on immigration and law and order, his superior reputation, developed when 
he was Minister of the Interior under Jacques Chirac, would allow him to successfully trespass on FN 
issue territory, and steal away FN voters (Kuhn 2007; Sauger 2007; Marthaler 2007a; Spoon 2008; 
Carvalho 2019). As Figure 7.5 demonstrates, it was certainly the case that in 2007 Sarkozy enjoyed a 
higher personal net satisfaction rating than other candidates. He had a rating of 5.67, while Ségolène 
Royal held a rating of 4.65, and Jean-Marie Le Pen languished with a rating of 1.21 (CSES 2019). As 
discussed above, Royal also made overtures to the voters of the FN in this election, playing up the 
importance of the French flag and anthem (Kuhn 2007; Marthaler 2007a; Spoon 2008), and she too 
was able to use her reputation, more personal than tied to cultural issues, to successfully trespass on 
FN territory, albeit to a much lesser degree than Sarkozy. Therefore, as a result of the joint-
accommodative strategies pursued by the candidates of the UMP and PS, and of their higher 
reputations, Jean-Marie Le Pen and the National Front were effectively crowded out (Kuhn 2007). 
Indeed, the extent to which Sarkozy seized the FN’s electorate is adequately demonstrated by the fact 
that in the second round of voting, Sarkozy was able to secure 69 percent of Le Pen’s voters from the 
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Figure 7.5: Reputation of the principal party and FN candidates. 
 
Source: CSES (2019) 
 
By 2012, however, Sarkozy entered the presidential race as one of the most unpopular presidents in 
the history of the French Fifth Republic. In an effort to retain his position, Sarkozy once again engaged 
in a strong accommodative strategy with regards to the National Front. However, his personal 
excesses, pursuit of celebrity, and general rudeness had diminished the office of the presidency in the 
eyes of many voters, and all served to undermine his reputation among French voters. As Figure 7.5 
shows, Sarkozy’s personal net satisfaction rating fell by 1.72 points in the period between 2007 and 
2012, from 5.67 to 3.95 (CSES 2019). While he was still ahead of the leader of the National Front – 
now Marine Le Pen who had taken over from her father in 2011 – this gap was a mere 1.09 points, as 
compared to 4.46 points in 2007 (CSES 2019). The gap shrank not only as a result of Sarkozy’s reduced 
personal rating, but also because of the higher reputation that Marine Le Pen’s enjoyed as compared 
to her father. Her reputation rating was 2.86 in 2012, while Jean-Marie Le Pen’s had only been 1.21 in 
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Le Pen put into action. This process, which was largely focused on the party’s rhetoric rather than on 
its programme or policies (Ivaldi 2016), sought to distance the FN from its extreme or radical status 
and portray it with a more moderate, mainstream image. While this clearly worked in that her 
reputation rose, it should be noted that, as illustrated in Figure 7.5, Marine Le Pen still came last in 
the reputation stakes in 2012, and the FN still trailed the principal parties (CSES 2019).  
It therefore seems that one of the conditions behind Sarkozy’s successful use of the accommodative 
strategy in 2007 was his high personal ratings, and his significant reputational lead on Jean-Marie Le 
Pen. The subsequent failure of the accommodative strategy to steal away FN voters in 2012, however, 
can be attributed to the fact that the difference between the personal ratings of Sarkozy and Marine 
Le Pen was considerably smaller. This suggests that the reputation of the party or candidate is 
fundamentally important in determining the potential success or failure of particular party strategies; 
in this case, the accommodative strategy.  
Introducing the reputation of the leader or candidate into the equation might also have theoretical 
consequences for understanding the influence of differing principal party strategies. To recall from 
Meguid (2005), one principal party need not adopt the same strategy as another principal party, and 
instances in which principal parties adopt diverging strategies will result in conflicting effects on the 
saliency of a specific issue and on the vote share of the radical right party with which the principal 
parties are competing. Suppose, for instance, that one principal party adopted an accommodative 
strategy vis-à-vis the radical right, while another adopted an adversarial strategy. The accommodative 
strategy should, according to Meguid, transfer ownership of that issue from the radical right party to 
the principal party. By contrast, the adversarial strategy should reinforce the radical right party’s 
ownership over that issue. In order to determine which strategy has the stronger effect, and therefore 
what the outcome is, Meguid argues that the tactic that is more consistently applied and that is 
applied over a longer period of time will be the one that prevails. In other words, if the accommodative 
strategy of one principal party is maintained for longer than the adversarial strategy of another 
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principal party, then the consequences of the accommodative strategy should be predominant: we 
should see an increase in the saliency of the issue and the transfer of issue ownership from the radical 
right party to the principal party.  
In the French context, the centre-right has maintained an accommodative strategy vis-à-vis the 
National Front for some years, while the Socialist Party has been less consistent in its application of a 
single strategy, although it has adopted the adversarial strategy more frequently than any other (see 
above). Following the discussion above and Meguid’s arguments, one would therefore expect the 
centre-right’s long-term accommodation of the FN to be the more predominant one. And indeed, this 
is borne out in the 2007 presidential elections. However, in 2012, the more consistently applied 
accommodative strategy failed while the Socialist Party was electorally successful following its 
employment of an adversarial strategy.  
This raises the question of whether or not longevity is really the best metric by which to determine 
the likely success of a particular strategy in scenarios where principal parties adopt opposing 
strategies. Given what happened in 2012, it seems more likely that leader and party reputation has 
more influence. François Hollande had a much stronger reputation during the 2012 elections than 
Sarkozy, and therefore his adversarial strategy against the National Front had a greater effect than the 
accommodative strategies of the centre-right. In keeping with Meguid’s theoretical foundations, this 
approach helps explain why the National Front polled so well in 2012 compared to 2007. In 2007, 
Sarkozy and the UMP held a strong reputational advantage over Le Pen and the FN, and were 
therefore the beneficiaries of the saliency of cultural issues. By 2012, the reputation of Sarkozy and 
the UMP had fallen, the reputation of Le Pen and the FN had increased, and Hollande and the Socialist 
Party, which held a reputational advantage over Sarkozy and the UMP, implemented an adversarial 
strategy that reinforced the FN’s ownership of cultural issues.  
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7.6.3. Satisfaction with Democracy and Politicians 
Generally speaking, voters who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works are significantly more 
likely to vote for radical right parties (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002). Moreover, if a radical right 
party is well organised and well led, then even people with a weaker sense of dissatisfaction are more 
likely to vote in favour of it (Lubbers et al. 2002). And this is the case with the National Front: it is 
considered a well organised, well-led, even credible, radical right party (Carter 2005; van Kessel 2015), 
and so even voters with lower levels of dissatisfaction are likely to consider voting for it over the 
Socialist Party or the Union for a Popular Movement/The Republicans. Given this then, principal 
parties such as the PS or UMP/LR should perform better in electoral terms when satisfaction with 
democracy is high, while conversely their strategies against the radical right are likely to be less 
successful when more voters feel dissatisfied with how democracy is working.  
Figure 7.6 shows the levels of satisfaction with democracy among French voters in the years between 
2002 and 2017 (CSES 2019). It shows that levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy were 
particularly low in 2002 and 2017, and this was reflected in what happened in the elections of those 
years. As discussed above, Jean-Marie Le Pen progressed into the second round of the presidential 
elections in 2002, while 15 years later, his daughter Marine did the same. In addition, the other 
candidate to go through to the second round of the presidential elections of 2017 (and the eventual 
winner) was Emmanuel Macron, another outsider candidate. By contrast, and in accordance with 
expectations outlined above, in the years in which French voters recorded high(er) levels of 
satisfaction with the functioning democracy, it was the principal parties that enjoyed success. In both 
the 2007 and 2012 presidential contests, the candidates who went through to the second round came 
from these principal parties. Moreover, in the 2007 parliamentary elections the UMP did particularly 
well and gained a huge majority in the National Assembly, while the FN recorded one of its lowest 
ever electoral results (winning just 4.8 percent of the vote on the first ballot, and ultimately securing 
no seats in parliament).  
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Figure 7.6: Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in France. 
 
Source: PEF 1995, 2002; FES 2007, 2012, 2017 
 
 
However, this apparent correlation between levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy 
and the success of the principal parties does not imply that particular strategies are always effective. 
This is evident if we examine and compare the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections. While Sarkozy’s 
accommodative strategy had been successful in stealing away voters from the FN in 2007, it failed to 
achieve the same result in 2012. During both periods, voter satisfaction in the functioning of 
democracy was quite high, and thus it might be the case that high levels of satisfaction in democracy 
is a necessary condition for principal party strategies to be successful, but that other conditions, such 
as leader and party reputation, can still undermine the efficacy of those strategies. There remains an 
open question, however, regarding cause and effect with respect to democratic satisfaction and party 
strategies: did an increase in democratic satisfaction increase the potential for an accommodative 
strategy to be successful, or did the accommodation of the FN by Sarkozy and the UMP lead to an 
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future research that addresses the influence that political context has on the efficacy of party 
strategies.  
In the same way, it might also be the case that higher levels of trust in politicians increase the 
effectiveness of certain principal party strategies, while lower levels of trust decrease the 
effectiveness of such strategies. After all, if a polity is defined by high levels of distrust in the political 
class, then any accommodation made by the so-called ‘political elite’ toward a radical right challenger 
might well be interpreted as insincere or otherwise negatively perceived. With this in mind, then, 
Figure 7.7 displays the overall levels of trust that French voters have had in their politicians in the 
period 2002 to 2016. What it shows is that, generally speaking, French voters are very consistent in 
their distrust of politicians. Indeed, over this period no more than 18 percent of respondents reported 
trusting politicians, while over 60 percent indicated that they had little to no trust in politicians 
(European Social Survey 2018).  
Against the background of high and slowly increasing levels of distrust in politicians, there was an 
increase in 2006 and another in 2014. The first increase occurs at the end of Chirac’s second term as 
president – which could well be attributed to the general perception that Jacques Chirac and his 
government had achieved little beyond financial scandal. Thereafter, levels of distrust declined, which 
coincided with the campaign and election of Sarkozy. In keeping with the popularity of Sarkozy at this 
time, and the increase in democratic satisfaction reported above, it is no surprise that distrust in 
politicians fell between 2006 and 2008. While the reasons behind the second increase in 2014 are less 
clear, it does coincide with a corruption scandal involving Sarkozy and then Libyan dictator Moammar 
Gaddafi – a story widely reported in the French and international press. Therefore, while it is not 
possible to directly tie this increase in distrust in politicians to the financial scandals of Sarkozy, it 
would certainly make sense that a significant corruption scandal would have this effect. As with 
satisfaction in the functioning of democracy, however, it is not entirely clear what relationship this 
condition has in regard to the efficacy of party strategies. It might well be the case that higher levels 
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of trust in politicians increases the likelihood that certain strategies will be successful in reducing the 
vote share of the radical right. By equal measure, however, it might also be possible that certain 
strategies have an effect on voter feelings of trust in politicians. After all, if a candidate such as Sarkozy 
sincerely pursues a particular strategy, and one that requires recognition of an issue that many voters 
feel is important, then voter attitudes toward politicians might improve – or they might not, and the 
individual candidate might see an improvement in their personal ratings (see above) while politicians 
generally are distrusted. Put simply, it is not yet clear what the effect of this condition is on the efficacy 
of principal party strategies.  
 
Figure 7.7: Levels of trust in French politicians. 
 
Source: European Social Survey 2018 
 
 
7.7. Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to identify the effect that contextual conditions have on principal 
party strategies. It began with a quick overview of the French political and electoral system, a brief 
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particular interest in the sorts of strategies that principal parties adopted vis-à-vis the National Front. 
The analysis of the three contextual conditions above – the issue agenda, the reputation of the party 
and candidate, and voter satisfaction with both democracy and politicians – provide some interesting 
insights into the efficacy of particular principal party strategies. Starting with the issue agenda, the 
issue of immigration was not perceived to be important to French voters relative to other issues. 
Rather, it was the issue of unemployment that was most salient throughout the period analysed. That 
being said, while economic issues – especially unemployment – always dominate elections in France, 
in those electoral periods where cultural issues became particularly salient, accommodative strategies 
were quite effective. By contrast, during periods in which cultural issues were not so important, the 
accommodation of the policy positions of the National Front by the principal parties was less 
successful. In short, the saliency of the cultural dimension seems to help determine the likely success 
or failure of an accommodative strategy. This is illustrated by the 2007 and 2012 elections where 
Sarkozy accommodated the policy positions of the National Front. In the 2007 election, where cultural 
issues were particularly prominent, the accommodative strategy successfully peeled away voters from 
the FN to the benefit of Sarkozy and the UMP. By contrast, in 2012, when cultural issues were not 
particularly salient, that same accommodative strategy failed to steal away voters from the FN.  
As for the reputation of the party or candidate, it seems that the party or candidate employing an 
accommodative strategy will be more successful in trespassing onto the radical right’s territory if they 
have a positive reputation. Indeed, Sarkozy employed a strong accommodative strategy in both the 
2007 and 2012 presidential elections – successfully in 2007 and unsuccessfully in 2012. One of the 
conditions that differed between these two elections – aside from the relative saliency of the cultural 
dimension, as just mentioned – was the reputation of Sarkozy himself. While he was fairly popular in 
2007 – and more so than any other candidate – his reputation had soured by 2012. Indeed, by this 
time Sarkozy had become one of the most unpopular presidents in the history of the French Fifth 
Republic. Importantly, though, it was not just that Sarkozy had become unpopular, but that the 
difference between his popularity and the popularity of Marine Le Pen had shrunk considerably.  
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Finally, with regard to voter satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, it seems that the 
accommodation of the National Front was more successful during periods in which satisfaction with 
democracy was higher. Conversely, when levels of satisfaction with democracy were lower, the 
National Front tended to perform more strongly. Having said that, it is important to note that previous 
research has suggested that not all radical right parties are as equally affected by level of satisfaction 
with democracy (van Kessel 2017). Therefore, it should not be assumed that higher satisfaction with 
democracy is automatically beneficial for the effectiveness principal party strategies employed against 
a radical right competitor.  
This case study demonstrates that while principal parties might have greater legislative experience, 
governmental effectiveness, and superior access to voters, the ‘principal party copy’ is not always 
perceived as more attractive than the ‘radical right original’ (see Meguid 2005, 2008). The 
effectiveness of principal party strategies is affected by political conditions such as the issue agenda, 
the reputation of the party and/or candidate, the satisfaction that voters have with democracy, and 
the levels of trust (or distrust) that voters have in politicians. When these conditions are favourable, 
the results show that the use of accommodative strategies by principal parties can be effective in 
peeling away voters from radical right parties. However, when those same conditions are 
unfavourable, then that same strategy will likely be doomed to failure. This is well illustrated by 
Sarkozy’s use of the accommodative strategy in the 2007 and 2012 presidential elections. Further, 
these results reinforce the idea that reputation should be considered a dynamic rather than a static 
condition (see Chapter 2). Indeed, just because the issue agenda is favourable, for example, does not 
automatically bestow upon a principal party the divine right to rule over particular issues. Without a 
positive reputation, any issue trespassing through the use of an accommodative strategy is unlikely to 
reap the expected rewards. This might be unwelcome news for principal parties, but at the same time, 
it is useful to remember that reputation is the one condition or feature that principal parties have the 
most control over. These parties can invest in safeguarding or improving their reputation, and in so 
doing can therefore prime voters for any future accommodative strategy. In short, by paying attention 
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to reputation, and by working to have reputational advantage over their intended target, principal 
parties can shift the odds in their favour.  





The previous chapter concerned itself with the strategies that the French principal parties have 
adopted in competition with the National Front. The National Front has had a presence in French 
presidential and legislative elections since at least the 1980s, and in that time has had many electoral 
successors (and indeed failures). By contrast, this chapter considers the strategies of principal parties 
in a country that, hitherto, has been considered ‘exceptional’ for its lack of established radical right 
party (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019). Indeed, the relatively recent electoral success of the 
Sweden Democrats (SD)33 in 2010 not only marked the end of Swedish exceptionalism but also had 
considerable consequences on established political party behaviour in Sweden. The purpose of this 
chapter, as with the previous chapter, is to determine the effect that certain political contexts have 
had on the efficacy of principal party strategies employed against the radical right, in this case, the 
Sweden Democrats. To that end, in the same way that the last chapter was, this chapter is split into 
two halves. The first half provides an overview of Swedish politics and elections. In particular, it 
outlines the electoral and party system in Sweden, and details the birth, development, and ideology 
of the Sweden Democrats. Thereafter, it presents an account of each legislative election between 
1998 and 2018, covering six elections in total, detailing the course that each election took, the issues 
that were prominent, and the electoral outcomes of each relevant party, before summarising the 
strategies that principal parties and relevant non-principal parties employed.  
The second more analytical half of the chapter concerns itself with contextualising the strategies 
employed by principal parties in order to ascertain the effect that political context has had on the 
efficacy of these strategies, specifically on their capacity to restrict or otherwise suppress the electoral 
 
33 Throughout this chapter, Sweden Democrats and SD will be used interchangeably. SD should not be 
confused with the Social Democrats (SAP).  
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growth of the Sweden Democrats. This second half has five sections. The first explores the extent to 
which the issue agenda provided favourable terrain for the Sweden Democrats and it examines the 
success or failure that principal parties, and others, have had in suppressing salient issues. Next, it 
considers the spatial positioning of principal parties relative to the Sweden Democrats, on two issue 
dimensions (immigration and redistribution), in order to determine whether or not the Sweden 
Democrats have been subjected to sustained competition or have been left to their own devices, free 
to pursue voters from the periphery. The third section then investigates the attitudes of voters on 
prominent issues, focusing in particular on the degree to which public opinion is amenable to the 
programmatic profile of the Sweden Democrats. Then, the chapter turns to examining the impact that 
satisfaction with democracy, as well as voter trust in politicians and parties, has had on the efficacy of 
principal party strategies. Finally, the chapter considers the reputation of the various parties and their 
respective leaderships, and in so doing also explores the leadership and organisational development 
of the SD. 
Ultimately, this chapter finds that the Sweden Democrats have been able to overcome a series of 
potential problems, from an increasing progressive and liberal population to a hostile political 
environment, by focusing on a small but significant segment of the population that is sufficiently anti-
immigration and anti-establishment, and by undertaking necessary organisational reforms that permit 
the proper exploitation of this reservoir of potential support. While the principal parties have been 
historically successful in restricting the growth of radical right parties in Sweden (barring the initial 
success of the short-lived flash party New Democracy, 1991-1994), in recent years the cordon sanitaire 
established by the principal parties against the Sweden Democrats has proved ineffective and is even 
at risk of breaking down entirely. Disagreements among the principal parties have fractured any 
consensus that may have existed, while individual party goals to secure a greater share of the vote, 
and inconsistencies across the electoral and legislative arena, have served to increase the saliency of 
issues that are favourable to the Sweden Democrats. The chapter therefore considers several 
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intermeshing conditions in its path to discovering why the strategies of the Swedish principal parties 
have failed in recent years.  
 
8.2. The Swedish Electoral and Party System 
Sweden is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. Following the Instrument of 
Government 1974 – the part of the Swedish constitution that dictates the underlying principles of 
Swedish democracy – the monarchy has no, even nominal, executive functions. Instead, all executive 
functions rest with the Prime Minister or the Speaker of the Parliament (who acts as the formateur 
during coalition negotiations) (Möller 2016; Öberg 2016).  
Elections to the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, are conducted using open list proportional 
representation. Practically, Sweden in broken up into 29 constituencies, with most constituencies 
electing between 10 and 12 members to the Riksdag. Outside this range, Stockholm elects 39 
members, while Gotland elects 2 (Widfeldt 2011a; Hermansson 2016; Riksdagen.se 2016; 
Valmyndigheten 2020). In total, the Riksdag is made up of 349 seats, of which 310 are fixed or 
permanent ones, and 39 are adjustment ones. Permanent seats are simply those won in a particular 
constituency, with their number reflecting the number of eligible voters within that constituency. The 
distribution between parties mirrors each party’s share of the vote within those constituencies 
(Hermansson 2016; Riksdagen.se 2016; Valmyndigheten 2020). Following the distribution of 
permanent seats, a second distribution is carried out, this time based on the parties’ votes in the whole 
of the country. This second distribution is compared to the first, and any party obtaining more seats 
in the second distribution (as compared to the first) is awarded adjustment seats. These are allotted 
in the constituency where the party performed most strongly (Valmyndigheten n.d.). These 
adjustment seats are meant to ensure greater proportionality.  
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Since 1998 it has also been possible for voters to express a personal vote. The system accommodates 
personal votes by beginning the distribution of constituency seats with those candidates who have 
exceeded the 5 percent threshold for personal votes. The remaining seats are distributed after this, in 
the order of the party lists. While this could, theoretically, have a major influence on the operation of 
elections, in practice most personal votes tend to go to the candidates who are at the top of the party 
list anyway. What is more, only a minority of voters actually use personal voting (e.g., 1/4 of voters in 
2010) (Hermansson 2016; Riksdagen.se 2016; Valmyndigheten 2020).  
In order to receive any seats, a party must achieve a national vote share of four percent or more, or 
of 12 percent in a particular constituency to be entitled to the seat distribution of that constituency 
(Widfeldt 2003, 2011a; Riksdagen.se 2016; Valmyndigheten 2020; Hermansson 2016). This has meant 
that the major parties – particularly the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party – have tended 
to be over-represented in the Riksdag. However, the extent of this over-representation of major 
parties is small. For instance, in 2010, it only amounted to three seats for the Social Democrats and 
two seats for the Moderates (Hermansson 2016).  
While Sweden operates a proportional representation system, and has had a fairly stable five-party 
system since 1917, for much of its history it essentially operated as a pre-dominant party system owing 
to the dominance of the Social Democrats (Sartori 2005b). Between 1940 and 1994, the Social 
Democrats won the majority share of the vote twice, and won more than 45 percent of the vote no 
fewer than ten times (Aylott 2016). Indeed, after 1917, no other party managed to break the 30 
percent limit until 2010, when the Moderates scored 30.1 percent of the vote. (Widfeldt 2011a; Aylott 
2016). In recent years, however, the predominance of the Social Democrats has waned, and in each 
election since 1998 it lost its electoral standing. At the same time, the number of parliamentary 
parties, stable at five for over 70 years, began to increase as the Greens, the Christian Democrats, and 
the Sweden Democrats gained representation in the Riksdag.  
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Despite the multi-party nature of the system, throughout much of Sweden’s post-1917 Swedish 
political history, the parliamentary parties (five historically, and seven in the contemporary period) 
have tended toward two separate but fairly stable blocs. The socialist or leftist bloc consists of the 
Social Democrats and the Greens, joined often but not always by Left Party. The bourgeois or centre-
right bloc, or ‘Alliance’, contains the Moderates, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, and the Centre 
Party (Berglund and Lindström 1978; Widfeldt 2011a; Berg and Oscarsson 2014; Aylott 2016). The 
growing presence of the Sweden Democrats, however, has somewhat destabilised the two-bloc 
system. The Alliance has particularly suffered: in 2019 it collapsed owing to intense disagreements 
regarding whether or not to collaborate with the Sweden Democrats (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 
2019; see also below).  
 
8.3. Sweden Democrats: Origins, Development, and Ideology 
The Sweden Democrats are a rather rare phenomenon in Swedish politics: an example of a successful 
radical right party. Prior to their breakthrough, extreme and radical right parties Sweden never 
garnered much support or exerted any impact.34 For sure, there were extreme right parties and 
movements in the country, with the first Nazi party formed in 1924 and with others following in 
subsequent decades (Widfeldt 2008). Perhaps the most prominent example is the Nationalist Socialist 
Workers Party (NSAP). Formed in 1933, the NSAP was a fully-fledged Nazi party that adopted all of the 
symbolism associated with the Nazi Party in Germany: the salute, uniforms, and the Swastika 
(Widfeldt 2008). The NSAP advocated positions identical to the German Nazi Party and even went so 
far as to make preparations for a German invasion of Sweden. Most chillingly, this involved local 
branches of the party gathering information on Sweden’s Jewish population (Schön 2012). In 1938, 
 
34 A notable exception was the New Democracy party which won 6.7 percent of the vote and 25 seats in the 
Riksdag in the 1991 general election. However, New Democracy proved to be nothing more than a flash party 
and fell into obscurity and irrelevance quite quickly. It should be emphasised, however, that New Democracy 
had little in common with the movements and parties mentioned in this section (Rydgren 2006).  
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the NSAP changed its name to the Swedish Socialist Gathering, and toned down much of its Nazi 
symbolism, even if it remained ideologically unchanged (Widfeldt 2008).  Yet, none of these groups 
was particularly successful in either gaining votes, winning seats, or even eliciting sympathies from 
more moderate voters. They were thus condemned to irrelevance and isolation. 
A new generation of neo-fascist and Nazi groups did emerge by the 1970s and 1980s. These groups 
were often more aggressive than their predecessors but were built on a foundation of relatively loyal 
and energetic activists. Of particular interest here is the radical – but not extremist – Progress Party 
(FsP), which was formed in 1968, and the Keep Sweden Swedish (BSS) party, which was established in 
1979 (Widfeldt 2008, 2014).  
While both of these parties were isolated at the right-wing fringes of Swedish politics, they were 
distinctly different to each other in their ideological profiles. BSS was born out of the racist and 
extremist fringes, while the FsP came from an attempt to unify the more moderate right-wing parties, 
but quickly developed into a populist, anti-establishment, radical right party (Widfeldt 2008). Despite 
these differences, however, by 1986, the two parties had merged to form the new Sweden Party, 
which was fairly active, which leafleted regularly, and which attracted a fair amount of media 
attention. As is common with these parties, however, the party was overwhelmed by internal conflicts 
and it split along its original organisational fault lines, that is, between the BSS and FsP factions 
(Widfeldt 2008). The BSS faction was better organised and it was from this faction that the Sweden 
Democrats emerged (Widfeldt 2008).  
Given the origins of the party, the Sweden Democrats were heavily compromised by the presence of 
Nazi veterans within the party organisation and membership – including an internal auditor who had 
served the Waffen-SS in a voluntary capacity during the second world war – and by numerous 
connections with various other extremist movements in the post-war period (Hellström and Nilsson 
2010; Widfeldt 2008, 2014). The party’s first president (1989-1995), Anders Klarström, was formerly 
a member of the neo-Nazi Nordic Realm Party and had a criminal record that included many colourful 
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offences from the stealing of ammunition to vandalism and intimidation. Other representatives of the 
party’s executive were members of extremist movements such as the White Arian Resistance 
(Hellström and Nilsson 2010). Indeed, around half of the party executive had criminal records, and 30-
50 percent had some Nazi affiliation (Widfeldt 2008). In 1989, the Sweden Democrats published a 
bulletin that contained a list of allies outside of Sweden. These included the National Front (France), 
various South African pro-apartheid newspapers, journals associated with the Ku Klux Klan, and 
Spearhead, a journal published by neo-Nazi John Tyndall of the British National Front and British 
National Party (Hellström and Nilsson 2010).  
It became clear to those within the Sweden Democrats that in order to achieve a national 
breakthrough, the party would need to shed its compromised image. In 1995, Klarström was replaced 
by Mikael Jansson as party leader. While Jansson was not a charismatic leader or even a particularly 
effective orator, he was not compromised by previous Nazi affiliations – having originally come from 
the moderate, agrarian Centre Party – and he presented a much cleaner image (Widfeldt 2008). Under 
Jansson, the party initiated a series of reforms designed to rid the Sweden Democrats of their Nazi 
affiliations and extremist profile. These included the banning of uniforms, the removal of executive 
members with criminal records or Nazi affiliations, and the expulsion of over 150 activists from the 
party (Widfeldt 2008; Rydgren and Ruth 2011; Erlingsson et al. 2014; Widfeldt 2014; Bolin and Aylott 
2019). These expelled members eventually founded the National Democrats and, rather fortuitously, 
many of the Sweden Democrats’ compromising contacts abroad were claimed by the National 
Democrats, thereby freeing up the Sweden Democrats to pursue contacts with the likes of the Danish 
People’s Party, a radical right party with a significantly less compromising history (Widfeldt 2008; 
Erlingsson et al. 2014; Bolin and Aylott 2019). Overall, the split proved rather positive for the Sweden 
Democrats in that while they lost a number of committed and experienced activists, they also got rid 
of the hard-extremists, Nazis, and dedicated fascists (Widfeldt 2008).  
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In February 2000, the party publicly disowned Nazism and stated that pro-Nazi behaviour within the 
party would lead to expulsion. This public statement was seemingly triggered by a series of highly 
publicised violent acts by Nazis in the preceding months, including a bomb attack on journalists, the 
shooting of policemen following a bank robbery, and the murder of a trade unionist who exposed a 
Nazi infiltrator in a local trade union committee (Widfeldt 2008, 2014; Erlingsson et al. 2014). In 
making this public statement, the Sweden Democrats also took the opportunity to question why these 
acts had happened and in so doing therefore targeted the political establishment for its reluctance to 
allow an open debate on difficult issues, including immigration (Widfeldt 2008).  
The gradual professionalisation of the party continued over the next years. In 2005, Jansson lost the 
leadership of the Sweden Democrats to Jimmie Åkesson, a young, university-educated activist who, 
like Jansson, was not compromised by Nazi affiliations or criminality (Widfeldt 2008). Åkesson was not 
much of an improvement in terms of charisma, but he was a competent performer who presented a 
professional image and performed well in TV interviews and debates (Widfeldt 2008).  
The reform process that the party embarked upon also concerned its policy, and here one of the most 
significant changes that the leadership undertook related to the party’s anti-immigration policies. 
While the party retained its strong anti-immigration stance, its policies were toned down significantly. 
For instance, in 1999 it abandoned the policy of enforced repatriation of all immigrants that had 
entered Sweden in the post-1970s period, and instead promoted a policy of repatriating immigrants 
who had not assimilated into Swedish society, unless they required protection according to 
international law (Widfeldt 2008; Hellström and Nilsson 2010; Bolin and Aylott 2019). The presence 
of classical, biological racism within the party’s official documentation also disappeared. Instead, the 
party began to embrace ethno-pluralism, which holds that all ethnic/cultural groups are equal, but 
should be nonetheless kept separate (Widfeldt 2008; Hellström and Nilsson 2010; Bolin and Aylott 
2019). Therefore, much like the National Front under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the Sweden 
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Democrats sought to drastically moderate the image that they project to voters, while maintaining 
much, although not all, of their anti-immigration profile.  
Having outlined the main characteristics of the Swedish electoral system and party system, and having 
provided a brief history of the organisational and ideological development of the Sweden Democrats, 
the chapter now turns to offering a summary of Swedish general elections from 1998 to 2018.  
 
8.4. Legislative Elections in Sweden: 1998-2018 
8.4.1. 1998 General Election 
The 1998 general election, held on 20th September, took place amid high levels of unemployment and 
state debt, both of which were a product of high public spending during the early 1990s recession 
(Arter 1999; Möller 1999). The governing Social Democrats sought to address these issues through tax 
increases and public spending cuts. Between 1994 and 1998 interest rates has been reduced, inflation 
had fallen, and growth had increased (Möller 1999). Going into the election, the Social Democrats 
announced a return to traditional social democratic policies with increased spending planned for 
healthcare, education, and welfare, while the centre-right Moderate Party favoured cutting taxes, 
reducing state spending, and privatisation (Arter 1999). 
The election results, summarised in Table 8.1, show a significant loss for the governing Social 
Democratic Party. Indeed, its score of 36.4 percent of the vote was the party’s lowest result since 1921 
when universal suffrage was introduced (Arter 1999; Möller 1999). The election was also a blow for 
the opposition centre-right Moderate Party, which had anticipated gaining 30-35 percent of the vote 
following favourable polls conducted during the campaign (Möller 1999). The winners of the election 
were, without doubt, the smaller Left Party and Christian Democratic Party, which managed to 
increase their share of the vote by 5.8 and 7.7 percentage points respectively (Arter 1999; Möller 
1999). The spending restrictions introduced by the governing Social Democratic Party between 1994 
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and 1998 proved to be a boon for the Left Party, and it became the primary beneficiary of the Social 
Democrats’ losses, with some 30 percent of the Left Party’s vote coming from the Social Democratic 
Party (Möller 1999). While the Moderate Party had managed to pick off some former Social 
Democratic voters, it too suffered a voter leakage, with 27 percent of the Christian Democratic vote 
coming from the Moderate Party (Möller 1999).  
 
Table 8.1: Swedish general election results, 1998. 
 Votes Seats 
Party Number Percent +/- Number +/- 
Social Democratic Party 1,914,426 36.4 -8.9 131 -30 
Moderate Party 1,204,926 22.9 0.5 82 2 
Left Party 631,011 12 5.8 43 21 
Christian Democratic Party 619,046 11.8 7.7 42 27 
Centre Party 269,762 5.1 -2.6 18 -9 
Liberal Party 248,076 4.7 -2.5 17 -9 
Green Party 236,699 4.5 -0.5 16 -2 
Other 137,176 2.6 0.5 0 - 
Total 5,261,122 100  349  
Source: Möller 1999 
 
Broadly speaking, Swedish voters tend to express low levels of political interest and are often 
indifferent to political happenings. Such is the state of democracy in Sweden that the Institute for 
Democratic Communication has described Sweden as a ‘lukewarm democracy’ (Möller 1999). This is 
in part a product of the significant number of voters who still vote along class lines, often having made 
their mind up before the campaign. All this was very evident in this election, with two-thirds of the 
working class backing either the Social Democrats or the Left Party, and with the Centre Party 
mobilising most strongly from agricultural communities. Likewise, the Liberal Party drew heavily from 
white collar workers and academics, and the Moderate Party was most popular among business 
owners (Möller 1999). 
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8.4.2. 2002 General Election 
The 2002 general election, which took place on 15th September, can generally be characterised as a 
traditional left-right contest: the left supported a stronger public sector and greater welfare spending, 
while the right favoured a reduction in taxation and the introduction of more individual choice in 
public services (Aylott 2002; Madeley 2003). The campaign did not start particularly well for the Social 
Democrats, who saw relatively low polling figures, coupled with accusations of complacency and 
presidentialism by Persson (Madeley 2003). The general message of the Social Democrats was that 
things had been going well and that they would continue to do so if voters trusted the party again. 
This message was slightly undermined, however, when government memos indicating the prospect of 
a deficit in 2003 were leaked to the media (Madeley 2003). By contrast, the Moderate Party proposed 
a range of reforms on salient issues including the right of parents/children to choose schools; the 
privatisation of state-owned companies; tougher measures against violent criminals; and significant 
reductions in taxation (Aylott 2002; Madeley 2003).  
Perhaps the most interesting innovation in the campaign – especially in terms of grabbing media 
attention – was that presented by the Liberals (the Liberal People’s Party), who set out a programme 
of ‘ethnic integration’, which included measures for a probationary period for immigrants (Aylott 
2002; Widfeldt 2003). Göran Persson, Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democratic Party, 
accused the Liberals of ‘fishing in troubled waters’ but the programme generally went down positively 
with voters (Widfeldt 2003).  
The immigration issue received further attention when a team of investigative journalists travelled 
around Sweden posing as xenophobic voters communicating with local officials and campaigners from 
various parties. Controversially, very few of the local party officials and campaigners challenged the 
anti-immigrant views expressed, and in many cases, xenophobic comments were made in return 
(Widfeldt 2003). While most parties, excluding the Greens and the Left, were affected, the Moderate 
Party seemed to suffer most both in media coverage and in the polls, although the reason for this was 
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not exactly clear (Widfeldt 2003). The issue of immigration is taboo in Sweden, partly as a result of the 
politicisation of immigration elsewhere – particularly in Norway and Denmark – but also as a result of 
the short-lived radical right party New Democracy in the early 1990s (Aylott 2002; Madeley 2003). As 
a result, the leaders of the principal parties in Sweden sought to avoid any discussion of the issue, and 
when measures were announced, they were more often phrased in the context of ‘ethnic integration’. 
It was in this context that the Liberals operated and while the party won immediate media attention, 
it was quickly criticised by other parties. It was accused of having policies that resembled those of the 
radical right Sweden Democrats, and it was compared to the Danish People’s Party (Aylott 2002).  
The results of the election, summarised in Table 8.2, show a slight increase in both vote share and 
seats for the governing Social Democratic Party, while the Moderate Party lost a significant proportion 
of its vote share (-7.6 percentage points) and a sizeable number of seats (-27). These losses are best 
explained by the Moderates’ decision to focus on non-salient issues in their campaign – namely tax 
cuts – and by the considerable reputational damage they incurred following the media reports of party 
xenophobia (Widfeldt 2003). However, while the balance of votes and seats between the two principal 
parties shifted, the ideological balance in the Riksdag remained unchanged (Madeley 2003; Widfeldt 
2003). This was because of the Liberal Party (a partner of the Moderates in the bourgeois bloc) 
experienced considerable gains. Indeed, the Liberals were the largest winners in this election, 
managing to almost triple their number of seats (gaining an additional 31) and increasing their share 
of the vote by 8.7 percent. These gains outweighed the losses of the Moderate Party. Finally, the Left 
Party lost some ground back to the Social Democrats, with its vote share falling by 3.6 percentage 
points and its seats by 13. The Sweden Democrats polled a meagre 1.4 percent of the vote, and 
remained excluded from the Riksdag. However, by Swedish standards, 1.4 percent for a radical right 
party was actually quite high (Widfeldt 2003).  
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Table 8.2: Swedish general election results, 2002. 
 Votes Seats 
Party Number Percent +/- Number +/- 
Social Democratic Party 2,113,560 39.9 3.5 144 13 
Moderate Party 809,041 15.3 -7.6 55 -27 
Liberal Party 710,312 13.4 8.7 48 31 
Christian Democrats 485,235 9.1 -2.7 33 -9 
Left Party 444,854 8.4 -3.6 30 -13 
Centre Party 328,428 6.2 1.1 22 4 
Green Party 246,392 4.6 0.1 17 1 
Sweden Democrats 76,300 1.4 1 0 - 
Others 89,090 1.7 -0.5 0 - 
Total 5,303,212 100  349  
Source: Widfeldt 2003 
 
 
8.4.3. 2006 General Election 
Despite Sweden’s improving economy, the governing Social Democratic, Green, and Left parties did 
not experience a happy period in office between 2002 and 2006. Firstly, the government lost a 
referendum in which it had advocated Swedish membership of the EMU (Widfeldt 2004; Bolin and 
Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). Secondly, the government failed to respond effectively to the 
aftermath of a tsunami in Asia during Christmas 2004, in which hundreds of Swedish tourists had died. 
An inquiry into the event was unexpectedly critical of the government, and laid direct blame on the 
Social Democratic Prime Minister, Göran Persson (Widfeldt 2004; Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and 
Bolin 2007). Thirdly, the government suffered a number of scandals. These included the youth wing 
of the Social Democrats fraudulently claiming public subsidies, the foreign secretary resigning 
following her actions over the Danish cartoon crisis, and the government’s use of patronage to state 
agencies and the civil service that reflected politics rather than competency. Ultimately, though, what 
harmed the government most was its failure to translate good economic indicators into higher 
employment despite promises to lower unemployment (Widfeldt 2004; Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott 
and Bolin 2007).  
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Since 1998, the Social Democrats had developed a close but informal relationship with the Green and 
Left parties, which ensured that it had maintained its governing position and a majority in parliament 
(Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). The growing radicalism within the Left Party, however, 
had begun to place a strain on this collaboration, even if cooperation had to continue out of necessity. 
By contrast, the centre-right block – consisting of the Moderates, the Centre Party, the Liberals, and 
the Christian Democrats – formalised their collaboration into the Alliance for Sweden, in which the 
parties developed common policies on economic growth, education, foreign policy, welfare provision, 
labour market reform, justice, and even the more challenging area of taxation (Widfeldt 2005, 2006, 
2007a; Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). This has been made possible in part by the 
election of Fredrick Reinfeldt as leader of the Moderates following the party’s 2002 defeat. He 
tempered the policies of the party, with ‘several sacred cows cheerfully slaughtered on the way’ (Bolin 
and Aylott 2006; Widfeldt 2006 Aylott and Bolin 2007). Going into the election campaign of 2006, the 
Moderates declared themselves the ‘new workers’ party’ and, made employment the central issue of 
their campaign. They also challenged the Social Democrats on the issue of healthcare, promising large 
spending increases. 
By contrast, the Social Democrats were especially vague on the issue of employment in part because 
they had a poor record on jobs growth (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). As for the Left 
Party, it adopted what was considered by many, including the Social Democrats, to be a wholly 
incredible policy: that the public sector should simply employ 200,000 more people (Bolin and Aylott 
2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007). This mix of vague and unrealistic policies allowed the Alliance to 
emphasise the Social Democrats’ and wider left bloc’s failure to address unemployment properly 
(Widfeldt 2007a).  
Just two weeks before polling day, the Social Democrats announced that repeated intrusions into their 
intranet – which had contained confidential details of the party’s campaign strategy – had been traced 
to the Liberal Party’s central office (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007; Widfeldt 2007b). It 
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quickly emerged that the Liberals’ youth wing was responsible and while the party secretary, Johan 
Jakobsson, at first denied all knowledge of the event, he did later admit his complicity and resigned. 
He, other senior members of the party, and the party’s youth wing, were all placed under investigation 
for suspected criminal activity (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007; Widfeldt 2007b).  
The results of the 2006 election, summarised in Table 8.3, show a dreadful performance for the Social 
Democratic Party: its share of the vote fell by nearly five percent, and it lost 14 seats. This terrible 
performance was in part a result of the party’s failure to tackle unemployment, but was also a 
reflection of the credibility of the respective party blocs. While the Alliance presented a joint 
manifesto and its constituent parties were clear regarding their intent to form a four-party coalition 
(Widfeldt 2007b), the Social Democrats failed to outline coalition intentions. Indeed, the official line 
was that the party sought a mandate for single-party government, a claim that lacked all credibility 
(Widfeldt 2007b).  
The Social Democrats also suffered as a result of negative perceptions of their leader, Göran Persson. 
He was seen as authoritarian and arrogant, and this contrasted rather negatively with the more 
reasoned and thoughtful Reinfeldt (Widfeldt 2007b). The only party to poll worse than the Social 
Democrats were the Liberals, who suffered deeply as a result of the intranet hacking scandal, losing 
nearly six percentage points of the vote, and 20 seats. By contrast, the Moderate Party recorded its 
best result since 1928, and achieved the largest increase in support between elections of any political 
party in Swedish history (Bolin and Aylott 2006; Aylott and Bolin 2007; Widfeldt 2007a). The radical 
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Table 8.3: Swedish general election results, 2006.  
 Votes Seats 
Party Number Percent +/- Number +/- 
Social Democratic Party 1,942,625 35 -4.9 130 -14 
Moderate Party 1,456,014 26.2 10.9 97 42 
Centre Party 437,389 7.9 1.7 29 7 
Liberal Party 418,395 7.5 -5.9 28 -20 
Christian Democrats 365,998 6.6 -2.5 24 -9 
Left Party 324,722 5.8 -2.5 22 -8 
Green Party 291,121 5.2 0.6 19 2 
Sweden Democrats 162,463 2.9 1.5 0 0 
Others 152,551 2.7 1.1 0 0 
Total 5,551,278 100  349  
Source: Widfeldt 2007a 
 
 
8.4.4. 2010 General Election 
Going into the election campaign of 2010, the Alliance pledged a continuation of the reform 
programme initiated in 2006 – a reduction in taxes and benefits – and it emphasised areas in which it 
judged itself to have an advantage: stability, continuity, and most importantly, competence (Widfeldt 
2011a).  
By contrast, the Red-Green bloc advocated increased spending on education and jobs training, a 
reversal of the Alliance’s reforms to benefits, and other expansions to the welfare state (Widfeldt 
2011a). The Red-Green bloc adopted an aggressive strategy towards the Alliance, seeking to attack 
the Alliance parties for irresponsible tax cuts that hurt the most vulnerable in society. However, this 
strategy ultimately backfired for two reasons. Firstly, it gave the Alliance parties another opportunity 
to reinforce their reputation for calm and collected competence. Secondly, the Social Democrats had 
matched the Alliance’s promise to introduce tax cuts for pensioners. This not only undermined the 
Red-Green bloc’s attempts to criticise the Alliance’s ‘reckless tax cuts’, but also shifted attention to 
the issue of taxation, on which the Alliance performed more strongly (Aylott 2010).  
The growing strength of the Sweden Democrats caused some civil unrest as protestors sought to 
disturb the party’s election rallies and meetings. The profile of the party increased in the media 
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following the banning of a television advertisement in which an old woman with a walking frame was 
harassed by a group of Muslim women in burkas (Widfeldt 2011a). The Sweden Democrats also staged 
election rallies with the leader of its Danish sister party, Pia Kjaersgaard of the Danish People’s Party, 
who electioneered with Jimmie Åkesson (Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a).  
Overall, the results – as summarised in Table 8.3 – showed an endorsement of the Alliance 
government. The Alliance increased its share of the vote and widened the gap in vote share between 
itself and the Red-Green bloc (Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a, 2011b). The Moderate Party recorded its 
best ever result, coming within 35,731 votes (0.6 percentage points) of the Social Democratic Party 
(Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a, 2011b). This success was not shared among other Alliance parties, 
however, as the Centre and Christian Democrats came awfully close to falling short of the 4 percent 
threshold, which would have seen them lose all their seats (Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a, 2011b). The 
Liberals, meanwhile, lost 0.4 percent of their vote share and four seats in the Riksdag.  
 
Table 8.4: Swedish general election results, 2010. 
 Votes Seats 
Party Number Percent +/- Number +/- 
Social Democratic Party 1,827,497 30.7 -4.3 112 -18 
Moderate Party 1,791,766 30.1 3.9 107 10 
Green Party 437,435 7.3 2.1 25 6 
Liberal Party 420,524 7.1 -0.4 24 -4 
Centre Party 390,804 6.6 -1.3 23 -6 
Sweden Democrats 339,610 5.7 2.8 20 20 
Left Party 334,053 5.6 -0.3 19 -3 
Christian Democrats 333,696 5.6 -1 19 -5 
Other 85,023 1.4 -1.4 0 0 
Total 5,960,408 100  349  
Source: Widfeldt 2011a 
 
The losses among the smaller members of the Alliance, in conjunction with the breakthrough of the 
Sweden Democrats, served to deny the Alliance an outright majority of seats. Having again doubled 
their vote share, with 20 seats, the Sweden Democrats were now the sixth largest party (out of eight) 
in the Riksdag (Aylott 2010; Widfeldt 2011a, 2011b). The entry of the Sweden Democrats into 
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parliament marked not only the failure of the cordon sanitaire that had been established by the 
principal parties, but also a failure of the principal parties’ attempt to suppress the saliency of the 
immigration issue. Paradoxically, the silence on the issue of immigration, coupled with desperate 
attempts to deny or otherwise downplay any connection between immigration on the one hand and 
social problems on the other, only served to provide ample space for the Sweden Democrats to exploit 
what was hitherto essentially an untapped electoral market (Aylott 2010).  
The presence of the Sweden Democrats in the Riksdag meant that any legislation that the Alliance 
wished to pass would require cross-bloc support from the Social Democrats, the Greens, or even the 
Left Party, or the government would have to hope that the Sweden Democrats were favourable to the 
Alliance’s legislative agenda (Widfeldt 2011a). While cooperation with the Sweden Democrats had 
been ruled out, some future collaboration was not entirely out of play, as between 1991 and 1994, 
the Moderates had cooperated with the radical right New Democracy (Engström 2010). 
The results for the Social Democrats in the 2010 election were disastrous. The party’s meagre 30.7 
percent of the vote reflected a long-term decline in party loyalty and party identification of working-
class voters (Widfeldt 2011a). Moreover, the Social Democrats lacked credibility on election-defining 
issues, including unemployment and the economy on which the party had traditionally performed 
well. By contrast, the Alliance generally, and the Moderates in particular, were seen as competent on 
these fundamental issues (Widfeldt 2011a).  
 
8.4.5. 2014 General Election 
Going in to the 2014 election, the Moderate Party sought to maintain its governing position. It 
criticised the Red-Green bloc over a parent’s right to choose their child’s school, arguing that this right 
would be lost if the Red-Green bloc were to win the election. Furthermore, party leader and Prime 
Minister Reinfeldt politicised the issue of immigration, arguing that the influx of immigrants expected 
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as a result of the migrant crisis would be considerable and that ‘where many people arrive in a short 
time, it would create tensions in Swedish society’. At the same time, however, he asked ‘the Swedish 
people to have patience and to open their hearts for those vulnerable people who we see around the 
world’ (Aylott and Bolin 2015: 733). Several commentators suggested that Reinfeldt’s encroachment 
onto such a taboo issue was a deliberate attempt to recreate a sense of crisis – such as that which had 
existed in 2010 when the global financial crisis was well under way – that could be exploited by the 
Alliance. As expected, however, the speech drew serious condemnation from parties of the left, which 
roundly criticised Reinfeldt for providing an opening for the Sweden Democrats by increasing the 
saliency of the immigration issue (Aylott and Bolin 2015).  
The Alliance also sought to question the competency of the Social Democrats on economic matters. It 
warned that it would ‘not wave through a government that has not shown it has the requisites to 
secure its budget’ and stated that it would submit its own budget, even if it were relegated to 
opposition status (Aylott and Bolin 2015). The main objective here was to force the Social Democrats, 
publicly, into the arms of the Left Party, and thereby recreate another feature of the 2010 election: 
Social Democratic incredibility (Aylott and Bolin 2015). 
While the campaign was generally quite fragmented, the issue of education did capture the limelight. 
Education had been a big winner for the Alliance parties in 2006, especially the Liberal Party, which 
branded itself as the champion of a traditional, rigorous education. However, by 2014, this reputation 
fell a little flat when, after eight years of the Liberals being in charge of the Ministry of Education, 
Swedish pupils performed terribly in the international PISA tests (Aylott and Bolin 2015). By contrast, 
the issue of unemployment, which had also been a profitable issue for the Alliance in the last election, 
particularly the Moderate Party, was essentially pushed to the side-lines in 2010, preventing the 
Alliance from capitalising on it (Aylott and Bolin 2015). In short, having ‘owned’ some of the most 
important issues in Swedish politics, the Alliance entered the 2010 campaign with only the 
‘government issue’ as its only advantage (Aylott and Bolin 2015).  
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The results, reported in Table 8.4, showed that the election was disappointing for the Alliance parties. 
The Moderate Party lost over 6 percent of the vote and over 20 seats, prompting its leader, Fredrik 
Reinfeldt, to resign (Berg and Oscarsson 2014). The results came as a blow to the Moderate Party as 
pre-election polls had suggested that voters were favourable toward the government’s performance, 
especially on the economy. Indeed, exit polls had suggested that the Moderates were considered best 
at handling the national and personal economy (Berg and Oscarsson 2014). The election also proved 
to be rather disappointing for the Red-Green bloc. The Social Democrats, Left Party, and Green Party 
saw very little change in their voting figures on the previous election. Taken collectively, the centre-
left parties saw no change in their share of the vote and gained a mere three seats. Following the 
election, Stefan Löfven, leader of the Social Democratic Party, formed a minority coalition with the 
Green Party. This coalition rested on only 138 seats out of a total of 349 in the Riksdag (Berg and 
Oscarsson 2014). While Sweden is accustomed to minority governments, this new coalition, in terms 
of parliamentary seats, was the fourth weakest in history (Berg and Oscarsson 2014).  
 
Table 8.5: Swedish general election results, 2014. 
 Votes Seats 
Party Number Percent +/- Number +/- 
Social Democratic Party 1,932,711 31.0 0.3 113 1 
Moderate Party 1,453,517 23.3 -6.8 84 -23 
Sweden Democrats 801,178 12.9 7.2 49 29 
Green Party 429,275 6.9 -0.4 25 0 
Centre Party 380,937 6.1 -0.5 22 -1 
Left Party 356,331 5.7 0.1 21 2 
Liberal Party 337,773 5.4 -1.7 19 -5 
Christian Democratic Party 284,806 4.6 -1.0 16 -3 
Feminist Initiative 194,719 3.1 2.7 0 0 
Other 60,326 1.0 -0.4 0 0 
Total 6,231,573 100  349  
Source: Berg and Oscarsson 2014 
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The real election winners of the 2014 election were the radical right Sweden Democrats. The party 
more than doubled its share of the vote from 5.7 percent in 2010 to 12.9 percent, and secured an 
additional 29 seats, bringing its total number of seats up to 49. This made the third largest party in the 
Riksdag (Berg and Oscarsson 2014). While both party blocs refused to cooperate with the Sweden 
Democrats in any way, thereby stripping the party of any coalition potential, its sheer size provided it 
with a degree of blackmail potential. Indeed, the Sweden Democrats had already denied both blocs a 
majority in the Riksdag, and therefore a degree of political instability was almost inevitable, especially 
given that the Sweden Democrats would not be absorbed into the right-wing bloc in the same way 
that their sister parties had in Denmark and Norway (Aylott and Bolin 2015).  
 
8.4.6. 2018 General Election 
Following the 2014 general election, the minority Red-Green government of Löfven had failed to 
secure parliamentary approval for its budget, while the Alliance, with support from the Sweden 
Democrats, had secured a parliamentary majority for its alternative budget. As a result, Prime Minister 
Löfven called a snap election for 22nd March 2015. This never came to be, however, as the principal 
parties and the Greens reached an agreement in which the largest of two blocs would not be blocked 
in attempting to form a government. Furthermore, opposition parties would not introduce and 
subsequently vote for an alternative budget (Aylott and Bolin 2019). The December Agreement, as it 
became known, had a central aim: to create an anti-Sweden Democrats cartel. This cartel had been 
envisaged to last for several years, but in fact it began to fray within less than a year as a result of 
internal dissent within individual parties (Aylott and Bolin 2019). For instance, members of the 
Christian Democratic Party opposed the deal and voted for the party to withdraw from it, which it 
subsequently did (The Local 2015). In practical terms, however, the agreement continued to dominate 
the strategic approaches of Swedish parties for years to come. Indeed, during the early months of 
2017, the Social Democratic-Green government suffered a major scandal when confidential 
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information that included the identities of undercover police operatives was accidentally leaked 
(Anderson 2017). As a result of this, two ministers resigned and Löfven came in for personal criticism. 
However, the Alliance was unable to bring down the government as this would have required the 
cooperation of the Sweden Democrats – action that the Moderate Party favoured, but which was 
intolerable for the Liberal and Centre parties (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019).  
During the early stages of the campaign for the 2018 elections, immigration and law and order were 
central issues. While the attention on these issues proved favourable to the Sweden Democrats, the 
principal parties also agreed on the need to enlarge the police force to address organised crime, and 
to reform immigration and refugee policy. What is more, the principal parties all sought to distance 
themselves from the more restrictive policies of the Sweden Democrats (Eriksson 2019). Then, as the 
weeks progressed, the campaign shifted focus away from these cultural issues towards welfare and 
taxation (Eriksson 2019). The Left Party favoured fighting social inequality through higher taxes, and 
while the Social Democrats also promoted increases in welfare and healthcare, they also called for the 
abolition of religious schools and for a restriction to labour-oriented immigration. As for the 
Moderates, they proposed greater measures for the social integration of immigrants, including 
language tests and incentives to gain employment, while the Liberals the Liberals advocated lower 
taxes, higher education spending, and greater EU-level cooperation (Eriksson 2019). By contrast, the 
Centre Party set itself up in direct competition to the Sweden Democrats, advocating for the liberal 
and ‘humane’ approach to immigration and integration (Eriksson 2019). Indeed, during a television 
debate the leader of the Centre Party, Annie Lööf, slammed her fist on the table as she sought to 
riposte Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the Sweden Democrats, for his suggestion that immigrants did not 
belong in Sweden (Eriksson 2019).  
In spite of debates on all these matters, the fundamental issue in the campaign concerned which 
parties would form the next government, and whether the Sweden Democrats would be involved. All 
parties rejected collaboration with the Sweden Democrats, and the Alliance parties also pledged to 
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vote against the incumbent Red-Green government (Aylott and Bolin 2019). However, the Alliance 
parties were not united on the means necessary to achieve this outcome. While the Moderates and 
Christian Democrats sought to vote against the government under any circumstances, the Centre and 
Liberal parties insisted that the removal of the Red-Green government and the subsequent installation 
of the Alliance should not proceed if it brought any influence to the Sweden Democrats (Aylott and 
Bolin 2019). Furthermore, the Centre and Liberal parties also argued that the Alliance should only form 
the government if it secured more seats in the Riksdag than the left parties (Aylott and Bolin 2019).  
The results of the 2018 elections – as summarised in Table 8.5 – were a huge disappointment to both 
the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party. The Social Democrats continued their downward trend, 
this time losing a further 2.7 percentage points and 13 seats. This represented their worst 
performance since 1911 (Aylott and Bolin 2019). Similarly, the Moderates’ share of the vote fell by 3.5 
percentage points, to 19.8 percent. This was their lowest share of the vote in 30 years. The party also 
lost 14 seats (Aylott and Bolin 2019). By contrast, the Centre and Left parties both increased their 
share of the vote and representation in the Riksdag. In the end, the left-wing bloc – comprising the 
Social Democratic, Left, and Green parties – beat the Alliance, but only by a mere 30,000 votes out of 
a total 6.5 million. The real winners of the election were the Sweden Democrats who reinforced their 
third-party status with an increase in their vote share of 4.6 percentage points, and a gain of a further 
13 seats in the Riksdag. The rise of the Sweden Democrats, coupled with the decline of the Social 
Democrats and, to a lesser extent, the Moderate Party, had upset the balance between the two blocs, 
fragmented the party system, and as a consequence, weakened governments within Sweden.  
Before a new government had even been formed, the post of speaker of the Riksdag was filled by a 
Moderate MP but only as a result of support provided by the Sweden Democrats. This led to claims 
by the left parties that the Alliance had violated the cordon sanitaire. Then, when parliament 
reconvened, the Alliance and the Sweden Democrats voted to end the incumbent Red-Green 
government. However, the Alliance parties were far from unified on how to form the next 
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government. While the Moderates and Christian Democrats favoured an Alliance government 
supported by the Sweden Democrats, the Centre and Liberals opposed any government put in place 
with the support of the Sweden Democrats (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019). Tensions within 
the Alliance were such that, ultimately, the parties could not agree, and in the end the Social 
Democrats formed another minority coalition with the Greens, and supported by the Left, Liberal, and 
Centre parties. This outcome, and the events that had preceded it, resulted in the dissolution of the 
Alliance (Aylott and Bolin 2019; Eriksson 2019). 
 
Table 8.6: Swedish general election results, 2018.  
 Votes Seats 
Party Number Percent +/- Number +/- 
Social Democrats 1,830,386 28.3 -2.7 100 -13 
Moderate Party 1,284,698 19.8 -3.5 70 -14 
Sweden Democrats 1,135,627 17.5 4.6 62 13 
Centre Party 557,500 8.6 2.5 31 9 
Left Party 518,454 8 2.3 28 7 
Christian Democrats 409,478 6.3 1.7 22 6 
Liberals 355,546 5.5 0.1 20 1 
Green Party 285,899 4.4 -2.5 16 -9 
Feminist Initiative 29,665 0.5 -2.6 0 0 
Others 69,472 1.1 0.1 0 0 
Total 6,476,725 100  349  
Source: Widfeldt 2019 
 
 
This overview of the general elections in Sweden in the period 1998-2018 has highlighted the ups and 
downs of each election campaign, provided an account of how the various parties approached each 
contest, and assessed the consequences of their behaviour. The next section of the chapter now turns 
to more explicitly consider what this means in terms of party strategies, and offers a summary of the 
strategies that principal and non-principal parties in Sweden have adopted in vis-à-vis the Sweden 
Democrats. Non-principal parties are included here because, as has been evident in the discussion 
above, the behaviour of the principal parties in Sweden is often strongly influenced by non-principal 
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parties within the same electoral bloc. As such, the strategies of non-principal parties are relevant to 
helping develop our understanding of principal party strategies in the Swedish case. 
 
8.5. An Overview of Principal Party Strategies 
The Swedish principal parties have been somewhat consistent in terms of the strategies that they have 
deployed with respect to the Sweden Democrats. Both the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate 
Party have long adopted two-dimensional accommodative strategies with respect to cultural issues. 
That is, they have regularly devoted attention to the cultural dimension of competition, and have 
taken a position on this dimension that is similar, even if more moderate, to that of the Sweden 
Democrats.  
That the principal parties have occupied similar spatial territory to the Sweden Democrats might, at 
first sight, seem odd or even contradictory given what has been said above. Indeed, the discussion of 
the elections showed that the principal parties were fairly consistent in their desire to dismiss the 
immigration issue, an archetypical cultural issue. However, it should be observed that the cultural 
dimension itself has not been subjected to any form of prohibition, but rather, it is the issue of 
immigration specifically that is considered taboo in Sweden. Thus, the principal parties of Sweden 
have tended to adopt rather small-c conservative positions on cultural issues such as those relating to 
national way of life and traditional morality. In other words, the principal parties have tended to 
support established national ideas, have appealed to voters on the basis of patriotism and pride in 
Swedishness, have favoured policies that prohibit or suppress behaviour that is unseemly or otherwise 
immoral, and have maintained support for the traditional family unit (Volkens et al. 2020). That being 
said, there was a very noticeable shift in the 2014 general election, when the principal parties and 
other mainstream parliamentary parties changed their approach and moved to adopt very clear two-
dimensional adversarial strategies against the Sweden Democrats on a variety of cultural issues such 
as law and order and traditional morality, in favour of small-l liberal positions. This move was in direct 
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response to the significant gains and electoral breakthrough that the Sweden Democrats had 
experienced in 2010. In such a context, all parliamentary parties remained committed to the exclusion 
and isolation of the Sweden Democrats.  
While the principal parties and other parliamentary parties have been fairly conventional when it 
comes to most cultural issues, they have been far less willing to compromise on or otherwise 
accommodate restrictive positions on the issue of immigration in so far as election campaigning is 
concerned. In the context of radical right party success throughout most of Western Europe– and in 
particular in Norway and Denmark – and in light of the rapid rise of New Democracy in the early 1990s, 
the mainstream parliamentary parties of Sweden have sought to avoid the politicisation of 
immigration in election campaigns. This has primarily been achieved through the use of dismissive 
strategies and the downplaying of the importance of immigration in election campaigns. Deviation 
from this approach has been uncommon and when parties did occasionally campaign on the issue of 
immigration, as both the Liberals and Moderates did in 2002 and 2014 respectively, the remaining 
parties tended to push back against what they saw as divisive politics, regardless of the actual 
positions adopted on these issues.  
For instance, the Liberal Party’s proposals in the 2002 campaign for ‘ethnic integration’ were 
resoundingly criticised by the left parties as pandering to the cause of the Sweden Democrats 
(Widfeldt 2003). Yet the net result of the Liberal campaign and the denunciations that followed was 
an increase in the politicisation of immigration, all of which undermined the effectiveness of the 
dismissive strategies. Similarly, following the 2010 general election, the governing Alliance and Green 
Party reached a deal that would further isolate the Sweden Democrats in the Riksdag, but it included 
the further liberalisation of Sweden’s immigration policy, so once again, it increased the politicisation 
of immigration. This undermined the existing dismissive strategies yet further, and in fact it amounted 
to the adoption of an adversarial strategy by the governing Alliance and Green Party.  
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The way in which principal parties in Sweden have handled the issue of immigration therefore seems 
to have pinned them into a corner. The dismissive strategy should only work if all the principal parties 
are committed to it, and if the issue of immigration is ignored consistently. But this is hard going, and 
demands consistency, and any mention of the issue by any of the principal parties breaks this silence 
and results in the issue becoming politicised and gaining salience. And if that happens, it is the SD who 
benefits.  
In addition to the issue-oriented strategies adopted throughout the period 1998 and 2018, the 
parliamentary parties of Sweden, including the principal parties, have employed a clear cordon 
sanitaire against the Sweden Democrats. This desire to politically isolate the Sweden Democrats saw 
all moderate parties refusing to collaborate with the Sweden Democrats in any capacity. In the 
electoral arena, this took the form of refusing any and all pacts with the Sweden Democrats, while in 
the legislative arena, it meant pursuing cross-bloc arrangements to limit or erase the influence that 
the Sweden Democrats could have in the Riksdag. A prominent example of this occurred in 2015 with 
the introduction of the December agreement. As explained above, this was a formal agreement 
between all moderate, parliamentary parties that bound each party to accept the right of the largest 
political bloc to not only form the government following an election, but also to pass its budget 
through parliament (Aylott and Bolin 2019). The central aim of this agreement was to establish an 
anti-Sweden Democrat cartel. Years later, even when the December agreement had fallen apart, the 
Liberal and Centre parties destroyed the Alliance (of which they were part) in order to maintain the 
cordon sanitaire against the Sweden Democrats at a time when the Moderates and Christian 
Democrats (their partners in the Alliance) were considering an overture to the Sweden Democrats.  
The cordon sanitaire does therefore remain in effect, but as this last example shows, it is increasingly 
under strain. Indeed, the Moderate and Christian Democratic parties have already begun to question 
‘what [is] essentially an artificial constraint on the size of any right bloc in parliament’ (Bale 2003: 69), 
and thus the durability of the cordon sanitaire is an open question. Given that the Alliance has been 
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terminated by the Liberal and Centre parties, the ‘artificial constraints’ placed upon the Moderates 
and Christian Democrats have been removed. Going forward, then, it is entirely plausible that the 
Sweden Democrats may well become a more normalised member of a new right-wing bloc consisting 
of the Moderates, the Christian Democrats, and the Sweden Democrats. Putting aside the optics of 
any such arrangement, the numerics of such a bloc would be favourable as it would contain two of 
the three largest parties in the Riksdag as of 2018. Furthermore, there is some form of precedent for 
this in as much as it might be recalled that the Moderates showed themselves willing to engage with 
radical right parties in the past, as their overtures to New Democracy between 1991 and 1994 
suggested (see above).  
 
8.6. Introducing Political Context, Sweden. 
Having provided a summary of the elections in the period 1998 to 2018, and the strategies employed 
by principal parties in this period, it is useful to explore some of the more important contextual 
conditions of Swedish politics, namely the issue agenda; the spatial positioning of relevant parties and 
the Sweden Democrats; the attitudes of voters to the issues of immigration and welfare; voter 
satisfaction with democracy and voter trust in both politicians and political parties; and the reputation 
of parties and their respective leaderships. These conditions were chosen for further analysis as they 
are either fundamental to the model of competition employed in this thesis, or appear key to how 
amenable voters have been to the Sweden Democrats. As such then, these conditions are likely to 
affect the success or failure of particular principal party strategies.  
 
8.6.1. The Issue Agenda 
As with the previous chapter on France, the first condition to be investigated is the issue agenda. As 
has been argued previously (see Chapter 2), political parties will selectively emphasise issues that are 
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favourable to them and downplay or even ignore issues that are not (Carmines and Stimson 1980; 
Riker 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994). Moreover, if a political party holds ownership over a 
particular issue, it will be especially keen to emphasise it, as the rewards for doing so are likely to be 
large among voters for whom that issue is important (Petrocik 1996; Holian 2004; Bélanger and 
Meguid 2008). In the context of Sweden, it stands to reason that by downplaying the issue of 
immigration, principal and other moderate political parties have sought to undermine the electoral 
potential of the Sweden Democrats, by reducing the importance of issues that the Sweden Democrats 
own or otherwise thrive upon.  
However, as is shown in Figure 8.1, this strategy has been rather ineffective. Indeed, between 2006 
and 2018, the number of respondents who said that immigration was one of the most important issues 
facing Sweden increased from a low of 3.5 percent in 2006 to a high of 12.5 percent in 2018 (European 
Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a). The saliency of the issue has 
therefore risen over this period, and it was precisely over these years that the Sweden Democrats 
increased their vote and seat share. Thus, the strategy of downplaying the issue of immigration – 
which once contributed to Sweden being labelled as a unique negative case among scholars of the 
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Figure 8.1: Issue saliency in Sweden, 2006-2018. 
 
Source: European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a 
 
 
However, due attention should also be paid to the relative importance of cultural issues over 
economic issues. When cultural issues are considered more important by the electorate, then the 
issue agenda is likely to be more favourable to a radical right party like the Sweden Democrats, who 
emphasise cultural issues and downplay economic ones (Rovny 2013). Put another way, focus should 
not be paid exclusively to the immigration issue because other issues may be favourable or 
unfavourable to the Swedish mainstream on the one hand, and to the Sweden Democrats on the 
other. In light of this, Figure 8.2 illustrates the saliency of cultural and economic issues as determined 
by survey respondents. It shows a relatively clear and consistent picture, namely that a large majority 
of respondents considers economic issues to be more important than cultural ones. Indeed, roughly 
70 percent of respondents saw economic issues as the most important issues facing Sweden between 
2006 and 2014. This then dipped to about 60 percent in 2018 (European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 
2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a). By contrast, cultural issues were named as the most important 
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2014, before increasing to a high of 25 percent in 2018 (European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 
2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a).  
These trends would suggest a less than favourable issue environment for the Sweden Democrats, at 
least until the election in 2018, and might even imply some success in the dismissive strategies of the 
principal parties. However, this would seem an inaccurate account given the increased saliency of 
immigration, as discussed above. More likely then, is that the greater importance of immigration is 
lost in in the declining importance of other cultural issues, as well as in the decreasing importance of 
traditional economic issues, such as unemployment, in Swedish politics.  
 
Figure 8.2: Cultural and economic issue saliency in Sweden, 2006-2018. 
 
Source: European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a 
Note: The cultural dimension consists of crime, terrorism, and immigration, while the economic dimension 
consists of the economic situation, prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, housing, government debt, 
pensions, healthcare, and education.  
 
The decline in the importance of economic issues is further illustrated in Figure 8.3. This figure uses 
the same data, but instead of presenting health and education under the economic dimension, it 
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for doing so is two-fold. Firstly, as is highlighted below, welfare issues tend to hold central importance 
in Swedish politics, and are even intertwined with patriotism and notions of Swedishness. Secondly, 
the Sweden Democrats have sought to immerse themselves in the traditional narrative of folkhem 
(see below), of which welfare is a fundamental pillar.  
Figure 8.3: Cultural, economic, and welfare issue saliency in Sweden, 2006-2018.  
 
Source: European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a  
Note: The cultural dimension consists of crime, terrorism, and immigration. The economic dimension consists 
of the economic situation, prices/inflation, taxation, unemployment, housing, and government debt. And the 
welfare dimension consists of healthcare, education, and pensions. 
 
Figure 8.3 shows that economic issues, especially unemployment, have become considerably less 
important in recent years. While a high of 48 percent of respondents named economic issues as the 
most important in 2010, by 2018 this figure was just 15.5 percent. By contrast, the welfare issues of 
healthcare, education, and pensions have increased in importance over the same period. In 2010 27.5 
percent of respondents considered them to be the most important, but by 2018 this had grown to 
44.5 percent (European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a).  
The fall in the saliency of economic issues and the rise in the importance attached to welfare issues is 
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which have economic platforms that have been described as neo-liberal (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), 
the Sweden Democrats have not embraced neo-liberal economic positions (Sunnemark 2014) and 
have instead long rooted themselves in a Sweden-specific social democratic tradition in which welfare 
is central (Hellström and Nillson 2010; Hellström et al. 2012; Nordensvard and Ketola 2014; Norocel 
2016). The development and subsequent evolution of the welfare state in Sweden has, from the very 
beginning, been inextricably linked not only to the consolidation of democracy but also to the idea of 
a folkhem or ‘people’s home’ (Hellström and Nillson 2010; Hellström et al. 2012; Norocel 2016). The 
folkhem served as the foundation from which a consensus could be built for the establishment of a 
‘class-transgressive’, cradle-to-the-grave system that protected the Swedish people (Hellström et al. 
2012: 195; Norocel 2016). Beyond simply wishing to preserve the idea of folkhem, the Sweden 
Democrats wish to restore it: ‘whereby the feeling of belonging is not founded on class solidarity but 
rather on national affiliation and identity, in which all citizens are guaranteed a physical, economic 
and social security’ (Sweden Democrats quoted in Norocel 2016: 9). Importantly, the restoration of 
the folkhem can simply be achieved, according to the Sweden Democrats, through the reallocation of 
resources that are currently spent on immigration (Nordensvard and Ketola 2014). For the Sweden 
Democrats, then, the way to preserve the folkhem, to preserve the welfare state as Swedes know it, 
is to end mass immigration and multiculturalism (ellström et al. 2012; Norocel 2016). The welfare 
chauvinism of the Sweden Democrats, then, provides a clear connection between their culturally-
oriented politics and the provision of welfare services in Sweden. This is coupled with a political 
mainstream that has hitherto refused to co-opt this exclusionary frame, providing the Sweden 
Democrats with the opportunity to present themselves as the ‘true social democrats’ (Hellström and 
Nillson 2010: 62; Hellström et al. 2012; Norocel 2016).  
Overall, the growth in the saliency of cultural and welfare issues has proved to be a boon for the 
Sweden Democrats and has provided them with fertile political territory from which to launch a 
breakthrough into the Riksdag. The increase in favourable cultural and welfare issues was helped by 
the fact that the mainstream political parties, including the principal ones, have been historically 
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unwilling to challenge the Sweden Democrats on territory it was perceived to own, most importantly, 
immigration. This provided the Sweden Democrats with what is an essentially monopolistic-niche on 
which to base their campaigns. It is to this political territory that the next section now turns. Using 
time series data, it shows where the Sweden Democrats are positioned in relation to the other parties 
in Sweden, and it highlights the niches in which the Sweden Democrats operate.  
 
8.6.2. Spatial Positioning 
With regard to the issue of immigration, as has been mentioned, the majority of Swedish political 
parties were committed to maintaining the taboo around the subject, at least as far as active 
campaigning or politicisation was concerned. However, they nonetheless developed policies on this 
issue. Their positions are illustrated in Figure 8.4, which displays the political space on the issue of 
immigration between the years 2006 and 2019. It shows that prior to 2019, the Sweden Democrats 
were the only party to offer a strongly restrictionist immigration policy. All other parties were fairly 
neutral on the issue. The Alliance parties tended towards a centrist approach in 2006 and 2010, and a 
much more liberal approach in 2014, while the Left and Green parties were consistently liberal on the 
issue (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). By 2019, however, there was a much greater spread of opinion on the 
issue of immigration. The Left and Green parties maintained their rather liberal approach towards 
immigration, and were joined by the Centre Party which had now defined itself as the anti-Sweden 
Democrats party. The Liberals, on the other hand, offered the only real centrist option, while the Social 
Democrats swung towards a more restrictive position – a position much more in keeping with their 
historical stance on the issue (see below). By contrast, following the collapse of the Alliance, the 
Moderates and the Christian Democrats were free to shift their positions, and they did so, moving 
significantly rightwards, in favour of a position much more similar to that of the Sweden Democrats.  
Figure 8.4: Spatial positioning of Swedish political parties on the issue of immigration, 2006-2019. 
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Sources: Bakker et al. 2015, 2020 
 
Other than illustrating a greater spread of opinion on the issue of immigration, the main trend evident 
in Figure 8.4 is the rather stark shift on the issue that took place first between 2010 and 2014 and then 
between 2014 and 2019. Between 2010 and 2014 a distinct liberalisation of immigration positions 
occurred, while in the years 2014 to 2019 a number of the mainstream parties changed their stances 
and adopted a much more restrictive position (Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). These noticeable shifts can 
be attributed to two political events.  
In the first instance, the shift that occurred between 2010 and 1014 can be explained in large part as 
a reaction by the moderate parties to the legislative breakthrough of the Sweden Democrats in 2010. 
The 2010 general election represented the first time that a radical right party had entered the Riksdag 
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since New Democracy in 1991, some 19 years earlier. The success of the Sweden Democrats, then, 
installed in the more moderate parties a desire to reinforce the cordon sanitaire and maintain the 
depoliticization of immigration, even if Moderate Party leader and then-Prime Minister Reinfeldt 
presented a break in this by politicising immigration in order to create a sense of crisis in the hope 
that such an environment would electorally strengthen the Moderates (see above).  
By contrast, the second shift, which happened from 2014 to 2019, was a response to global events, 
and more specifically to the refugee crisis that beset Europe from 2015. While Sweden had historically 
been generous in its support to refugees, especially when compared to other countries, the sheer 
number of asylum applications that it received in 2015 led its leaders to reconsider matters. Indeed, 
in 2015, Sweden experienced a record-high of 163,000 asylum applications – primarily from natives of 
Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This amounted to about 1.6 percent of the country’s population (Tomson 
2020: para 1). Put in perspective, if the United States were to accept 1.6 percent of its population in 
refugees, this would equate to over 5 million additional people; in reality, the United States only 
accepted about 83,000 applications in 2015 (Tomson 2020: para 1). In response to this unprecedented 
wave of migration, Social Democratic Party leader and then Prime Minister Stefan Löfven said ‘It pains 
me that Sweden is no longer capable of receiving asylum seekers at the high level we do today. We 
simply cannot do any more’ (Crouch 2015: para 5).  
While this approach might seem out of kilter for a social democratic party, historically, the Swedish 
Social Democratic Party has tended to favour strict immigration policies to keep immigrant (and even 
refugee) numbers down (Hinnfors et al. 2012). For example, during the 2004 EU enlargement process, 
the Social Democrats argued in favour of imposing transitional controls on new member states. They 
believed that immigrants from new enlargement states would threaten the regulated labour market 
and the welfare state, even going so far as to suggest that new immigrants might ‘abuse’ the system 
through so-called ‘social tourism’, and that without transitional controls, Sweden would be pitting 
‘foreign-born’ labour against native Swedes (Hinnfors et al. 2012). The Social Democrats’ position on 
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immigration is not informed by some underlying ethno-nationalism, as is the case with the Sweden 
Democrats. Rather, it draws on the tradition of folkhem discussed above, in which the Swedish welfare 
state is deeply rooted, and it reflects a desire to maintain the ‘institutional expression of the social 
democratic project: a heavily regulated labour market and generous welfare state’ (Hinnfors et al. 
2012: 589). This also explains why the party’s approach to ‘ethnic integration’ has been rather more 
generous than its position on immigration. It has advocated positively for those who are already in 
Sweden (Hinnfors et al. 2012).  
Given this, in order to better understand Swedish party positions on the issue of immigration, a 
measure that excludes ethnic integration is required. While there is no perfect or ideal dataset for 
this, some semblance of a measure can be developed by using the Comparative Manifesto Project 
(Volkens et al. 2020) and the Parties Integration and Immigration Positions Dataset (Lehmann and 
Zobel 2018). Since 2014, the CMP has included an immigration category in its dataset – and therefore 
figures for the 2014 and 2018 general elections can be extracted – while the PImPo dataset contains 
an immigration category for the years 2006 and 2010.35 Combining the two datasets thus allows for 
the position of Swedish political parties on immigration from 2006 to 2018 to be plotted. Figure 8.5 






35 The calculations used to arrive at immigration positions are somewhat different. The PImPo dataset 
calculates immigration positions by subtracting the share of restrictionist quasi-sentences from the share of 
liberal quasi-sentences, and dividing this figure by the sum of these two quasi-sentences and quasi-sentences 
that are neutral on the issue of immigration (Lehmann and Zobel 2018). The CMP dataset does not contain a 
category for neutral immigration statements, but rather, contains an unassorted category for any quasi-
sentences that could not be meaningfully categorised elsewhere (Volkens et al. 2020). The share of quasi-
sentences categorised as ‘unmeaningful’ is extremely low in the Swedish case with the majority of parties 
having no such categorised quasi-sentences. Unfortunately, the 2010 figure for the Social Democrats is missing 
– in this instance, an average of the 2006 and 2014 position has been used instead.  
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Figure 8.5: Issue of immigration exclusive of integration, 2006-2018.  
 
Sources: Lehmann and Zobel 2018; Volkens et al. 2020 
Note: The position of a number of parties in 2018 is identical and hence difficult to see on the graph. In this 
year, both the Green and Left parties are both positioned at 1, while the Social Democrats, Christian 
Democrats, Sweden Democrats are both positioned at -1.  
 
Figure 8.5 demonstrates two things that Figure 8.4 did not. Firstly, it shows a lack of consensus in 
2006, when the Liberals ‘broke ranks’ and adopted a fairly restrictionist approach towards 
immigration, while the other mainstream parties all expressed a more liberal position (Lehmann and 
Zobel 2018; Volkens et al. 2020). Secondly, it reveals a significant degree of liberalisation in the 
mainstream parties’ positions between 2010 and 2014, such that all of the principal and mainstream 
parties occupy the same territory. Thirdly, it shows that the significant liberalisation was followed by 
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a considerable shift towards more restrictive immigration policies from 2014 to 2018, especially from 
the Social Democrats and Moderate Party (Lehmann and Zobel 2018; Volkens et al. 2020).  
Sizeable though these shifts were, they are actually not that surprising. As discussed above, the Social 
Democrats have, for much of their post-war history, maintained a relatively strict position on 
immigration. While they have been fairly generous to those who have arrived in Sweden (i.e., they 
have been fairly liberal on the issue of integration), they have maintained a clear desire to limit the 
number of immigrants arriving into Sweden. In short, the Social Democrats more liberal positioning in 
2006, 2010, and 2014 was out of kilter with their historical positions. By contrast, the Moderate and 
Christian Democratic parties’ shift on immigration is in large part explained by their rather 
opportunistic approach to the Sweden Democrats. As explained above, up until 2019 the Moderates 
and Christian Democrats were held back from making overtures towards the Sweden Democrats by 
the fact that they were partners in the Alliance with the Liberal and Centre parties, two parties that 
opposed any collaboration with the Sweden Democrats. Yet with the weakening of the Alliance 
between 2015 and 2018, and its ultimate dissolution in 2019, the Moderates and Christian Democrats 
were now free to pursue their own strategies, including potential future collaboration with the 
Sweden Democrats.  
In more general terms, Figures 8.4 and 8.5 demonstrate that while the mainstream parties in Sweden 
have sought to suppress the vote share of the Sweden Democrats through isolation and dismissive 
strategies, in reality, such an approach has given the Sweden Democrats a significant degree of 
freedom to operate within the restrictionist or anti-immigration niche. Unlike in other countries such 
as France (see Chapter 7), there has been no real alternative or lighter version of the Sweden 
Democrats’ position on offer, at least until 2018. This space, coupled with the gradual increase in the 
salience of the immigration issue as discussed above, therefore proved a boon for the Sweden 
Democrats. However, since 2018, the Sweden Democrats lost their monopolistic position on 
immigration as the Social Democrats and Moderates accommodated their position.  
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Immigration has not been the only issue to gain prominence in Sweden over the period studied. 
Welfare has always been a fairly salient issue in Swedish politics, and as discussed above, its 
importance has grown in recent years. Therefore, this issue, and its impact on party competition is 
worth brief consideration. As mentioned above, the welfare state became intricately tied to the idea 
of Swedishness through the notion of the Folkhem. Throughout post-war history, Swedish elections 
have often featured arguments over the nature of the welfare state, with the centre-left bloc 
advocating protecting the welfare state in its current form and committing to continuing to fund it 
generously.  
Figure 8.6 reports the attitudes of the Swedish political parties towards redistribution, and reflects the 
two different visions of the welfare state rather well. It reveals a great deal of cohesiveness within the 
two main blocs on the issue of redistribution. The three left-wing parties are all within the range of 
0.5 to 3.5, while the mainstream right parties are even more concentrated between 5.5 and 7.5 
(Bakker et al. 2015, 2020). In addition, the figure shows the very consistent and centrist placement of 
the Sweden Democrats on the issue between 2010 and 2019. This is therefore another example of the 
Sweden Democrats adopting a specific niche on a very prominent issue domain.  
One interpretation of the position of the Sweden Democrats on this issue is that the party has assumed 
a centrist position as a result of being squeezed by competition from the two main blocs. However, an 
alternative interpretation, is that the Sweden Democrats’ relatively centrist placement gives the party 
access to the voters of both blocs on this issue. That is, the party can seek to attract less left-leaning 
Social Democratic voters as well as former Moderate voters. The latter interpretation corresponds to 
research that has suggested that Sweden Democrat voters are generally centrist on economic issues 
(Sannerstedt 2016; Jylhä et al. 2019).  
The centrist position adopted by the Sweden Democrats on this issue also allows the party to embrace 
and advocate the narrative of folkhem. Yet it does so in a way that it different to the other political 
parties. More specifically, the Sweden Democrats adopt the narrative of folkhem in order to justify 
264 | P a g e  
 
their chauvinist stances on welfare, and their anti-immigration and anti-multicultural positions. This 
has been particularly successful because many of the arguments that the Sweden Democrats advance 
in favour of the folkhem and restricting immigration have, in previous years, been put forward by the 
Social Democratic Party, albeit without the ethno-nationalist undertones of the Sweden Democrats’ 
presentation of the issue. In a sense, then, the Sweden Democrats have been able to piggy-back off 
the success of the Social Democrats and tie themselves to a fundamental concept underlying 
Swedishness and the Swedish approach to welfare – a concept essentially developed by the Social 
Democratic Party. And in putting forward this stance, the SD have been helped by the Social 
Democrats becoming gradually more progressive and inclusive in their conception of the folkhem, 
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Figure 8.6: Spatial positioning of Swedish political parties on the issue of redistribution, 2006-2019. 
 
Sources: Bakker et al. 2015, 2020 
 
The last two sections of this chapter have explored the issues that have grown in prominence over the 
years in Sweden, how these issues have been favourable to the Sweden Democrats, and how the 
positioning of other parties on the respective issue dimensions has provided potential competitive 
space to the Sweden Democrats. What has been missing so far, however, is an examination of the 
attitudes of Swedish voters. After all, certain positions on issue dimensions can only be truly 
competitive if a significant proportion of voters also share that position. The next section, then, 
considers the position of Swedish voters on the issues of immigration and welfare.  
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8.6.3. Voter Attitudes to Immigration and Welfare Issues 
As was discussed above, and illustrated in Figure 8.1, the issue of immigration in Sweden increased in 
salience over the period 2006-2018. In 2006, just 3.5 percent of respondents named immigration as 
one of the two most important issues facing Sweden, but by 2018 the figure was 12.5 percent. In the 
most recent general election, then, immigration was one of the top five most important issues as 
judged by Swedish voters (European Commission 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b, 2014a, 2014b, 2018a). 
What these salience figures do not reveal, however, is the position that Swedish voters take on the 
issue of immigration. After all, the increase in the salience of immigration should only be favourable 
to the Sweden Democrats if there is a sufficient reservoir of anti-immigrant feeling among the Swedish 
population. Likewise, the disposition of Swedish voters towards the immigration issue should 
influence the extent to which dismissive, adversarial, or accommodative strategies are successful (or 
not). The following paragraphs therefore focus first on the position of Swedish voters on the issue of 
immigration, and secondly on their attitudes to welfare, in order to determine the impact of such 
views on the strategies adopted by mainstream Swedish political parties.  
Generally speaking, the Swedes are positively predisposed towards immigration. Indeed, Sweden 
ranks as the most accepting country in Europe on the Migrant Acceptance Index, scoring 7.92 out of 
10, well above the European average (and median) of 6.61 (Esipova et al. 2017). This picture of an 
immigration-friendly Sweden is further reinforced when Swedish voters are asked whether 
immigrants undermine or enrich the cultural life of the country. Figure 8.7 illustrates their responses 
to this question in the period between 2002 and 2016, and shows that Swedes generally view the 
cultural impact of immigration as being positive. In 2002, just under 9 percent of respondents felt that 
immigrants undermined Swedish cultural life. While this rose slightly by the end of this period – to 
around 14 percent in 2016 – the numbers viewing immigration as having a negative impact on culture 
remained low (ESS 2018). The vast majority of respondents instead believed that Sweden is culturally 
enriched by immigration. In 2002 a full 75 percent thought this, and even though levels of support 
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dropped slightly by 2016 (to 71 percent), this view continued to be widely prevalent over the period 
(ESS 2018). Thus, Figure 8.7 shows both a very clear pattern as regards people’s opinions on the 
benefits and costs of immigration to Swedish culture, and a very consistent one. 
 
Figure 8.7: Swedish perceptions of whether immigrants undermine or enrich cultural life, 2002-2016. 
 
Source: ESS 2018 
 
A similar picture is revealed when Swedes are asked for their view on whether or not immigrants make 
Sweden a better or worse place to live in. As Figure 8.8 shows, the number of Swedes who believe 
that immigration has made Sweden a worse place to live in increased marginally from just under 15 
percent in 2002 to a high of 18 percent in 2016, averaging out at around 15 percent over the period 
(ESS 2018). By contrast, the number of Swedes who believe that immigration makes Sweden a better 
place to live in actually increased marginally, from around 57 percent in 2002 to just over 58 percent 
in 2016, with a peak of 64 percent in 2014 (ESS 2018). While the number of respondents who thought 
that immigration made Sweden a better place to live in was somewhat lower than the number who 
considered immigration as something that enriched Sweden culturally, both sets of responses (i.e., 
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Swedes hold positive views on the issue of immigration and that this picture has not changed very 
much at all over the period under consideration.  
 
Figure 8.8: Swedish perceptions of whether immigrants make Sweden a better or worse country to live in, 
2002-2016. 
 
Source: ESS 2018 
 
The data, then, suggest that while the issue of immigration has been increasing in prominence, the 
Swedish view on immigration was, and remains, positive. That said, it should be noted that there is 
nevertheless a significant reservoir of anti-immigration feeling among the Swedish population, and as 
Demker and Sandberg (2014) have shown, those who ranked immigration as among the most 
important social issues were more likely to have anti-immigration views. Therefore, an increase in the 
saliency of immigration has at the very least made it easier for the Sweden Democrats to mobilise 
support among this segment of the voting population (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019).  
This all points to the failure of the dismissive strategy adopted by the principal parties in Sweden. This 
strategy has not resulted in the saliency of immigration being suppressed in recent years – as 
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vote share of the Sweden Democrats being curbed. However, it is not just the dismissive strategy that 
is under fire in this period, because while the mainstream political parties in Sweden – including the 
principal ones – have tended to adopt dismissive strategies in election campaigns, in the legislative 
arena they often embraced somewhat different strategies. As mentioned above, the Social 
Democratic Party has a long history of pursuing restrictive policies on immigration. In other instances, 
mainstream parties have taken on stances in parliament that amount to adopting an adversarial 
strategy. This was the case following the 2010 general election when the governing Alliance struck a 
deal with the Green Party in order to further isolate the Sweden Democrats. The agreement also 
produced a liberalisation of immigration policy, contributing to an increase in the politicisation of 
immigration, and representing an adversarial strategy in the legislative arena (Rydgren and van der 
Meiden 2019). The impact of this adversarial strategy, then, was to increase the saliency of 
immigration, and in the process increase the Sweden Democrats’ ownership over the restrictionist 
immigration position (see above; also, Rydgren and van der Meiden 2019). The failure of the dismissive 
strategies in the electoral arena, then, could be attributed to a lack of consistency by mainstream 
parties across the electoral and legislative arenas, rather than something inherent to the dismissive 
strategy itself. In short, the principal parties have been inconsistent in their use of strategies, and this 
has undermined the effectiveness of their attempts to curb the rise of the Sweden Democrats.  
Turning to public attitudes on welfare issues, a broadly similar pattern is also observed. Figure 8.9 
illustrates that the percentage of people who believe that the government should engage in some 
form of (economic) redistributive policy-making has remained fairly constant over the period, even if 
a slight decline can be observed from 66 percent in 2002 to 61 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). 
Interestingly, the number of respondents who disagree with government redistribution also fell a 
little, from around 14 percent in 2002 to just under 11 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). These two slight 
declines are accompanied by a small rise in the percentage of people who felt relatively neutral on the 
issue. In 2002 17 percent of people felt this way, but by 2016 this had risen to 26 percent. 
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Notwithstanding these small changes, the main picture to emerge from Figure 8.9 is that attitudes 
towards redistribution remained broadly unchanged over the period.  
 
Figure 8.9: Percentage of respondents who think that the government should take measures to reduce 
differences in income levels, 2002-2016. 
 
Source: ESS 2018 
 
While opinions on redistribution have not really changed over the period, there have been more 
noticeable shifts in the attitude of voters towards specific areas of welfare, notably education and 
healthcare. Figure 8.10 shows how respondents felt about the state of education in Sweden in the 
period 2002-2016. It reveals that, from 2002 to 2012, there was a relatively consistent rise in the 
percentage of respondents who thought that the overall quality of Swedish education was good, from 
45 percent to around 57 percent (ESS 2018). As expected, there was a corresponding decrease over 
these years in the percentage of people who believed that the quality of Swedish education was bad. 
In 2002 35 percent of respondents thought that the quality of education in Sweden was poor; by 2010, 
only 23 percent did so (ESS 2018). In short then, between 2002 and 2010, Swedes considered that the 
quality of educational provision in their country had improved. However, this picture changed rather 
rapidly in 2014. While in 2012 57 percent of respondents thought that the Swedish education system 
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rating the quality of Swedish education as bad – from 26 percent in 2012 to 39 percent in 2014 (ESS 
2018). As discussed above, one possible reason for this sharp decline in satisfaction with the quality 
of education was the poor performance of Swedish schoolchildren in the international PISA rankings 
(Aylott and Bolin 2015).  
 
Figure 8.10: Swedish perceptions of the state of education, 2002-2016. 
 
Source: ESS 2018 
 
A similar trend is observed with regard to perceptions of the state of healthcare in Sweden. As can be 
seen from Figure 8.11, the number of respondents who believed that the quality of Swedish 
healthcare was good increased from 42 percent in 2002 to a high of 68 percent in 2012, before falling 
to 57 percent in 2014. By contrast, the numbers who believed that the quality of Swedish healthcare 
was poor declined from 42 percent in 2002 to a mere 18 percent in 2010, before increasing once again 
to 27 percent in 2014, and 29 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). This can most likely be attributed to a series 
of scandals that were widely interpreted as putting profits before people in private healthcare facilities 
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Figure 8.11: Swedish perceptions of the state of healthcare, 2002-2016. 
 
Source: ESS 2018 
 
Taken collectively, then, it is not clear what role Swedish attitudes to welfare have had on the efficacy 
of principal party strategies. The number of respondents who believed that the quality of education 
and healthcare in Sweden tended to increase between 2002 and 2010, before falling between 2012 
and 2016. These attitudinal shifts, however, do not coincide with the failure of the dismissive 
strategies to prevent the growing strength of the Sweden Democrats. The Sweden Democrats began 
experiencing electoral successes as far as back as 2006, and a parliamentary breakthrough in 2010, 
while growing dissatisfaction in the state of healthcare did not occur until 2012. Rather, it seems likely 
that growing dissatisfaction with the state of education and healthcare after 2012-2014 directly 
contributed to the growing electoral strength of the Sweden Democrats.  
It seems almost counterintuitive that the Sweden Democrats would experience their breakthrough 
into the Riksdag (2010) during a period characterised by relatively high levels of positive perceptions 
of immigration and positive attitudes towards the healthcare and education system. Yet this is what 
has happened, and it therefore points to the growing capacity of the Sweden Democrats to draw votes 
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Furthermore, changing attitudes to the perception of the quality of healthcare and education helps 
explain why the isolation strategies failed, especially after 2012. To recall, the Sweden Democrats have 
adopted a centrist economic position that is rooted in the social democratic tradition of Sweden. 
Dissatisfaction with the state of education and healthcare, then, might encourage many centre-right, 
pro-welfare voters to shift from the Alliance parties to the Sweden Democrats. This is certainly 
indicated by the fact that every third person who voted for the Sweden Democrats had previously 
supported one of the Alliance parties (Kielos 2014) 
The next section shifts gear by turning its attention to the satisfaction that Swedish voters have with 
democracy, as well as the levels of trust that Swedish voters have in their politicians and political 
parties.  
 
8.6.4. Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Politicians and Parties 
As has been argued previously (see Chapter 5), voters who are dissatisfied with the functioning of 
democracy are much more likely to vote for radical right parties, with well-organised and well-lead 
radical right parties reaching voters with even weak levels of democratic dissatisfaction (Knigge 1998; 
Lubbers et al. 2002). Given this, it is reasonable to assume that principal party strategies will be more 
effective in periods in which there are high levels of satisfaction with democracy, and less effective 
during periods of low satisfaction with democracy. With this in mind, Figure 8.12 illustrates the levels 
of satisfaction that Swedish voters have had with the functioning of democracy between 2002 and 
2016. The figure shows that levels of satisfaction with Swedish democracy increased over the period, 
from 60 percent in 2002, to a high of 78 percent in 2012. They then dropped slightly to 73 percent in 
2014 (ESS 2018). By contrast, levels of dissatisfaction are generally low. In 2002 only 21 percent of 
respondents said they were dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. This then fell further to 10 
percent in 2012, before increasingly slightly to 14 percent in 2014 (ESS 2018). As was the case with 
patterns surrounding Swedish attitudes to welfare and immigration, we therefore have a superficially 
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counterintuitive result: the strategies of principal parties to suppress the vote share of the Sweden 
Democrats seemed to fail during a period in which we would expect to see low levels of support for 
the radical right – i.e., during a period when satisfaction with democracy was steadily increasing.  
 
Figure 8.12: Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Sweden, 2002-2016. 
 
Source: ESS 2018 
 
Of course, there are myriad reasons why satisfaction with democracy might increase, and the trend 
illustrated in Figure 8.12 need not favour mainstream political parties or politicians. Afterall, the 
connection between satisfaction in democracy and the success of mainstream political parties is not 
clear cut. In countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands, where satisfaction in democracy is quite 
high, radical right parties have succeeded in squeezing the vote share of mainstream parties in recent 
years. By contrast, in countries such as Spain and the UK, where mainstream parties have tended to 
perform significantly better, satisfaction in democracy is rather low (Pew 2019). Furthermore, 
satisfaction in democracy is often intertwined with opinions regarding the long-term economic future. 
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about future economic performance (Pew 2020). It is therefore possible that high levels of satisfaction 
in democracy in Sweden are as a result of good economic performance.  
However, it seems counterintuitive to think that the principal parties would experience relatively weak 
election results during a period of good economic performance and high levels of democratic 
satisfaction. Given this, it is worthwhile tapping Swedish attitudes to politicians and political parties 
directly, to see what influence these two factors have.  
Figure 8.13 illustrates the levels of trust that Swedes had in political parties between 2002 and 2016 
and shows that Swedes are generally distrusting of their political parties. That being said, it reveals 
that trust in political parties increased from 29 percent in 2002 to 36 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). 
Correspondingly, there was a modest decline in the percentage of respondents who distrust political 
parties, with levels of distrust falling from 46 percent in 2002 to 38 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). 
However, while these trends indicate growing levels of trust in political parties, it should be 
nonetheless noted that for a significant part of this time period – from 2002 to 2007 and from 2014 
to 2016 – there were more respondents who indicated they were untrusting than there were 
respondents who reported they were trusting. Even between 2008 and 2012, which is the high point 
for trust in political parties, the percentage of respondents who said they had trust in the parties never 
exceeded 50 percent. In short, while more Swedes report having trust in their political parties since 
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Figure 8.13: Levels of trust in Swedish political parties, 2002-2016. 
 
Source: ESS 2018 
 
A similar pattern is observed in levels of trust in politicians, as demonstrated in Figure 8.14. This figure 
shows little change in the number of respondents who said they trusted politicians. In 2002 37 percent 
reported trusting politicians, while in 2016 38 percent did (ESS 2018). Similarly, levels of distrust in the 
country’s politicians also remained relatively stable with 40 percent of respondents saying they 
distrusted politicians in 2002, compared to 39 percent in 2016 (ESS 2018). There was, however, a 
noticeable spike in levels of distrust in 2004. This could well correspond with the strong criticism that 
the government received following its poor handling of the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in Asia (see 
above).36 Generally, what this shows is that despite there being very high levels of satisfaction in the 
functioning of democracy in Sweden, there is a significant proportion of the population that is 




36 The tsunami occurred in December 2004, while the data collection for Sweden for the European Social 
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Figure 8.14: Levels of trust in Swedish politicians, 2002-2016. 
 
Source: ESS 2018 
 
All in all, what the data has thus far shown is that, at least theoretically, the overall environment or 
political context is not propitious for a radical right party like the Sweden Democrats. And yet we see 
that the Sweden Democrats have increased their share of the vote and hence that principal party 
strategies have not worked. During the period under investigation, the Sweden Democrats have 
become increasingly astute, it seems, at cornering the segment of the population that remains 
sceptical or hostile toward immigration, fears its impact on society, and is generally distrustful of the 
political class. This suggests that the declining efficacy of principal party strategies could be explained, 
at least in part, by the growing competency of the Sweden Democrats. It is to this issue of agency that 
the next section of this chapter turns. More specifically, it explores the overall reputation of the 
political parties in Sweden, as well as the reputation of party leaderships, and it then briefly examines 
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8.6.5. Reputation and Professionalism 
As was argued in Chapter 2, when political parties or candidates share the same position on a given 
dimension of competition, voters are more likely to choose the one with the better reputation. 
Moreover, relative reputation might well have an effect on the success of particular party strategies. 
For instance, an isolationist strategy may well be more effective when the isolated party has a weaker 
reputation than the parties doing the isolating.   
Figure 8.15 illustrates the overall reputation of the Swedish principal parties (the Social Democrats 
and the Moderates) and the Sweden Democrats, as measured on a 0 to 10 scale. The reputation score 
is based on the reputation ranking in the SNES (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017) and CSES (2019) data. 
Respondents were asked to rank each party leader on an 11-point scale with 0 being strongly dislike 
and 10 being strongly like. Each of these ranks were then multiplied by the number of respondents 
that selected it, thereby creating a weighted number of respondents. The weighted number of 
respondents were then added up to create a total number. This total number was then divided by the 
total number of respondents in the original surveys. It shows that the Social Democrats have enjoyed 
a fairly high level of reputation in the period 1998 to 2014, and that there has been little change in 
this. Indeed, the party’s reputation score in this period has only fluctuated between a low of 5.77 in 
1998 and a hight of 6.63 in 2006 (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019). Interestingly, however, 
the (albeit small) drop in the reputation of the Social Democrats between 2006 and 2010 coincided 
with one of the worst electoral performances in the party’s history. By contrast, there has been more 
change in the reputation of the Moderate Party. Over the period, the party’s reputation fell a little 
(from 4.60 in 1998 to 4.05 in 2002), but then grew considerably to 6.10 in 2010, before falling once 
more to 5.57 in 2014. The party recorded its highest reputation (in 2010) at the same time that it 
experienced its best ever electoral results. As for the Sweden Democrats, their reputation is low, even 
if it has increased steadily from 2006 onwards, rising from 1.15 in 2006 to 1.90 in 2014 (Holmsberg 
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and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019). These low scores indicate that a large majority of Swedes still view 
the Sweden Democrats quite negatively.37  
 
Figure 8.15: The reputation of the principal parties and the Sweden Democrats, 1998-2014. 
 
Sources: Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019 
 
Figure 8.16 illustrates the reputation of the party leaders, rather than the reputation of the parties in 
general. It shows that the reputation of the leaders of the principal parties rose and fell. More 
specifically, Social Democratic Party leader Persson saw his reputation rise from 4.65 in 1998 to 6.53 
2002 (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019). While Persson had been regarded as an electoral 
liability in 1998, his reputation improved by 2002 as a result of the smooth operation of the pact with 
the Left and Green parties, and because most Swedes felt economically better off, unemployment had 
fallen, and the government had reversed many of the unpopular spending cuts required to address 
the financial problems of the 1994-1998 period (Aylott 2002). By 2006, however, Persson’s reputation 
had fallen to 4.50, most likely because of perceptions that his leadership style was arrogant and 
authoritarian (Widfeldt 2007b). In the wake of disastrous results in the 2006 election (see above), 
 
37 It should be noted, however, that within the chosen data (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019), 
sympathisers of the Sweden Democrats were largely underrepresented (Tryggvason and Hedberg 2015: 10), and 
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Persson stood down as party leader, and was succeeded by Mona Sahlin who took over as leader in 
2007. She was unable to nurture high reputation scores, however. Indeed, in 2010 her reputation 
score was a mere 4.92. By the next elections, the leader of the Social Democrats – now Stefan Löfven, 
who had been elected party leader in 2012 – enjoyed a better reputational rating. His reputation score 
in 2014 was 5.67, and he presided over the party coming back into government (Holmsberg and 
Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019).  
Turning to the three leaders of the Moderate Party during this period, Carl Bildt ended his thirteen 
years of leadership with a score of 4.60 in 1998. His immediate successor, Bo Lundgren, failed to make 
any real improvement and recorded a score of just 4.76 in 2002 (Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 
2019). Things improved with the party’s next leader, however. Frederik Reinfeldt became leader of 
the party in 2003 and quickly set about recasting the Moderates as a more centrist political party. He 
developed a reputation as being thoughtful, reasoned, and calm and collected – qualities that were 
especially valuable during the 2010 general election which followed the financial crisis – and his 
reputation score increased from 5.48 in 2006 to 6.96 in 2010. Reinfeldt’s reputation did then subside, 
falling to 5.57 in 2014. This coincided with his party’s significant loss in the 2014 elections (Holmsberg 
and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019).   
The reputation data for Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the Sweden Democrats, is restricted to 2010 and 
2014, but nonetheless demonstrates a very low reputation score, and is much lower than that of the 
leaders for the Social Democrats and Moderate Party. However, Åkesson’s reputation score – which 
is 2.32 in 2010 and 2.51 in 2014 – is higher than that of his party – which is 1.80 in 2010 and 1.90 in 
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Figure 8.16: The reputation of the leaders of the principal parties and the Sweden Democrats, 1998-2014. 
 
Source: Holmsberg and Oscarsson 2017; CSES 2019 
 
 
Even though there is some slight difference between the reputation of the Sweden Democrats and 
the reputation of their party leader, Åkesson, the main trend is that there has been a small but 
noticeable increase in the reputation of both the party and its leaders since 2006. And interestingly 
this has happened at a time when the principal parties have sought to isolate the Sweden Democrats 
through the use of a cordon sanitaire. It is therefore worth briefly exploring what the Sweden 
Democrats and the party’s leadership have done in this period to improve their image and strengthen 
their reputation.  
In the main, the improvement in the Sweden Democrats’ reputation can be attributed to two factors. 
Firstly, and as was discussed in more detail earlier in this chapter, the party has undergone a process 
of ideological moderation. This began under the leadership of Mikael Jansson (1995 to 2005) and 
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anti-immigration policies were toned down, and arguments rooted in biological racism were removed. 
As such changes were implemented, extremist, radical, or otherwise undisciplined activists and 
members were expelled. These steps all contributed to the party being able to rid itself of its extremist 
image, and to present a more moderate and respectable one – and one which then improved the 
party’s reputation.  
Alongside this ideological moderation, the Sweden Democrats also engaged in some significant 
organisational changes. Under Åkesson’s leadership the Sweden Democrats have become the most 
centralised party in Sweden (Junger 2016). Traditionally, the responsibility for the formulation of party 
policy was determined by the party congress, as in the Social Democratic Party, but since 2008 it has 
been delegated to the party board, which is under the control of Mattias Karlsson, a loyal friend of 
Åkesson and a member of the so-called ‘gang of four’ (Junger 2016). The other members of this group 
include Björn Söder, who held the position of party secretary from 2005 to 2015, and Richard Jomshof, 
who was the chief editor of the Courier, the party’s internal newspaper. The greater power of the 
party board, the domination by Åkesson loyalists, and the weakening of other party organs alongside 
the expulsion of troublesome members has all added up to the party leadership being in firm control 
of party.  This has then enabled the party to pursue its aims of moderation without challenge, to go 
after those voters who do find the party’s message appealing, and to appear more organised and 
professional, including putting more emphasis on more modern campaigning methods than 
traditional ones (Widfeldt 2008).  
Over the period, then, the principal parties and their respective leaderships have maintained a clear 
reputational advantage over the Sweden Democrats. Yet, this reputational advantage seems to have 
had no discernible impact on the efficacy of the primarily dismissive and isolationist strategies pursued 
by the principal parties against the Sweden Democrats. This is somewhat puzzling, but one reason for 
why this reputational advantage might not have improved the success of dismissive and isolationist 
strategies is that the principal parties have adopted a somewhat inconsistent approach between 
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elections and across political arenas (electoral and legislative). In other words, this inconsistency might 
have cancelled out any advantage that the principal parties might have derived from their superior 
reputations. It is also likely that the growing professionalism of the Sweden Democrats has also 
mitigated the effect of dismissive and isolationist strategies. It certainly appears to be the case that 
the Sweden Democrats are indeed ‘masters of their own success’ (Carter 2005: 13).  
 
8.7. Summary and Conclusion 
Until now the Swedish principal parties have sought to restrict the growth of the Sweden Democrats 
primarily through the use of dismissive and isolationist strategies. Until 2010, it seemed that this 
combination of strategies had proved successful, as the Sweden Democrats failed to achieve 
representation in the Riksdag. Between 2010 and 2018, however, the Sweden Democrats went from 
being the sixth largest party in parliament to the third largest. It is therefore clear that the dismissive 
and isolationist strategies adopted by the principal parties have failed to suppress the vote share of 
the Sweden Democrats in recent years.  
In order to understand why these two strategies began to fail when they had previously succeeded, 
this chapter has examined a series of contextual conditions (or intervening variables) that are likely to 
have affected the efficacy of the principal parties’ strategic approach. These conditions are the issue 
agenda; the positioning of various political parties on issue dimensions; the attitudes of voters to the 
issues of immigration and welfare; levels of voter satisfaction with the functioning of Swedish 
democracy; the trust that voters have in political parties and politicians; the reputation of the Swedish 
political parties and their respective leaderships; and the growing professionalisation of the Sweden 
Democrats themselves. The analyses conducted in the course of this chapter reveal that during the 
period 1998-2018, a number of these contextual conditions changed in favour of the Sweden 
Democrats.  
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Firstly, cultural issues, and the issue of immigration in particular, increased in saliency over time, as 
did welfare issues, while the dominance of economic issues began to wane. Not surprisingly, as an 
anti-immigration radical right party, the Sweden Democrats have thrived when the issue agenda has 
favoured immigration-related issues. Yet it is important to appreciate the increased saliency of 
immigration sits in a particular context in Sweden. That is, the issue of immigration has proved to be 
rather taboo in Swedish politics, not least since the rise and fall of New Democracy in the early 1990s. 
Moreover, while the saliency of this issue has increased over the period, Swedish attitudes to 
immigration, overall, have actually become more positive. In spite of this, however, there exists a 
significant pool of anti-immigration voters in Sweden, from which the Sweden Democrats can draw, 
and the increasing saliency of immigration has galvanised this group of voters in the Sweden 
Democrats’ favour.  
Secondly, the increasing saliency of welfare did not harm the Sweden Democrats as it might have 
other more neoliberal radical right parties. Perhaps unusually for a radical right party, the Sweden 
Democrats have also found welfare issues to provide a relatively fertile territory on which to campaign. 
In fact, the Sweden Democrats have rooted themselves in the social democratic tradition of the 
folkhem. By employing the concept of the folkhem, the Sweden Democrats apply a chauvinistic frame 
to their welfare policies, thereby advocating a generous but also very restrictive system of benefits.  
Thirdly, turning to voter attitudes toward immigration, Swedish voters have been very positive 
regarding immigrants and the impact that immigration has had on Sweden. However, while the 
majority of Swedes hold pro-immigration views, there is a significant segment of the population that 
remains sceptical or even hostile to immigrants and/or immigration.  
With respect to welfare issues, Swedish attitudes toward economic redistribution remained positive 
throughout the period under investigation. By contrast, perceptions of the state of education and 
healthcare were increasingly positive until 2012-2014 only. From 2014 these perceptions soured as a 
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number of scandals led to a sudden drop in the number of people who believed that the quality of 
education and healthcare was good.  
In this context, the dismissive strategies of the principal parties – and other mainstream political 
parties – served to aid the Sweden Democrats, as these strategies prevented any direct competition. 
As a result, the Sweden Democrats were provided with a near monopoly on the anti-immigration 
position until around 2018, when the Social Democrats, the Moderates, and the Christian Democrats 
adopted strong accommodative strategies. Furthermore, the Sweden Democrats’ centrist position on 
welfare allowed them to win over former Social Democratic and Moderate voters, especially after 
2012-2014, while their chauvinism appealed to anti-immigration voters.  
Turning to levels of satisfaction that voters have in the functioning of democracy, it is fair to conclude 
that Sweden has become a progressively more satisfied country. With regards to trust in politicians 
and parties, however, there is a significant number of untrusting and anti-establishment voters to 
whom the Sweden Democrats can appeal. This is especially the case with regard to levels of trust in 
political parties and politicians which, generally speaking, is rather low.  
In short then, even though there has been no great increase in anti-immigration sentiment or in 
dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Sweden, there is a significant segment of the 
population that is particularly amenable to the messaging of the Sweden Democrats. What is more, 
the Sweden Democrats have helped themselves. Under the leadership of Jimmie Åkesson, the image 
of the party has softened, and while the party and its leader are still widely disliked by most Swedes, 
organisational reforms and growing professionalisation enacted under Åkesson have proved 
invaluable in ensuring that the Sweden Democrats can effectively exploit that reservoir of potential 
support.  
The failure of the dismissive and isolationist strategies of the Swedish principal and mainstream parties 
can therefore be attributed to both contextual conditions and an enhanced Sweden Democrats party 
machine. On top of this, inconsistency in which strategies were adopted also likely played a role. That 
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is, while the principal and mainstream parties in Sweden did primarily adopt dismissive and isolationist 
strategies with regards the Sweden Democrats, there were some (limited) instances in which they 
adopted other strategies. As the discussion above illustrated, the Liberals employed an 
accommodative strategy in 2002, while the Alliance and Greens engaged in an adversarial strategy in 
2014, and in both instances the saliency of immigration increased. Thus, inconsistencies in the use of 
strategies by the principal parties are likely to have undermined the effectiveness of their dismissive 
and isolationist strategies.  
Looking to the future, while the conditions that have been analysed have been favourable to the 
Sweden Democrats, the long-term political trends are not necessarily so auspicious. The Sweden 
Democrats are dependent upon a relatively small, albeit significant, segment of the population and 
up until now the party has benefitted from a lack of competition for these voters. However, the Social 
Democrats, the Moderates, and the Christian Democrats have, as of 2018, sought to compete more 
directly with the Sweden Democrats for these votes, thereby challenging the monopolistic position of 
the Sweden Democrats. Moreover, following the collapse of the Alliance in 2019 (Aylott and Bolin 
2019; Eriksson 2019), the Moderates and the Christian Democrats have indicated a certainly 
willingness to cooperate with the Sweden Democrats. As such then, the Sweden Democrats are likely 
to face more competition from the mainstream parties but at the same time may also soon find 
themselves finally being welcomed into a new right-wing bloc.  





The main goal of this thesis has been to understand the effect that principal party strategies have had 
on the vote share of the radical right. Despite the growing presence of radical right parties throughout 
Western Europe, very few studies have considered whether particular strategies or particular 
combinations of strategies have been more successful than others in combating the rise of the radical 
right. And this is despite the relatively recent call by Bale et al. (2010) for such work. Indeed, to date, 
Bonnie Meguid’s (2005, 2008) seminal contributions remain the most substantive response to the 
question of the efficacy of principal party strategies.  
The preceding chapters of this thesis have developed a model of competition between principal 
parties and their radical right competitors, tested that model in order to ascertain the effect that 
particular party strategies have had on the vote share of the radical right, and then sought to further 
develop our knowledge of party strategies by considering the political context in which these 
strategies are employed. In doing so, this thesis has demonstrated that there is no silver bullet that 
principal parties can employ against the radical right. That is, there is no one strategy or one 
combination of strategies that routinely or consistently leads to a reduction in the vote share of the 
radical right. In addition, the thesis has found that the reputation of political parties and their leaders, 
which is an important element of the new model of competition advanced by this thesis, impacts upon 
the effectiveness of principal party strategies vis-à-vis the radical right. Furthermore, that the agency 
and organisational capacity of radical right parties themselves is critical to understanding not just 
whether certain strategies will be successful (or unsuccessful) but also what strategies principal parties 
are likely to employ in the first place. Finally, this thesis has found that political context is important 
in determining the efficacy of principal party strategies.  
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The purpose of this final chapter is to review these findings and to then consider their implications. As 
such, the next section of the chapter starts with a quick overview of Meguid's model of competition 
and its shortcomings, followed by an explanation of how the model of competition developed in this 
thesis resolves these shortcomings. 
 
9.2. Developing a Model of Competition and Incorporating Context  
In order to explore the effect that principal party strategies have had on radical right parties, the 
starting point of the thesis was the need to employ a model of competition that was up to the task. 
This was done by first engaging in a deep exploration of the literature on party competition and party 
strategies. Of chief importance here was the highly influential Position, Salience, and Ownership (PSO) 
model introduced by Meguid, which considered competition between unequals; that is, how 
mainstream parties compete with smaller, niche parties. To recall from Chapter 2, this model 
essentially brings together three dominant approaches to party competition, and argues that there 
are three important elements to party competition, namely the spatial position that the party adopts 
on particular issues, the salience of the issues that are being contested, and the ownership of those 
same issues. It is from this foundation that Meguid proposes her three issue-oriented strategies: 
accommodative, adversarial, and dismissive.  
However, in the course of this review of the existing literature it was also argued that, despite its 
influence and wide applicability, Meguid’s model does nonetheless suffer from a number of 
shortcomings.  
Firstly, it seems preoccupied with the issue-oriented strategies that parties employ, which are the 
strategies that parties employ on dimensions and issues, and devotes little attention to the party-
oriented strategies, which are the strategies that parties employ directly against one another, that are 
available to principal parties. For instance, a cordon sanitaire is a popular weapon against the radical 
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right in some polities, yet this strategy does little to address particular issues nor does it seek to 
manipulate dimensions of competition. Rather, the strategy is squarely aimed at a political party 
directly. Secondly, it assumes that issue competition occurs in a unidimensional plane. This is 
problematic as radical right parties often compete solely on the cultural and not economic dimension 
of competition, and when radical right parties do address economic issues, these are often couched 
in cultural considerations. That is, economic issues become subsumed into the cultural dimension. 
Therefore, any model of competition that is concerned with how principal or mainstream parties 
compete with the radical right must also consider the cultural dimension of competition. Thirdly, it 
assumes that radical right parties, as niche parties, are ‘by-product[s] of competition between 
mainstream parties (Meguid 2008: 22), that is, hapless victims with little to no agency of their own. 
However, as this thesis and other studies (Betz 1998; Carter 2005; Mudde 2007; Luther 2011; van 
Kessel 2015) demonstrate, radical right parties do possess agential and organisational capacity, and 
can utilise this capacity to undermine or even mitigate the effect of principal party strategies.  
In order to address these shortcomings, the thesis proposed its own model of party competition which 
built on Meguid’s work but augmented it in three ways. Firstly, it incorporated the dimensional 
strategies of Alonso (2012), Elias et al. (2015) and Alonso et al. (2015) in order to create issue-oriented 
strategies that could take place over multiple dimensions of competition. Secondly, the model 
proposed incorporated an array of party-oriented strategies borrowed from Downs (2011, 2012) and 
Bale et al. (2010) in order to supplement the issue-oriented strategies in the PSO model. And thirdly, 
it developed a reputational dimension of competition in which parties compete against each other 
not on issues but on reputations. This new model of competition not only resolved some of the 
shortcomings of the PSO model, but it also identified a number of additional strategies that parties 
can adopt, and in so doing demonstrated that principal parties have access to a far greater range of 
strategies than was previously considered.  
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Of course, no matter how good a model is, it remains just a model. In other words, whether parties 
adopt one or another strategy, and whether these strategies prove to be effective or not, will be 
influenced by a whole range of other factors. Chapter 3 of the thesis therefore explored these other 
factors and examined how and whether a party’s origin or type might affect its choice of strategy, 
whether and how the internal balance of power within parties – in particular the power of the 
leadership and the power of different factions – is of importance, whether and how organisations that 
are closely linked to parties exert any influence on the choice of strategies adopted, and whether the 
party’s goals impact on what strategies are chosen. In addition, the chapter considered the ‘target’ of 
the strategies – i.e., the radical right parties – and explored whether and how the goals and 
organisation of these parties might also affect what strategies other parties adopted against them. 
Finally, the chapter also paid attention to the institutional environment within which this party 
competition takes place, and considered whether and how electoral systems may shape what 
strategies are adopted, and whether these strategies prove effective or not. Together, all these factors 
can be considered as ‘intervening’ factors or variables, likely to make the adoption of some strategies 
more or less probable, and likely to influence their efficacy.  
The last stage in setting the theoretical groundwork was to be clear about a number of core concepts. 
Therefore, before it turned to analysing the effect that the strategies of principal parties had on the 
vote share of radical right parties, the thesis set out what it meant by the term ‘principal parties’ and 
by the term ‘radical right’, and then identified the relevant players. To recall, Chapter 4 defined 
principal parties as those parties that are economically mainstream, electorally large, and ideologically 
moderate. Meanwhile, following Mudde (2007), the chapter defined radical right parties as those that 
reject the substantive elements of democracy but not the procedural elements; that is, radical right 
parties support the institutions of democracy but reject some or all of the liberal underpinnings of 
modern democracy. On the basis of these definitions, the chapter then identified 37 principal parties, 
and 19 radical right ones, across 14 countries.  
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These three chapters thus laid the foundations for the analyses which were to follow. Together they 
established a new and augmented model of party competition, explored a range of intervening factors 
that might well impact upon what strategies principal parties choose to adopt and on how effective 
these strategies turn out to be, and specified what parties were to be considered.  
Adopting this dual analytical framework or multi-method approach is not only recommended as a 
good standard of practice in the QCA community (Schneider and Wagemann 2010) but also allowed 
for the identification of relevant competitive pathways through mvQCA and the contextualisation of 
party strategies through case studies.  
 
9.3. Analysing the Strategies of Principal Parties 
Having laid the theoretical foundations, the thesis then turned to analysing what strategies were 
employed by principal parties, how often these strategies were employed, and the effect that these 
strategies had on the vote share of the radical right. The analysis was undertaken in two phases: one 
extensive one, and one intensive one. As explained in detail in Chapter 5 of the thesis, the extensive 
stage (outlined in Chapter 6) involved multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA) and was 
designed to identify the various combinations of strategies that principal parties employ and what 
impact these strategies had on the vote share of the radical right. This was followed by an intensive 
phase that involved the in-depth exploration of two contrasting cases: France and Sweden. This 
approach is not only good practice in the QCA community but also allows for the exploration of some 
of the intervening variables or contextual conditions that were identified in Chapter 3.  
 
9.3.1 Multi-value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA) 
The mvQCA was carried out in two analytical steps. The first focused on the impact of the strategies 
of a single principal party on the vote share of the radical right, while the second concentrated on the 
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effect of the strategies of two principal parties on the radical right’s vote share. For each step the 
analysis was conducted twice: once for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right and once for 
an increase in the radical right’s vote share. 
Focusing first on the strategies of a single principal party, the results indicated that there was 
significant variability in terms of what strategies, or combination of strategies, principal parties 
adopted with respect to the radical right. Furthermore, the analyses identified no necessary conditions 
for the decrease or increase of radical right vote share. Put simply, the analysis identified no strategies 
or combination of strategies that consistently led to a decrease or an increase in the vote share of 
radical right parties.  
However, the adoption of some strategies by a single principal party was sometimes related to a 
greater likelihood of a particular outcome. More specifically, the analyses suggested that a scenario in 
which a single principal party adopted a one-dimensional dismissive strategy – and hence competed 
solely on the economic dimension – and an engagement strategy with the radical right party saw the 
radical right vote decrease. The extent to which this finding can be generalised is severely limited, 
however, as it was based on just one case. More generalisable was the outcome of a situation in which 
a single principal party adopted a disengagement strategy vis-à-vis the radical right party – such as 
ignoring it or isolating it. This strategy was employed in 110 cases, and in 79 of these the radical right 
vote share increased. Of course, this leaves the remaining 31 cases which did not show this outcome 
– and where the radical right vote share either decreased or did not change. As such then, it cannot 
be argued that the outcome of this strategy is completely consistent, but with over 70 percent of 
relevant cases showing an increase in the radical right vote, the likelihood of such an outcome is 
relatively high.  
When the strategies of two principal parties were examined, the results once again showed that there 
was a great deal of variability in the strategies, or combinations of strategies, that principal parties 
employ against the radical right. As before, however, there were no strategies, or combinations of 
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strategies, that were considered necessary for either a decrease or an increase in the vote share of 
the radical right. Again therefore, no strategies or combination of strategies consistently led to a 
decrease or an increase in the vote share of radical right parties.  
Having said this, the analyses of the strategies of two principal parties did yield some interesting 
findings. In the first instance, they showed that, while the two principal parties did adopt a range of 
strategies against the radical right, and often in different combinations as just mentioned, 
accommodative strategies were used far more frequently than any other strategy. What is more, in a 
number of cases, the adoption of accommodative strategies by both principal parties was 
supplemented by disengagement strategies vis-à-vis the radical right parties – i.e., by strategies that 
ignore or isolate the radical right party.  
However, the analyses also showed that the impact of these accommodative strategies in the radical 
right vote has been rather mixed, and in fact more often than not, their impact has been unfavourable. 
That is, there were 29 cases in which both principal parties adopted an accommodative strategy, but 
in 20 of these the outcome was an increase in the radical right vote share. Furthermore, the adoption 
of disengagement strategies in addition to these accommodative strategies, did little to combat the 
radical right either. In fact, in 15 cases the vote share of the radical right increased, while in a mere 
four cases the radical right’s vote share decreased. 
These findings therefore show that principal parties have often favoured a strategy of increasing the 
saliency of issues associated with the radical right (i.e., issues on the cultural dimension of 
competition) in order to usurp that territory and retain or win back sympathetic voters, and that they 
have then often coupled this with strategies that aim to ignore or isolate the radical right. But as noted, 
and contrary to Meguid’s (2005, 2008) predictions, the results of such approaches are at best rather 
mixed. There is certainly no indication that such strategies constantly result in a decrease in the radical 
right party vote, and more often than not result in an increase in radical right vote share.  
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9.3.2. Findings from the Case Studies 
The extensive phase of the analysis, undertaken by the use of mvQCA, was followed by an intensive 
phase that engaged in two in-depth case studies. As discussed above, this extensive-intensive 
approach allows for a deeper understanding of the strategies that principal parties choose and the 
reasons behind those choices, and a fuller examination of their effects on the vote share of the radical 
right. In particular, the case studies enable the context in which party competition occurs to be fully 
explored. The two countries that were chosen for analysis were France and Sweden. These were 
selected because, as was highlighted in Chapter 5 (section 5), they provide interesting but very 
different environments in which to understand how differing factors impact upon the efficacy of party 
strategies. Firstly, they differ with regards to institutional arrangements, including whether or not the 
country employs a majoritarian or plurality electoral system, whether or not the state provides 
funding for parties, and whether or not parties have access to funds for media broadcasts. Secondly, 
the radical right parties in each country differ in how ‘credible’ they are. Finally, they differ in respect 
of voter attitudes to immigration, with French voters more negative, and Swedish voters more 
positive.  
The two case study chapters examined a number of contextual conditions. More specifically, they 
explored the effect of the issue agenda – understood to refer what issues were particularly salient – 
on the principal parties’ choice of strategy and on the efficacy of those chosen strategies; they 
investigated the impact of levels of satisfaction with democracy and levels of trust in politicians and 
parties on which strategies were chosen and on whether these strategies proved effective; they 
considered the impact that the reputation of party candidates and parties had on the efficacy of party 
strategies; and they addressed how voter attitudes to immigration impacted on principal party 
strategy choice and the efficacy of those chosen strategies. In addition, the Swedish chapter also 
considered the consequences that spatial positioning of principal parties had on their strategies vis-à-
vis the Sweden Democrats. This additional factor was considered in the case of Sweden because, 
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unlike in France, Swedish principal parties had been unwilling to accommodate the Sweden Democrats 
on the issue of immigration, and therefore they granted the Sweden Democrats ample opportunity to 
develop a strong niche within the electorate.  
The issue agenda – i.e., which issues were salient – influenced which strategies the principal parties 
chose and the efficacy of those strategies in both countries, but in very different ways. The analyses 
showed that in France, the principal parties’ strategies of accommodation of the radical right were 
more successful during periods when cultural issues were particularly prominent, and by extension 
less successful when economic issues were salient. By contrast, in Sweden, cultural issues remained 
relatively subdued until around 2014 as the principal parties had sought to dismiss these. Despite this 
approach of dismissing these issues however, and contrary to the theoretical expectations of Meguid 
(2005, 2008), cultural issues, particularly immigration, began to grow in prominence from 2014 
onwards.  
The differences between the French issue agenda and the Swedish issue agenda, and the differences 
in the strategies that the principal parties in each country adopted made for very different patterns of 
competition, especially with regard to the issue of immigration. In Sweden, the radical right was 
essentially gifted a monopolistic position on many of its preferred issues. This was because, with the 
exception of a few isolated incidences, the Swedish principal parties had maintained a taboo around 
the issue of immigration, and had simply not addressed it. As such, the Sweden Democrats were the 
only party to offer a strong and consistently restrictionist position on immigration. This did change 
after 2018, when there was much greater diversity with regard to party positioning on immigration, 
and when the Social Democrats, the Moderates, and the Christian Democrats all began to address the 
issue to a greater extent and began to adopt more restrictionist positions on it. However, since the 
Sweden Democrats had been occupying this territory for a long time and had become the owners of 
the issue, it was they who derived the greatest electoral benefit. By contrast, in France, the centre-
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right parties had long been willing to occupy similar territory to the National Front and therefore their 
attempts to usurp that territory were sometimes more successful. 
The Sweden Democrats were also able to capitalise in another way in that they were also able to take 
advantage of the position they had adopted on welfare, which was another salient dimension of 
competition in Sweden. The party had chosen to occupy a rather centrist position on welfare, which 
was in between that of the two main blocs. In short, the Sweden Democrats proposed redistribution 
but coupled this with a chauvinistic framing of welfare. In doing this, they were able to integrate issues 
of considerable concern to Swedish voters, namely welfare and education, into their existing anti-
immigration profile. The tactic proved especially successful given the importance of the folkhem. 
Ultimately then, the case studies demonstrated that the efficacy of principal party strategies can be 
heavily influenced by the issue agenda. What is more, the analyses showed that while the principal 
parties can of course influence the issue agenda, they are also subject to it. Furthermore, the 
strategies of the principal party strategies do not exist in a vacuum; instead, they are also influenced 
by the strategies of other parties. The Swedish case showed this especially clearly: the principal parties 
sought to shape the issue agenda including by dismissing the issues of the radical right, but they ended 
up also being influenced by it. In addition, the consequences of the actions of the principal parties 
ended up giving the Sweden Democrats a near monopoly from which to launch their electoral 
insurgency. As such then, the case studies showed that it is not just which issues are salient that 
matters, but it is also the positioning of all the parties on those issues that is also important.  
The issue agenda is clearly linked to the attitudes of voters, given that if the issue agenda is understood 
to refer to those issues that are salient, then it is voters that make them, or consider them, salient. 
However, voter attitudes also matter in other ways. It is not just what issues voters consider important 
– or salient – that is of consequence, it is also the position that voters have on these issues that is 
relevant. The two case studies therefore also considered where voters were positioned on issues, and 
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they examined the position of voters on the issue of immigration in particular so as to ascertain 
whether or not the radical right parties were able to draw on a significant pool of voters.  
Again the two case studies reflected interesting differences. In France, voters tended to be more 
hostile to immigration, while in Sweden they tended to be more progressive. Indeed, the majority of 
Swedes remained positive about the benefits of immigration in the time period under investigation. 
However, what this masked was a significant, if still limited, reservoir of anti-immigration feeling in 
the population.  
The principal parties in both countries also addressed this in different ways. In France, the principal 
parties, and the Republicans and their previous incarnations in particular, were content to appeal to 
those voters who held anti-immigration views in order to win elections. In Sweden, by contrast, the 
principal parties preferred the use of dismissive strategies, which, according to Meguid (2005, 2008) 
should signal to voters that the issue of immigration lacks merit, and which should mean that the 
salience of immigration should fall. But this did not happen, and as the Sweden chapter demonstrated, 
these strategies proved unsuccessful in containing the Sweden Democrats. Moreover, the consistency 
with which the Swedish principal and mainstream parties adopted these dismissive strategies was in 
question. As the chapter explained, while these parties tended to adopt these strategies in election 
campaigns, in the years between elections they sometimes favoured other strategies. This lack of 
consistency in the approach of the principal and mainstream parties thus further undermined the 
effectiveness of their attempts to curb the rise of the Sweden Democrats. 
The two case studies also addressed how satisfied voters were with how principal parties had 
delivered on important and salient issues. In France, Sarkozy was considered best able to handle the 
issue of immigration in 2007 but this had slipped considerably by 2012 where Marine Le Pen was 
considered by a majority of voters to be bested placed to deal with immigration. This had a 
consequence for the accommodative strategy of Sarkozy, which was successful in 2007 in winning 
over FN voters, but which failed in 2012, owing in part to Sarkozy’s perceived inability to address 
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immigration. Similarly, in Sweden, the Alliance parties were seen to have performed poorly on the 
highly salient issues of healthcare and education – issues which had been adopted by the Sweden 
Democrats sometime prior. The consequence was a further strengthening of the position of the 
Sweden Democrats and a continuation in the failure of principal party strategies to contain the 
Sweden Democrats.  
Perceptions on delivery can also feed into a sense of anti-establishment feeling as well as trust in 
politicians and parties. While dissatisfaction with principal and mainstream parties and politicians 
were commonplace in both case studies – albeit more so in France than Sweden – it is not entirely 
clear what impact this had on the efficacy of principal party strategies. Similarly, the two case studies 
also paid attention to how (dis)satisfied voters have been with the functioning of democracy in their 
respective countries. This condition was explored because numerous studies have concluded that 
voters who are more dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy are much more likely to vote for 
radical right parties (Knigge 1998; Lubbers et al. 2002). As with trust in politicians and parties, 
however, the case studies were inclusive with respect to the impact that voter (dis)satisfaction in the 
functioning of democracy had on the efficacy of principal party strategies.  
The case studies showed that, by contrast to trust in politicians and parties, the reputations of parties 
and their leaders proved to be quite influential in determining the efficacy of principal party strategies. 
Indeed, the French case study demonstrated that a strong reputational advantage is a strong predictor 
of how successful an accommodative strategy is. In instances where two principal parties adopt 
diverging strategies, Meguid (2005, 2008) argued that the strategy that is more consistently applied 
and applied over a longer period of time will be the one that has the greatest influence. The French 
case study, however, suggested that in such instances, the strategy adopted by the principal party 
with the stronger reputation could have the greater effect. However, the same logic was not present 
in the Swedish case study. While the Swedish principal parties consistently maintained overwhelming 
reputational leads over the Sweden Democrats, their strategies did not prove to be that successful in 
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curbing their radical right competitor. Again, an explanation for this is the inconsistent approach of 
these parties, which might well have undermined any advantage that reputation might have bestowed 
on them. As such then, Meguid’s point about the consistency with which strategies are applied seems 
to hold. What the case studies also demonstrated was that party and candidate reputations were not 
static variables but were rather dynamic elements of competition that served to increase the efficacy 
of principal party strategies. However, contrary to Meguid (2005, 2008), the Swedish case study 
demonstrated that principal parties cannot rely on supposed inherent reputational advantage and 
that reputation can be undermined by strategic inconsistency and radical right agency.  
Indeed, perhaps the most significant conclusion that the case studies reached is that radical right party 
agency really matters – a conclusion very much in line with the findings of a number of other studies 
(Betz 1998; Carter 2005; Mudde 2007; Luther 2011; van Kessel 2015). In short, this agency can and 
does impact the effectiveness of principal party strategies. A shortcoming of Meguid’s theory of party 
competition is its treatment of radical right parties, which are seen mere pawns in a game between 
mainstream parties. But the case studies have shown that the National Front and the Sweden 
Democrats are, to borrow from Carter (2005: 13), to a great extent ‘masters of their own success’. 
Both parties engaged in detoxification agendas designed to improve their appeal, and the Sweden 
Democrats went considerably further in making significant changes to improve their organisational 
capacity. Indeed, such has the change been in the Sweden Democrats that, as discussed in Chapter 8, 
the centre-right Moderate and Christian Democratic parties are now re-evaluating how they might 
approach their radical right competitor, including in the formation of government.  
Ultimately, then, what the analysis showed was that there is no silver bullet or magic formula when it 
comes to competing against the radical right. What the analysis demonstrated is that the same 
strategy employed in another country or in the same country but at a different time period, might 
produce a different result. There is no guarantee that a particular strategy will work and the efficacy 
of any strategy is, in part, dependent upon the factors discussed above. Indeed, political context 
300 | P a g e  
 
proved to be very important in determining the efficacy of principal party strategies, as did the agential 
and organisational capacity of radical right parties, and the strategic choices of other principal and 
mainstream parties.  
 
9.4. Avenues for Future Enquiry 
While the case studies demonstrated the importance of a number of contextual conditions, the impact 
that voter (dis)satisfaction in democracy and voter trust in politicians and parties has had on principal 
party strategies was inconclusive.  The Swedish case was especially muddy in this regard, as 
satisfaction in the functioning of democracy increased at a time when the Sweden Democrats were 
gaining popularity. This raises a number of questions regarding the relationship between the electoral 
success of radical right parties and satisfaction in democracy, but also what impact this has on the 
efficacy of principal party strategies. Indeed, if democratic satisfaction increases in response to radical 
right success, then this could have deleterious effects on the efficacy of principal party strategies. 
Therefore, additional work is required on the relationship between radical right parties and 
satisfaction on democracy, and then the impact that this relationship has on party strategies.  
Furthermore, additional work should be done on the importance of reputation in party competition. 
Of particular interest to this thesis has been the introduction and testing of the reputational 
dimension, and therefore party and leadership reputations, as a method by which voters can 
differentiate between political parties that share similar political positions on issue dimensions. 
Indeed, the case studies demonstrated that reputation can be extremely important, especially in 
circumstances where principal parties engage in so-called issue trespassing, seeking to usurp 
ownership of an issue from another party. Going forward, research needs not only concern itself with 
reputation more broadly, but it is important that future research does not relegate reputation to a 
static condition, as Meguid does, but rather recognises reputation as a dynamic condition that changes 
over time, that is open to manipulation by political actors, and that serves as a dimension of 
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competition in of itself; especially in light of party cartelisation (see Katz and Mair 1995) where issue 
competition is replaced by what is essentially reputational competition.  
Following on from this expanded conception of party competition, it is vital that future studies do not 
fall into the trap of assuming that radical right parties – and smaller, niche parties generally – are 
hapless victims of principal and mainstream parties. Indeed, as has been demonstrated here and 
elsewhere, radical right parties are important actors in their own right, and whose agential capacity 
can significantly impact on the efficacy of principal party strategies. Furthermore, and as has been 
argued previously, radical right parties are not always competitors in need of constraint but also 
potential partners in future coalitions. It cannot be assumed that radical right parties are not office-
seeking entities and furthermore that the changing goals of radical right parties provide many 
potential avenues for success, through more inclusive right-wing blocs, for otherwise opportunistic 
principal parties that seek office. Additionally, further work should also consider the strategies and 
counter-strategies that radical right parties adopt vis-à-vis principal parties. Indeed, radical right 
parties have interests that they pursue and the strategies they employ in fulfilling these goals is 
important for patterns of competition, especially as radical right parties have become established 
actors in many European countries.  
Finally, given that the analysis found no silver bullet for tackling the radical right and that the case 
studies demonstrated how important context is, more work needs to be done on the ways in which 
context not only influences the types of strategies that principal parties choose but also how context 
impacts upon the efficacy of party strategies. However, this work needs to be done in a meaningful 
and systemic way. Firstly, such work needs to include a broader range of contextual conditions than 
was considered in this thesis, such as the inclusion of economic conditions, other institutional 
variables, and perhaps even the impact of European integration, in order to meaningfully advance our 
understanding of how context impacts on party strategies. Secondly, work needs to be conducted in 
a systemised way that ensures comparability across cases and ensures that cases conform to the same 
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standards and procedures, so as to maximise generalisability. This also requires careful consideration 
of concepts and variables to ensure cases are not too particular and subsequent work can be 
conducted using the same conceptual framework. Core to this would be a shared understanding of 
what constitutes context. Given this, it is recommended that future work make greater use of multi-
method designs that combine the extensive nature of large-n statistical methods with the intensive 
nature of case studies, as has been done in this thesis and was done by Meguid (2005, 2008). Such an 
approach allows for strong cross-case comparison and detailed within-case analysis.  
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Appendix A: Mainstream/Niche calculation 
Party p’s nicheness in a given country is: 
With xip being party p’s emphasis on policies on policy 
dimension i, and being the average emphasis of all 
other parties (excluding p) on policy dimension i, weighted by 
party size (Meyer and Miller 2013: 262). 
Expressed more simply, then, Party P’s Raw Nicheness Score is calculated by square rooting Party P’s 
emphasis on a given dimension minus the weighted average of other relevant parties’ emphasis on 
that same dimension squared. The raw nicheness scores of all other relevant parties is then summed 
and weighted, and then subtracted from the raw nicheness score of Party P.  
Raw Nicheness Score (RNS) = SQRT ((Party_1_DE - (Party_2_DE * Party_2_VS + Party_3_DE * 
Party_3_VS + Party_n_DE * Party_n_VS) / (Party_2_VS + Party_3_VS + Party_n_VS) ^2 )) 
Where DE is dimensional emphasis and VS is vote share.  
Mean nicheness (MN) = (Party_2_RNS * Party_2_VS + Party_3_RNS * Party_3_VS + Party_n_RBS * 
Party_n_VS) / (Party_2_VS + Party_3_VS + Party_n_VS) 
Standardised Nicheness Score = RNS - MN 
A score of zero indicates that Party P’s emphasis is identical to that of the average party in that system. 
Positive values indicate relative nicheness while negative values indicate relative mainstreamness.  
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Appendix B: Analyses of Necessity 
Appendix B.1: Analysis of Necessary, Single Party Strategies, Decrease in Radical Right Vote Share 
Expression Cons.Nec Cov.Nec RoN 
issuestrategy 0.915 0.119 -1.752 
disengage 0.356 0.191 0.5 
engage 0.169 0.4 0.921 
~issuestrategy -4.407 1.024 0.987 
~disengage 0.644 0.427 0.683 
~engage 0.831 0.282 1.67 
 
Appendix B.2: Analysis of Necessary, Single Party Strategies, Increase in Radical Right Vote Share 
Expression Cons.Nec Cov.Nec RoN 
issuestrategy 0.952 0.26 -3.136 
disengage 0.637 0.718 0.742 
engage 0.113 0.56 0.941 
~issuestrategy -2.089 1.02 0.989 
~disengage 0.363 0.506 0.714 
~engage 0.887 0.632 0.281 
 
Appendix B.3: Analysis of Necessary, Two Party Strategies, Decrease in Radical Right Vote Share 
Expression Cons.Nec Cov.Nec RoN 
p1issuestrategy 0.8636 0.1329 -1.1754 
p1disengage -0.3182 0.1795 0.5362 
p1engage 0.0455 0.1667 0.933 
p2issuestrategy 1 0.1078 -2.3704 
p2disengage 0.3636 0.1951 0.5147 
p2engage 0.3182 0.4375 0.8696 
~p1issuestrategy -3.1364 1.0299 0.9862 
~p1disengage 0.6818 0.4054 0.6393 
~p1engage 0.9545 0.3 0.1091 
~p2issuestrategy -5.9545 1.0234 0.9855 
~p2disengage 0.6364 0.4 0.6613 
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Appendix B.4: Analysis of Necessary, Two Party Strategies, Increase in Radical Right Vote Share 
Expression Cons.Nec Cov.Nec RoN 
p1issuestrategy 0.959 0.329 -2.31 
p1disengage 0.592 0.744 0.787 
p1engage 0.102 0.833 0.986 
p2issuestrategy 0.939 0.225 -4.267 
p2disengage 0.612 0.732 0.761 
p2engage 0.163 0.5 0.882 
~p1issuestrategy -1.429 1.045 0.979 
~p1disengage 0.408 0.541 0.696 
~p1engage 0.898 0.629 0.188 
~p2issuestrategy -2.612 1 1 
~p2disengage 0.388 0.543 0.719 
~p2engage 0.837 0.683 0.457 
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Appendix C: Truth Table for Single Party Strategies, Radical Right Vote Share Down 
Pathway ISSUESTRATEGY DISENGAGE ENGAGE OUT n Incl. PRI 
1 0 0 0 0 6 0.666667 0.666667 
2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
3 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 
4 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
5 1 0 0 0 16 0.3125 0.3125 
6 1 0 1 0 7 0.285714 0.285714 
7 1 1 0 0 24 0.208333 0.208333 
8 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
9 2 0 0 0 7 0.428571 0.428571 
10 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
11 2 1 0 0 8 0.375 0.375 
12 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
13 3 0 0 0 38 0.421053 0.421053 
14 3 0 1 0 14 0.5 0.5 
15 3 1 0 0 71 0.183099 0.183099 
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Appendix D: Truth Table for Single Party Strategies, Radical Right Vote Share Up 
Pathway ISSUESTRATEGY DISENGAGE ENGAGE OUT n incl PRI 
1 0 0 0 0 6 0.333333 0.333333 
2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
3 0 1 0 1 4 1 1 
4 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
5 1 0 0 0 16 0.625 0.625 
6 1 0 1 0 7 0.714286 0.714286 
7 1 1 0 0 24 0.541667 0.541667 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 2 0 0 0 7 0.428571 0.428571 
10 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
11 2 1 0 0 8 0.625 0.625 
12 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
13 3 0 0 0 38 0.5 0.5 
14 3 0 1 0 14 0.428571 0.428571 
15 3 1 0 1 71 0.760563 0.760563 
16 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 
        











































































































































































Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishCentre,   
Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_FinnishCentre,   
345 | P a g e  
 
































































347 | P a g e  
 
Appendix E: truth table for two party strategies, radical right vote share down 
 P1ISSUESTRATEGY P1DISENGAGE P1ENGAGE P2ISSUESTRATEGY P2DISENGAGE P2ENGAGE OUT n incl PRI 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
6 0 0 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
7 0 0 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
8 0 0 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
9 0 0 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
10 0 0 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
11 0 0 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
12 0 0 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
13 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 3 1 1 
14 0 0 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
15 0 0 0 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
16 0 0 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
17 0 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
18 0 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
19 0 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
20 0 0 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
21 0 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
22 0 0 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
23 0 0 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
24 0 0 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
25 0 0 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
26 0 0 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
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27 0 0 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
28 0 0 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
29 0 0 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
30 0 0 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
31 0 0 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
32 0 0 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
34 0 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
35 0 1 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
36 0 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
37 0 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
38 0 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
39 0 1 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
40 0 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
41 0 1 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
42 0 1 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
43 0 1 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
44 0 1 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
45 0 1 0 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
46 0 1 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
47 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 2 0 0 
48 0 1 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
49 0 1 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
50 0 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
51 0 1 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
52 0 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
53 0 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
54 0 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
55 0 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
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56 0 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
57 0 1 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
58 0 1 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
59 0 1 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
60 0 1 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
61 0 1 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
62 0 1 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
63 0 1 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
64 0 1 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
65 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
66 1 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
67 1 0 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
68 1 0 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
69 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
70 1 0 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
71 1 0 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
72 1 0 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
73 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0.5 0.5 
74 1 0 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
75 1 0 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
76 1 0 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
77 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 
78 1 0 0 3 0 1 0 5 0.6 0.6 
79 1 0 0 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
80 1 0 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
81 1 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
82 1 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
83 1 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
84 1 0 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
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85 1 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
86 1 0 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
87 1 0 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
88 1 0 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
89 1 0 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
90 1 0 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
91 1 0 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
92 1 0 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
93 1 0 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
94 1 0 1 3 0 1 0 5 0.2 0.2 
95 1 0 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
96 1 0 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
97 1 1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
98 1 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
99 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
100 1 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
101 1 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
102 1 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
103 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 
104 1 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
105 1 1 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
106 1 1 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
107 1 1 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
108 1 1 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
109 1 1 0 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
110 1 1 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
111 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 9 0.22 0.22 
112 1 1 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
113 1 1 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
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114 1 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
115 1 1 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
116 1 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
117 1 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
118 1 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
119 1 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
120 1 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
121 1 1 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
122 1 1 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
123 1 1 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
124 1 1 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
125 1 1 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
126 1 1 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
127 1 1 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
128 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
129 2 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
130 2 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
131 2 0 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
132 2 0 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
133 2 0 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
134 2 0 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
135 2 0 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
136 2 0 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
137 2 0 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
138 2 0 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
139 2 0 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
140 2 0 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
141 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 
142 2 0 0 3 0 1 1 2 1 1 
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143 2 0 0 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
144 2 0 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
145 2 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
146 2 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
147 2 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
148 2 0 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
149 2 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
150 2 0 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
151 2 0 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
152 2 0 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
153 2 0 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
154 2 0 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
155 2 0 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
156 2 0 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
157 2 0 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
158 2 0 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
159 2 0 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
160 2 0 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
161 2 1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
162 2 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
163 2 1 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
164 2 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
165 2 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
166 2 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
167 2 1 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
168 2 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
169 2 1 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
170 2 1 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
171 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 0.5 0.5 
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172 2 1 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
173 2 1 0 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
174 2 1 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
175 2 1 0 3 1 0 0 2 0 0 
176 2 1 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
177 2 1 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
178 2 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
179 2 1 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
180 2 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
181 2 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
182 2 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
183 2 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
184 2 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
185 2 1 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
186 2 1 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
187 2 1 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
188 2 1 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
189 2 1 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
190 2 1 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
191 2 1 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
192 2 1 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
193 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
194 3 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
195 3 0 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
196 3 0 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
197 3 0 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
198 3 0 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
199 3 0 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
200 3 0 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
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201 3 0 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
202 3 0 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
203 3 0 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
204 3 0 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
205 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 8 0.375 0.375 
206 3 0 0 3 0 1 0 2 0.5 0.5 
207 3 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 0.33 0.333 
208 3 0 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
209 3 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
210 3 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
211 3 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
212 3 0 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
213 3 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
214 3 0 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
215 3 0 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
216 3 0 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
217 3 0 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
218 3 0 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
219 3 0 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
220 3 0 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
221 3 0 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
222 3 0 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
223 3 0 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
224 3 0 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
225 3 1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
226 3 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
227 3 1 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
228 3 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
229 3 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
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230 3 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
231 3 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
232 3 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
233 3 1 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
234 3 1 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
235 3 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 
236 3 1 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
237 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 
238 3 1 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
239 3 1 0 3 1 0 0 15 0.2 0.2 
240 3 1 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
241 3 1 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
242 3 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
243 3 1 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
244 3 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
245 3 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
246 3 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
247 3 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
248 3 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
249 3 1 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
250 3 1 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
251 3 1 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
252 3 1 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
253 3 1 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
254 3 1 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
255 3 1 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
256 3 1 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
           
13 Greece_(IndependentGreeks)_17/06/2012_P1(PanhellenicSocialistMovement)_P2(NewDemocracy), 























Italy_(NorthernLeague)_13/04/2008_P1(DemocraticParty)_P2(PeopleofFreedom),   




















































193 Italy_(NorthernLeague)_21/04/1996_P1(DemocraticPartyoftheLeft)_P2(GoItaly)   
 
205 
Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_11/03/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals),   
Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_20/11/2001_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals),   
Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_08/02/2005_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals),   
Denmark_(PeoplesParty)_13/11/2007_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals),   
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Appendix F: truth table for two party strategies, radical right vote share down 
Pathways P1ISSUESTRATEGY P1DISENGAGE P1ENGAGE P2ISSUESTRATEGY P2DISENGAGE P2ENGAGE OUT n incl PRI 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
3 0 0 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
4 0 0 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
6 0 0 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
7 0 0 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
8 0 0 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
9 0 0 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
10 0 0 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
11 0 0 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
12 0 0 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
13 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 
14 0 0 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
15 0 0 0 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
16 0 0 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
17 0 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
18 0 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
19 0 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
20 0 0 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
21 0 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
22 0 0 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
23 0 0 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
24 0 0 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
25 0 0 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
26 0 0 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
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27 0 0 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
28 0 0 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
29 0 0 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
30 0 0 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
31 0 0 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
32 0 0 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
33 0 1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
34 0 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
35 0 1 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
36 0 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
37 0 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
38 0 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
39 0 1 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
40 0 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
41 0 1 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
42 0 1 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
43 0 1 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
44 0 1 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
45 0 1 0 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
46 0 1 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
47 0 1 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 
48 0 1 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
49 0 1 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
50 0 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
51 0 1 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
52 0 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
53 0 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
54 0 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
55 0 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
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56 0 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
57 0 1 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
58 0 1 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
59 0 1 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
60 0 1 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
61 0 1 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
62 0 1 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
63 0 1 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
64 0 1 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
65 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
66 1 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
67 1 0 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
68 1 0 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
69 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
70 1 0 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
71 1 0 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
72 1 0 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
73 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 
74 1 0 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
75 1 0 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
76 1 0 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
77 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 1 1 
78 1 0 0 3 0 1 0 5 0.4 0.4 
79 1 0 0 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
80 1 0 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
81 1 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
82 1 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
83 1 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
84 1 0 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
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85 1 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
86 1 0 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
87 1 0 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
88 1 0 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
89 1 0 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
90 1 0 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
91 1 0 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
92 1 0 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
93 1 0 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
94 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 5 0.8 0.8 
95 1 0 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
96 1 0 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
97 1 1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
98 1 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
99 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
100 1 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
101 1 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
102 1 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
103 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 0.67 0.67 
104 1 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
105 1 1 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
106 1 1 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
107 1 1 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
108 1 1 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
109 1 1 0 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
110 1 1 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
111 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 9 0.56 0.56 
112 1 1 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
113 1 1 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
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114 1 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
115 1 1 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
116 1 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
117 1 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
118 1 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
119 1 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
120 1 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
121 1 1 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
122 1 1 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
123 1 1 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
124 1 1 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
125 1 1 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
126 1 1 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
127 1 1 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
128 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
129 2 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
130 2 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
131 2 0 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
132 2 0 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
133 2 0 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
134 2 0 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
135 2 0 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
136 2 0 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
137 2 0 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
138 2 0 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
139 2 0 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
140 2 0 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
141 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 1 1 
142 2 0 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 
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143 2 0 0 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
144 2 0 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
145 2 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
146 2 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
147 2 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
148 2 0 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
149 2 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
150 2 0 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
151 2 0 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
152 2 0 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
153 2 0 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
154 2 0 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
155 2 0 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
156 2 0 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
157 2 0 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
158 2 0 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
159 2 0 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
160 2 0 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
161 2 1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
162 2 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
163 2 1 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
164 2 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
165 2 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
166 2 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
167 2 1 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
168 2 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
169 2 1 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
170 2 1 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
171 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 0.5 0.5 
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172 2 1 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
173 2 1 0 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
174 2 1 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
175 2 1 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 
176 2 1 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
177 2 1 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
178 2 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
179 2 1 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
180 2 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
181 2 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
182 2 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
183 2 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
184 2 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
185 2 1 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
186 2 1 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
187 2 1 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
188 2 1 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
189 2 1 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
190 2 1 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
191 2 1 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
192 2 1 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
193 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
194 3 0 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
195 3 0 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
196 3 0 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
197 3 0 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
198 3 0 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
199 3 0 0 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
200 3 0 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
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201 3 0 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
202 3 0 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
203 3 0 0 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
204 3 0 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
205 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 8 0.625 0.625 
206 3 0 0 3 0 1 0 2 0 0 
207 3 0 0 3 1 0 0 3 0.67 0.67 
208 3 0 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
209 3 0 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
210 3 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
211 3 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
212 3 0 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
213 3 0 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
214 3 0 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
215 3 0 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
216 3 0 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
217 3 0 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
218 3 0 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
219 3 0 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
220 3 0 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
221 3 0 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
222 3 0 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
223 3 0 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
224 3 0 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
225 3 1 0 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
226 3 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
227 3 1 0 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
228 3 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
229 3 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
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230 3 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
231 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
232 3 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
233 3 1 0 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
234 3 1 0 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
235 3 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 
236 3 1 0 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
237 3 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 
238 3 1 0 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
239 3 1 0 3 1 0 1 15 0.8 0.8 
240 3 1 0 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
241 3 1 1 0 0 0 ? 0 - - 
242 3 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 - - 
243 3 1 1 0 1 0 ? 0 - - 
244 3 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 - - 
245 3 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 - - 
246 3 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 - - 
247 3 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 - - 
248 3 1 1 1 1 1 ? 0 - - 
249 3 1 1 2 0 0 ? 0 - - 
250 3 1 1 2 0 1 ? 0 - - 
251 3 1 1 2 1 0 ? 0 - - 
252 3 1 1 2 1 1 ? 0 - - 
253 3 1 1 3 0 0 ? 0 - - 
254 3 1 1 3 0 1 ? 0 - - 
255 3 1 1 3 1 0 ? 0 - - 
256 3 1 1 3 1 1 ? 0 - - 
 
Cases 
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Appendix G: Full tables for the conservative and parsimonious solutions for a decrease and an increase in the vote share of the radical right. 
As per Chapter 6 - mvQCA: Operationalisation and Results - inclS: inclusion score; PRI: proportional reduction in consistency; covS: coverage score; covU: 




Table 6.2: Conservative solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right 
Pathway Expression inclS PRI covS covU 
1 ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{0}*ENGAGE{1} 1 1 0.013 - 





Table 6.3: Parsimonious solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right 
Pathway Expression inclS PRI covS covU 
1 ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*ENGAGE{1} 1 1 0.013 - 
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Table 6.4: Conservative solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right   
Pathway Expression inclS PRI covS covU 
1 ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1} 0.767 0.767 0.452 0.452 
2 ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1} 1 1 0.008 0.008 
3 ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{0} 1 1 0.032 0.032 
M1  0.782 0.782 0.492 - 
Cases 
1 
Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_SocialDemocraticLabourParty   
Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_21/09/1998_ModerateCoalitionParty   
Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_15/09/2002_ModerateCoalitionParty   
Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_SocialDemocraticLabourParty   
Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_17/09/2006_ModerateCoalitionParty   
Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_SocialDemocraticLabourParty   
Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_ModerateCoalitionParty   
Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_SocialDemocraticParty   
Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_Liberals   
Finland_(TrueFinns)_21/03/1999_NationalCoalition   
Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishSocialDemocrats   
Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_NationalCoalition   
Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_FinnishCentre   
Finland_(TrueFinns)_18/03/2007_FinnishCentre   
Finland_(TrueFinns)_17/04/2011_FinnishCentre   
Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_LiberalReformationParty   
Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/1999_FrancophoneSocialistParty   
Wallonia_(NationalFront)_13/06/2010_ReformMovement   
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats   
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_21/05/1995_ChristianPeople’sParty   
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishSocialistParty   
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats   
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Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish   
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_People’sUnion   
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats   
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_ChristianDemocraticandFlemish   
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_NewFlemishAlliance   
Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_LabourParty   
Netherlands_(ListPimFortuyn)_15/05/2002_ChristianDemocraticAppeal   
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_22/11/2006_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy   
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_LabourParty   
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy   
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_ChristianDemocraticAppeal   
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy   
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_12/09/2012_ChristianDemocraticAppeal   
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_LabourParty   
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy   
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_ChristianDemocraticAppeal   
France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_UnionforFrenchDemocracy   
France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_RallyfortheRepublic   
France_(NationalFront)_09/06/2002_UnionforFrenchDemocracy   
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_SocialistParty   
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_DemocraticMouvement   
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_UnionforaPopularMovement   
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_DemocraticMouvement   
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_RepublicOnwards!   
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_DemocraticMouvement   
France_(NationalFront)_11/06/2017_TheRepublicans   
Greece_(PopularOrthodoxRally)_16/09/2007_NewDemocracy   
Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_22/09/2013_ChristianDemocraticUnion/ChristianSocialUnion   
Germany_(AlternativeforGermany)_24/09/2017_Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union   
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Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty   
Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_AustrianPeople’sParty   
Austria_(FreedomParty)_01/10/2006_AustrianPeople’sParty   
Austria_(FreedomParty)_28/09/2008_AustrianPeople’sParty   
Austria_(FreedomParty)_15/10/2017_AustrianSocialDemocraticParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LabourParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_LiberalDemocrats   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_ConservativeParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LabourParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_LiberalDemocrats   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_ConservativeParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LabourParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_LiberalDemocrats   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_ConservativeParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LabourParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_LiberalDemocrats   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_ConservativeParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_LabourParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_ConservativeParty   
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_08/06/2017_ConservativeParty   
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2012_UnionforaPopularMovement   
Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_RadicalDemocraticParty   
 
2 Switzerland_(PeoplesParty)_21/10/2007_SocialDemocraticPartyofSwitzerland   
 
3 
Wallonia_(NationalFront)_21/05/1995_Ecologists   
Wallonia_(NationalFront)_18/05/2003_ReformMovement   
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_18/05/2003_SocialistPartyDifferent-Spirit   
France_(NationalFront)_25/05/1997_SocialistParty   
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Table 6.5: Parsimonious solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right 
Pathway Expression inclS PRI covS covU 
1 ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*DISENGAGE{1} 1 1 0.032 0.032 
2 ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*DISENGAGE{1} 0.767 0.767 0.452 0.435 
3 DISENGAGE{1}*ENGAGE{1} 1 1 0.024 0.008 




























































































Note: as Table 6.2  
 
 
Table 6.7: Conservative solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies) 
Pathway Expression inclS PRI covS covU 
1 
P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1} 1 1 0.091 0.091 
2 
P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1 1 0.045 0.045 
3 
P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1 1 0.136 0.136 
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Table 6.8: Parsimonious solution for a decrease in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies) 
Pathway Expression inclS PRI covS covU M1 M2 
1 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ENGAGE{1} 1 1 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 
2 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1} 1 1 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
3 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{0} 1 1 0.136 0 0.136 - 
4 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0} 1 1 0.136 0 - 0.136 
 M1 (Pathways 1, 2 and 3) 1 1 0.273 - - - 
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Table 6.9: Conservative solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies) 
Pathway Expression inclS PRI covS covU 
1 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}* 
P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{1} 
1 1 0.041 0.041 
2 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
0.812 0.812 0.265 0.265 
3 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
1 1 0.02 0.02 
4 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
1 1 0.02 0.02 
5 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
1 1 0.041 0.041 
6 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
1 1 0.02 0.02 
7 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{1}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{1}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{1} 
0.8 0.8 0.082 0.082 
8 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
1 1 0.041 0.041 
9 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
1 1 0.041 0.041 
10 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{0}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P2DISENGAGE{0}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
1 1 0.02 0.02 
11 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
1 1 0.02 0.02 
12 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{0}*P1DISENGAGE{1}*P1ENGAGE{0}* 
P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2DISENGAGE{1}*P2ENGAGE{0} 
1 1 0.041 0.041 
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Table 6.10: Parsimonious solution for an increase in the vote share of the radical right (two party strategies) 
Pathway Expression inclS PRI covS covU 
1 P1ENGAGE{1} 0.833 0.833 0.102 0.082 
2 P2ISSUESTRATEGY{0} 1 1 0.061 0.061 
3 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{2} 1 1 0.02 0.02 
4 P1ISSUESTRATEGY{2}*P2ISSUESTRATEGY{3}*P2ENGAGE{0} 1 1 0.082 0.082 
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Sweden_(SwedenDemocrats)_19/09/2010_P1(SocialDemocraticLabourParty)_P2(ModerateCoalitionParty) 
Denmark_(ProgressParty)_11/03/1998_P1(SocialDemocraticParty)_P2(Liberals) 
Finland_(TrueFinns)_16/03/2003_P1(FinnishSocialDemocrats)_P2(NationalCoalition) 
Flanders_(FlemishInterest)_13/06/1999_P1(FlemishSocialistParty)_P2(FlemishLiberalsandDemocrats) 
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_09/06/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy) 
Netherlands_(PartyforFreedom)_15/03/2017_P1(LabourParty)_P2(People’sPartyforFreedomandDemocracy) 
France_(NationalFront)_10/06/2007_P1(SocialistParty)_P2(UnionforaPopularMovement) 
Austria_(FreedomParty)_17/12/1995_P1(AustrianSocialDemocraticParty)_P2(AustrianPeople’sParty) 
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_01/05/1997_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) 
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/06/2001_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) 
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_05/05/2005_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) 
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_06/05/2010_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) 
UnitedKingdom_(UnitedKingdomIndependenceParty)_07/05/2015_P1(LabourParty)_P2(ConservativeParty) 
 
 
